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Abstract 
Canada remains the sole G8 country lacking a national-scale policy and institutional framework for 
funding and planning urban transit projects and operations, largely due to a constitutional division of 
powers granting transit responsibilities to provinces and municipalities. However, Canada’s growing 
municipal infrastructure deficit and the benefits of predictable senior-level transit funding on ridership, 
urban productivity, and equitable mobility observed internationally have led civic organizations, 
scholars, and politicians to advocate for the adoption of such a framework in Canada.  
Rather than develop a “best-case” national-scale framework for urban transit in Canada, this 
thesis focuses on the history of federal involvement in urban transit policy-making. This work begins to 
fill gaps in Canada’s planning and federalism literature about the role of “policy ideas” (referring to the 
organized principles and causal beliefs in which policy alternatives are embedded) in Canada’s urban 
transit “policy regime” (referring to coalitions of actors and institutions from multiple disciplines and 
jurisdictions sharing tangible interests in a complex policy problem). The overarching research question 
asks: How have the policy ideas informing the role of the Government of Canada in Canada’s urban 
transit policy regime changed over time? Via a review of historical literature, components of the policy 
regime in three discrete historical periods are described. These temporal divisions also structure a 
thematic content analysis of 60 documents produced by federal agencies and their representatives. In 
this analysis, the policy ideas invoked by federal agents on the subject of urban transit in Canada from 
1968 to the present are characterized in accordance with a framework developed by Campbell (1998), 
involving paradigms, programs, frames and public sentiments. The specific modes of policy change at 
critical historical junctures in the analysis are also classified in relation to Howlett and Cashore’s (2009) 
framework for understanding policy dynamics. Key findings emerging from this analysis relate to the 
links between the role of paradigmatic ideas and federal policy change; the unintended consequences of 
a capital-funding focus in federal programs; an overriding respect for provincial jurisdiction and priorities 
evidenced in program descriptions and framing statements across analytical periods; and the growing 
influence of municipal actors in federal transit agenda-setting. 
This thesis offers urban planners grappling with transit-related issues insight into the intricacy of 
federal-municipal relations in Canada, an important consideration given the transit priorities of Canada’s 
newly-elected government. It characterizes the conditions under which policy has shifted in the past, 
providing a platform to determine how the federal role might evolve to reflect Canada’s changing 
sociopolitical, economic, and environmental landscapes. Indeed, a number of recommendations 
regarding the appropriate role for the federal government in Canada’s urban transit policy regime are 
presented, including: the creation of a permanent intergovernmental “transit council” with 
responsibility for overseeing long-term federal programs; the establishment of more stringent funding 
criteria to limit political influence on project selection; the development of a system for providing 
ongoing operational support; and the expansion of individual transfers and benefits.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions 
1.1 Urban transit governance issues in contemporary Canadian cities 
Urban transit is a critical component of sustainable city-building. Scholars and public agencies alike have 
long acknowledged transit technologies and services as necessary means to achieve tripartite policy 
goals for sustainability in metropolitan areas, improving mobility in an equitable fashion while reducing 
carbon emissions and fostering the intensification of urban form (Kennedy et al., 2005). In contemporary 
Canadian cities, municipal and provincial planners and policy-makers have made significant long-term 
commitments to enhance transit’s attractiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency. In many of Canada’s 
peer nations, these local efforts receive predictable support from the highest tier of government. In 
Canada, this is not the case. 
Indeed, Canada remains the sole G8 country lacking a national-scale policy and institutional 
framework for funding and planning urban transit projects and operations, providing service-delivery 
agencies with stability and continuity in relation to the funding they receive (Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 2010b; Hjartarson et al., 2011). The benefits of predictable senior-level transit funding on 
ridership, urban productivity, and equitable mobility observed internationally have led numerous civic 
organizations, scholars, and politicians to advocate for the adoption of such a framework in Canada 
(Buehler and Pucher, 2011; Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2011a; Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities, 2007; Hatzopoulou and Miller, 2008; Hjartarson et al., 2011).  
This advocacy stems from increasingly widespread recognition that the fiscal gap faced by 
service-providing provincial and local governments – in the realms of both capital funding and 
operational support – is growing. The absence of stable revenue streams and a clear, consistent policy 
direction has produced a situation in which funding sources for urban transit might cover initial capital 
outlays for the purchase and construction of infrastructure, but often fail to meet long-term operational 
requirements (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2010a; Hjartarson et al., 2011). This problem has 
governance dimensions, as urban regions in Canada grapple with two divergent public-sector trends: the 
need for more regional-scale coordination of transportation and land-use planning (Kennedy et al., 
2005), and a broader movement toward the increased devolution of fiscal responsibilities from higher to 
lower orders of government characterizing the neoliberal public-administrative paradigm (Hatzopoulou 
and Miller, 2008). 
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Unpredictable federal engagement is the reality for many policy sectors in Canada with a “local” 
focus, a direct result of the delineation of responsibilities under the Constitution Act 1982, in which 
provinces are granted sole jurisdiction over the structure and content of municipal governance. Yet the 
Government of Canada possesses the strongest and most flexible fiscal capacity in the Canadian 
federation – the federal “spending power,” a residual constitutional clause designed to facilitate 
intervention in areas external to explicit federal authority via the transfer of funds to individuals and 
institutions (Bakvis, Baier, and Brown, 2009).  
Federal intervention in urban affairs is not without precedent. Structured, long-term 
involvement in municipal governance dates from the late 1960s,1 when the Government of Canada 
initiated a cycle of federal-urban policy development with provinces and municipalities in the context of 
a broader effort to restructure and “rationalize” federal priorities (Langford, 1976; Oberlander and 
Fallick, 1987; Spicer, 2011). The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was the result, existing from 1971 to 
1979 and providing support for provinces and municipalities in various forms – including research and 
resource allocation for transit projects – over its lifespan. Similarly, the Ministry of State for 
Infrastructure and Communities existed briefly from 2005 to 2006, and while this portfolio has since 
been reorganized, recent years have witnessed a resurgent ad hoc and indirect federal role in matters 
pertaining to urban mobility. New programs, committees, and departmental mandates suggest that 
federal engagement in urban transit issues has not remained static over time and continues to shift. 
As such, increasingly vocal and diverse pleas for a major change in policy direction present an 
impetus to investigate the manner by which federal involvement in urban transit policy has changed in 
the past, and by extension, how it may evolve in the future. This justification is further supported by the 
growing salience of the need for more sustainable patterns of mobility within cities in North America. 
Canada’s urban communities have historically relied heavily on public transit for social connectivity and 
economic stability (Perl and Pucher, 1995). However, the automobile has largely determined the form 
and character of these cities in the postwar period, and consequences in the realms of traffic 
congestion, productivity loss, and environmental impacts are growing in severity and prominence on the 
                                                     
1
 The argument can be made that other “urban agendas” were advanced prior to the 1960s, including: the War 
Measures Act following World War I; the Municipal Improvements Act during the Great Depression, and the 
National Housing Act in the aftermath of World War II; however, these programs focused primarily on housing and 
mortgage protection (with some provisions for infrastructure improvements) and did not include an ongoing role 
for the federal government in local affairs (Bakvis et al., 2009; Sancton, 2008). 
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public agenda (Blais, 2010; Walks, 2015a). Addressing the interrelated and difficult problems of 
“automobility” – referring to the physical infrastructure supporting and facilitating car use, as well as 
conditions of social, economic, and cultural reproduction perpetuated by reliance on automobiles 
(Walks, 2015a) – require integrated and coordinated action from all levels of government.  
Urban transit offers at least partial remedy. However, transit interventions are required at a 
scale for which few effective Canadian precedents exist, and at which Canada’s fractious governance 
structure is ill-suited to provide solutions: the metropolitan or regional scale (Anderton, 2010). 
Awareness of the importance of metropolitan transportation governance is growing in Canada – 
Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal each possess institutions structured for this purpose – in tandem 
with the recognition that urban regions constitute Canada’s 21st-century “economic engines” (Hamilton, 
2013). However, these organisations (established, generally, for the purpose of coordinating all modes 
of transportation across non-traditional jurisdictional areas)2 continue to face challenges to varying 
degrees in the realms of service integration and the mobilization of sufficient public and political support 
for transit-supportive initiatives (Hamilton, 2013; Schabas, 2013). It may also be argued that these 
institutional challenges stem from insufficient devolution of powers for revenue-generation and 
decision-making granted by provincial governments. As such, involving all three levels of government in 
this emerging level of transportation governance may reduce the propensity for intergovernmental 
tensions and “finger-pointing”, as well as increase the capacities and effectiveness of these fledgling 
institutions (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2010a; Hjartarson et al., 2011). In this tectonic 
institutional context, establishing an appropriate and long-term role for the federal government remains 
critical. 
Before the research questions underpinning this thesis are delineated, it is important to define 
its core concepts. “Policy” refers to a set of principles defining a course of action taken by an 
organization in relation to a given issue (Birkland, 2014). “Urban transit” refers to transportation 
services operating within a defined urban or metropolitan area which are: available to all who pay fares; 
provided (or regulated) by the public sector; and operate with fixed routes and schedules (Hanson and 
Giuliano, 2004). This definition encompasses all vehicular modes (i.e. buses, metros, light-rail systems, 
bus-rapid networks, commuter rail, etc.) through which these services – as well as the programs and 
                                                     
2
 Note that these agencies arose in distinct historical and institutional contexts within their provinces and urban 
regions; differences in their structures, functions, and purposes of all three are explored in greater depth in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.3.4). 
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mandates executed by vehicles and labour – are delivered in urban areas. The costs of providing these 
services include capital and operational expenditures. Capital expenses include the procurement of 
rolling stock (i.e. trains and buses), as well as land procurement and development costs for terminals, 
stations/stops, and rights-of-way (Guess, 2008; Hanson and Giuliano, 2004). Operational costs include 
fuel, vehicle and facility maintenance, and labour (i.e. employee training, salaries, and benefits) (Guess, 
2008; Hanson and Giuliano, 2004).  
In Canada, fares paid by users of the system contribute primarily to the operational costs of 
transit delivery, while capital costs are typically borne by taxpayers and – increasingly – private partners 
(Sancton, 2015). While “economically-optimal” transit policy would see all users pay the full costs of 
their mobility, Canada’s legacy of public subsidization of  transportation activities; the structural realities 
of “sprawled” urban development; and difficulties in monitoring and recouping non-market costs 
renders this infeasible in the contemporary Canadian context. As such, public investment in and 
subsidization of urban transit is widely viewed as a “second-best” method for the achievement of a 
lower-impact transportation system and more equitable mobility outcomes in Canadian cities (Roschlau, 
2008; Schiller, Bruun, and Kenworthy, 2010). 
1.2 Overview of related research 
It is also pertinent to discuss the means by which previous research (for academic and advocacy 
purposes) has considered the role of Canada’s federal government as a participant in the urban transit 
policy sphere. This section presents research and advocacy from the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities, the Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, and the Canadian Urban Transit Association, as 
well as rationales for these efforts as they relate to this research. 
Transit policy reform is a complex undertaking with many possible formulae for success – the 
wide variety of governance frameworks employed by Canada’s peer nations for transit provision is a 
testament to this fact (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2011c; Transport Canada, 2004). As such, it 
is not clear what form a Canadian national transit policy might take. Canada is a unique country with 
disparate geography and varied transportation needs, as well as a tradition of strong provincial 
autonomy relative to other federal countries. Despite the supposed decentralization of municipal 
funding and policy-making this arrangement entails, federal agencies have played some role in transit 
planning and funding for decades (Perl and Pucher, 1995), and the Government of Canada has been an 
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especially critical player in financing capital investments for transit since the turn of the century (Ruffilli, 
2010). This involvement is increasingly viewed by Canadian mayors, transit advocates, and academics as 
integral to the ability of transit systems to accommodate the population growth many Canadian regions 
are likely to experience by mid-century  (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2007; Roschlau, 2008). 
In recent years, these participants in the urban transit “policy regime”3 have called upon the federal 
government to invoke its aforementioned spending power to supplement existing (largely insufficient) 
transit funding mechanisms. There is little doubt that a long-term, institutionalized solution that 
respects the relative revenue-generating capabilities of each level of government is required, as 
discussed previously. 
Over the course of the past decade, two prominent Canadian advocacy organizations have 
sketched preliminary frameworks for a national transit policy, while another has made repeated calls for 
the transfer of existing international practices to Canada (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2011c; 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2007; Hjartarson et al., 2011). The Canadian Urban Transit 
Association (2011a) (CUTA) has produced a significant volume of research regarding the substance of a 
potential federal urban transit policy, drawing primarily on arrangements from peer nations. Despite the 
introduction of a number of transit-supportive personal tax credits and new federal funding programs 
for municipalities (in which transit is an eligible investment category) toward the end of the 2000s 
(primarily the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund, the Infrastructure Stimulus Fund, the Building 
Canada Fund, and the Green Municipal Fund), CUTA continues to argue for a more stable federal role in 
supporting urban transit in Canada. The organization was particularly vocal during Canada’s 2015 federal 
election campaign, employing imagery and arguments about automobile congestion in major cities to 
sway voters towards more transit-supportive party platforms, and surveying all major political parties on 
plans to address congestion and the growing need for transit infrastructure in urban centres of all sizes 
(Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015d). 
In line with CUTA’s advocacy, the Big City Mayor’s Caucus of the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities (FCM) proposed a “National Transit Strategy” in 2007. Suggested contents include a 
conditional block transfer of $2 billion annually from the federal government to municipalities, requiring 
the demonstrated integration of land-use and transportation planning objectives and strategies by 
                                                     
3
 Referring to coalitions of actors and institutions from multiple disciplines and jurisdictions sharing tangible 
interests in a complex policy problem; this concept is defined and discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2. 
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recipients, as well as the adoption of auditing mechanisms to ensure funds earmarked for transit capital 
investment are spent accordingly (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2007). In addition, the FCM 
proposes the introduction of federal incentives for transit use by individuals (including tax credits), as 
well as financial and staffing support for transit research and development at the municipal level 
(Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2007). Another major component of this proposed strategy 
relates to the provision of different funding “envelopes” for urban regions with populations greater or 
less than 400,000 (Roschlau, 2008). Upon its release, the FCM’s strategy was debated and considered by 
the federal cabinet (Roschlau, 2008), but was not implemented (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 
2011b).  
In a similar vein, the Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation at the University of Toronto released a 
“blueprint” for a national transit policy framework in Canada in 2011, featuring five key elements. These 
include: the creation of a single block transfer with a transparent allocation formula to determine 
recipient cities and transit agencies; reliance upon equitable formulaic inputs in the form of ridership, 
congestion, and capital requirements; long-term, stable funding horizons; deference to existing 
provincial accountability arrangements and the absence of onerous reporting requirements to federal 
agents; and the transfer of complete allocative discretion to regional transportation governance bodies  
(Hjartarson et al., 2011). The Mowat Centre echoes the concerns of the FCM in some regards while 
advancing the substance of its proposal in a number of areas – chiefly in the addition of nuance to the 
application of a funding formula, while acknowledging the need to include regional bodies in transit 
planning and delivery and retaining a significant role for provinces (Hjartarson et al., 2011). 
1.3 Introduction to the research questions 
Given the substance and multiplicity of these proposals, this research does not attempt to further 
develop a “best-case” national-scale framework for urban transit in Canada based on international 
exemplars or sweeping recommendations about constitutional reform. Instead, this thesis focuses on 
the history of urban transit policy-making at the federal level in Canada, examining the political and 
economic forces that have shaped the action (and inaction) of the Government of Canada in this policy 
sphere. Characterizing the conditions under which policy has shifted in the past provides a platform to 
determine ways in which it might evolve in the future to reflect Canada’s changing sociopolitical, 
economic, and environmental landscapes.  
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To better understand evolution and change within discrete policy sectors, scholars often aim to 
understand a given set of “policy dynamics,” referring to historical patterns of stability and instability 
within evolving institutional environments. Traditionally, policy dynamics have been characterised as a 
“homeostatic” process, in which long periods of stability in policy goals and the instruments for their 
achievement (ends and means, respectively) are punctuated by “perturbations” caused by the 
encroachment of external influences on closed institutional systems (Henstra, 2011; Howlett and 
Cashore, 2009). However, this characterisation has been called into question by some scholars: there is 
a movement to better capture the diverse and contextual nature of policy change through the 
expansion of policy-dynamic typologies in the literature. For instance, there is growing recognition that 
so-called “policy ideas” may influence institutional decision-making as much as traditional modes of 
change, including external pressures (i.e. macroeconomic forces such as globalization).  
“Policy ideas” refer here to the organized principles and causal beliefs in which policy 
alternatives are embedded, which may be internal to a society or policy domain, or adopted (or 
adapted) from elsewhere (Béland, 2005; Campbell, 1998). In the age of the automobile in North 
America, one example is the “intuitive” positive relationship between investment in highway 
infrastructure (rather than competing modes of mass transportation) and economic growth, a notion 
that pervaded urban and regional planning throughout much of the 20th century (Vuchic, 1999). Policy 
ideas, in the context of Canadian urban transit, are used in this research as a vehicle to investigate the 
reasoning behind specific political actions at pivotal historical junctures. 
1.4 Research questions 
The primary objective of this thesis is to inform and further the debate over appropriate governmental 
roles in the financing, planning, and provision of urban transit in Canada. Constitutional responsibilities 
were established when Canada was a “largely agrarian society” (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987); since 
then, the scope and scale of urban issues have evolved in line with other developments in technology, 
society, and the economy. It follows that governance structures might require adaptation to meet the 
transportation priorities of an increasingly urban society. In light of the aforementioned shortcomings of 
urban transit governance in Canada, and with the analytical starting point of policy ideas firmly located, 
a central research question emerges: 
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- Primary research question: How have the policy ideas informing the role of the Government 
of Canada in Canada’s urban transit policy regime changed over time?  
Sub-questions emerging from this line of inquiry include: 
- Sub-question 1: How has the federal government’s role in the Canadian urban transit 
“policy regime” shifted from 1968-2015, and in response to what “triggering” factors (in the 
context of the policy regime’s ideas, issues, institutions, and interests)? 
- Sub-question 2: How have urban transit policy ideas (paradigms, programs, frames, and 
public sentiments) invoked by the federal government in public policy documents changed 
from 1968-2015? 
- Sub-question 3: How might the federal government modify its role in order to improve 
transit policy-making and services in Canadian cities? 
In short, this thesis aims to assess the contributions of ideas espoused by Canada’s federal 
government to contemporary Canadian urban transit policy, a landscape characterised today by delayed 
investment in transit infrastructure and operations (Moore, Sachgau Les Perreaux, and Mason, 2015); 
shifting political coalitions at various geographical and institutional scales regarding the form and 
content of transportation investments (Steinberg, 2013); and the socioeconomic backdrop of significant 
congestion-driven productivity losses in major urban centres (Dachis, 2011). Perhaps most importantly, 
the research explores, based on historical precedents and insights, how the role of the federal 
government within the policy regime might change in order to support the provision of more effective 
transit service delivery in Canadian cities. In order to move from analysis to recommendations, the 
findings of the literature review, analysis, and discussion related to both policy dynamics and ideas are 
integrated – as such, recommendations reflect applicable concepts from the literature, shortcomings of 
previous federal efforts, and the interests of other members of the policy regime. 
1.5 Research objectives and significance 
As discussed throughout this chapter, the impetus for this research derives primarily from the growing 
political appetite for an urban transit policy shift – in many Canadian cities and provinces, attempts to 
decide upon new funding and planning arrangements for urban transportation options are well 
underway (Moore et al., 2015), and Canada’s recent federal election featured infrastructure, urban 
transit, and congestion as key themes (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015d). The global 
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environmental context also necessitates a transformative approach to transportation, and more 
broadly, energy policy. Decreasing fossil fuel reserves (over the long term) and concomitant concerns 
over energy prices suggest a need to reduce dependence on personal automobiles. More pressingly, the 
need to intensify human settlement patterns to reduce the environmental and socioeconomic impacts 
of urban sprawl and automobility on urban quality of life and productivity is growing in salience (Blais, 
2010).  
However, the significance of this research does not derive from the support it might provide to a 
given policy agenda. A great deal of research exists to explain the contemporary urban transportation 
hierarchy in Canadian cities (i.e. the primacy of the automobile), much of which is referenced in Chapter 
3, and numerous attempts to sketch a national transit framework have also been made (section 1.3). 
This thesis does not attempt to duplicate these studies – rather, it attempts to integrate the historical 
and causal factors influencing transit policy evolution with the systematic examination of policy ideas, 
discerned through a thematic content analysis of policy documents explicating federal attitudes toward 
urban transit over time. 
To urban planning, both as a profession and an academic discipline, this thesis offers a number 
of insights. Planners in Canadian cities over the last 20 years have made concerted efforts to improve 
the coordination of transit and land-use planning processes; however, transit-supportive community 
visions found in municipal planning documents have often met significant resistance (Blais, 2010). Many 
of these obstacles relate to a dearth of funding support and political capital (at all levels of government), 
areas in which the federal government is well-placed in the Canadian institutional hierarchy to 
contribute. However, the planning and political science literature remain largely silent on the subject of 
federal involvement in urban transit: while Spicer (2010, 2011) has conducted seminal inquiries into the 
formal mechanisms of federal intervention in urban affairs over time; Young and McCarthy (2009) have 
explored municipal issues and federal agenda-setting; and Stoney and Graham (2009) have investigated 
the dynamism of the federal-municipal organizational landscape, there is very little research in the 
Canadian planning and political science literature analyzing federal interest and action in relation to 
other governments on the subject of urban transit. More specifically, there have been no attempts to 
characterize urban transit policy ideas in Canada, particularly those expressed by a non-traditional actor 
in the policy sphere (i.e. the Government of Canada). However, given that the influence of policy ideas is 
often “hidden” (Béland, 2005; Campbell, 1998), this is perhaps unsurprising. As such, this thesis analyzes 
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urban transit policy ideas in Canada from 1968-2015 – with an emphasis on the activities and outputs of 
federal involvement – in order to fill this informational gap. This analytical component represents this 
work’s most valuable contribution to planning and federalism literature in Canada, although the 
recommendations also present substantive means by which the federal role in urban transit might be 
reconsidered in light of evidence from Canadian history. 
While the recommendations relate primarily to the ways in which higher-order governments 
might more effectively deal with lower orders, it offers urban planners grappling with transit-related 
issues evidence-based insight into the intricacy of federal-municipal relations in Canada, and attempts to 
fill a gap in Canadian planning and political science literature surrounding the character of federal 
involvement in municipal affairs in relation to a specific policy issue.  
1.6 Summary of the introduction 
This chapter introduced the contemporary state of urban transit in Canada, and literature was reviewed 
regarding recent attempts to articulate a revised role for the federal government in urban transit policy. 
The avenues of inquiry through which this research is carried out (involving both policy dynamics and 
policy ideas) were then outlined, and specific research questions posed. Lastly, motivations for and the 
significance of this research were presented.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the methods applied in 
the analysis, including theoretical underpinnings, data collection strategies, and interpretive methods. 
Chapter 3 serves as a literature review of urban transit in Canada, with an eye to providing the reader 
with useful context: it outlines three discrete periods in Canadian history with reference to scholarly and 
grey literature, providing a narrative of the federal government’s changing role in urban transit from 
1968 to 2015 (which is separated into three discrete historical period of analysis). Chapter 4 presents 
the results of a qualitative, thematic content analysis of federal policy documents on the subject of 
urban transportation over the historical periods in question, undertaken with the assistance of analytical 
software (QSR NVivo 11). The dominant themes and ideas emerging from federal transportation policy 
documents are explored and discussed in relation to each discrete period. Chapter 5 compares the 
evolution of policy ideas over time, and classifies the modes by which federal policy change has 
occurred. From this discussion, four key findings are presented. Finally, Chapter 6 offers five substantive 
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policy recommendations in light of these findings and provides concluding thoughts. In Chapters 5 and 
6, the research questions are explicitly addressed and resolved as fully as the analysis permits.  
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Chapter 2: Methods of Analysis in Policy-Idea Research 
2.1 Introduction to the methods 
This chapter provides a roadmap for the analysis of policy ideas conducted subsequently, outlining the 
study’s theoretical and methodological underpinnings. Its purpose is to introduce the specific concepts 
and procedures involved in the identification and interpretation of policy ideas, carried out through a 
thematic content analysis of federal policy documents on the subject of urban transit in Chapter 4. This 
chapter also describes the framework in which the structured, historical literature review is nested, 
situating the examination of policy ideas in its appropriate theoretical context (Chapter 3).  
The chief objective of the research – to determine how the Government of Canada’s policy ideas 
have evolved from 1968 to the present vis-à-vis urban transit – is underpinned by two interrelated 
methods. First, to describe how the federal role in the broader policy community has shifted, historical 
literature is reviewed, identifying relevant actors, pivotal policy decisions, and developments in global 
politics and economics in order to provide insight into the divergent circumstances of three distinct 
temporal periods (described in 2.1.1). Second, the content of relevant government documents is 
analyzed via a “directed” technique (section 2.3), categorizing the urban transit policy ideas articulated 
by the Government of Canada over time, and characterizing the nature of policy change in accordance 
with guiding theoretical frameworks (outlined in section 2.1.2). The specific character of policy dynamics 
and ideas over time are then discussed in order to resolve the research questions. Finally, policy 
recommendations to improve intergovernmental roles and responsibilities for urban transit (i.e. best 
practices in policy “machinery”) are developed, based on the preceding analysis. Table 1 provides a brief 
overview of the linkages between this study’s research questions (identified in Chapter 1) and methods. 
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Table 1: An overview of the conceptual linkages between the research questions and the analytical methods 
employed in their investigation.  
Primary research question: How have the policy ideas supporting and informing the role of the Government 
of Canada in Canada’s urban transit policy regime changed from 1968-2015?  
Research sub-questions (SQs): Method applied: 
SQ1: How has the federal government’s role in the 
Canadian urban transit “policy regime” shifted from 
1968-2015, and in response to what “triggering” 
factors (in the context of the policy regime’s ideas, 
issues, interests, and institutions)? 
 
Literature review (Chapter 3): Historical literature 
review of urban transit in Canada is reviewed; 
depictions of “policy regimes” are constructed for 
each analytical period.  
SQ2: How have urban transit policy ideas (paradigms, 
programs, frames, and public sentiments) invoked by 
the federal government in public policy documents 
changed from 1968-2015? 
Content analysis (Chapter 4): Thematic content 
analysis of formal policy documents from federal and 
intergovernmental bodies on the subject of urban 
transit over each historical period is undertaken, with 
references to the framework developed by Campbell 
(1998). A directed coding strategy is applied in the 
analysis, involving thematic and open coding 
processes.  
Discussion (Chapter 5): The specific nature of policy change observed in each transition between historical 
periods is characterized in accordance with the framework developed by Howlett and Cashore (2009) to 
address SQ1; the findings of the content analysis are discussed in-depth to resolve SQ2. 
SQ3: How might the federal government modify its 
role in Canada’s urban transit policy regime order to 
improve transit policy-making and services in 
Canadian cities? 
Conclusions and policy recommendations (Chapter 
6): Based on the analysis and discussion, means by 
which the federal government’s role in the urban 
transit policy regime might be amended are 
proposed.  
Upon this foundation, the chapter proceeds as follows. First, the orienting theoretical constructs 
supporting the line of qualitative inquiry employed in this work are made explicit, outlining the 
importance of ideas in understanding the formation and dynamics of “policy regimes,” as well as the 
epistemological origins of qualitative policy analysis in the realm of historical institutionalism (these 
concepts are defined in the following sections). The process of data collection involved in obtaining an 
appropriate analytical sample of documents for use in the thematic content analysis is then described – 
this includes the delineation of search procedures, terms, and databases, as well as the criteria used in 
selecting documents for inclusion in the analysis. Finally, a detailed overview of the systematic processes 
of document “coding” and interpretation used to derive key findings are described. This research is 
exploratory, meaning that its objective is to establish conceptual understanding around a problem that 
has not been clearly defined by and by which explanatory (or causal) relationships have not yet emerged 
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(Bhattacherjee, 2012). As such, the methods have been chosen for their ability to balance systematic 
analytical procedures with a flexible interpretative process. 
Before proceeding with a discussion of theoretical and methodological constructs, however, it is 
important to briefly explain why content analysis was chosen over other qualitative methods of inquiry 
(such as semi-structured interviews, grounded theory, etc.) for the purposes of this research. 
Pragmatism is one reason – the historical nature of the work makes locating participants easier for more 
recent time periods than others, so content analysis provides a level analytical playing field for all three 
eras. Secondly, while some documents may be criticized as “speculative” about ideal policy alternatives 
or non-reflective of the policy outcomes observed in reality, this is an inalienable aspect of the content-
analytical approach: the documentary inputs involved in this study provide “snapshots” of the views and 
biases of government actors and departments at specific historical junctures (Hammond and Wellington, 
2013). As such, the sample does not reflect hindsight biases and other factual discrepancies which may 
arise when events being recalled by interview participants took place many years prior; documents are 
analyzed for their “interpretive” (or contextual) meaning, rather than their literal depiction of historical 
events (Hammond and Wellington, 2013; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). In addition, content analysis is 
appropriate for this work because existing theories of policy change are well-established in the literature 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), providing the researcher with significant analytical and theoretical guidance.  
There is also significant deductive value in document analysis via the use of a “directed” 
content-analytical approach (defined in section 2.2) (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Through a review of 
federal documents over time, the intention is to compare and contrast narratives present in the 
literature (reviewed in Chapter 3) with the ways in which these issues, stakeholder perspectives, and 
policy alternatives have been portrayed by the Government of Canada (outlined in Chapter 4). As a 
traditional background actor in the field of urban transit, there are likely to be key differences between 
these “metanarratives” (Van Eeten, 2007) which may be informative in identifying avenues for 
realigning and improving intergovernmental relationships and objectives. This final element is 
elaborated upon in section 2.4. 
This is not to say, however, that this research construct is without limitations. The drawbacks 
and inferential limits of the content-analytical approach are discussed in detail in section 2.5. 
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2.2 Orienting theoretical perspectives 
Broadly considered, this thesis applies an overarching theoretical lens of political economy to the 
evaluation of urban transportation in the Canadian federation. As defined by Weingast and Wittman 
(2006), political economy “refers to interdisciplinary studies drawing upon economics, law, and political 
science in explaining how political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system … 
influence each other” (p. 39). In the context of policy analysis, this orienting perspective contends that 
public authorities and the goods they administer (including urban transit services) arise through a 
constant process of bargaining among state and societal actors in formal and informal political venues 
(Gaudry, 1997). In other words, political economy acknowledges the importance of context in 
understanding historical, contemporary, and possible future institutional arrangements and policy 
decisions. As such, institutions are conceptualized as amenable to change in tandem with intertwined 
political and economic landscapes over both the short and long term (Peters, 2012; Weingast and 
Wittman, 2006). 
While political economy is a useful lens through which to conceptualize the origins and 
implications of Canadian transit policy and funding arrangements from a macro-level, more specific 
subsets of this theoretical family are better-suited to the study of policy change over time. These include 
attention to formation and change within the Canadian urban transit “policy regime” (in the case of the 
literature review), and the application of a theoretical lens of historical institutionalism (in the 
evaluation of policy ideas via content analysis). 
2.2.1 Policy regime theory and structured literature review 
In order to grasp the reasons behind specific urban transit policy choices made by Canada’s federal 
government and chart the evolution of ideas within this realm, the historical patterns of governance 
within the broader policy community (including provincial and municipal governments, civil society, and 
private actors) must first be delineated. Theories of “policy networks” have been traditionally invoked in 
historical policy studies of this nature (i.e. Craft et al., 2013; Henstra, 2011), referring to the linkages and 
interdependencies between groups of stakeholders on a particular issue, typically featuring “significant 
stability in their interactions, ... patterns of expectation and predictability in this behaviour, [and] some 
common values”  (Peters, 2012, p. 119). However, policy networks do not allow researchers to 
“understand the ebbs and flows of policy over time,” in that they focus on regularized interactions and 
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omit explanations for policy change (Birkland, 2014, p. 158). As such, this research applies a 
contemporary theoretical alternative to the policy network known as “policy regime theory”, which is 
well-suited to “boundary-spanning” problems where a single, clear policy community does not exist, 
despite the presence of similar goals (Birkland, 2014). This framework supposes that actors from various 
policy “subsystems” (referring to coalitions of organisations with an active interest in a particular policy 
problem) influence the manner in which an aspect of the public interest is characterized, studied, and 
addressed; however, actors within these subsystems may have disparate interests and objectives that 
complicate policy-making (Jochim and May, 2010). As such, the full expanse of subsystems – or the 
policy regime – involved in the public discourse ought to be considered in complex and dynamic policy 
areas (Henstra, 2015; Jochim and May, 2010). Policy regimes contain power relationships among a 
variety of governmental and non-governmental actors; a dominant paradigm through which problems 
and solutions are articulated; and well-established institutional arrangements mediating power relations 
(Birkland, 2014). 
While these elements generally resist change, stability in the policy regime is said to be 
disrupted when factors become conducive to change – i.e. alternative paradigms arise, crises of political 
legitimacy occur, or other factors converge to undermine the dominant policy narrative (these might 
include cumulative demographic shifts, technological changes, the emergence of successful policy 
solutions internationally, etc.) (Cohen-Vogel and McLendon, 2009). In other words, a “trigger” event 
initiates a response or call for greater action from society (i.e. in the form of activism or research), which 
necessitates a shift in how the problem is conceived of and addressed by the political apparatus – 
however, these “triggers” can be conceptualized in many ways, an aspect of the broader theoretical 
framework for policy-idea analysis discussed in greater depth in the following section (2.1.2).4 Policy 
regime theory emphasizes the importance of diverse actors operating at different scales, “mov[ing] us 
closer to realizing that groups, interests, and ideas are central to thinking about how group politics is 
organized” (Birkland, 2014, p. 158).  
In Canada, urban transit meets the criteria for conceptualization as a policy regime. Multiple 
disciplines, jurisdictions, and actors from across the nation share broadly-similar policy goals (i.e. to 
effectively and efficiently deliver public mandates for transit connectivity) and grapple with similar 
                                                     
4
 Recall that the ways in which ideas within the urban transit policy regime have changed is the primary focus of 
the content analysis – however, it is important to establish a framework for the literature review that is wholly 
compatible with the manner in which policy ideas will be subsequently interpreted. 
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problems in the course of realizing these objectives (i.e. inadequate infrastructure, limited and sporadic 
funding, the entrenchment of automobile culture, etc.). Despite these similarities, there is little 
“regularized” interaction among stakeholders at the national scale (Roschlau, 2008) or consensus about 
how best to provide services and redress transit issues (Hjartarson, Szala, and Hinton, 2011). For 
example: one subsystem may be concerned with enhancing social equity by improving access to services 
(i.e. civil society), while others may be concerned primarily with improving the financial sustainability of 
transit agencies (i.e. municipal and provincial governments). Policy interventions preferred by each of 
these subsystems may stand in opposition to one another (i.e. lower vs. higher fares; higher levels of 
subsidization vs. greater privatization). Policy regime theory is viewed as particularly appropriate in the 
study of urban politics (Jochim and May, 2010), given the wide range of government actors, private 
interests, and grassroots organisations involved in local governance. 
Aspects of the policy regime framework amenable to assessment include issues (referring to the 
broader political, economic, and social forces causing a problem to rise on the public agenda, as well as 
the range of proposed policy solutions), institutions (the formal and informal organizations and 
mechanisms through which political agents affect or attempt to affect change), interests (the agendas 
held by these institutional actors), and ideas (the common or divergent objectives and proposals of 
participants) (Henstra, 2015; Jochim and May, 2010; Peters, 2012). This research emphasises ideas  – 
which Béland (2005) argues are generally understudied, and Taylor and Eidelman (2010) suggest have 
been largely absent from urban-Canadian political science discourse – at a discrete level of the 
governance hierarchy (i.e. the national or federal scale). However, to provide context for the ideas and 
subsequent policy choices made by the federal government, the literature review is structured to 
identify the issues, institutions, and specific interests involved in the full expanse of Canada’s urban 
transit policy regime over time, in recognition of the fact that historical events and the corresponding 
interests of all relevant actors in the policy regime have shaped federal action (and inaction) (Béland, 
2005; Campbell, 1998). 
Relevant scholarly and grey literature on the subject of Canadian transit policy is reviewed in 
Chapter 3, with the intention of conveying a narrative depiction of the evolution of the urban transit 
policy regime from the late 1960s (when formal federal engagement with provincial and municipal 
governments on urban issues began in earnest) to the present. In order to organise this information, the 
history of Canadian urban transit policy is conceptualized in three distinct time periods, with reference 
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to the issues, institutions, and interests involved in each – the final element of the policy regime 
framework, ideas, are explored in detail for all three historical periods in Chapter 4 via content analysis.  
Discrete policy periods are used to help the researcher make sense of the factors influencing 
policy change by situating occurrences in their appropriate historical contexts. These analytical periods 
were chosen following a review of seminal texts on the subject of federal-urban relations in Canada (e.g. 
(Langford, 1976; Oberlander and Fallick, 1987; Spicer, 2010, 2011; Stoney and Graham, 2009; Young and 
McCarthy, 2009) and prior to undertaking structured data collection for the literature review and 
content analysis (section 2.2). Note that these periods are not uniform in length – however, the 
temporal divisions were chosen carefully, and for a number of reasons. First, the “starting point” of 1968 
corresponds with the election of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, and more generally approximates the 
establishment of a new public-administrative climate in Canada following the MacPherson Commission 
of the early 1960s (in which the federal transportation portfolio was dramatically reorganized) and the 
Glassco Commission of the late 1960s, in which a revamped approach to public administration was 
adopted throughout the federal public service in response to perceived inefficiencies and the growing 
complexity of federal responsibilities (Langford, 1976; Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). Stemming from 
these administrative reforms was a significant shift in federal priorities – more specifically, growing 
salience of urban issues and advocacy for a more prominent federal role from a number of stakeholders 
led to the creation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs in 1971, giving the federal government a 
formal avenue into urban policy-making for the first time in Canadian history (Spicer, 2011). In short, 
this was a period of great transformation in federal-urban relations. The global political landscape was 
also supportive of this interventionist governance style: while Keynesianism was waning significantly, it 
was still widely viewed as the purview of central governments to “rationalize” and coordinate the 
activities of all members of the policy community (Langford, 1976). 
The second period of analysis began in 1980 with the dissolution of the Ministry of State for 
Urban Affairs, which Spicer (2010) suggests ended the “first wave” of federal urban policy development 
in Canada. This period is considered to have persisted until 2001, as the principles of supply-side 
economics, new public management, and alternative service delivery came into vogue (and stagnated) 
in tandem with a broader movement toward neoliberalism (synonymous, ostensibly, with today’s 
“conservatism” or neo-conservatism) throughout Western democracies (Savoie, 2010). This political tide 
aimed to reduce (in theory) the scale and scope of government and reduce regulations for the private 
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sector, particularly at the national level (Savoie, 2010). In this period, there was relatively little federal 
engagement with urban transit issues – indeed, both the literature review and content analysis illustrate 
that conceptions of the role and importance of urban transit during these years were very different than 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The third and final period corresponds with the revival of federal support for transit’s capital 
expenditures in 20025 (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2009); it also loosely approximates the 
advent of the short-lived Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities and includes the 
institutions and programs introduced by the administrations of Prime Ministers Paul Martin and Stephen 
Harper for dedicated transit funding (Urban Transportation Task Force, 2010). While both Liberal and 
Conservative governments were in power over this decade’s span, the manners by which urban transit 
issues have been approached by federal departments share some commonalities (i.e. program design, 
criteria for project eligibility, etc.) in line with changing political sentiments and emergent urban and 
environmental issues in the 21st century. Recession politics and a “rekindling” of Keynesian 
infrastructure investment followed the global financial crisis of 2008, with implications for the role of 
urban transit in Canadian cities. While the timing of this thesis is too early to assess Canada’s most 
recently-elected federal government’s influence on urban transit, the platform upon which the Liberal 
Party was elected (by a significant majority) in 2015 – and the significant role for infrastructure funding 
featured in the budget of Spring 2016 (Government of Canada, 2016) – suggests that Canada may be 
witness to greater integrated involvement of the federal government in urban transit issues in coming 
years (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015d).  
2.2.2 Theories of policy ideas and content analysis 
As discussed, this thesis’ primary method of analysis involves the aggregation of a sample of publicly-
focused policy documents produced by Canada’s federal government in order to assess the degree to 
which policy ideas have evolved and affected the trajectory of Canadian transit policy dynamics at the 
national level. For the purposes of this analysis, a subset of political-economic theory known as historical 
                                                     
5
 Note that Roschlau (2008) argues transit issues rose on the national agenda as early as 1998; however, for the 
purposes of this thesis, 2002 has been chosen as the boundary between two eras primarily because formal federal 
initiatives with a distinct urban lens were undertaken at that time (i.e. the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on 
Urban Issues, the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities, etc.) (Spicer, 2010). Note, however, that 
the temporal boundaries applied in this thesis are best viewed as approximate, given the impossibility of 
identifying the exact moment of change within a policy sphere (Hall, 1993). 
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institutionalism possesses great utility in understanding and explaining policy ideas. This theory is 
predicated on the notion that institutions (referring here to organizations, statutes, regulations, and 
customs) and “policy legacies” (policy decisions made in the past and influencing present policy and 
legislation) structure the decision-making of political actors, constraining or enabling the consideration 
and feasibility of various policy alternatives (for example, transit-supportive versus auto-centric 
programming) (Béland, 2005; Campbell, 1998). Historical institutionalism suggests the range of 
acceptable political outcomes within a given society and in a particular policy arena – or policy regime 
(e.g. urban transit) – depends greatly upon the inertia of past decisions and the interests of prominent 
decision-makers in society (Campbell, 1998). The interactions of these two phenomena normalize 
processes and outcomes through a constructivist process of policy feedback, resulting in “path 
dependence,” or the continuation of a pre-existing policy direction (Peters, 2012).  
While this theoretical perspective meshes well with the conceptualization of policy regimes, 
scholars agree that historical institutionalism in application encounters issues similar to those explored 
in the previous section regarding the differences between policy networks and regimes. Employed 
singly, historical institutionalism does a suitable job describing processes ex-post – it is especially 
supportive of Lindblom’s (1959) incrementalism – yet fails two critical litmus tests. Primarily, historical 
institutionalism is ill-suited to the explanation of policy change, in terms of elucidating the reasons 
underlying gradual policy evolution and eventual paradigm shifts (Campbell, 1998; Peters, 2012). 
Additionally, the means by which institutions are established – or the manner by which society’s 
normative constraints in a particular area become engrained in the psyches of both decision-makers and 
publics – has traditionally been absent from historical-institutional analysis (Campbell, 1998). In essence, 
historical institutionalism, much like policy-network theory, has been criticized for being overly and 
overtly deterministic (Béland, 2005). As such, two additional considerations must be made in order to 
validate its use as a theoretical girder of the content analysis.  
First, to address historical institutionalism’s difficulty in explaining policy change, the analytical 
framework employed in this research adopts a conceptual perspective on policy dynamics departing 
from the simplistic – albeit entrenched – view that policy exists and persists in a state of “punctuated 
equilibrium,” in which path dependence is broken only by infrequent exogenous “triggering” or 
“focusing” events (i.e. changing national or global political or economic conditions; this is known as 
“homeostatic” change) or through a gradual (or incremental) process of social learning in which 
 21 
essential policy structures remain unaltered (Campbell, 1998; Henstra, 2011; Howlett and Cashore, 
2009; Peters, 2012; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 2007). These varieties of policy change undoubtedly exist – 
for instance, homeostatic policy change occurred in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 in New York City, wherein the United States government leveraged the newly-developed “culture 
of fear” to legitimize actions in the realms of domestic security and foreign policy that would have 
previously been politically unacceptable (Birkland, 2004; Matsaganis and Payne, 2005). Incremental 
change, on the other hand, was most famously defined by Lindblom (1959) in describing slow, 
piecemeal organizational and procedural change within large bureaucracies in response to resource, 
time, and expertise constraints.  
However, there is a greater diversity of policy-change scenarios observed in reality. To provide 
for this range of circumstances, an expanded taxonomy of policy change is described by Howlett and 
Cashore (2009). First, however, it is useful to define the six major components of policy. These range 
from a high level of abstraction to the minutiae of specific regulatory requirements. Goals, objectives, 
and settings comprise the three aspects of policy “ends” (or aims), while the “means” (or tools) by which 
policy is implemented involve instrument logics, mechanisms, and calibrations. Definitions and examples 
for each of these are also provided by Howlett and Cashore (2009), and can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2: A taxonomy of policy components relevant to the evaluation of policy change (adapted from Howlett and 
Cashore, 2009, p. 39, Figure 1). 
Level of 
abstraction 
High-level abstraction Program-level 
operationalization 
Specific on-the-ground 
measures 
Policy content 
Policy ends (or 
aims) 
Goals: What general types 
of ideas govern policy 
development?  
 
E.g. environmental 
protection, economic 
development 
Objectives: What does 
policy aim to formally 
address?  
 
E.g. saving wilderness or 
species habitat, 
increasing harvesting 
levels to create 
processing jobs 
Settings: What are the 
specific “on-the-ground” 
requirements of policy? 
 
 E.g. considerations about the 
optimal size of designated 
riparian zones, or sustainable 
harvesting levels 
Policy focus 
Policy means (or 
tools) 
Instrument logic: What 
general norms guide 
implementation 
preferences? 
 
 E.g. preferences for the use 
Mechanisms: What 
specific types of 
instruments are used?  
 
E.g. the use of different 
tools such as tax 
Calibrations: In what specific 
ways are instruments used?  
 
E.g. designations of higher 
levels of subsidies, the use of 
mandatory vs. voluntary 
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of coercive instruments vs. 
moral suasion 
incentives, public 
enterprises, public-
private partnerships, etc.  
regulatory standards 
In addition to homeostatic and incremental change, policy paradigms can also shift “neo-
homeostatically” (wherein goals shift gradually in response to small changes in policy settings until the 
original goals of the policy are no longer recognizable) – an example is found in Canada’s national 
agricultural policy landscape, in which federal assistance to farmers was rolled back to such a degree 
that market-oriented policy goals and state retrenchment had replaced the maintenance of Canadian 
farmers’ economic status as the sector’s dominant policy goal by the early 1990s (Coleman et al., 1996). 
Policy change may also be “quasi-homeostatic” (in which broad goals remain stable but objectives 
change over time in response to factors external to a government or society), as was the case in “lesson-
drawing” efforts made in many Western nations in the 1980s, as market-oriented strategies from the 
international community were incorporated into existing welfare programs, resulting in a shift from 
“welfare” to “workfare” policy (Rose, 1991). Lastly, “thermostatic” policy change (in which goals are set 
very broadly, allowing for paradigmatic change as policy objectives and settings evolve incrementally) 
may occur, as in forestry policy for public lands in the United States’ Pacific Northwest, in which existing 
institutions remained unchanged, but paradigmatic change in logging practices was prompted by 
growing scientific and civil awareness to protect endangered species: as a result, the nature of the 
industry was drastically altered (i.e. a paradigm shift from conservation- to preservation-focused 
management took place) (Cashore and Howlett, 2007; Howlett and Cashore, 2009). 
While the short-term modes of change in these three examples are undoubtedly incremental, 
the major policy shifts which took place in each instance are not well-explained by purely homeostatic 
or incremental means. In line with this framework (and in order to triangulate the findings of the 
structured literature review and content analysis), this research classifies and describes the modes of 
policy change characterizing the two transitions (in the late 1970s and early 2000s) between the three 
historical eras in Canada’s urban transit policy regime in Chapter 5. This taxonomy is captured fully in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3: A broad taxonomy of policy change (adapted from summaries of Cashore and Howlett, 2007; Coleman et 
al., 1996; Howlett and Cashore, 2009; Lindblom, 1959; Rose, 1991). 
Type of policy 
change 
Explanation Exemplar 
Homeostatic “Punctuated equilibrium”; policy goals 
change only in response to discrete “trigger” 
events 
Terror attacks of September 11, 
2001spark dramatic change in national 
security policies in the United States 
(Birkland, 2014) 
Neo-homeostatic Policy goals shift gradually in response to 
small changes in policy settings 
Canada’s national agricultural policy; 
shift from farmer- to market-oriented 
policy goals over time via gradual 
elimination of subsidies (Coleman et 
al., 1996) 
Quasi-homeostatic Policy goals remain stable, but objectives 
change in response to external ideas and 
factors 
International “lesson-drawing” to 
amend welfare policies results in shift 
from welfare to workfare (Rose, 1991) 
Thermostatic Policy goals set broadly; paradigmatic change 
occurs over time as a result of incremental 
changes to policy settings and objectives 
(similar to a thermostat regulating heat in a 
home) 
Public forestry policy in the US Pacific 
Northwest; incremental changes to 
harvest rates and growing awareness 
of environmental harms triggered a 
shift from conservation to preservation  
(Cashore and Howlett, 2007) 
The second issue encountered by historical institutionalism relates to institutional establishment 
– that is, how new policy-making bodies come into being. To resolve these theoretical issues posed by 
institutional establishment, Campbell (1998) and Béland (2005) suggest that consideration of the unique 
and imperative role of ideas in policy-making and agenda-setting is essential and oft-overlooked. In this 
context, “ideas” refer to both specific policy alternatives and the causal beliefs and worldviews in which 
these alternatives are inextricably embedded (Béland, 2005; Campbell, 1998). This requires a discursive 
analysis of the manner by which policy alternatives are framed, rationalized, and debated by 
governments (Chapter 4).  
It is pertinent to differentiate between categories of ideas invoked in these formal documents, 
given that they represent pragmatic units of policy analysis (Van Eeten, 2007) and useful proxies for (and 
reflections of) the goals and objectives of governments within a policy area (Yanow, 2007). According to 
Campbell (1998), there are four types of ideas involved in policy-making, derived from the work of 
scholars of historical and organizational institutionalism (the latter perspective adding psychological 
elements of routine-normalization within organizations to the structuralist insights of the former). It is 
important to note that ideas may be “underlying and sometimes taken-for-granted assumptions residing 
in the background of policy debates” (i.e. paradigms and public sentiments) but they may also be 
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“concepts or theories  located in the foreground of these debates where they are expertly articulated by 
[policy-makers]” (i.e. programs and frames) (Campbell, 1998, p. 384). Further, ideas may be “cognitive” 
in that they describe cause-and-effect relationships as a basis for policy action (i.e. programs and 
paradigms), or they may be “normative” by invoking values and attitudes in the defense or 
rationalization of a decision or position (i.e. frames and public sentiments) (Campbell, 1998). 
The first order of ideas (referring to concepts and theories invoked explicitly in the foreground 
of policy debates) involves programmatic ideas (technical policy prescriptions devised by elites to chart 
clear and specific actions for governments) and discursive frames – the political symbols and concepts 
invoked by policy-makers to legitimize interventions. The second order of ideas, referring to the 
underlying assumptions implied within policy debates, include paradigms (the systems of causal beliefs 
constraining the range of useful solutions readily available to policy-makers) and public sentiments, 
referring to the dominant assumptions made by the electorate (comprised of a plurality of interests) on 
a policy topic, constraining the range of politically-legitimate interventions (Béland, 2005; Campbell, 
1998). Table 4 provides a visual overview of this typology, as well as examples of each category in the 
content of public policy documents. 
Table 4: A typology of ideas involved and invoked in the policy-making process, shaping policy and public support 
for selected alternatives (adapted from Campbell, 1998). 
Idea type 
(1
st
 order) Concepts and theories 
invoked in policy foreground 
(2
nd
 order) Underlying 
assumptions in policy background 
Cognitive 
Programs: Ideas as policy 
prescriptions, assisting policy-
makers in establishing 
clear/specific policy actions. 
 
Includes tangible plans or 
proposals for transit-related 
research, feasibility studies, capital 
funding, or operational support 
Paradigms: Ideas as causal 
assumptions constraining the 
cognitive range of useful solutions 
available to policy-makers. 
 
Includes problem definitions, 
causal linkages between 
phenomena, and rationales for 
action 
Normative 
Frames: Ideas as symbols and 
concepts; assist policy-makers in 
the legitimization of policy 
solutions to the public. 
 
Includes values espoused in 
campaign speeches, press releases, 
and other public statements from 
bureaucrats and politicians 
Public sentiments: Ideas as public 
assumptions constraining the 
normative range of legitimate 
(publicly-acceptable) policy 
solutions available to policy-
makers. 
 
Includes representations of public-
opinion polls, focus group outputs, 
and other forms of public comment 
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The specific ways in which these ideational theories inform the analytical processes of this thesis 
are discussed in section 2.3. First, however, the process by which documents were identified for 
inclusion within the literature review and content analysis are described. 
2.3 Data collection and related considerations 
This section outlines the procedures and considerations employed in the identification and selection of 
relevant federal documents on the subject of urban transit, comprising the inputs to the historical 
literature review and content analysis. 
2.3.1 Identification of sources for the historical literature review 
As discussed previously, this research employs a “structured” approach to the review of existing 
literature about urban transit in Canada, with an emphasis on the issues, institutions, and interests 
involved in urban transit policy-making (Chapter 3). In order to identify scholarly and grey literature that 
effectively describes and analyzes the political-economic landscape of each of the three time periods, a 
number of systematic considerations for data collection were made. First, a list of search terms (with 
appropriate Boolean operators) was identified; these terms were then applied to an array of relevant 
databases from the fields of urban planning, geography, and public administration (lists of both can be 
found in Appendix A). Documents were then scanned for relevance to Canada’s urban transit policy 
regime – the emphasis in this section was upon scholarly (i.e. peer-reviewed) literature, although a 
number of grey literature documents were included (i.e. via the Canadian Urban Transit Association, the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the Conference Board of Canada, etc.). Note that in selecting 
documents for the content analysis, criteria for inclusion were stricter – these are described in the 
following section. Also note that information from documents selected for the content analysis (i.e. 
those produced by agencies of the Government of Canada) are also cited in Chapter 3 in order to 
provide context for federal actions as appropriate. 
2.3.2 Data collection for the content analysis 
The search terms and databases identified in Appendix A were also applied in the search for content 
analysis inputs. As per the typology of documents relevant to qualitative policy research identified by 
Yanow (2007), the following varieties of federal documents were deemed appropriate for inclusion: 
- Policy documents and legislative records, including bills and their drafts;  
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- Committee, task force, and commission publications and reports;  
- Agency memoranda and correspondences (including those within and between departments); 
and  
- Ministry, department, and agency reports (including both research and annual reports).  
The sample was scoped at the first 20 documents yielded by the queried databases per 
historical period (for a total of 60 documents) – this limit was selected in light of document-access 
restrictions and time (to both systematically code each document and conduct the analysis over a 
reasonable timeframe) constraints, but also because it was determined as an appropriate “saturation 
point” in the document analysis (at which point information – in this case, policy ideas – tended to 
repeat) (Bowen, 2009; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). It should be noted, however, that there is no ironclad 
sample-size standard to which content analyses can be held: as such, the decision to scope the sample is 
generally left to the researcher’s discretion (Bowen, 2009; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Krippendorff, 
2004). Table 5 summarizes the types of documents included in the final sample. 
Table 5: Summary of document types included in the content analysis (n=60). 
Document type Number included in content 
analysis 
Percentage of total 
Departmental/program report 
(Annual or otherwise) 
8 13.3 
House of Commons proceedings 4 6.6 
Conference proceedings 3 5 
Ministerial address 4 6.6 
National Inquiry report 1 1.6 
Policy brief 3 5 
Policy directive 3 5 
Policy evaluation 3 5 
Policy recommendation 4 6.6 
Press release 1 1.6 
Research report 17 28.3 
Trade publication 2 3.3 
White paper 7 11.6 
Total 60 100 
Only those documents produced by or for agencies of the Government of Canada – as well as 
intergovernmental organizations with transit mandates and a permanent federal role, such as the 
Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety – were included in the content 
analysis. Documents containing the phrase “urban transit” or “urban transportation” were scoped in, 
regardless of any obvious position on the subject (i.e. documents demonstrating a clear preference 
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either “for” or “against” a greater federal role in the policy sphere). In order to compile a suitable 
sample size and temporal range, some federal documents discussing the Government of Canada’s 
interests and activities in transportation more broadly were included in the analysis (i.e. those 
containing the phrase “urban transportation” but not “urban transit”). This decision was made primarily 
due to the fact that urban transit falls outside of explicit federal jurisdiction (as discussed in Chapter 1) – 
as such, it was generally difficult to locate documents devoted solely to the subject. This was particularly 
the case during the second era of analysis (1980-2001), an epoch of relatively limited federal 
engagement in the policy regime. However, all documents discuss the federal role in urban 
transportation to some degree – where transit in particular does not appear as a topic of explicit 
discussion, transit issues are conspicuous in their absence (i.e. National Transportation Agency, 1985, 
1989). For instance, the now-defunct National Round Table on the Environment and Economy was 
included as an acceptable federal source, given its stated advisory role in relation to the Government of 
Canada (National Round Table on the Environment and Economy, 1997). Table 6 delineates the sample 
further by specific authorship within the Government of Canada (see Section 2.3). Appendix B provides a 
comprehensive list of the type and authorship of all 60 documents involved in the content analysis, 
broken out by historical period. 
Table 6: Summary of federal organizations cited in the content analysis (n=60). 
Government of Canada 
Department, Agency, or affiliation 
Number of proprietary documents 
included in content analysis 
Percentage of sample produced 
Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation 
1 1.6 
Council of Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway Safety, 
Urban Transportation Task Force 
3 5 
Canadian Transportation Agency 
(Including: National Transportation 
Agency) 
2 3.3 
Department of External Affairs 1 1.6 
Environment Canada 1 1.6 
House of Commons of Canada 
(Debates) 
1 1.6 
Infrastructure Canada 1 1.6 
Library of Parliament 3 5 
Ministry of Finance 2 3.3 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce 
2 3.3 
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Ministry of Public Works and 
Government Services  
1 1.6 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 17 28.3 
Ministry of Transport 
(Transportation Development 
Agency) 
1 1.6 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy 
2 3.3 
Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada 
1 1.6 
Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force 
on Urban Issues 
1 1.6 
Standing Committee on Finance 1 1.6 
Standing Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and Communities 
2 3.3 
Statistics Canada 1 1.6 
Transportation Association of 
Canada 
4 6.6 
Transport Canada (Including: 
Transportation Development 
Centre, Urban Transportation 
Research Branch, Urban 
Transportation Showcase Program, 
and Moving on Sustainable 
Transportation Program)  
12 20 
Total 60 100 
There are two immediately salient points that may raise questions about this sample and 
warrant further explanation. First, Table 5 suggests that research reports (28.3 percent) comprise a large 
proportion of the document sample. However, given that public reports are commissioned to inform 
both policy-makers and civil society about policy issues and the merits of various alternatives, it is 
reasonable to suspect that policy ideas are likely to be well-represented in these documents. Table 6 
and Appendix B, meanwhile, suggest that the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) is over-
represented as a source (authoring, by affiliation, 17 of 20 first-era documents); however, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, MSUA served a coordinative role among other federal ministries and agencies during this 
period on the “urban dimensions” of federal policy (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987), so it is unsurprising 
that the database scan yielded almost exclusively MSUA documentation for the first period of analysis.  
Now that the systematic considerations for the aggregation and identification of content-
analysis inputs have been described, the following section outlines the ways in which these documents 
were coded and the means by which their constituent policy ideas were interpreted. 
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2.4 Analysis of policy ideas 
In this research, a “directed” approach to content analysis was employed, in which theory situated the 
analytical approach and determined initial categories of codes (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Content-
analysis software – QSR NVivo 11 – was used to organize documents via the “Externals” tab, and these 
documentary inputs were further categorized in two interrelated stages: thematic and open coding. 
In the thematic coding stage, each document in the sample was manually scanned line-by-line in 
NVivo to explore the ways in which policy ideas were represented in the text (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, 
p. 1283). Campbell’s (1998) categories formed the foundational coding structure (outlined in section 
2.1.2) – each variety of policy idea (programs, paradigms, frames, and public sentiments) was assigned a 
primary or “parent node” in NVivo (more commonly referred to as “codes” in qualitative research 
[Creswell, 2014; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005]) in relation to its time period. Upon each instance in which a 
policy idea regarding urban transit (or an analogous/relevant concept) was discussed explicitly or 
implicitly in the text (i.e. within the 60 federal documents), the most relevant “thematic” code was 
deployed in line with Campbell’s framework (placed in “child nodes” in NVivo). This involved 
considerable discretion – it was up to the researcher to determine whether a given passage of text 
warranted coding, and if so, which code to apply. However, this bias was mitigated via adherence to 
rigorous definitions for each ideational category (Table 4; discussed in greater detail below). Figure 1 
demonstrates the thematic coding hierarchy of parent and child nodes, as displayed in the NVivo 
interface prior to the commencement of the thematic coding process. Each passage was allocated to a 
time frame based on the date of the publication in which it was found (“1st Era [1968-1979]”, “2nd Era 
[1980-2001]”, and “3rd Era [2002-2015]”) and then assigned a “thematic” code within the era in question 
– programs, paradigms, frames, or public sentiments. 
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Figure 1: Parent and child nodes used to organize coded ideas in the thematic coding process. 
 
Specifically, each of the “program” nodes included proposals for tangible projects, plans, or 
operational programs (including research, feasibility studies, etc.), as well as passages proposing the 
transfer of capital or operational resources to other levels of government, transit providers, or users. 
The “paradigm” node included statements defining the specific or general problems policy aims to solve, 
causal linkages between phenomena related to urban transit and transportation, or rationales for action 
– these were, by and large, located in policy and research documents. 
The “public sentiments” nodes focused on information in which public perspectives, opinions, 
and beliefs have been evaluated, reflecting passages that reference public opinion polls, focus groups, 
and quotations from other forums for public comment. “Public sentiment” is hardly a monolithic entity 
in reality – as such, efforts were made during coding to capture the perspectives of competing and 
convergent public interests (including the positions of advocates, detractors, proponents, and 
opponents of transit projects as they were articulated by federal agents in each document). As such, 
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perspectives and values from throughout the policy regime are captured in this node for all periods of 
analysis. 
Finally, the “frames” nodes identified value-laden statements made in press releases, speeches, 
and other policy documents which attempted to reflect or sway public opinion and consolidate political 
support for or against  policy alternatives proposed or selected within the policy regime – in other 
words, passages aiming to persuade the reader, be they substantiated or unsubstantiated directly by 
evidence in the text (Campbell, 1998; Lieberman, 2002). Examples of codes applied in these four 
categories are provided in Table 7, while a full list of thematic excerpts is located in Appendix C.6 
Table 7: Examples of coded excerpts for each thematic category employed in the content analysis. 
Coding category Example from document sample 
Paradigms 
“Movement within urban areas should not depend to the extent that it does on the 
private automobile, which results in congestion, environmental pollution, and denial of 
adequate transportation to those without cars such as the poor, the handicapped, the 
elderly and young people. Substantial government assistance is required if public transit 
facilities are to compete effectively with the private automobile in convenience, 
comfort, speed and cost. Broadly speaking, the form of the city and the type of 
transport available are closely related: the spread of sprawling low-density suburbs 
tends to make dependence on the private automobile inevitable; conversely a more 
closely-knit urban area may require a commitment to adequate and well-planned 
transport facilities at an early stage” (1Paradigms14 [Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 
1974, p. 8]) 
Programs 
“A major benefit of efficient urban transportation facilities is realized in capital 
investment. Stated simply, transit is less capital-intensive than the automobile. Studies 
conducted in the cities of Vancouver and Halifax in the 1970s indicated that the cost of 
providing transit facilities to meet travel demands through the 1980s was roughly half 
the cost of providing facilities for automobiles. Transit means fewer expressways and 
.access-roads; less parking space; savings on traffic-signaling equipment; and savings on 
police, fire-fighting and ambulance services” (2Programs7 [Department of External 
Affairs External Information Program Division, 1981, p. 8]) 
Frames 
“In the past ten years almost every city in Canada has had its transportation study. We 
have had one learned paper after another analysing our urban transport problems ad 
nauseam. Yet the average citizen has seen nothing approaching a solution to his 
problem as he waits for thirty or more freezing minutes, for a bus that is supposed to 
run every ten minutes, on a morning when his car has failed to start or he has refused to 
face the hopeless task of digging out his driveway” (1Frames1 [Lewis, 1972, p. 1]) 
Public sentiments “A number of stakeholders who met with the Committee in Ottawa took the 
                                                     
6
 Each thematically-coded passage listed in Appendix C contains a “coding key”. These are used to aggregate 
thematic codes into emergent or “open” categories and to avoid unnecessary length and duplication in Appendix 
D. For instance, the first code in the “1
st
 Era Paradigms” node is given the key “1Paradigms1”, while the 56
th
 and 
final code in this category is denoted “1Paradigms56”. Similar shorthand is used for each of the other thematic 
categories, as well as the second and third eras of analysis (e.g. 1Frames10 “2PublicSentiments20”, 3Programs30”, 
and so forth). 
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opportunity to express appreciation for the billions in federal contributions to Canada’s 
transit systems in recent years. These witnesses indicated that the additional federal 
funds precipitated the undertaking of many important transit projects. Conversely, a 
representative of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation (CTF) was of the view that federal 
funding programs had distorted decision-making for transit agencies and had actually 
delayed necessary projects. The CTF argued that projects such as the Evergreen Line in 
Vancouver would have been built sooner if the transit agency had not waited for an 
offer of federal funding” (3PublicSentiments22 [Tweed, 2012, p. 9]) 
Upon the completion of this initial coding process, a second round of “open coding” was 
undertaken, in which all thematically-coded excerpts within each time frame were further analyzed in 
order to concretely describe policy ideas. Open coding refers to the identification of “concepts or key 
ideas that are hidden within textual data” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 114) via the determination of sub-
categories within the content (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1282). During this analytical stage, the 
researcher undertook a close-reading of thematic codes, and memo-writing was employed to maintain 
“closeness” to the data (Single, 2010) – short, concise notes helped to determine recurrent themes in 
the thematic codes for each era. Following memo-writing, a “focused” reading of these memoranda 
took place, in which the large number of themes identified in the memos were consolidated and 
summarized into a workable and analyzable group of open codes (Krippendorff, 2004). During the 
process of analysis in which this final set of open codes was identified – or “emerged” from the data 
(Bowen, 2009) – tertiary categories were assigned “grandchild nodes” in NVivo for each timeframe, 
representing substantive descriptions of the policy ideas identified during thematic coding. Examples of 
grandchild nodes identified within each thematic idea category via the open coding process are listed in 
Table 8, and are described and explored in greater depth in Chapter 4 (each analytical section features a 
snapshot of its “open nodes”). A full list of all excerpts coded during the open coding process (identified 
by their coding keys – i.e. “2Paradigms1”, “3PublicSentiments6”, etc.) is located in Appendix D.   
Table 8: Examples of open codes in relation to their thematic coding categories. 
Coding category Thematic examples (with coding keys) Open code applied 
1
st
 Era Paradigms 
E.g. ““Urban mobility has never before been enjoyed by such a 
large proportion of the population. On the other hand the modern 
private car has also contributed to the urban dweller’s increasing 
sense of isolation and frustration” (Lewis, 1972, p. 1)  
(1Paradigms1) 
 
“We seem to accept the fact that our roads and highways which 
concern us so much are part of the general revenues. We don't 
seem to do cost-benefit analyses on these; in this country at least 
Recognition of 
automobile 
externalities 
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we accept them as part of our taxes or our budgets. But as soon as 
we talk about public transportation, we immediately start counting 
the cost. And so far, I've been unable to find a proper economic 
analysis which will compare those two, compare the losses along 
those roads, the amount it costs us to drive our cars and  amortize 
those cars and the gasoline to use them, not to mention the wear 
and tear on our nerves and the additional health cost I which is 
probably hard to quantify” (Danson, 1975, p. 5) (1Paradigms16) 
2
nd
 Era Programs 
E.g. “We have committed $500,000 to provide full support to the 
Canadian exhibitors at the International Public Transit Expo ’81 in 
Chicago in October. As many of you are aware, more than 16,000 
square feet has been leased by the federal government, and will be 
used by 22 companies to display Canadian technology. We are 
producing, jointly with the manufacturers, a new film depicting the 
Canadian experience in urban transit. We are publishing the first 
catalogue of the industry. And we have a brand-new selling tool – 
‘Telidon’ … this is the first application of this high-technology 
system, developed by the federal government … This is one of the 
largest marketing assistance projects we have ever undertaken for 
any industry” (Gray, 1981, p. 8) (2Programs4) 
 
“In addition to the urban and transportation planning expertise 
which has evolved over the years, Canada also possesses a pool of 
experienced consulting and technical personnel. Canadian 
specialists, in both the public and private sectors, build, operate 
and maintain subways, light rail transit services, commuter rail and 
bus networks and urban bus services. This experience is available 
to municipalities anywhere in the world on a commercial basis” 
(Department of External Affairs External Information Program 
Division, 1981, p. 13) (2Programs8) 
Support for domestic 
transit manufacturers 
2
nd
 Era Frames 
E.g. “The current environmental and economic climates, more 
specifically the energy crisis, favour urban transit” (Department of 
International Trade and Commerce, 1981, p. 19) (2Frames4) 
 
“Improvements in transit that attract individuals from the private 
automobile, as well as land use and transportation planning that 
leads to shorter trips, fewer motorized trips and increased use of 
cycling and walking are also seen as essential elements of meeting 
Canada’s commitments to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, 
improvements in air quality, and related health impacts, while also 
helping to conserve energy and reduce dependence on fossil fuels” 
(IBI Group and Soberman, 2001, p. 6) (2Frames49) 
Environmental and 
sustainability benefits 
of transit 
3
rd
 Era Public 
Sentiments 
E.g. “I’ve heard a lot of support for is the creation of completely 
new, targeted Infrastructure funds. This type of new program could 
help to achieve better results, it is said, by focusing exclusively on a 
national priority like urban transit or safe water or housing. Again, 
this is another proposal worthwhile developing together”(Martin, 
2002, p. 6-7) (3PublicSentiments1) 
 
Demand for new 
federal leadership and 
programming 
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“The industry is open to alternative funding sources such as P3s, 
but the current procurement model restricts the federal 
government to a maximum of 25% share of the cost in a P3. This 
often leaves municipalities and provinces with a more substantial 
share of the initial capital investment up front. As the federal 
government prepares its next budget, it should consider raising its 
maximum share of P3 projects from 25% to 33%, especially in cases 
where no private partners are providing initial capital investments” 
(House of Commons of Canada, 2014, (p. 4) (3PublicSentiments39) 
 Following the thematic and open coding processes, interpretation of the data was carried out by 
presenting the results of both thematic and open coding within each historical period and for each 
category of ideas (i.e. programs, paradigms, frames, and public sentiments) in Chapter 4, discussing the 
substantive themes and content of each period. Comparisons of each category of ideas across the three 
analytical periods are presented in Chapter 5. From these comparisons, key findings were developed in 
relation to both policy ideas and dynamics.  The following section discusses the specific means by which 
both key findings and policy recommendations were developed. 
2.5 Developing key findings and recommendations 
In order to determine the ways in which policy ideas evolved over time, each category of ideas were 
compared and contrasted over the three analytical periods in Chapter 5 in order to answer the research 
sub-question asking: “How have urban transit policy ideas invoked by the federal government in public 
policy documents changed over time?” The framework for policy dynamics is then applied to the 
transitional periods between historical “eras”, classifying the mode of policy change at each intersection 
in accordance with Howlett and Cashore's (2009) framework (resolving the second sub-question: “How 
has the federal government’s role in the Canadian urban transit policy regime shifted from 1968-2015, 
and in response to what “triggering” factors?”). The content analysis provides the final conceptual 
element to the descriptions of policy regimes constructed in Chapter 3, permitting the classification of 
policy change at each historical “transition.” The aim is to describe the manner by which the policy 
regime has shifted in the past, and by extension, how policy might change in the future. 
Key findings represent insights made in relation to the evolution of the urban transit policy 
regime’s ideas, and dynamics (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). Van Eeten (2007) suggests that differences 
between “metanarratives” – in this case, the accounts provided by document-producers at the time of 
writing as discerned by the researcher, and by the academic community ex-post (representing more 
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holistic and multi-stakeholder viewpoints – are of particular interest to scholars of policy history, given 
that they represent the interplay of competing views of reality and events. Comparisons of the 
differences, similarities, and insights of these individual narratives allow researchers to make the 
“normative leap” from “is to ought” (Van Eeten, 2007).  
In the context of this study, comparisons of policy ideas over time; the identification of 
“underutilized” ideas espoused by federal agencies (i.e. programmatic ideas proposed but not 
implemented);  discrepancies between the “metanarrives” of the literature review and analysis; 
unaddressed problems across time periods; and  shortcomings in federal action as perceived by other 
stakeholders (identified both in the literature review and in the analytical “public sentiments” nodes)  
were all instructive in developing recommendations for ways in which the effectiveness of federal 
involvement in Canada’s urban transit policy regime could be amended and improved. These 
recommendations are the subject of Chapter 6).  
2.6 Limitations 
Despite the inclusion of systematic means and theoretical guidance to ensure the reliability, objectivity, 
and validity of this work, it is impossible to completely remove all sources of bias in qualitative content-
analysis research (Creswell, 2014; Krippendorff, 2004). Primarily, limitations include the reality that the 
document scan could have missed relevant documents – despite the author’s best efforts and an 
exhaustive list of queried terms and databases, the dated nature of the data or omission of relevant 
keywords or databases leaves the possibility open. However, via the use of systematic, explicit, and 
uniform sampling guidelines (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991; described in section 2.2) and by including 60 
documents in the content sample, it was the researcher’s intention to minimize the likelihood of this 
occurrence. 
 In content analysis, it is also critical that the author disclose the element of subjectivity involved 
in the coding process. Specifically, the categories of ideas (programs, paradigms, frames, and public 
sentiments) involved in the thematic coding process are inherently nebulous and are not amenable to 
categorization based on pre-defined words or phrases (beyond the broad terminology identified in 
Appendix A). However, operational definitions for coding and interpretation (i.e. the application of 
Campbell's [1998] framework) were strictly adhered to in order to mitigate this potential. 
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In sum, this study is designed to infer “analytic generalizability,” in which observations may be 
applied only to the specific phenomenon in question, or analogous phenomena (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
As such, the results of this analysis should not be taken as a definitive or holistic account of the federal 
government’s role in urban transit policy-making. Rather, the unique contribution of this study (namely 
the content analysis) is its attempt to approximate the federal government’s view of its own role in the 
policy sphere as demonstrated over the period from 1968-2015, and to make informed 
recommendations about the ways in which federal institutions may more effectively contribute to 
Canada’s urban transit policy regime. 
2.7 Summary of methods 
This chapter outlined the theoretical underpinnings of this research, as well as the systematic fashion in 
which the proceeding literature review and content analysis is conducted. The historical literature 
review relies heavily on a framework for describing policy regimes developed by Jochim and May (2010), 
while the investigation of policy change draws upon the work of Howlett amd Cashore (2009). The 
content analysis may be considered “directed,” as per the approach outlined by Hsieh and Shannon 
(2005).  
Procedures for data collection were then described, referring primarily to the search parameters 
(terms) and sources of policy documents (databases) employed. The specific considerations and 
procedures guiding both thematic and open coding processes were then outlined, and examples of each 
provided. The methods by which key findings and recommendations were developed were then made 
explicit – primarily, these “summative” elements were identified by integrating discussions of policy 
ideas and dynamics, and by discussing sources of agreement and conflict between the findings of the 
literature review and the content analysis. Finally, limitations of the research (including potential 
sources of bias and how these were minimized) were discussed. The following chapter constructs an 
historical narrative of the urban transit policy landscape in Canada from the late 1960s to the present. 
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Chapter 3: An Historical Literature Review of Canada’s Urban Transit Policy 
Regime 
This chapter draws upon the policy regime framework (introduced and defined in Chapter 2) in order to 
describe developments in Canadian urban transit from the late 1960s to the present. The purpose of this 
structured review of historical and contemporary literature is to situate the role of federal politicians, 
departments, and agencies in relation to those of other institutional (both formal and informal) “actors” 
(or stakeholders) within the urban transit policy regime. These include civil-society groups concerned 
with the provision and improvement of transit services; municipalities and the transit agencies under 
their purview; provincial governments and their constituent transit-planning and service-delivery 
organizations; intergovernmental bodies with urban transit agendas; and private-sector entities with 
material interests in the advancement of transit in cities. The issues defining the decisions of these 
actors, as well as their interests, are also explored in detail. The final element of the policy regime 
framework – policy ideas – constitutes the primary focus of this thesis and warrants its own analytical 
component (Chapter 4). In line with the research questions and objectives, emphasis is placed upon the 
federal government’s actions within the policy regime throughout this chapter. 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, the literature review is carried out in three parts. The first section 
describes a tumultuous “experiment” in Canadian urban governance (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987) 
which took place from 1968 to 1979, involving indirect federal involvement in urban affairs, albeit a 
limited role in urban transit. The second period of analysis was significantly longer (1980-2001), during 
which intergovernmental relations in Canada generally featured lower levels of cooperation (often 
referred to as the era of “competitive federalism” [Sancton, 2008; Shaker, 2005]) in tandem with the so-
called “neoliberal turn”. The final period of analysis (2002-2015) begins with the advent of direct and 
ongoing federal transit funding, includes Prime Minister Martin’s “New Deal” for Canadian cities, and 
extends through the Harper Government’s period of “open federalism” to the present. During each era, 
it is demonstrated that the roles and responsibilities of the federal government have evolved in tandem 
with transit’s status as a political tool, as well as the economic and fiscal health of the industry. The 
following section provides a brief overview of conditions immediately prior to the first analytical 
timeframe (discussed in sections 3.2-3.4). 
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3.1 An introduction to urban transit and the federal government in the postwar era 
The end of World War II signaled a turning point for North America’s transit industry. While ridership on 
Canada’s electric street railways (operating in cities of all sizes in the early 20th century) reached historic 
highs due to gasoline rationing and materials shortages during wartime (Hanson and Giuliano, 2004; 
Jones, 2008), the age of the automobile began in earnest upon the resumption of peace. By 1945, the 
nation’s rolling stock of electric railcars and trolleybuses required significant refurbishment (Day, 2015) – 
under the Constitution Act 1867 (s. 92), this upkeep was the sole jurisdictional responsibility of provinces 
and their “creature” municipalities (Sancton, 2008). However, replacement on the scale required was 
infeasible due to significant provincial budgetary deficits wrought by the demands of wartime spending 
(Bakvis, Baier, and Brown, 2009); as a result, many provinces and cities elected to provide comparatively 
cheaper (i.e. less capital-intensive) and more flexible bus services (Day, 2015). A combination of political 
pressure from North America’s powerful auto-manufacturing sector (Walks, 2015c); the consequent 
increase in the affordability of automobile ownership; a burgeoning middle class; and changing social 
expectations for mobility and individualism also contributed to the decline of streetcars (Perl and 
Kenworthy, 2010; Perl and Pucher, 1995) such that by 1959, they remained operational only in Toronto 
(Day, 2015). 
Despite these challenges, Canada’s municipal transit authorities continued to operate with 
moderate success in the post-war period (see Figure 3). The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), for 
instance, turned a streetcar operating surplus into Canada’s first subway line in 1954 (the north-south 
Yonge line) (Perl and Kenworthy, 2010) – although by 1955, when the complementary east-west Bloor 
line was constructed, the TTC was able to finance only 45 percent of the cost (Sancton, 2015). As such, 
political will and incentives for federal involvement in urban transit funding were not yet warranted. in 
other aspects of municipal affairs, however, the federal government began to apply its spending power 
(referring to “residual” constitutional authority to transfer money to governments, institutions, and 
individuals for use in areas beyond federal jurisdiction) in pursuit of “a postwar agenda of social and 
economic reform” (Verrelli, 2008, p. 6). This included sharing capital costs of municipal infrastructure 
projects with provinces (typically 50 percent), partially in recognition of the heavy toll taken by the war 
effort on provincial and municipal resources: as such, scholars refer to the postwar period as an era of 
“cooperative” federalism (Bakvis et al., 2009). Generally, however, funding for infrastructure was limited 
to one-off projects and Keynesian stimulus initiatives (Bakvis et al., 2009). Municipal governments 
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provided the vast majority of operational and capital funding for transit throughout this period (Bunting 
and Filion, 2010), while the federal government entered the realm of transportation in cities only by 
playing a (limited) role in funding segments of the Trans-Canada Highway passing through metropolitan 
areas (Perl and Kenworthy, 2010; Verrelli, 2008). 
Perl and Kenworthy (2010) argue that because Canadian municipalities were not forced to 
adhere to a singular urban policy in the postwar period, cities were able to achieve relatively high 
population densities and strong transit ridership in city centres. However, federal action in this period 
did not establish a wholly productive framework for the evolution of Canadian urbanism. The creation of 
the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) and its subsidized/guaranteed mortgages via 
the National Housing Act 1944 stimulated low-density development beyond traditional municipal 
boundaries and rail-servicing capacities (Bakvis et al., 2009; Bunting and Filion, 2010; Walks, 2015a), 
facilitating the “sprawled” suburban form that remains prevalent in Canada today. Transit in these areas 
was (and remains) uncompetitive with automobile travel and commute times (Blais, 2010) – as a result, 
ridership stagnated in the suburbs as the 1960s drew to a close (Cervero, 1986). Simultaneously, social 
malcontent with the reform and renewal agendas peddled by all levels of government in traditional 
urban cores grew to a  head in the 1950s and 1960s (Bunting and Filion, 2010). 
In short, the rapid pace and outward nature of postwar urbanization (and suburbanization) in 
Canadian cities birthed the conditions under which urban issues emerged onto the national agenda in 
the late 1960s. In this context, the roles and responsibilities of each order of government in the realm of 
urban affairs and transit policy lost their previous clarity. A cycle of dispersed residential development 
was initiated, leading to a smaller tax base in traditional municipal centres and a more fractured 
municipal system overall. Consequently, public-service quality declined, providing Canadians with 
further motivation to leave dense urban areas (Bunting and Filion, 2010). The trajectory of urban 
development in Canada was significantly influenced as a result. 
3.2 Canada’s urban transit policy regime, 1968-1979 
3.2.1 First-era issues 
Urbanization began to alarm decision-makers in the 1960s. The proportion of Canadians residing in 
urban areas grew from 41 percent in 1941 to 74 percent by 1966 (Statistics Canada, 2011) – within 
cities, meanwhile, population distribution polarized spatially. High- and middle-income earners moved 
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to the suburbs, while low-income households remained in traditional downtown areas (Bunting and 
Filion, 2010; Mendez et al., 2015). Consequent problems related to dilapidated and overcrowded 
working-class housing; roadway congestion and air pollution; and the social “ills” produced by freight 
railways in cities were of particular concern (Picton, 2010). As such, and in line with broader ideological 
movements to “rationalize” urban space, federal, provincial, and municipal governments began a 
process of urban renewal, ameliorating “slum” conditions by relocating low-income housing to the 
urban periphery; constructing urban parkways through city centres (bulldozing low-income housing as 
necessary) to facilitate suburban commuting and remove traffic from downtown streets; and relocating 
industrial rail lines away from city centres to reduce pollution and provide commercial real estate 
development opportunities (Basford, 1972; Bunting and Filion, 2010; Picton, 2010; Sancton, 2008). As in 
the United States, the accommodation of the automobile lay at the heart of these renewal efforts 
(Jones, 2008). 
Simultaneously, urban life in Canada became “politicized” (Tindal, 2013). The social 
ramifications of urban renewal (namely displacement of low-income residents) drew the particular ire of 
Canadian civil society (Spicer, 2011); efforts to block urban thoroughfare construction in Vancouver, 
Toronto, and Montreal were especially prominent (Bunting and Filion, 2010). The escalating social and 
economic costs of automobile ownership, particularly in relation to shocks associated with the oil crisis 
of 1974 and the “first wave” of global environmentalism’s concern with pollution and air quality, also 
became salient in this era (Schiller et al., 2010), resulting in increased ridership and grassroots support 
for transit (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 1984). Indeed, Spicer (2011) argues that urban advocacy 
was a primary driver behind the implementation of a formal federal urban agenda, although Oberlander 
and Fallick (1987) note that growing “academic” recognition of the interdependence of urban well-being 
and national prosperity also contributed to the decision by newly-elected Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
to investigate means by which federal and urban objectives could be aligned. The Hellyer Task Force was 
commissioned in 1968 to advise the federal government on the most effective method of urban 
intervention (with a focus on housing and land-use issues), recommending the establishment of regional 
planning bodies to integrate land-use and transportation objectives (Sancton, 2008) and hinting at a 
growing recognition of urban-suburban linkages and interdependencies within Canada’s urban policy 
community. However, this strategy was deemed constitutionally-infeasible on the basis of infringement 
into provincial jurisdiction (Sancton, 2008).  
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Instead, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) was created via the Government 
Organization Act in 1971 in order to develop and apply “policies to influence the urbanization process” 
and coordinate the activities of federal line departments deemed to possess “urban dimensions” 
(Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). Thus began a period of significant and direct federal engagement with 
cities – and jurisdictional encroachment, albeit indirectly (Sancton, 2008; Spicer, 2010). Over MSUA’s 
lifespan, “turf wars” became key issues of contention, both among federal agencies and between 
provincial and federal governments, culminating in MSUA’s disbandment in 1979 (Sancton, 2008). 
However, in MSUA’s wake, some transit-supportive initiatives were left intact (Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 1984). The specific institutions and interests defining MSUA’s “experiment in public 
administration” (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987), as well as MSUA’s relationship with urban transit, are 
discussed in the following section. 
3.2.2 First-era institutions and their interests 
As described above, urban civil society’s political clout grew during the late 1960s and into the 1970s. 
Prominent institutions included the Strathcona Property Owners’ and Tenants’ Association in 
Vancouver, which opposed downtown demolition and expressway construction; Montreal’s Citizen 
Movement, which demonstrated against the city’s housing renewal policy; and Toronto’s Confederation 
of Residents and Ratepayers Associations, which prevented construction of the Spadina Expressway 
(Spicer, 2011). Many groups favoured investment in public transit as an alternative to road- and 
highway-building, which they argued would provide greater mobility benefits to a wider constituency 
and insulate urban dwellers from oil shocks similar to those experienced during the 1970s (Jones, 2008), 
although it should be noted that some (albeit few) transit projects were also opposed on the grounds of 
“community disruption” (IBI Group, 1993). Likewise, the Canadian Urban Transit Association 
(representing the interests of municipal transit authorities and vehicle manufacturers) was at the 
forefront of the movement for the consideration of transit as an alternative to roadway expansion in the 
1960s and 1970s in order to maximize the value and social impact of its membership (Roschlau, 2008). 
These organizations expressed their concerns to municipal councils, who, in turn, communicated these 
sentiments to higher orders of government. In Toronto and Vancouver, city councils and their 
representatives in the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (formed in 1937 via the merger of the 
Union of Canadian Municipalities and the Dominion Conference of Mayors to provide a national forum 
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for the coherent expression of municipal interests) began lobbying provincial and federal governments 
for transit support as early as 1961 (Spicer, 2011).  
The transit-specific interests of municipalities and local transit agencies in this era focused on 
securing financial support for infrastructure and service-expansion projects they were increasingly 
unable to finance alone (Spicer, 2011). Prior to 1980, capital and operational funding data for urban 
transit was not collected (Lauren Rudko [CUTA], personal communication). However, in lieu of a detailed 
breakdown of the sources of capital and operational funding for this period (which is presented for 
subsequent timeframes), Figure 2 presents a comparison of total operating revenues and direct 
operating expenses from 1955 to 1979. These data demonstrate the declining ability of municipal transit 
authorities to cover the costs of their operations throughout the postwar period and into this study’s 
first period of analysis, as well as the rapidly escalating costs of operation in relation to revenues. The 
increasing rate of deficit (particularly from 1970 to 1979) can largely be explained by population growth 
and the need to service increasingly-broad swaths of suburban land; however, fare-box revenues were 
unable to account for rising operational costs as ridership declined and automobile ownership became 
increasingly accessible and convenient (Bunting and Filion, 2010). Other reasons for the growing 
operating deficit include inflation, the expansion of transit services into suburban areas, low fares, and 
increasing trip lengths (Urban Transportation Research Branch, 1979). Given these deficit conditions, 
higher-order involvement became necessary in order to provide essential services: indeed, cities across 
the country (i.e. Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver) lobbied for federal support for planned LRT 
systems during this period, with varying degrees of success (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 1986).  
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Figure 2: Comparison of revenues and expenses for urban transit in Canada, 1955-1979 (Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 2015c). Note that the uneven scale reflects the limited availability of data for the period from 1955-
1975: prior to 1975, capital and operating data were reported by transit authorities to CUTA very five years, rather 
than annually. 
 
Overall, MSUA’s involvement in the urban transit policy regime was tangential, but its transit 
interests and activities were pioneering and noteworthy. MSUA focused primarily on improving the 
“effectiveness, responsiveness, and innovative capacity” of the federal government to urban issues 
(Langford, 1976). However, it possessed no formal budget or direct control over program delivery 
(Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). As such, its functional scope was restricted to research and coordinating 
the policy and programming of other federal departments whose activities possessed “urban 
dimensions” (such as the Ministries of Transportation and Public Works) (Spicer, 2011), meaning that 
“the only avenue left to the Ministry was the power of its ideas in the decision-making process” 
(Oberlander and Fallick, 1987, p. 113). These coordinative activities were largely carried out by the 
Senior Interdepartmental Committee on Urban Affairs (SIDCUA), which involved representatives from 15 
federal line departments and acted as the primary mechanism for disseminating MSUA’s policy ideas 
throughout the federal bureaucracy (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1974). 
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Despite these material limitations, MSUA’s mandate evolved significantly over its lifespan. By 
1974, MSUA had leveraged the urban connections and expertise of its personnel to become a vehicle for 
the transfer of capital funds from federal line departments to municipalities (Oberlander and Fallick, 
1987). Urban transit became a focus in the mid-1970s; transit-related research was conducted and 
commissioned by MSUA’s Urban Networks Directorate on transportation-housing inter-relationships, 
mechanisms for land-value capture through capital investment in transit infrastructure, and methods of 
improving the economic efficiency of urban transportation (including both roadways and transit 
systems) (Frankena, 1979; Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1979; N.D. Lea and Associates Ltd., 1979). 
These objectives were shared by other federal organizations: the Ministry of Transport’s Surface Policy 
and Urban Transportation Assistance Branch (SPUTAB) and Urban Transportation Research Branch 
(UTRB) also conducted  research tailored to municipal requests in conjunction with (Urban 
Transportation Research Branch, 1979). 
The most significant outcome of these interdepartmental relationships was the creation of the 
Urban Transportation Assistance Program. This capital initiative (totaling $230 million) included two 
distinct funding categories: projects eligible under the Railway Relocation and Crossing Act (assisting 
municipalities in removing freight rail from urban centres) and urban transit projects. The latter 
component allocated funds to provinces and municipalities from 1978 to 1984 for capital purchases 
related to “commuter rail vehicles, stations and platforms, and required traffic control facilities” (or 
buses and designated lanes for higher-order transit where commuter rail was infeasible) (Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs, 1975b), as well as “paratransit vehicles, construction of maintenance and 
storage facilities, terminals, shelters and pedestrian walkways … fare boxes, as well as traffic studies and 
surveys” (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 1984, p. 62-63). Eligibility for these funds depended on 
the formulation of tri-level agreements on appropriate growth-management strategies in applicant 
urban regions (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1975b), and the federal government provided up to 
75 percent of capital costs for projects awarded funding based on these criteria (Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 1984). This initiative represents the first formal foray into the realm of direct transit funding 
in the history of Canada’s federal government, and as such constitutes an historical “breakthrough” in 
the context of this research. These expenditures, while developed in the first era of this analysis, were, 
for the most part made in the second era – as such, specific projects and regional funding allocations are 
discussed in greater depth in section 3.3.2. 
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Provincial politics in this era also engaged in reorganization, with significant impact on urban 
transit services. Canada’s first wave of municipal amalgamation was in full force during the 1960s and 
1970s (Lightbody, 1999) – many provinces annexed land surrounding major urban centres to create 
regional (or “upper-tier”) municipalities (reminiscent of Hellyer’s recommendations), including the 
creation of Metropolitan Toronto, the Montreal and Quebec City Urban Communities, Ottawa-Carleton, 
and a unified Winnipeg (Bakvis et al., 2009; Hamilton, 2013). Transit service delivery was, by and large, 
made the responsibility of these reorganized municipalities (Langford, 1976). Provinces began to 
recognize that the social benefits of public subsidies for transit outweighed the costs (economic, 
environmental, and social) of unbridled roadway expansion (Langford, 1976). In light of transit’s deficit 
situation (Figure 2) Ontario became the first province to offer capital support for urban transit in 1971 – 
by 1978, all 10 provinces had capital assistance programs in place (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 
1984). 
Provinces (unlike municipalities) were not interested, however, in federal policy direction and 
financial support (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). While cooperative with MSUA at first, by the mid-
1970s, provincial representatives were unhappy with perceived federal “meddling” in urban land-use 
planning and transportation projects (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). As such, provinces began to 
challenge MSUA’s constitutional legitimacy; similarly, federal line departments felt constrained and 
impeded by MSUA’s coordinative activities, and were also complicit in its dismantling (Oberlander and 
Fallick, 1987; Spicer, 2010). In 1976, MSUA’s size and scope was greatly reduced in tandem with a 
Ministerial change, when Barney Danson was replaced by André Ouellet; the political climate became 
hostile to federal intervention in urban affairs, and MSUA was effectively shuttered in 1979 (Oberlander 
and Fallick, 1987). In tandem, SPUTAB and the UTRB were disbanded by the Ministry of Transport as “a 
result of recent policy changes regarding the federal government’s role in urban transportation” (Urban 
Transportation Research Branch, 1979).  
MSUA was inherently an interdepartmental body, due primarily to its lack of a programmatic 
functionality and independent fiscal resources (Langford, 1976; Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). In order 
to operate effectively, MSUA leveraged the urban policy community that developed in the 1950s and 
1960s, characterized by Spicer (2011) as “state-corporatist”, in which urban activists, municipal councils, 
and municipal associations advanced actions within the network, while federal and provincial  
governments determined the direction and duration of policy outputs (Spicer, 2011). Tri-level 
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conferences on urban affairs became key avenues for policy debate, with major goals related to 
information-sharing and policy harmonization (Bakvis et al., 2009). These conferences were successful in 
1972 and 1973 – however, a third meeting scheduled for 1976 was boycotted by the provinces over 
their displeasure with MSUA’s evolving mandate and more blatant jurisdictional incursions (Oberlander 
and Fallick, 1987; Sancton, 2008; Spicer, 2011). Other relevant intergovernmental institutions of this era 
included the FCM’s Urban Transportation Committee and the Canadian Council of Urban and Regional 
Research, agencies lacking provincial representation which advocated for higher-order transit support 
(Langford, 1976). The movement towards the integration of federal and municipal interests – often 
without provincial support – is a key theme of this era that bears highlighting. 
One intergovernmental transit initiative undertaken in Ottawa-Hull from 1974 to 1975 illustrates 
the collaborative appetite of federal and municipal governments that existed in this era. Municipal 
transit agencies on both sides of the Ontario-Quebec border, the National Capital Commission (NCC), 
and MSUA identified the need to reduce automobile congestion during peak hours (particularly in the 
central business district, home to the majority of the federal public service). The federal government 
implemented paid parking for employees to incentivize transit use; in tandem, the NCC provided 
dedicated lanes for buses on local highways from the suburbs, and city transit authorities increased peak 
hour service. The results were compelling: transit experienced a 33 percent peak-hour mode share 
increase, jumping to 70 percent of downtown journey-to-work trips following implementation; 
additionally, ridership on Ottawa’s transit network (OC Transpo) increased from 39 million annual trips 
in 1972 to 854 million by 1983 (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). Despite MSUA’s eventual rejection as a 
formal federal-urban institution for coordinating and delivering transit services, this example illustrates 
the important intergovernmental strides taken in this era. In particular, it highlights the benefits 
provided by the coordination of priorities among government agencies in developing solutions to 
regional transportation problems.  
Table 9 summarizes In summary of the issues, institutions, and interests characterizing Canada’s 
urban transit policy regime from 1968 to 1979, as discussed in this section.   
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Table 9: Canada’s urban transit policy regime, 1968-1979. 
Issues affecting urban transit 
(cross-cutting)  
Societal/governance 
level 
Institutions involved in urban 
transportation policy-making Interests specific to urban transit 
Traffic-congested inner-city roads 
and conventional “urban 
renewal” policy response (c. 
1968) (Picton, 2010)  
 
Energy crises and increasing costs 
of automobiles (c. 1974) 
(Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 1984) 
 
Rise of the first wave of 
environmentalism (c. 1969) 
 
Jurisdictional “turf wars” 
between federal and provincial 
actors over land-use and 
transportation responsibilities (c. 
1979-1978) (Oberlander and 
Fallick, 1987) 
 
 
 
 
Urban civil society Urban renewal protest groups (i.e. 
Toronto’s Confederation of Residents and 
Ratepayers Association, Vancouver’s 
Strathcona Property Owners’ and Tenants’ 
Association, Montreal Citizen Movement) 
Abandonment/reversal of urban expressway 
plans; advancement of transit as an alternative to 
urban expressways (Spicer, 2011) 
Municipal government Transit authorities under purview of upper-
tier (regional) municipalities (i.e. Toronto 
Area Transit Operating Authority) 
 
 
Federation of Canadian Mayors and 
Municipalities 
Improvement  transit efficiency across 
metropolitan areas, especially within city centres 
(Langford, 1976; Oberlander and Fallick, 1987) 
 
Procurement of direct financial assistance for 
transit capital investments from both provincial 
and federal governments (Spicer, 2011) 
Provincial government Ministers of Transportation (provincial) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provincial policy research agencies (i.e. 
Ontario Urban Transit Research 
Directorate) 
Retaining jurisdictional supremacy over urban 
transportation (Urban Transportation Research 
Branch, 1979); providing capital support for 
transit agencies (all provinces provided some 
level of support by 1978) (Canadian Urban 
Transit Association, 1984) 
 
Advancing provincial support for transit (fiscal 
and policy)  
 
Federal government Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 
- Senior Interdepartmental 
Committee on Urban Affairs 
- Urban Networks Directorate 
- Interdepartmental Committee on 
Urban Transportation 
 
Ministry of Transport 
- Transport Development Agency; 
Urban Transportation Research 
Urban renewal; improving access between major 
urban centres via highways; coordinating 
activities of departments with “urban dimensions 
(Langford, 1976; Oberlander and Fallick, 1987) 
 
 
 
Conducting transit-related research tailored to 
municipal requests (Urban Transportation 
Research Branch, 1979) 
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Issues affecting urban transit 
(cross-cutting)  
Societal/governance 
level 
Institutions involved in urban 
transportation policy-making Interests specific to urban transit 
Branch (including the Urban 
Services Systems Group) 
- Surface Policy and Urban 
Transportation Assistance Branch 
(Urban Transportation Research 
Branch, 1979) 
Intergovernmental 
organizations 
Tri-level conferences 
 
Bilateral organizations with municipal and 
federal representation, no pro (i.e. Urban 
Transportation Committee, Canadian 
Council of Urban and Regional Research 
Developing “policy harmony” around urban 
transit objectives (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987) 
Securing transit funding for capital projects 
(Langford, 1976) 
Private  sector/ 
labour unions/ 
miscellaneous 
stakeholders 
 
Canadian Urban Transit Association 
 
 
Public investment in transit as alternative to 
urban roadway construction/expansion 
(Roschlau, 2008) 
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3.3 Canada’s urban transit policy regime, 1980-2001 
3.3.1 Second-era issues 
MSUA’s demise was reflective of changing political tides in Canada, and in North America more broadly 
(Spicer, 2010). Specifically, political neoconservatism – or perhaps more accurately, neoliberalism – took 
hold throughout the Western world in response to recession and stagflation (Harvey, 2005). Urban 
transit was not unaffected. While the OPEC energy crisis and the first wave of environmentalism 
contributed to strong transit ridership in the mid-1970s, the 1980s brought global recession and the rise 
of “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism to Canada, in which public-sector austerity and private-sector 
involvement in the delivery of public services became commonplace (Perl and Pucher, 1995). 
Throughout North America, governments at all levels scaled back public investment to eliminate deficits, 
as the Keynesian public policy of previous eras proved unable to control inflation or fuel economic 
growth (Bunting and Filion, 2010). Simultaneously, governments intensified their focus on roadway 
expansion, as rates of car ownership rose as concerns over energy supplies were abated by a global “oil 
glut” in the 1980s (Anderson et al., 1996). In this context, the private automobile established a price 
advantage over public transit as federal and provincial transit subsidies began a downward trend 
(beginning in 1985) and agencies raised fare prices to compensate (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 
1984). Significant “hidden” subsidies for highways and automobile manufacturers continued throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s (Vuchic, 1999), which Ralph Nader and other prominent North American political 
commentators suggest emerged in the prewar period and matured in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II (at which point auto subsidies became a full-blown “highway complex”) (Fellmeth, 1973; as 
discussed in section 3.2.1).  
Despite these obstacles, transit experienced some growth in ridership in the early 1980s, which 
Perl and Pucher (1995) attribute to the federal and provincial capital investments of the previous era 
and the early 1980s. However,  restrictive fiscal policy from both federal and provincial governments in 
Canada detracted from public transit’s cost- and modal-competitiveness in the latter stages of the 
1980s, and ridership declined significantly in the 1990s (Perl and Pucher, 1995). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate 
these trends in urban transit financing from 1980 to 2001. 
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Figure 3: Sources of operational funding for urban transit in Canada transit funding in Canada, 1980-2001 
(Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015c).
7
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 Note that “for operating expenditures, ‘other’ contributions include local dedicated gasoline taxes, auto licence 
fees, and other miscellaneous sources”; “for capital expenditures, ‘other’ contributions include capital reserves, 
development charge funding and debenture, transportation development levies, and other miscellaneous sources” 
(Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2013b). All figures are exclusive of debt-servicing contributions. 
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Figure 4: Sources of capital funding for urban transit in Canada transit funding in Canada, 1979-2001 (Canadian 
Urban Transit Association, 2015b). 
 
As per these figures, municipal and provincial funding contributions for this period demonstrate 
an inverse relationship. Dewing et al. (2006) offer an explanation: in line with trends toward austerity 
and subsidiarity (components of the “New Public Management” administrative paradigm [Savoie, 2010] 
discussed in greater depth in section 3.3.2), provincial funding for transit trended downwards over this 
period as responsibilities for program delivery were “downloaded” en masse to municipalities – 
particularly under Mike Harris’ government in Ontario from the mid-to-late 1990s, which eliminated all 
forms of capital subsidy in 1998 (Horak, 2012b). However, provinces maintained control over program 
design and implementation, resulting in a situation in which “municipalities were burdened with new 
responsibilities, but no additional funding or political autonomy” (Dewing et al., 2006, p. 17). Federal 
contributions to the transit funding mix (for both capital and operational expenditures) were negligible 
in this period, as discussed in the following section (3.3.2). 
The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed a slow-down in urbanization – from 1981 to 2001, the 
proportion of Canadians living in urban regions grew only marginally, from 76 to 77 percent (Statistics 
Canada, 2011). However, suburban growth continued unabated; in some provinces, this was supported 
by distinctly anti-urban political interests and governance strategies (Filion and Kramer, 2011). While 
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urban and surburban voters had begun to exhibit partisan polarization in the 1970s – and specifically, a 
suburban preference for right-wing candidates – this trend grew especially strong in subsequent 
decades (Walks, 2015b). Despite an unsupportive political environment for transit, “new” environmental 
issues of the 1980s and 1990s (such as acid rain, climate change, and ozone depletion) brought the 
concept of sustainable development, as well as anthropogenic climate change and discussion of policy 
solutions, into sharp focus and the popular vernacular as the 1990s drew to a close (Shaker, 2005).  
3.3.2 Second-era institutions and their interests 
Urban civil society demonstrated a shift away from the environmental focus of preceding decades in the 
1980s, largely in response to the growing economic crises identified in the preceding section. As the 
economy sagged in response to the “stagflation” of the 1980s, the ability of civil society to gather 
political momentum for urban issues waned in tandem (Tindal, 2013). Public distaste for the perceived 
“inefficiencies” of public service delivery grew, and the firebrand version of urban politics of the 1960s 
and 1970s became muted, although not altogether silenced (Bunting and Filion, 2010). CUTA remained a 
vocal proponent and researcher of transit issues and the interests of its membership through the 1980s 
and 1990s (Perl and Pucher, 1995), and  a number of third-sector organizations became active in the late 
1990s – in particular, the Canadian Policy Research Network, the Conference Board of Canada, and the 
Canada West Foundation produced research and policy recommendations in support of urban transit as 
a “third way” between the social objectives of the welfare state and the economic imperatives of 
neoliberal governance, proposing that these issues might best be addressed in tandem via  sustainable 
city-building initiatives (Steinberg, 2013). However, it was not until the 21st century that these ideas 
came to fruition in policy outcomes; in general, citizens in the 1980s and 1990s grew increasingly 
politically independent and more apt to avoid “low-quality” or deteriorating transit service as compared 
to users in the 1960s and 1970s (Perl and Pucher, 1995). Changing economic conditions as a result of 
globalization and the consequent shift from a manufacturing- to service-based economy in North 
America has also been cited as a motivation for shifting consumer preferences in this era, particularly in 
light of the oil glut of the 1980s and regeneration of North America’s automotive sector following the 
OPEC crisis of the 1970s (Jones, 2008).  
This reduction of grassroots effectiveness in the urban transit policy regime was accompanied 
(and perhaps influenced) by municipalities assuming a much less prominent role within the federal 
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apparatus during the 1980s and 1990s. The new fiscal climate of austerity forced many cities to scale 
back service delivery, including transit (Perl and Pucher, 1995). Indeed, municipalities began to focus on 
enhancing their competitiveness as a destination for private investment rather than the delivery of high-
quality public services (Bunting and Filion, 2010). Lower taxes and greater emphasis on development 
proximate to highways left little money for transit investment (Tassonyi, 1997). Municipalities were also 
faced with fiscal “downloading” pressures from provinces, including maintenance requirements for 
sprawling road networks and transit systems without the commensurate financing power to renew 
infrastructure (Spicer, 2011) – indeed, Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the general trend towards a reduced 
provincial role in transit financing. The private sector became a more important player in transit as 
public-private partnerships came into vogue for capital projects, particularly in the 1990s (Siemiatycki, 
2011). 
Canada’s second wave of municipal restructuring was undertaken by provinces throughout the 
1990s (Lightbody, 1999). Largely, this involved the amalgamation of large, multi-tiered municipalities 
into single-tiered “city regions” – however, the ability of these amalgamated municipalities to effectively 
balance urban and suburban transportation priorities proved questionable (Hamilton, 2013; Lightbody, 
1999; Walks, 2015a). For instance: Ontario’s Progressive Conservative provincial government of the 
1990s grew wary of the growing influence of metropolitan regions on the province’s electoral structure, 
and devolved significant revenue-generating power and planning authority to fragmented and quasi-
regional municipalities with little interest in transit provision (Perl and Pucher, 1995). In Ontario, some 
scholars viewed municipal restructuring as a means to redistribute wealth away from cities, prioritizing 
the infrastructure and transportation needs of voters and drivers on the urban fringe over those in 
traditional downtown areas (Filion and Kramer, 2011). When the province created the suburban 
municipalities of York, Durham, and Peel to surround Metropolitan Toronto, transit planning 
responsibilities were placed in administrative silos – these new municipal bodies were heavily invested 
in low-density planning (and the development charges this mode contributed to municipal coffers) and 
lacked the incentive to enhance urban-suburban transit linkages; as a result, “exclusive visions of urban 
development” played out adjacently in downtowns and suburbs (Perl and Pucher, 1995). Defenders of 
these reforms characterize them as an attempt to match local government structure and transportation 
services with the spatial realities of suburban development (Tassonyi, 1997).  
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Following MSUA’s disbandment, a “policy vacuum” appeared at the federal level vis-à-vis urban 
transit (O’Brien, 1982). Both federal and provincial governments were in a period of budgetary deficit, 
and the federal government was interested, primarily, in reducing these conditions (Sancton, 2005). The 
pillars of federal governance in the 1970s – responsiveness, innovation, and effectiveness (Langford, 
1976) – were replaced by the cost-reduction objectives of the “New Public Management” (NPM) and 
“alternative service delivery” (ASD) administrative paradigms (Bunting and Filion, 2010; Savoie, 2010). 
As such, this period witnessed a transition from the federal government as a provider of services to an 
enabler of economic stability via support for the private sector and the removal of regulations (Barnett, 
1997); indeed, the promotion of Canadian transit-vehicle and -technology manufacturers became an 
area in which federal departments and ministers took an active interest (Gray, 1981). In general, 
incursions into areas of provincial jurisdiction were greatly reduced in the 1980s: ideologically, the 
election of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1984 completed the movement away from urban 
involvement initiated by the Trudeau government in 1979 when MSUA fell out of favour with its 
departmental and provincial partners (Hume, 2015). 
However, the federal government did provide some support for transit in this era. Funding 
under the urban transit component of the Urban Transportation Assistance Program (UTAP) developed 
by MSUA and implemented by the Ministry of Transport (discussed in section 3.2.2) was spent in this era 
– the most notable project that received support was Montreal’s commuter rail service (Canadian Urban 
Transit Association, 1986). Figure 5 presents an overview of the funds allocated to 207 projects via the 
two constituent components of the Urban Transportation Assistance Program (urban and projects under 
the Railway Relocation and Crossings Act [RRCA]). Note that urban projects received only 25.4 percent 
of total UTAP funds, while the remainder was allocated to RRCA projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Funding allocation under the Urban Transportation Assistance Program, 1978-1984 (Canadian Urban 
Transit Association, 1984, p.63). 
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In addition to these funds, the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (formerly the 
Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce) provided a grant of $60 million in support of Advanced 
LRT in Vancouver (the SkyTrain) – $20 million was used in a “demonstration” program, in which design 
concepts and vehicle performance was tested, while the remaining $40 million was used to purchase 
117 vehicles (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 1986). Hutton (2012) suggests that this funding was a 
component of the broader federal “regional industrial policy” to support Canada’s transit manufacturers 
discussed previously, given that a requirement for this funding was the tendering of contracts to 
Canadian manufacturers (e.g. Bombardier, SNC-Lavalin, etc.). As a result of these funds, capital support 
fluctuated between 1 and 1.5 percent of transit capital expenditures from 1978 to 198 (Figure 4). In 
addition, the Canada Infrastructure Works Program (CIWP; jointly managed by provincial and federal 
representatives) was introduced from 1994 to 1999 to assist municipalities in meeting their 
infrastructure needs; however, while transit was an eligible investment category under these programs 
(Rochon, 2002; Shaker, 2005), the impact of the CIWP on transit funding – and indeed, on the condition 
of municipal infrastructure in general – was negligible (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015b). 
Despite these federal initiatives (which, in the case of UTAP, were partially the result of 
decisions and ideas from the previous era) intergovernmental relations were generally unsuccessful in 
the advancement of urban issues over the majority of this era. The federal government became 
entangled in “constitutional crises” with premiers through the 1980s and early 1990s (Bakvis et al., 
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2009), and involvement in urban affairs took a backseat to more pressing matters of national concern as 
a result (Sancton, 2008). However, the National Round Table on the Environment and Economy (NRTEE), 
created in the early 1990s, acted as a voice for the development of revamped urban transportation 
policy in Canada  (NRTEE, 1997). However, the NRTEE was hardly an intergovernmental body – while it 
featured some provincial representation over its 25-year lifespan (1988-2013), all members were 
appointed by the Prime Minister and membership was dominated by academics and the private sector 
(Seidle, 2002). Its interests were, however, generally supportive of urban transit – its policy 
recommendations revolved primarily around the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 
automobiles and the enhancement of transit’s mode share as an objective related to the policy goal of 
reducing air pollution and climate change (National Round Table on the Environment and Economy, 
2003; National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1995). In a similar vein, the Canada 
Transportation Act Review Panel (CTARP) was an important institution at the end of the era. The CTARP 
undertook a statutory review of the Canada Transportation Act in 2001, reviewing the propriety of 
existing federal policy relation to all modes of transportation. Specifically,  research and consultation 
with other orders of government, civil society, and academia was undertaken in order to recommend 
substantive changes to federal transportation legislation, with considerations in its mandate on specific 
steps to “preserve urban rail corridors for mass transit use” (Flemming, Patenaude, Findlay, Rae, and 
Waters II, 2001, p. 3). 
At the end of the era, however, municipal malcontent with downloading conditions and their 
impacts on transit came to head in the late 1990s, particularly in big cities. Indeed, Horak (2012b) argues 
that transit was the “catalyzing” issue behind the establishment of the New Deal for Canadian 
Municipalities under Paul Martin (discussed in the following section). The City of Toronto was especially 
vocal in its need for transit funding as the TTC entered a period of “fiscal crisis” in response to the 
withdrawal of all forms of provincial capital subsidies in 1998. Via the Big City Mayor’s Caucus of the 
FCM, Toronto spearheaded an inter-municipal lobbying effort for the federal government for the 
creation of a “multilevel funding scheme” to assist with capital costs. 
Table 10 provides an overview of the transit policy regime from 1979-2001. Despite the “urban 
apathy” displayed by many of these actors during the 1980s and 1990s, the scale of the municipal 
infrastructure deficit became more difficult for the federal executive to ignore at the turn of the century 
(Spicer, 2010). For urban transit, sweeping reductions to provincial funding support left the nation’s 
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transit systems in a dire state. In tandem with greater awareness of the risks posed by climate change 
and its linkages to personal automobile use, the stage was set for renewed focus on urban transit in the 
21st century. 
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Table 10: Canada's urban transit policy regime, 1980-2001. 
Issues affecting urban 
transit 
(cross-cutting) 
Societal/governance level 
Institutions involved in urban transportation policy-
making 
Interests specific to urban transit 
Rise of economic 
neoliberalism and 
political 
neoconservatism 
(Harvey, 2005)  
 
Growing public 
mistrust of government 
and the need for social 
services (c.1980s) 
(Bunting and Filion, 
2010) 
 
“Oil glut” and 
decreasing public 
subsidies creating 
significant automobile 
price advantage (c. 
1990s) (Anderson et 
al., 1996; Perl and 
Pucher, 1995) 
 
Growing infrastructure 
deficit in line with 
downloading from 
federal government to 
provinces, and from 
provinces to 
municipalities (c. late 
1990s) (Barnett, 1997; 
Horak, 2012b; 
Urban civil society 
  
Canadian Policy Research Network, Canada (late 
1990s) 
 
Very little civil engagement on urban 
transportation in 1980s; organizations 
affiliated with business, academia, and social 
welfare groups coalesced in late 1990s to 
advocate for more coherent transit goals 
(Steinberg, 2013) 
 
Municipal government 
 
Transit agencies under the purview of amalgamated 
and upper-tier municipalities (downloading occurred 
in some regions) 
 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
- Big City Mayors’ Caucus 
  
Providing scaled-back services in an 
unsupportive fiscal climate (Perl and Pucher, 
1995) 
 
Advocacy for higher-order transit support in 
1980s and late 1990s (Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities, 2007) 
Provincial government 
 
Political executive and the regional transit authorities 
under their purview (i.e. Greater Vancouver Transit 
Authority, GO Transit) 
 
 
Provincial transit research organizations (i.e. Ontario’s 
Urban Transit Development Corporation) 
Downloading of fiscal support for transit to 
municipalities (Hamilton, 2013; Perl and 
Kenworthy, 2010); elimination of deficits 
(Bunting and Filion, 2010) 
 
Advancing Canadian-made transit 
technologies; supporting domestic transit 
vehicle manufacturers 
Federal government 
 
Department of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce/Regional Industrial Expansion 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Transport/Transport Canada 
- Urban Transportation Assistance Program 
(Urban transit component) 
Capital support for transit systems (i.e. $60 
million capital grant for construction of 
Automated LRT in Vancouver); support for 
Canadian-made transit vehicles and 
technologies (Gray, 1981) 
 
Minimizing costs and jurisdictional 
interference; research re: public mobility 
options for disabled persons and 
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Issues affecting urban 
transit 
(cross-cutting) 
Societal/governance level 
Institutions involved in urban transportation policy-
making 
Interests specific to urban transit 
Tassonyi, 1997) 
Rise of second wave of 
environmentalism, 
concerned with 
cumulative sources of 
pollution (i.e. ozone 
depletion, greenhouse 
gases) in the wake of 
the Brundtland Report 
(c. 1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Public Works 
- Physical Infrastructure Initiative 
 
- Canada Transportation Act Review Panel (c. 
2001) 
 
 
Roads and Transportation Association of Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
National Roundtable on the Environment and 
Economy (est. 1988) 
 
technology/efficiency improvements 
(Canadian Urban Transit Association, 1986); 
elimination of deficits (Bunting and Filion, 
2010);  
 
Reducing municipal infrastructure deficit 
(transit an eligible but untapped investment 
category) (Shaker, 2005) 
 
Identifying avenues for multi-modal federal 
transportation policy reform; preserving urban 
rail corridors for urban transit use 
 
Enhancing the technological advancement and 
efficiency of service delivery; providing 
research support to provinces and transit 
agencies(Transportation Association of 
Canada, 2013) 
 
Advancement of sustainable development 
principles, including modal shift from 
automobiles to transit in cities  
Intergovernmental 
organizations 
Canada Infrastructure Works Program (1994-1999), 
implemented by joint federal-provincial management 
committee  
 
Reducing municipal infrastructure deficit 
(transit an eligible but untapped investment 
category) (Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada, 1999; Shaker, 2005) 
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Issues affecting urban 
transit 
(cross-cutting) 
Societal/governance level 
Institutions involved in urban transportation policy-
making 
Interests specific to urban transit 
Private sector/ 
unions 
 
Private contractors  
 
 
Canadian Urban Transit Association 
- Government Funding Agencies Committee 
(est. 1982) 
 
Engagement in public-private partnerships for 
capital transit projects (c. mid-1990s) 
(Siemiatycki, 2011) 
 
Advancement of transit’s modal share and 
advocacy for higher-order funding (Canadian 
Urban Transit Association, 1986; Cervero, 
1986)  
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3.4 Canada’s urban transit policy regime, 2002-2015 
3.4.1 Third-era issues 
As witnessed at the dawn of the first era of federal-urban engagement, a change in political leadership 
catalyzed a major policy shift in the federal government’s involvement in urban transit policy in the 
transition between the second and third eras of analysis. In this case, the rise to prominence of Paul 
Martin’s urban agenda in 2002 and his subsequent election in 2003 stimulated agreement over urban 
policy goals and laid the foundation for tri-level funding partnerships for transit. The issues underlying 
this shift revolved around growing concern from urban planners, academics, public-activist groups (and 
eventually by extension, bureaucrats and politicians) about the quality of urban infrastructure, public 
subsidies for suburbanization, and functionally-segregated zoning requirements (Blais, 2010; Shaker, 
2005). In this context, transit has emerged as a sustainable “fix” for the failures of neoliberalism (which 
in turn was a response to the Fordist suburban “spatial fix”) – namely, expensive, congested, and 
unsustainable urban environments, and the consequent social and environmental impacts of 
automobile reliance (Blais, 2010; Steinberg, 2013). The quantification of congestion-driven productivity 
and quality-of-life costs has also contributed to the growing political acceptability of transit as a viable 
alternative to the automobile in urban regions (Dachis, 2011; Transit Investment Strategy Advisory 
Panel, 2013; Urban Transportation Task Force, 2012). 
 Roschlau (2008) argues for the consideration of two other key issue-based drivers of the 
ascension of urban transit on the federal policy agenda at the turn of the century. First, growing 
awareness of climate change and the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions culminated in the creation 
of the  Transportation Climate Change Table, a working group assembled to inform Canada’s ultimately-
reneged commitments to the Kyoto Protocol – this working group highlighted the importance of public 
transit as a key component of “any serious attempt to reduce emissions for the urban transport sector” 
(Roschlau, 2008, p.91). Secondly, a coalition of groups began to advocate for a tax exemption for 
employer-provided transit benefits – this effort catalyzed interest and debate among both social and 
environmental advocates. However, these factors and issues do not receive much attention elsewhere 
in the literature – as such, a more formal transitional boundary between these two eras was selected. 
Among this plethora of motivating political factors, the infrastructure deficit (the difference 
between required infrastructure spending and available funds in the near term) is perhaps the defining 
issue of 21st century municipal politics, given its ability to unite the interests of civil society and all three 
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orders of government in Canada (Gill, 2011; Steinberg, 2013). Despite the initiatives and interests 
discussed in this section, this issue remained significant over the duration of this era. Indeed, transit’s 
share of this deficit – and specifically infrastructure deemed by municipalities to be in “poor” to “very 
poor” condition – was estimated at $9 billion in 2015 by the Canadian Infrastructure Report Card (2016) 
initiative (an independent auditing association of academics and municipal professionals attempting to 
quantify and approximate the scale of infrastructure deterioration in Canadian communities). This figure 
represents 17 percent of all public transit infrastructure in Canada (including vehicles, mobile 
technology, security systems, signalization equipment, and terminal facilities) (Canadian Infrastructure 
Report Card, 2016). The Canadian Urban Transit Association (2015c), meanwhile, estimates the total at 
$18 billion – however, readers should note that this figure was released in advance of the 2015 federal 
election and is therefore likely to be an “upper-bound” estimate released for maximum political effect. 
In light of this complex backdrop, the following section traces the evolution of the urban transit 
policy regime from the close of the second era and into this final period. As in previous sections, the 
specific agendas and interests of these actors are explored in depth. 
3.4.2 Third-era institutions and their interests 
Local urban politics have been reinvigorated in the 21st century. Steinberg (2013) suggests that the 
urban advocacy of policy think-tanks in the late 1990s entered the mainstream of urban political 
discourse in the early 2000s, leading to the formation of “infrastructure coalitions” as the interests of 
local, provincial, and federal governments achieved alignment on the importance of city-building via 
“sustainable” initiatives (including transit projects and improvements). In tandem, a revival in the 
efficacy of grassroots urban politics has been witnessed (Tindal, 2013). By way of example, the 
aggregation of political support for a light-rail transit system in the Region of Waterloo was helped in 
large part by the support from local activists (Casello et al., 2015). Organizations such as the Mowat 
Centre, the Conference Board of Canada, and CUTA have also remained vocal in their advocacy for 
greater intergovernmental cooperation on transit financing (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2010a, 
2011c; Evans, 2007; Hjartarson, Szala, and Hinton, 2011). In contrast, however, Vancouver’s failed 
transit plebiscite in 2015 (discussed in the following section) and recent political (even mayoral) 
resistance to transit initiatives in Toronto demonstrate that public opposition to transit projects persist 
(Johnson and Baluja, 2015; Sancton, 2015). As discussed in section 3.2.2, Walks (2015b) argues that 
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preferences for automobile-oriented policy can largely be explained by “the urban-suburban” divide in 
lifestyles and political ideology. In addition, Horak (2012a) argues that “local social” forces in opposition 
to transit investment are often  marginalized in favour of the interests of the local business and political 
community in debates over transit infrastructure, given the capital-intensive and technical requirements 
of these projects. 
Nonetheless, scholars suggest that municipalities and their pro-transit interests have regained 
some political traction in the federal arena in tandem with growing recognition of cities as the loci of 
national economic growth (Bunting and Filion, 2010). For instance, the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities (and the Big City Mayors’ Caucus in particular) has been vocal in its advocacy for the 
achievement of a national transit strategy (see Section 1.2), and as alluded to in the previous section, 
played an important role in advocacy for an increased federal role that eventually culminated in the 
New Deal (Horak, 2012b). The role of the private sector has not abated either: in particular, the “design,-
build-finance-operate- maintain” (DBFOM) model has been used widely in Canadian cities as a form of 
revised public-private partnership in which private operators assume responsibility for operational costs. 
In this model, tenders for the establishment of integrated services are sought in which project design, 
construction, maintenance, and long-term operation are the responsibility of the contractor (Canadian 
Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2011). Examples in Canadian urban transit include “VIVA” BRT 
service in Mississauga and Toronto, as well as the Region of Waterloo’s ION LRT project. The DBFOM 
strategy serves to reduce the amount of risk and debt that need to be taken by public institutions in 
transit projects, and transfers significant operating costs to the private sector, offering municipal cost 
savings (Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2011). Figure 6 presents an overview of the 
project delivery and operational structure in DBFOM arrangements. 
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Figure 6: Design-build-finance-operate-maintain” (DBFOM) project structure (Canadian Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships, 2011). 
 
Similarly, provinces introduced and revitalized a number of regional institutions for the delivery 
of transit services in the early 2000s. The form and specific functions of these agencies differ in many 
respects, but broadly, organizational goals aim to integrate and coordinate transit service delivery across 
municipal boundaries. Despite lingering issues regarding the efficacy of these organizations in achieving 
their integrative goals (Schabas, 2013), provincial interests have been largely cohesive on the subject of 
urban transit in recent years, and significant emphasis has been placed on the introduction of higher-
order light-rail and bus-rapid transit systems, given the inability of conventional bus routes to compete 
with the automobile for mode share, particularly for commuters in mid-sized cities (Ruffilli, 2010).  
While these organizations are similar in many respects, Canada is a nation of regional diversity, 
and the institutional arrangements for regional transit services are no exception. In Greater Vancouver, 
the South Coast of British Columbia Transportation Authority (more commonly known as TransLink) is a 
provincially-mandated, inter-municipal special-purpose body responsible for managing roadways and 
delivering transit services. 21 mayors and one First Nations’ chief elect an 11-member board of 
directors, which approves transportation plans, determines municipal funding, sets fare prices, and 
establishes borrowing limits. As such, it draws upon property taxes, parking fees, and gasoline taxes (a 
federal transfer) from member municipalities (Sancton, 2015). The organization has a “stormy” 
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relationship with municipal councils in Vancouver’s metropolitan region, stemming largely from the lack 
of control over transit planning municipalities are afforded in this institutional structure (Sancton, 2015, 
p. 62). Its power is strong relative to other regional transportation bodies – however, its activities and 
ambitions remain severely curtailed by funding restraints. While the SkyTrain’s Canada Line (approved in 
2004 and completed in 2009 received dedicated funding from a number of public and private partners 
(Transport Canada, 2013), more recent long-term plans have faced opposition. For instance, a plebiscite 
in the summer of 2015 proposed a 0.5 percent sales tax to fund a $7.5 billion transit plan in Greater 
Vancouver; however, the motion was not supported by 62 percent of citizen respondents and failed as a 
result (Johnson and Baluja, 2015).  
In contrast, L’Agence métropolitaine de transport (AMT) – tasked with planning for public transit 
and delivering commuter rail services in Greater Montreal – can be classified as an intergovernmental 
special-purpose body (Sancton, 2015). Unlike Vancouver, the provincial government directly appoints 
four of seven board members, while the remaining representatives are city councilors from Montreal, 
Laval, and surrounding municipalities. However, it has no coordinative authority over roads and no 
operational control over transit (this is largely the purview of the Société de transport de Montréal 
[STM], Montréal’s municipal transit authority).  
Finally, in order to coordinate regional transit in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA), 
the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority was created in 2006 and branded as Metrolinx in 2009. 
This organization has yet another different organizational structure – it is appropriately characterized as 
a local special-purpose body, but unlike Montreal, it features no formal municipal involvement (Sancton, 
2015). As in Montreal, Metrolinx produces comprehensive transit plans for the GTHA (i.e. 2008’s The Big 
Move) and provides regional commuter bus and rail services via the operation of GO Transit, but has no 
control over highways, road transportation, or municipal transit authorities – these are the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Transportation for Ontario (MTO) and municipalities (most notably the TTC). While 
municipalities helped subsidize GO services and sat on the board of directors in the organization’s 
infancy, all 15 board members are now appointed by the province (and none are elected officials),  
representing an obvious attempt by provincial authorities to reduce the power of local councils to deal 
with the transportation dimensions of Toronto’s significant urban issues (i.e. sprawl, congestion, etc.) 
(Sancton, 2015). 
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Beyond transit planning and delivery, provinces have also adopted policies for urban 
intensification across the country (Hamilton, 2013) and some (with municipal support) have begun to 
investigate innovative financing mechanisms for transit services, albeit with limited political and public 
acceptance in Toronto and Vancouver (Johnson and Baluja, 2015; Transit Investment Strategy Advisory 
Panel, 2013). Examples include Ontario’s Places to Grow Act (2006), Vancouver’s Regional Growth 
Management Strategy, and Edmonton’s Regional Growth Management Plan  (Sancton, 2015). 
At the federal level, this era witnessed renewed investment and interest in municipal 
infrastructure was witnessed at levels unseen since MSUA’s heyday. As mentioned briefly in section 
3.3.1, Paul Martin’s Liberal Party injected new political will into the national urban transit policy 
landscape. During his short tenure as Prime Minister (2003-2006), the federal government embraced 
tenets of “new localism” and acknowledged the inability of local and provincial governments to redress 
infrastructure deficits in the absence of renewed federal support (Bakvis et al., 2009), largely in response 
to coordinated municipal lobbying efforts given the reduction in provincial assistance to transit agencies 
for capital funding (Horak, 2012b). The Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues was 
launched prior to Martin’s election, signifying changing political foci in the Liberal Party; with new 
leadership, a new policy direction and programs under the umbrellas of the “New Deal for Canadian 
Municipalities” and the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities (MSIC) emerged, applying 
an “urban lens” to federal activities (Shaker, 2005). Spicer (2010) argues that this incarnation of a 
federal urban role was more successful than MSUA due primarily to institutional “lessons-learned” 
regarding a heavy-handed and bi-lateral approach to engagement with cities – under MSIC’s framework, 
provinces were treated more as equal partners than barriers (Spicer, 2010), a contextual approach to 
governance referred to as “deep federalism” (Bradford, 2007).  
MSIC’s key programmatic outputs for urban transit include the permanent implementation of 
the Gas Tax Fund, remitting $2 billion of the federal gas tax to municipalities (by way of provinces) 
annually for “sustainable infrastructure projects” (including transit), as well as the Green Municipal 
Fund, a project endowed by the federal government annually and administered by the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities (Roschlau, 2008). Transport Canada also introduced supporting initiatives for 
MSIC’s mandate in the mid-2000s: the Moving on Sustainable Transportation (MOST) initiative and the 
Urban Transportation Showcase were both aimed at directing the impact of federal transit investments 
and increasing the attractiveness of transit to Canadian urbanites (Shaker, 2005). At the time, these 
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actions were significant and unprecedented in their longevity in the limited history of federal action on 
urban transit.  
The election of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006 ushered in a change of 
political course, and “deep federalism” gave way to a period “open federalism” in Canada, under which 
the federal executive vowed to retract their involvement in areas of provincial jurisdiction (Bradford, 
2007; Savoie, 2010). In many policy areas, this was the case – however, the decade from 2006 to 2015 
has, ironically, witnessed the greatest degree of direct federal involvement in urban transit funding in 
Canada’s history. While this may seem surprising given the ideological leanings of the Harper 
Conservatives, Steinberg (2013) suggests the sheer scale of the municipal infrastructure deficit and the 
increasingly-unified lobbying efforts were heavily involved in creating an atmosphere of “consensual 
politics” in the urban transit policy regime, in which pro-transit interests (largely local and municipal) 
became impossible for both provinces and federal actors to ignore. Further, Stoney and Graham (2009) 
suggest that “visibility” is another key driver of recent federal involvement – investing in transit (and 
other local infrastructure) has been recognized as a relatively simple means for the federal government 
to contribute to solving urban problems, while attaining political “credit” for public programming. MSIC 
was disbanded, although the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities (SCOTIC) was created in 2006 as an avenue through which to study “legislation, policies 
and programs, and other issues of national importance related to transportation, infrastructure and 
Canadian cities and communities as well as the operations of Transport Canada and Infrastructure 
Canada” (Tweed, 2012). 
Table 11 outlines federal programs and investments undertaken in this period, demonstrating 
the existence of numerous instruments and mechanisms providing support and assistance to 
municipalities undertaking capital projects with federal funds over this period. The federal government 
also retains a modicum of coordinative responsibility (reminiscent of MSUA’s role in decades past): for 
instance, Transport Canada’s Transit Programs group manages contribution agreements for projects 
receiving capital support from these programs outlined in Table 11 (Transport Canada, 2012). In 
addition, the Transportation Association of Canada’s Urban Transportation Committee has been heavily 
involved in conducting transit-related research on behalf of municipalities and provinces since the turn 
of the century, after a period of greater emphasis on roads and highways in the 1990s (Transportation 
Association of Canada, 1998). Note that the majority of these programs (with the exception of the Gas 
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Tax Fund) are contribution: programs, in which the other orders of government are required to provide 
matching financial contributions  (Horak, 2012a). 
Table 11: An overview of capital funding programs introduced by the Government of Canada in which urban transit 
was an eligible investment category, 2002-2015 (adapted from Canadian Urban Transit Association [2009, 2013a]; 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities [2015]; Infrastructure Canada [2014]; and Tweed [2012]). 
Capital funding programs for urban transit introduced by the Government of Canada, 2002-
2015 
Example 
projects 
Program Years active Specifications Funding 
spent on 
transit 
Green 
Municipal 
Fund 
2002-
present 
(indefinite 
end date) 
Endowed with $550 million by federal 
government in 2002Administered in 
partnership with the FCM 
$32.2 million 
(committed 
funding) 
Kitchener, ON: 
Grand River 
Transit North 
Depot 
Expansion 
Gas Tax Fund 2005-
present 
Transfers $2 billion annually to municipalities; 
transit is an eligible investment category 
$1.8 billion 
(approximate 
committed 
funding) 
Dartmouth, NS: 
Metro Transit 
Bridge Terminal 
($8.4 million in 
federal 
contributions) 
Transit-
Secure 
Program 
  
2006-2009 Designed to provide on-vehicle and in-station 
security infrastructure for urban transit 
$80 million Montreal QC: 
Surveillance 
technologies 
($1.68 million in 
federal 
contributions); 
Gatineau, QC: 
Communication 
equipment 
improvements 
($137,595 in 
federal 
contributions; 
Vancouver, BC: 
Access control 
measures 
($842,250 in 
federal 
contributions) 
Public Transit 
Fund/Public 
Transit 
Capital Trust 
2006-2010 Funding for capital projects (including rapid 
transit expansion/renewal, transit stations, 
rolling stock, etc.)  
$1.3 billion Calgary, AB: Bus 
procurement, 
LRT network 
improvements 
Building 
Canada 
Infrastructure 
2007-2014 Funding used for up to 50% of eligible project 
costs for a provincial or a municipal project 
(although eligible costs are usually split 1/3 
$2.3 billion 
(approximate 
spending) 
Greater Toronto 
Area, ON: GO 
Transit Network 
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Fund among funding partners), and 25% for private 
sector projects. Transit is an eligible category 
under the Large Urban Centres, Major 
Infrastructure, and Provincial-Territorial 
Infrastructure components of the fund 
Improvements 
($350 million in 
federal 
contributions) 
Canada 
Strategic 
Infrastructure 
Fund 
 $4.3 billion for large-scale infrastructure 
projects in support of sustaining economic 
growth and quality of life for Canadians. 
Federal government contributes a maximum of 
50 percent of total eligible costs. Projects 
chosen according to regional/national 
infrastructure priorities (determined in 
consultation with provinces and territories) 
$600 million 
(approximate 
spending) 
Toronto, ON: 
Union Station 
Signal 
Improvements 
($92 million in 
federal 
contributions); 
Mississauga, 
ON: BRT ($83 
million in 
federal 
contributions) 
Infrastructure 
Stimulus 
Fund 
2009-2010 $4 billion allocated for community 
infrastructure improvements; for transit 
projects beginning in 2009 and 2010, up to ½ 
capital costs covered by the program 
$240 million Toronto, ON: 
TTC network 
and facility 
improvements 
(approximately 
$61 million in 
federal 
contributions) 
P3 Canada 
Fund 
2009-2014 Targets public-private-partnerships for 
infrastructure projects; transit as an eligible 
investment category. The amount of funding 
support, in combination with any other direct 
federal assistance, may not exceed 25% of the 
project's direct construction costs. The level, 
form and conditions of funding support vary 
depending on the needs of a given project. 
$175.3 
million 
Edmonton, AB: 
Southeast-to-
West LRT line 
improvements 
($250 million in 
federal 
contributions) 
Public Transit 
Infrastructure 
Fund 
2016-2020 
(indefinite 
end date) 
Establishment of permanent fund for transit 
projects, reaching a peak of $1 billion annually 
by fiscal year 2019-2020. Funding allocated to 
municipality in accordance with observed 
ridership figures 
N/A 
(forthcoming) 
Incoming 
government 
pledges $750 
million for 
transit in 
2015 and 
2016, and $1 
billion 
annually 
beginning in 
2019 (2016 
N/A 
(forthcoming) 
 70 
federal 
budget) 
Some criticisms of these programs exist in the literature. Horak (2012a) argues that the “vague 
and underspecified” policy goals of these programs allow them to act as discretionary funding sources, 
which may be used in “politically advantageous ways”, increasing their attractiveness to federal 
politicians. Criticisms of federal involvement in Vancouver’s Canada Line LRT project, for instance, 
focused on the role the availability of “unconditional” capital funds in subverting regional transit 
priorities (Hutton, 2012). Federal involvement was motivated by the “visibility” associated with 
improving transit prior to the 2010 Olympic Winter Games, and involved “no responsibility and limited 
risk” for Transport Canada, given that long-term costs were absorbed by regional (i.e. TransLink) and 
private interests. Hutton (2012) argues that the presence of federal funds convinced the provincial 
government (despite local support) to build the project in the absence of a selection process (i.e. 
selecting a partially-underground rail line over other alternatives or alignments). As discussed in the 
1980s in the context of SkyTrain funding, federal support again constituted a “regional/industrial policy” 
given that conditions for support included contracts for eastern Canadian vehicle manufacturers 
(Hutton, 2012). Hutton (2012, p. 278) concludes that the “blended policy cultures of ‘big government’ 
and the private sector engaged in megaproject planning that failed to account for the interests of local 
constituencies.”  
Overall, intergovernmental relations have ebbed and flowed over this era – while MSIC involved 
significant tri-lateral consultation, “open federalism” resulted in a significant disconnect between 
provinces and the federal government on a wide range of issues (Savoie, 2010). Nevertheless (and 
particularly in comparison to the second era), provinces have largely cooperated to advance transit 
goals. For instance, the Council of Canadian Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway 
Safety (CCMRTHS) – involving both federal and provincial membership – established the Urban Transit 
Task Force in 2002 to monitor developments in urban transit across the country (Urban Transportation 
Task Force, 2012), releasing reports in 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2012 outlining both  transit needs and 
opportunities in urban centres across Canada (Urban Transportation Task Force, 2005, 2009, 2010, 
2012). The chief concern of municipalities, provinces, and their transit providers revolves around the 
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short-term and unpredictable nature of recent federal involvement – there is concern that in the 
absence of legislation enshrining a “fiduciary role” for the federal government on the subject of transit 
(and cities more broadly), current sources of funding may be the victim of shifting political whims 
(Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2007). 
Similarly,  a private-members’ bill introduced in the House of Commons in 2011 advocating for 
the creation of a national transit strategy – echoing many of the recommendations of the FCM and other 
organizations discussed in section 1.2 – led to SCOTIC’s involvement in the debate over the appropriate 
federal role in transit funding and planning. Over the latter years of this era, SCOTIC carried out a 
number of consultations with other orders of government and members of the urban transit policy 
regime on propriety and content of an optimal federal role. The Canadian Taxpayers Federation and the 
Amalgamated Transit Union joined CUTA and academics in testifying before SCOTIC and the Standing 
Committee on Finance on this subject between 2012 and 2015 (House of Commons of Canada, 2014; 
Miller, 2015; Tweed, 2012). 
Figures 7 and 8 present sources of transit funding in Canada from 2002 to 2014 (data for 2015 
were unavailable at the time of this writing). As discussed, the emergence of a significant federal role in 
capital funding represents the most drastic change from previous eras. However, despite the growing 
prominence of urban transit on the national agenda, Hjartarson et al. (2011) argue that the current 
structure of federal transit policy and support in Canada is patchwork (in that it is confusing for 
bureaucrats and politicians to navigate), inconsistent (in that annual funding is highly variable and 
unpredictable), and largely unstructured (in that operators are largely unaccountable to higher orders of 
government through performance requirements and other reporting measures). As such, civil society, 
municipalities, and provinces continue to lobby for a more consistent approach to transit policy and 
funding on the part of the federal government (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015d; Roschlau, 
2008). Note that while Figure 7 includes a line denoting federal operational support, this component is 
illustrative only of the fact that the federal government (as in other areas) did not contribute funding to 
this domain. 
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Figure 7: Sources of operational funding for urban transit in Canada, 2002-2015 (Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 2011a, 2012, 2013b).
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8
 Note that “for operating expenditures, ‘other’ contributions include local dedicated gasoline taxes, auto licence 
fees, and other miscellaneous sources”; “for capital expenditures, ‘other’ contributions include capital reserves, 
development charge funding and debenture, transportation development levies, and other miscellaneous sources” 
(Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2013b). All figures are exclusive of debt-servicing contributions. 
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Figure 8: Sources of capital funding for urban transit in Canada, 2002-2013 (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 
2011a, 2012, 2013b). 
 
In summary and as produced for previous eras, Table 12 outlines Canada’s urban transit policy 
regime as it has evolved into the 21st century, summarizing the issues, institutions, and interests invoked 
in this final analytical period.  
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Table 12: Canada’s urban transportation policy regime, 2002-2015. 
Issues affecting 
urban transit 
(cross-cutting) 
Societal/governance 
level 
Institutions involved in urban 
transportation policy-making 
Interests specific to urban transit 
Municipal 
Infrastructure 
deficit (Shaker, 
2005; Spicer, 2010) 
 
Urban congestion 
and consequent 
productivity  
losses (Dachis, 
2011) 
 
Identification of 
social and 
economic ills 
associated with 
urban sprawl (Blais, 
2010) 
 
Emergence of 
climate change (i.e. 
regulation of 
greenhouse-gas 
emissions) as a 
national policy 
imperative 
(National Round 
Table on the 
Environment and 
Economy, 2003; 
Roschlau, 2008) 
Urban civil society Urban policy community (e.g. Conference 
Board of Canada, Mowat Centre) 
 
 
Community transit advocacy groups  - i.e. 
TriTAG (Region of Waterloo, ON), Better 
Transit and Transportation Coalition 
(Vancouver, BC), Toronto Environmental 
Alliance (Toronto, ON) 
Advancing transit as a solution to social, environmental, and 
economic issues associated with urban sprawl and degraded 
infrastructure (Gill, 2011; Hjartarson et al., 2011) 
 
Advancing political support for public and active transportation 
policy and investment in Canadian cities; enhancing urban 
livability (Casello et al., 2015) 
 
Municipal 
government 
Transit authorities under the purview of 
regional municipalities 
 
 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
- Big City Mayors’ Caucus 
 
Containing sprawl (reducing infrastructure servicing costs), 
natural capital protection, economic development (Hamilton, 
2013)  
 
Developing and advocating for the adoption of a national 
transit strategy containing stable, long-term funding sources 
(Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2007) 
Provincial 
government 
Regional transportation bodies (AMT, 
TransLink, Metrolinx) 
 
Provincial transportation departments (e.g. 
Ministry of Transportation Ontario) 
Reducing congestion and productivity loss (Transit Investment 
Strategy Advisory Panel, 2013); reducing infrastructure deficit 
 
Federal government Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on 
Urban Transportation; Ministry of State for 
Infrastructure and Communities (2004-2006) 
 
 
House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities 
 
 
 
“Introduc[ing] a new strategy for a safe, efficient and 
environmentally responsible transportation system [to ]… 
reduce congestion” (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on 
Urban Issues, 2002) 
 
“Study legislation, policies and programs, and other issues of 
national importance related to transportation, infrastructure 
and Canadian cities and communities as well as the operations 
of Transport Canada and Infrastructure Canada” (Tweed, 2012) 
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Issues affecting 
urban transit 
(cross-cutting) 
Societal/governance 
level 
Institutions involved in urban 
transportation policy-making 
Interests specific to urban transit 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Communities; 
Transport Canada; Infrastructure Canada 
- Gas Tax Fund 
- Green Municipal Fund 
- Building Canada Fund 
- Infrastructure Stimulus Fund 
- Canada Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund  
- Public Transit Fund 
 
Transport Canada 
- Urban Transportation Showcase 
Program 
- Transit Infrastructure Programs 
See text for individual program details; aim is to maintain 
federal influence over urban affairs while minimizing 
jurisdictional conflict via contribution-based capital funding 
programs (Spicer, 2010; Steinberg, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manages contribution agreements for transit projects receiving 
funding under federal capital infrastructure programs 
(Transport Canada, 2012) 
 
Intergovernmental 
organizations 
Council of Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation - Urban Transit Task Force 
 
 
House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Transportation, Infrastructure and 
Communities 
Determining transit investment priorities for provinces and 
municipalities (Transport Canada, 2002; Urban Transportation 
Task Force, 2009) 
 
Consulting with provinces, municipalities, private sector, 
unions, etc. on an appropriate  
Private sector/ 
unions/ 
miscellaneous 
Canadian Urban Transit Association 
(representing public and private operators) 
 
 
Association for Commuter Transportation in 
Canada 
 
 
Canadian Taxpayers Federation 
Advocating for the adoption of a national transit strategy, 
drawing on elements of existing policy structures in peer 
nations (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2010b, 2011b) 
 
Increasing public emphasis on transportation demand-
management policies by provinces and municipalities 
(Association for Commuter Transportation of Canada, 2015) 
 
Opposition to federal involvement and investment in provincial 
issues and transit specifically 
 
76 
3.5 Summary: The evolving federal role in urban transit 
This chapter has demonstrated that the role of the federal government in Canada’s urban transit policy 
regime has undergone a process of dynamic evolution over the past 47 years. From the late 1970s until 
the turn of the century, the federal government’s approach to and involvement in transit funding and 
policy-making has waxed and waned in concert with provincial disengagement and the role of transit as 
a policy tool to placate or address the needs of constituents at the urban level. Recent developments 
and increasing financial support from Canada’s highest order of government suggest that a more stable 
role for federal agents in the urban transit policy regime may yet emerge; nonetheless, significant 
funding gaps persist, and institutional structures remain largely ad hoc. This chapter has hinted at some 
of the policy ideas underlying the decisions made by various orders of government on the subject of 
transit investment and support – however, it remains to be seen if documentation produced by federal 
actors over time corroborates, contradicts, or adds new elements to this discussion. As such, the policy 
ideas invoked by the federal government are explored in significant detail through the use of 
substantive evidence from 60 policy documents via directed content analysis in the following chapter 
(and methodologically depicted in Chapter 2).  
This represents the analytical crux of this thesis, explicating the paradigms, programs, political 
frames, and public sentiments that have employed by the federal bureaucracy and political executive in 
support of policy decisions vis-à-vis urban transit. The goal is to better understand how policy-makers 
have leveraged the issues, interests, and ideas of other orders of government and relevant institutions 
to produce the urban transit policy regime described in this chapter via the addition of policy ideas. 
These four components complete the full theoretical scope of policy regime conceptualization (Jochim 
and May, 2010). Following this analysis, the specific modes of policy change characterizing the historical 
junctures between the first and second era and the second and third era are classified, drawing upon 
Howlett and Cashore's (2009) framework for policy change (Chapter 5).  
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Chapter 4: Content Analysis of Federal Urban Transit Policy Ideas in Canada 
4.1 Introduction to the content analysis 
This chapter provides the results of the content analysis of federally-produced urban transit documents. 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the objective is to characterize the policy ideas espoused by the 
Government of Canada and its representatives over three time periods (the urban histories and 
scholarship of which were the subject of Chapter 3). These ideas – the motivations for political action, 
the characterisations of problems they aim to solve, and the broad (or narrow) interests they aim to 
serve – are often silent participants in the public discourse around a policy issue. However, as Béland 
(2005, p. 2) suggests, a “lack of theoretical interest in the role of ideas is problematic because paying 
equal attention to ideas and institutions is necessary for the analysis of policy change.” 
Conceptualizations of urban transit issues, substantive proposals for action, benefits and costs for 
members of society, and the values of other members of the urban transit policy regime as they have 
been articulated by federal actors (including politicians, bureaucrats, commissioned researchers, and 
stakeholders throughout the policy regime) from 19729 to the present are relayed in this chapter. These 
ideas reflect the “organized principles and causal beliefs” (Béland, 2005) in which the federal decision-
making discussed in the previous chapter is embedded. Some of these ideas emerged internally from 
the experiences of Canadian society, while others have been adopted (or adapted) in recognition of 
analogous experiences in other jurisdictions. 
As discussed previously, urban issues rose on the federal government’s agenda (and the 
improvement urban transit infrastructure and services emerged as an explicit policy goal) as early as the 
1960s (Perl and Kenworthy, 2010). However, tangible and sustained intervention – in terms of both 
fiscal support and involvement in policy-making beyond a four-year political cycle – waned in the 1980s, 
and was not witnessed or formalized again until the early 2000s (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 
2010a; Roschlau, 2008). This chapter is concerned with discerning the ways in which urban transit issues 
and solutions were characterized at and leading up to these historical junctures. Utilizing the framework 
for classifying policy ideas developed by Campbell (1998) and introduced in Chapter 2, this chapter 
outlines the findings of the content analysis and characterizes policy ideas – including paradigms, 
                                                     
9
 Note that while the first era of analysis formally begins in 1968 for the purposes of the literature review, the first 
document identified in this era was published in 1972. 
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programs, frames, and public sentiments – in the three historical periods introduced in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 5, these results are compared and integrated with the review of literature in order to 
characterize instances of federal urban transit policy change in Canada in accordance with Howlett and 
Cashore's (2009) framework.  
Before the results of the analysis are presented, some caveats to the interpretation of 
qualitative data (coded in Appendices C and D) ought to be discussed. First: in some cases, it is not 
useful (or even possible) to discuss policy ideas specific to transit in isolation from other modes and 
broader urban phenomena. As such, urban transit problems and policy alternatives are referenced in 
relation to a number of other transportation, land-use, and social issues throughout this chapter. For 
instance, discussions of transit policy ideas often arose in the sample in the context of or in conjunction 
with urban road and rail policies (e.g. HOV/HOT lanes, tolls, parking strategies, railway repurposing, 
etc.), fuel taxes and regulations, as well as the broader fiscal climates in which governments operate. As 
such, there are many instances throughout this chapter in which the implications for transit of a 
particular passage are implicit rather than stated outright. 
A second series of considerations relate to the first iteration of coding (or the “thematic” coding 
process). While the sample’s 60 documents contain a number of redundant descriptions of issues and 
proposals, repetitive coding within the same document – and to some extent, among similar documents 
within the same era – was generally avoided (i.e. redundant nodes for similar programs in different 
jurisdictions, repetitive definitions of urban problems or policy positions, etc. were not coded). As a 
result, urban transit was mentioned more frequently than the 670 discrete passages logged in NVivo 
(and presented in Figures 9-21), as only unique instances were coded. Also note that codes include 
representations of programs and policies from other orders of government – the focus in this chapter is 
on how the programs, paradigms, frames, and sentiments espoused by other orders of government 
have been portrayed by agents and contractors of the federal government, rather than assessing the 
degree to which motivations of municipal, provincial, and private actors are accurately presented. For 
instance, “programs” codes do not refer exclusively to policy directions and concrete initiatives 
implemented by the federal government; rather, the policy alternatives debated over the course of a 
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policy-making cycle are more pertinent considerations for this research, regardless of whether or not 
these proposals were adopted.10 
Efforts were also made to code each document as systematically and objectively as possible (see 
section 2.5 for a more detailed discussion of how sources of bias were accounted for in the research 
design and execution). Further considerations made during the thematic and open coding processes are 
briefly described in the following sections; following these discussions, sections 4.4-4.6 present the 
analytical results from the confluence of thematic and open coding procedures, relaying specific findings 
in each era. Broader key findings and policy recommendations for improving federal transit involvement 
are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
4.2 Overview of thematic coding 
As described in Section 2.3, the thematic coding process involved an intensive “close reading” of all 60 
documents included in the sample. This analysis – guided to a limited degree by word- and phrase-
frequency queries in NVivo 11 in order to identify relevant sections, particularly in longer documents  – 
resulted in the identification of 670 passages suitable for coding (meeting the definitions of Campbell's 
(1998) four categories of policy ideas). The 20 first-era documents (those written from 1968-1979) 
produced 187 codes; the 20 second-era (1980-2001) documents contained 272; and third-era (2002-
2015) documents yielded 215. Figure 9 provides an overview and thematic breakdown of these codes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10
 This is also relevant for the public sentiments nodes – for the purposes of this analysis, the definition of “public” 
includes the views, values and preferences of other members of Canada’s urban transit policy regime (e.g. 
municipal and provincial governments, civil society, etc.). 
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Figure 9: Overview and topical breakdown of thematic codes (compiled prior to the commencement of open 
coding). 
 
 The three eras yielded different numbers of relevant codes – the first and second eras (187 and 
268 respectively) in particular. There are two plausible explanations for this disparity. Primarily, first-era 
documents tended to focus on broad urban issues, as federal agencies in general (and MSUA in 
particular) grappled with how best to conceptualize and address interrelated transportation, housing, 
and public health problems. As such, they contained fewer transit-specific or -related passages than 
those in subsequent eras. Sample documents also became longer in the second era – the page-length of 
first-era documents averaged 28.3, compared to 55.1 pages for the second era and 46.4 for the third. In 
short, the latter two eras contained a higher volume of “potential data” than in earlier years. Perhaps it 
is unsurprising, then, that the distribution of codes mirrors the average length of each sample section.  
 The thematic coding process also a produced higher volume of programmatic and paradigmatic 
ideas as compared to frames and public sentiments – the three programs nodes totaled 239 codes; 
paradigms yielded 198; frames accounted for 137; while public sentiments totaled only 96. It is difficult 
to say concretely why the latter two coding categories (described by Campbell [1998] as “normative” 
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categories of policy ideas) were so prevalent, but an intuitive hypothesis can be proffered. Policy 
proposals and research reports, by definition, outline issues at hand and propose relevant solutions 
(Hammond and Wellington, 2013); indeed, most of the documents in the sample espouse a specific 
policy direction (i.e. a partnership, action, or project – representing a “program”) in relation to a 
substantive problem (i.e. congestion, environmental degradation – an aspect of the contemporary 
“paradigm”). The distribution of codes in the content analysis supports this theory, as paradigmatic and 
programmatic codes were identified in nearly all documents: programs were coded in an average of 
18.7 documents per era, compared to 17.7 for paradigms, 14 for framing statements, and 8.7 for public 
sentiments. This means that over the course of this research, framing statements – passages containing 
explicit normative (such as “the Government should…” or “the Ministry ought to…”) or value-laden (e.g. 
“unless these negative trends are addressed…”, “… the efficient movement of people is crucial for 
greenhouse-gas reduction“, etc.) language – were less common than those articulating the state of 
urban transit in Canadian cities in a “taken-for-granted” (i.e. paradigmatic) sense. The articulation of 
stakeholder positions (i.e. public sentiments) was even less common – however, passages describing the 
results of consultations and hearings became increasingly frequent as years progressed, with the third 
era’s 45 public sentiments codes eclipsing the second era’s (35) significantly and the first era’s (16) by a 
wide margin. 
4.3 Overview of open coding 
In comparison to the thematic coding process, open coding was undertaken with relatively little 
theoretical guidance. Rather, Bowen (2009) suggests these codes ought to emerge “organically” in 
relation to the topics present in the sample in order to reduce the influence of preconceived notions. As 
such, open coding was highly iterative – while the process is described in detail in Chapter 2, it bears 
review before the results are presented in the following sections. The first step was an “open” reading 
of each of the 12 sets of thematic codes, during which “memos” (or detailed notes) were made 
regarding themes (or content) in the subsets of data. These “open” themes were then translated into 
tentative sets of grandchild nodes in NVivo 11. Sets of thematic codes were then reviewed again, and 
each code (assigned a “coding key” in Appendix C) was placed in the grandchild node representing its 
content most closely. Similar categories (or grandchildren) were then condensed, amalgamated under 
revised titles, or discarded until the researcher was satisfied that all themes were accurately 
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represented under each parent node. Despite this paring-down of categories, there were some 
instances in which codes could, arguably, relate to more than one open coding category: in these cases, 
the most appropriate of grandchild node was chosen at the researcher’s discretion. 
In sum, 90 grandchild nodes were identified; on average, each thematic parent contains 7.5 
grandchild categories (90/12), and grandchildren average 7.4 thematic references per node (670/90). 
The largest of these grandchildren features 26 references (2nd Era Programs, “Transit governance and 
programming”), while the smallest categories contain only two (on nine occasions). Throughout sections 
4.4-4.6, the grandchild categories of each of the 12 temporal-ideational divisions are presented and 
discussed in detail. Note that in this chapter, while efforts have been made to capture the spirit of all 
categories and codes, not all 670 open codes are explicitly cited due to space constraints. 
4.4 Policy ideas, 1968-1979 
As discussed in section 3.4, this era was characterized by considerable federal “experimentation” in the 
realm of urban affairs and, to a limited degree, urban transit (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). The creation 
of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) led to the extension of federal programming into the 
traditional policy-making territory of provinces and municipalities – largely, this was in response to the 
rise of grassroots politics and the decreasing ability of municipal service-providers to cover the capital 
and operational costs of suburbanization (Spicer, 2011). Some tangible initiatives emerged, but much of 
the academic and grey literature reviewed in Chapter 3 contained mainly indirect references to federal 
attitudes toward urban transit. As such, determining the specific ideas invoked in support of transit-
related policy by federal actors in this era required careful analysis of policy documents. Sections 4.4.1-
4.4.4 present content-analytical results for each of the four categories of ideas: paradigms, programs, 
frames, and public sentiments. 
4.4.1 First-era paradigms 
Paradigmatic ideas, to reiterate, refer to  “assumptions constraining the cognitive range of useful 
solutions available to policymakers” (Campbell, 1998, p. 385). This thematic category deals with how 
problems are defined, cause-and-effect relationships, and rationales for action as articulated in federal 
policy documents. Figure 10 presents the list of eight open codes contained in the “1st Era Paradigms” 
thematic node.  
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Figure 10: Open codes for the “1
st
 Era Paradigms” thematic node.
11
 
 
Federal impacts on cities comprise one of four grandchild themes that garnered nine codes. This 
category refers to rationales for federal involvement in municipal affairs related to the Government’s 
physical urban footprint and the urban impacts of its programming. For instance, MSUA policy 
researchers Sunga and Duc (1975) suggested that MSUA’s creation was spurred by “the realization that 
the federal government is itself a major actor in urban Canada, affecting developments in urban areas to 
a far greater extent than previously supposed” (1Paradigms19) as well as “the recognition that the 
urban implications of current federal activities needed to be understood more precisely” 
(1Paradigms20). These realizations caused MSUA to evaluate the congruency of its programs with “local 
urban transportation objectives” (1Paradigms32-33), and to assess the feasibility of subsidizing 
municipal services, including transit (i.e. Frankena 1979; 1Paradigms45). Other codes cited federal 
responsibilities for vehicle standards and the social consequences of this regulation in cities (i.e. air 
pollution) as reasons for an active interest in urban transportation (1Paradigms18). 
Excerpts (i.e. 1Paradigms51 and 53) from the short-lived Urban Transit Research Board (UTRB) 
suggest that bureaucrats were aware that the impact of the organization’s transit programming – 
confined primarily to one-off R&D projects – on urban Canada in the 1970s was limited. Indeed, in its 
final review of activities, it is suggested that “[t]he problems of urban transportation are not unique to 
any one country … Unlike Canada, however, most other countries have a centralized responsibility for 
urban transportation R&D and it is difficult for Canada to participate in these studies” (1Paradigms55). 
                                                     
11
 Note that in Figures 10-21, the leftmost column displays the title of the open coding category; the middle 
column displays the number of documents (out of a maximum of 20) in which the category was identified; and the 
rightmost column denotes the number of thematic codes assigned to the open coding category. The headings in 
NVivo 11 were omitted to preserve the conciseness of each figure. 
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In short, there was optimism in the early 1970s about MSUA’s ability to influence urban transit policy; by 
the end of the decade, however, federal agents had less confidence in their effectiveness. UTRB 
researchers reflected on their institutional impact by arguing that the institutions impacts on cities were 
limited by conflicting priorities:  
“A research group working as part of the federal government and housed within a line 
department necessarily has mixed allegiance. On the one hand, the allegiance is to the 
broad Canadian community. The acknowledgement of that responsibility leads to the 
conduct of projects which may or may not have any interest or relevance to the parent 
department. In fact, in some instances the research results produced may be critical of 
line policies or programs and may be directly embarrassing to the line department” 
(Urban Transportation Research Branch, 1979; 1Paradigms53). 
 Postwar suburban sprawl was also cited as a motivator of federal action, referring to the 
expansion and migration of Canada’s urban population into exurban areas in the decades following 
World War II. Codes in this category involve federal recognition of the long-term fiscal implications of 
sprawl (1Paradigms36-38), reduced social access to employment and activities (1Paradigms50), and 
declining transit use in some cities (1Paradigms42). Sprawling development was also referenced 
implicitly in MSUA’s 1977-1978 Annual Report in relation to the “efficiency” of population distribution 
across the country: 
 “Each parcel of land needs access, needs links to other parcels, if it is to function in its 
intended way. The pattern of transport demand is thus directly tied to the pattern of 
settlement, both nationally and within cities or regions. Some patterns are more 
efficient than others, in terms of the monetary and other resources consumed and in 
terms of the benefits yielded” (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1978; 1Paradigms34). 
 Urban decay policy ideas were also articulated as federal-urban policy catalysts, in which 
overcrowding in Canada’s three major cities were linked to deteriorating public services in the 1950s 
and 1960s (1Paradigms21, 25). C. Beaumont Lewis (1972) – Director of Planning and Development at the 
Ministry of Transport’s Transportation Development Agency – also suggested that “the root causes of 
our present and imminent vehicle traffic problems are the growth of human and automobile 
populations and the almost complete lack of any planned development of our cities in the interest of the 
people who … live and work in them” (1Paradigms3). Similarly, the Inadequacy of transit services node 
focuses on the transit-specific impacts of these urban trends. MSUA researchers argued that growing 
transit operating deficits and plummeting ridership in the late 1960s could be explained not only by 
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suburban expansion, but also by rising fare prices relative to automobile costs prior to the energy crises 
of the mid-1970s (1Paradigms41, 43); income growth and the inferiority of transit services to cars in 
comfort and travel times (1Paradigms40); and a general lack of integration among modes 
(1Paradigms8). Frankena's (1979) results suggested that subsidies were as much a problem as solution in 
this context, arguing that servicing low-demand suburban areas did little to improve user experiences 
(1Paradigms56). A lack of academic interest in transit is also espoused by the UTRB as a reason for the 
general decline in the extent and quality of transit research and innovation in Canada throughout this 
era (1Paradigms52). 
The Recognition of automobile externalities was another major paradigmatic theme driving 
federal interest in cities, related closely to both sprawl and declining urban quality. Costs imposed by 
automobiles described in the sample include social isolation (1Paradigms1), traffic congestion, pollution, 
noise (1Paradigms4 and 77), wasted fuel, and automobile accidents (1Paradigms22). Note that few 
attempts in this era were made to quantify these costs – Lewis (1972) admitted that the absence of 
evaluative methodologies of this nature was a hindrance to effective transportation policy-making 
(1Paradigms6). Frankena (1979) also suggested that road-building to reduce congestion – a common 
assumption of studies conducted throughout the 1960s – had not proven an effective policy approach 
(1Paradigms47-48). Barney Danson, Minister of State for Urban Affairs from 1974-1976, provided the 
following rationale for the involvement of the federal government in urban affairs stemming from 
automobile externalities:  
“We seem to accept the fact that our roads and highways which concern us so much are 
part of the general revenues. We don't seem to do cost-benefit analyses on these; in 
this country at least we accept them as part of our taxes or our budgets. But as soon as 
we talk about public transportation, we immediately start counting the cost. And so far, 
I've been unable to find a proper economic analysis which will compare those two, 
compare the losses along those roads, the amount it costs us to drive our cars and  
amortize those cars and the gasoline to use them, not to mention the wear and tear on 
our nerves and the additional health cost, which is probably hard to quantify” (Danson, 
1975; 1Paradigms16). 
In many instances, documents suggested that the Interdependence of urban issues (i.e. linkages 
between housing and transportation inadequacies; 1Paradigms12) necessitated a “synoptic” approach 
to both urban planning and federal involvement (1Paradigms11; discussed in more detail in section 
4.4.2). Duc (1975) argued that the federal government was well-equipped to take a holistic approach 
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due to “an increasing consciousness” in the federal bureaucracy “of the urban impacts of their actions” 
(1Paradigms17). Despite the acknowledgement of these urban problems, however, federal agents were 
also aware of discomfort surrounding the Jurisdictional tensions of the era, both between federal and 
provincial governments and within the federal bureaucracy (as alluded to by the UTRB previously in 
relation to Federal Impacts on cities). While hopes were high for MSUA’s inter- and intra-governmental 
mechanisms (i.e. tri-level conferences and project agreements) in 1972 and 1973 (1Paradigms10 and 
13), they were characterized as largely ineffective by the end of the era (1Paradigms54). However – and 
despite the provincial resistance to federal encroachment described by Oberlander and Fallick (1987) 
and Spicer (2011) in Chapter 3 – constitutional respect pervaded the language used by federal agents 
throughout the era. For instance, Minister Danson stated the following in a 1975 address: 
“In my view … the management of our urban regions and their future shape and form is 
most appropriately dealt with at the provincial and local level. There are obvious 
constitutional reasons for this. There are other reasons as well. If we want to preserve 
and enhance the diversity of our communities and the life-styles that they offer, this 
choice should reflect the differences in the social fabric and cultural attitudes of a 
Montreal as compared with a Vancouver, or a St. John's as compared with a Regina” 
(Danson, 1975a; 1Paradigms26). 
Given this perspective and the eventual shuttering of MSUA and the UTRB by 1979, it can be 
deduced that while federal actors were aware of the consequences of sprawl and automobile-oriented 
transportation policy, the political structures and attitudes of the era were not conducive to a federal 
leadership role in the urban transit policy regime at this juncture. However, this is not to say that the 
federal government made no transit-specific efforts in this era – these are the subject of the following 
section. 
4.4.2 First-era programs 
Now that rationales for federal involvement in urban transit have been established, the degree to which 
programming involved and affected transit can be assessed. As per Campbell (1998), this category of 
ideas involves “policy prescriptions that help policy-makers to chart a clear and specific course of policy 
action” (p. 385), and includes tangible proposals and plans, project feasibility and research studies, 
funding programs, etc. Figure 11 presents a breakdown of transit-specific and -related programmatic 
ideas identified in this era. 
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Figure 11: Open codes for the “1
st
 Era Programs” thematic node. 
 
The most populated node in this category deals with Interdepartmental and intergovernmental 
coordination and influence – an understandable result given MSUA’s mandate and the overwhelming 
proportion of documents from this era produced by the Ministry of State or at its behest. The Senior 
Interdepartmental Committee on Urban Affairs (SIDCUA), the primary mechanism for disseminating 
MSUA’s policy ideas (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987), was mentioned on numerous occasions in relation 
to the articulation of programmatic objectives to federal line departments and other orders of 
government (e.g. 1Programs12 and 27). Proposals for coordination included relationship-building 
initiatives with local planning authorities (1Programs33) and transit-specific research and development 
work for provinces, some of which was transit-specific (i.e. the New Brunswick Six-City Transit Study; 
1Programs70). Also prominent in this category were tri-level committees and conferences, the first of 
which assessed the broad requirements of Canada’s municipal governments, while the second involved 
federal assistance in the preparation of regional multi-modal transportation plans (1Programs11). Ad-
hoc regional programming was also undertaken by SIDCUA throughout the era with the involvement of 
provincial and municipal authorities to varying degrees (i.e. in coordinating the provision of funds for 
urban revitalization efforts in Halifax and Winnipeg; 1Programs14, 73). 
Capital funding initiatives of this era were limited, but included the coordination of transfers 
through the Ministries of Transport and Public Works, most notably the Urban Transportation Assistance 
Program (UTAP; introduced in discussed in depth in sections 3.2 and 3.3). While this program was 
announced in 1975 and enacted in 1978, its implementation horizon extended into the second analytical 
era (demonstrating the difficulty of establishing effective boundaries for the assessment of policy ideas). 
Managing urban growth and congestion were cited as political motivators for its adoption – only 
 88 
commuter services were eligible for investment, although the program involved cost-sharing 
(1Programs36). Federal funding commitments were substantial – up to 75 percent of total project costs 
for new systems in grants and 25 percent in loans (although these figures were lower for projects 
already under construction) (1Programs37). The Railway Relocation and Crossing Act (and its association 
with UTAP) was another programmatic means by which funds were provided directly to cities to “fund 
and support the planning and implementation of railway relocation and rail traffic rerouting proposed 
by provinces and municipalities so that expanded rapid transit facilities, housing, recreation facilities, 
among other projects, can go forward” ((Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1975b; 1Programs41).   
Federal programming was also concerned with Enhancing redistributive benefits via transit 
improvements, specifically by launching demonstration projects in Canadian cities (i.e. Vancouver) for 
the separate transit needs of elderly and disabled populations (1Programs 15-20), and producing 
positional research espousing the geographically-limited benefits of rail transit investments over buses 
(1Programs60). Programs bent on Improving multimodal efficiency also represent attempts to redress 
urban problems identified in the previous section – these include indirect means to investigate more 
efficient transit planning practices via the creation of the Urban Service Systems Group under UTRB’s 
organizational umbrella (1Programs30), as well as proposals directed at municipalities to reduce transit 
fares, increase parking charges, and levy congestion charges in concert (1Programs45-46, 59, 65, 80, 82). 
However, methods of implementation for these programmatic ideas were largely absent from the 
sample.  
Federal R&D involvement and Modernizing transit also refer to indirect programmatic ideas to 
enhance federal influence over transit in this era. Federal R&D efforts were largely undertaken by the 
UTRB or funded and carried out via Ontario’s Urban Transit Development Corporation (UTDC), involving 
technological development for transit vehicles, guidelines for transit-supportive subdivision design, 
development of transportation behaviour-modeling, and cost-benefit analyses of transit vs. highway 
investment (1Programs47-51). Modernization policy ideas suggested the implementation of express bus 
routes and demand-responsive services (1Programs2); the development of futuristic rail-based 
“capsules” throughout cities for joint passenger and goods movement (1Programs4); the integration of 
modes and installation of automated transit payment systems (1Programs56); and the improvement of 
transit’s operational or efficiency, rather than focusing on increasing capital-intensive investment (i.e. 
service efficiency) (1Programs67). 
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As mentioned in section 4.4.1 in reference to the interrelated nature of urban issues, the 
Synoptic approach to planning and programming was in full effect in this era.12 MSUA’s research and 
coordinative capacities were described as all-encompassing in terms of the urban issues it aimed to 
address; there was also explicit consideration for research to identify effective programming at the 
“intersection of citizen participation and transportation” (1Programs10). This approach is embodied in 
the following passage, in which the process by which MSUA’s research program was formulated in 1973 
is described: 
“The research program must represent the elements that are salient in the urban life of 
Canada. To emphasize a few, for example, housing, transportation or welfare to the 
exclusion of others, would impair the capacity for a synoptic view of urban problems 
and lead to distortions in policy advice. There is an obligation to move on a broad front” 
(Gertler, 1973; 1Programs9). 
 
Despite the breadth and diversity of ideas reviewed in this section, the UTRB offered reflections 
on Program effectiveness, illustrating awareness of the shortcomings of the federal government’s 
programmatic approach in this era. It was suggested that criticisms of “meddling” in provincial affairs be 
resolved in future federal programs by extending the horizons over which research is planned 
(1Programs78), and in summary of its own research efforts suggested that: 
“UTRB, if viewed as an experiment, has been successful and has demonstrated that the 
federal government does have a role in urban transportation research, particularly in 
the areas of information dissemination and high risk R&D. Trying to perform such roles 
as part of the line administrations, however, was found impractical. Should the federal 
government re-enter this field in the future. It is recommended that responsibility for 
urban transportation research be placed with an independent body where the resources 
of the federal and provincial governments and industry can be pooled and an ideal 
research environment can be fostered “ (Urban Transportation Research Branch, 1979; 
1Programs79). 
4.4.3 First-era frames 
In contrast to paradigms and programs, frames refer to “symbols and concepts that help policy-makers 
to legitimize policy solutions to the public” (Campbell, 1998, p. 385). These include the values and 
arguments used by politicians and bureaucrats to influence the sentiments of stakeholders, highlighting 
both tangible and intangible benefits in order to validate (or “sell”) a given course of action. Coding for 
                                                     
12
 This refers to the analytical process popular in postwar public administration, in which goals are specified, policy 
alternatives are identified, and all possible consequences are then evaluated (and considered “knowable”) 
(Meyerson and Banfield, 1955). 
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framing statements primarily involved the identification of normative or value-laden language, as 
discussed in section 2.4. Figure 12 presents the seven categories of frames identified in first-era 
documents. 
Figure 12: Open codes for the “1
st
 Era Frames” thematic node. 
 
The Benefits of federal-urban involvement were a key theme among this era’s frame codes. 
Lewis (1972) suggested that the federal government could offer municipalities “well-digested” research 
and assess transit development opportunities against needs and resources (1Frames8). A stronger 
federal role was also linked to the enhancement of “cheap and efficient public transit within cities” via 
its involvement in railway and airport locations (1Frames16). Although specifics are vague, the programs 
by which this influence was exercised aimed to “promote the clarity, comprehensiveness, economy and 
foresight” of federal decision-making in the complex and contested urban policy arena (1Frames12). The 
certainty of these benefits was tempered in some codes, given that “the modalities of municipal 
cooperation are a matter for each provincial government to determine” (Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs, 1976; 1Frames10).   
Similarly, codes outlining the Benefits of improved intergovernmental coordination espoused the 
importance of viable working relationships among the three orders of government for the achievement 
of effective federal urban policy (1Frames11). The transit-enhancing benefits of municipal and federal 
cooperation on railway relocation are also mentioned in relation to UTAP (1Frames17), while other 
passages touted the potential for tri-level coordination of land-use and transportation planning to lessen 
environmental impacts, shrink urban footprints, and reduce energy consumption (1Frames20). Other 
benefits include reduced strain on municipal (and provincial) staff and budgets by allowing the federal 
government to conduct research and influence transportation priorities (1Frames30-31).  
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Improvements to infrastructure and policy were justified by framing Transportation as a key 
component of the Canadian identity, suggesting that Canadians have a moral imperative to improve the 
efficiency of passenger and goods movement through urban centres in order to safeguard “national 
wealth” by “modifying” automobile use (1Frames7). The absence of national transportation goals is 
framed as an obstacle to this end (1Frames2). Automobile primacy is also framed as a fundamental value 
of the 1960s and 1970s, despite its economic (1Frames28) and social costs (i.e. congestion, pollution; 
1Frames32). However,  Lewis (1972) suggests that the car ought to be viewed as a complement to 
transit, rather than its enemy: 
“I believe that there is no way in North America that we will be able to banish the 
private car from our cities, and, indeed, most of us would hate to see it abolished unless 
completely satisfactory alternatives were available. Thus, we must attempt to achieve 
an optimal mix of private and public transportation and make the car a better ‘citizen’ of 
the urban environment. In doing this, we may well have to develop some new forms of 
‘semi-private’ transportation” (Lewis, 1972; 1Frames3). 
The need to improve ineffective transit services was the most frequent framing code in this 
thematic category – agents suggest that while service deficiencies have long been apparent, “the 
average citizen has seen nothing approaching a solution … as he waits thirty or more minutes for a bus 
that is supposed to run every ten minutes” (1Frames1). Federal representatives also suggested that 
“conventional” approaches of the era to improving services were flawed, arguing that the benefits of 
buses outweighed those associated with rail investment for municipalities and users (1Frames24-25); 
espousing wariness regarding the potential of technology alone to resolve transit issues (1Frames27); 
and the need to levy “fair” user fees for all modes (i.e. road tolls) (1Frames6). The UTRB also suggested 
that new funding mechanisms were required to meet this need, implying that municipalities require 
incentives from higher orders of government (1Frames33). 
Federal agents also argued for the need to enhance Social justice through transit. These 
statements framed the construction of radial expressways (1Frames23) and the selection of peripheral 
affordable housing locations (1Frames21) as exclusionary to select social groups and income brackets. 
For instance, MSUA’s 1975 annual report posited that: 
“In many cities … movement depends heavily on the private automobile, with the 
resulting traffic-clogged streets and fume-laden air. At the same time, non-drivers –the 
poor, the handicapped, the very old and the young – are denied cheap and efficient 
transportation. Governments recognize that they will have to lend substantial assistance 
to make public transportation systems as convenient, comfortable, and efficient as the 
 92 
private car” (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1975, 1Frames13) 
Worsening urban conditions represents the framing counterpart to the Urban decay 
paradigmatic node, involving emotive language about “withering” urban areas in response to 
mismatched growth and decline throughout Canada’s urban landscape (1Frames14). The municipal 
“fiscal squeeze” was also represented as responsible for imposing environmental and social costs on 
Canadian cities (1Frames9), as well as responsible for “immense” and “unmanageable” impacts 
(1Frames14, 18). Danson (1975a) suggests that the types of communities Canadians wanted were 
jeopardized in the 1970s by the absence of a federal role in urban affairs in the context of rapid 
urbanization and growth (1Frames15). 
4.4.4 First-era public sentiments 
Public sentiments refer to “public assumptions constrain[ing] the normative range of useful solutions 
available to policy-makers” (Campbell, 1998, p. 385). In the context of this research, this category 
primarily relays the diversity of viewpoints held or demands made – perceived or otherwise – by 
stakeholders in the urban transit policy regime (primarily other orders of government and civil society). 
Figure 13 presents the four categories of public sentiments identified in this era – note that this 
thematic category was by far the most limited of the 12 thematic parents. 
Figure 13: Open codes for the “1
st
 Era Public Sentiments” thematic node. 
 
Demand for suburban living and automobility refers to public values tied directly to the Postwar 
suburban sprawl paradigm and the Automobile primacy frame node. Principally, these codes refer to 
households and citizens valuing “space over accessibility” (1PublicSentiments7), but who also “find it 
difficult to give up the private automobile in favour of mass transit” – even during energy crises 
(1PublicSentiments8). As such, some segments of society (i.e. suburban homeowners) were 
characterized as likely to switch modes only if the comfort and convenience of transit “exceeds that of 
car travel” (1PublicSentiments10). 
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 On the other end of the political spectrum, sentiments in Opposition to sprawl and automobility 
were also present in this thematic node, referring mainly to the civil-society groups instrumental in 
preventing urban freeway construction (as discussed in section 3.2.1; 1PublicSentiments1, 3). Anti-
sprawl positions included advocacy for and willingness to accept congestion charges and other forms of 
user-pays tax policies for transportation, which were largely deemed politically unpalatable in light of 
global energy shortages in this era (1PublicSentiments11, 13, 16). Opponents of sprawl were also 
paraphrased by Danson (1975a): 
“There appears to be fairly general agreement that the trends [towards sprawl and 
population concentration in three major cities] are unacceptable ... The residents of two 
of our three largest centres, Vancouver and my own City of Toronto, are showing signs 
of resisting rapid, uncontrolled growth. So are the residents of other communities. 
These people are telling us that they would be happy to see more of the future growth 
spread around to other regions” (Danson, 1975a; 1PublicSentiments6). 
 A closely related node involves Demand for transit and planning reform. These sentiments 
include pressure for governments to increase the quality, convenience, and speed of services 
(1PublicSentiments2, 4), as well as greater public participation in transit and transportation decision-
making at all levels of government (although particularly in municipal planning) (1PublicSentiments14).  
 In general, assessing Public influence on federal decision-making was difficult in this era – very 
few instances of public views were espoused in the documents, and those sentiments that were 
articulated were largely portrayed as unitary in nature. The urban demands of the Canadian public in the 
1970s were discerned via “opinion polls, through Members of Parliament, the press and other 
communication media and through the various community and interest groups” (Sunga and Duc, 1975; 
1PublicSentiments5). As the era came to an end, mounting public pressure to reduce federal spending 
was cited as a chief impetus for the removal of MSUA and the UTRB from the policy regime by the end 
of the 1970s (1PublicSentiments15). 
4.5 Policy ideas, 1980-2001 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the second era of analysis featured a withdrawal of federal agents and efforts 
from urban affairs in general, and the urban transit policy regime specifically, in line with public-sector 
trends toward downloading, privatization, and the “New Public Management” more broadly. This 
section attempts to discern how these trends were manifested in the substance and character of federal 
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policy ideas regarding urban transit in Canada in the policy and research produced by federal agencies in 
this era. Sections 4.5.1-4.5.4 present content-analytical results for each of the four categories of ideas: 
paradigms, programs, frames, and public sentiments. 
4.5.1 Second-era paradigms 
In this era, the paradigmatic views of the federal government on urban issues shifted significantly – no 
longer was intervention in cities championed by politicians as an appropriate response, and different 
actors within the policy regime gained prominence. The paradigmatic codes identified in the document 
sample reflect these changes. Figure 14 presents the distribution of codes over the 10 open-coded 
categories for this thematic node. 
Figure 14: Open codes for the “2
nd
 Era Paradigms” thematic node. 
 
The shift towards fiscal conservatism in this era (discussed in Chapter 3) is represented in a 
number of paradigmatic policy ideas in the sample. Budget constraints refer to the interrelated effects 
of global recession and the burgeoning neoliberal administrative paradigm that pervaded national 
politics in Canada (and most of the Western world) throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Devolution of 
expenditure responsibilities was especially prevalent in the 1990s – as the Transportation Association of 
Canada (1997) suggests, “local governments have less money available for transportation, and … more 
road and transit responsibilities assigned by the province … New construction is being delayed and 
cancelled, and transit budgets are being reduced” (2Paradigms61). The end of federal support for transit 
subsidies with UTAP’s expiry in 1984 are rationalized as a movement in concert with declining provincial 
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transit subsidies (2Paradigms69, 79). However, decreasing federal transfers to provinces were also 
acknowledged as a driver of transit budget constraints throughout the 1980s and 1990s (2Paradigms65). 
When the Canadian Infrastructure Works Program (CIWP; see section 3.3.2) came into effect in 1997, 
further provincial spending reductions via the “substitution” of provincial funds with CIWP funding for 
transit capital projects were described by the Auditor General (2Paradigms66). At the end of the era, 
jurisdictional overlap and funding differences in priorities among all three levels of government were 
acknowledged as key issues in Canadian urban transit by Transport Canada (2Paradigms72).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, New Public Management (NPM) Imperatives refer to the bureaucratic 
ideas guiding the “business-like” approach to “alternative service delivery” that rose to public-sector 
prominence in the 1980s (Savoie, 2010). Codes from the 1980s emphasize the need for less regulation; 
greater reliance on competition; and for the federal government to “facilitate and encourage, rather 
than obstruct and intervene” in the Canadian transportation sector (2Paradigms14-15). Divestiture of 
federally-owned transportation infrastructure was another theme that emerged from transportation 
documents from this era (2Paradigms41), as was the need for less regulation and costs for Canadian 
transit manufacturers (2Paradigms20). In this context, the Ministry of Transport’s (renamed Transport 
Canada in this era) role evolved from an operator to regulator, with a reduced role in urban policy-
making (2Paradigms84). While these codes illustrate the federal approach to transportation du jour, the 
Canadian Transportation Act Review Panel (CTARP; established to review the legislation guiding federal 
transportation interests and initiatives at the turn of the century) suggested that transit’s status in the 
context of deregulation was exceptional: 
“Transit has become an anomaly in transport policy. Governments at all levels have 
generally sought to liberalize entry to transport markets, reduce price regulation, and 
inject a measure of enterprise in publicly owned carriers and infrastructure, yet urban 
transit is still delivered almost exclusively by municipal agencies. Further, while 
governments have tried in other transport modes, and in other fields, to make users 
responsible for the cost of services, urban transit is still funded mainly through direct 
subsidies” (Flemming, Patenaude, Findlay, Rae, and Waters II, 2001; 2Paradigms76). 
Despite the apparent implications of this statement, the CTARP did not view transit subsidies as 
economically-inefficient. A cost-benefit analysis – a measure to determine investment efficiency and 
therefore an offshoot of the NPM paradigm – of urban transit in Canada conducted as part of the review  
process suggested that net benefits (in avoided social costs) of transit subsidies approached $6 billion 
annually (2Paradigms80). The CTARP also justified transit subsidies on the grounds that car use is under-
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priced in relation to its environmental costs (2Paradigms75). In short, NPM policy ideas did not preclude 
the federal government from supporting transit services in this era, given urban transit’s contribution to 
national interests; however,  via downloading and subsidiarity, the rejection of federal support for 
transit was both the de facto and de jure reality. 
In a related vein, the trend toward Public-private cooperation also represents an extension of 
NPM into the realm of transit. The relationship between transit-vehicle manufacturers (i.e. Bombardier, 
New Flyer, etc.) and the federal government was a major focus early in the era, as the “critical role” 
played by manufacturers in both national and regional economies was widely espoused (2Paradigms7, 
9). In 1981, Minister of Trade, Industry and Commerce Herb Gray drew a link between the concerted 
public-private efforts (from all three orders of government) in this field and the relative “health” of 
urban transit in Canada as compared to the United States (2Paradigms1, 3). Surprisingly, there was little 
federal acknowledgement of the role of the private sector in another branch of private-sector 
cooperation – the delivery of transit projects – in this era’s codes (although Siemiatycki [2011] suggests 
that public-private partnerships [PPPs] were used in the delivery of transit projects in Vancouver, 
Toronto, and Montreal in the 2000s). The CTARP provided the following summative commentary on 
private involvement in the Canadian transit industry at the end of the second era: 
“Urban transit, including buses and rail transit, is still supplied mainly by government 
rather than the private sector. Rail transit is generally government-owned and heavily 
subsidized. The latter reflects both a social policy of providing transportation for those 
not able to drive and recognition that reducing traffic congestion benefits motorists and 
reduces the need for new road investment. Commercial motivation has almost no role 
in the provision of urban transportation. There is a wide gap between the cost of 
providing urban transportation — whether by car or by transit — and the price paid by 
users. In addition, the signals conveyed to road users are distorted because of their 
failure to convey the high social costs of increasing automobile use in urban regions” 
(Flemming et al., 2001; 2Paradigms74). 
There is an argument to be made that Energy shortage and related effects influenced transit-
supportive policy-making early in this era (as discussed in section 3.3). Despite the fact that major 
energy crises occurred throughout the 1970s, concerns remained in the national psyche in the early 
1980s, voiced by federal agents in the context of oil prices and the concomitant need to reduce auto use 
and increase the proportion of trips taken by transit (2Paradigms2, 6). By 1985, however, 
representatives of the Mulroney Government, in the context of the National Transportation Act update 
process, provided a causal link between higher energy prices and lower transportation productivity, 
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necessitating reduced regulation and taxation, albeit primarily for freight movement (2Paradigms18). In 
the 1990s, the locus of energy and fuel concerns shifted from import prices to the recognition of peak oil 
and dwindling global supplies (2Paradigms27, 44). 
However, rising global oil prices in the mid-1980s accelerated development in oil-rich Western 
Canada, and some codes suggest that this contributed, ironically, to the Resilience of Canadian transit 
systems in the 1980s, particularly in Edmonton and Calgary. The Department of External Affairs External 
Information Program Division (1981) argued that light-rail systems constructed in the 1980s (with 
municipal planning and provincial funding) in Edmonton and Calgary were immediately successful given 
their ability to keep these “booming” cities moving (2Paradigms5). Well-planned bus systems in Ottawa 
and Vancouver were also lauded for their ability to facilitate strong ridership despite the decreasing 
costs of auto use in the late 1980s (2Paradigms8).  
On the other hand, later documents suggest that despite these isolated “success” cases, federal 
agencies were aware of the Declining importance and quality of transit as the era progressed. The 
preamble to the National Transportation Act 1985 acknowledges that fewer Canadians travelled by bus 
and train both between and within cities in the 1980s than in the 1970s (2Paradigms16-17), and the 
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) referred to a “planning paralysis” that characterized 
the urban transit policy regime from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s (2Paradigms25). Blame for this 
complacency is laid at the feet of municipal planners unsure of the worthiness of transit investment in 
decreasingly-dense communities (2Paradigms35), although Environment Canada (1994) suggests that 
the withdrawal of provincial operating subsidies also contributed to a general decline in transit quality in 
Canadian cities (2Paradigms38). As energy prices dropped through the late 1980s and 1990s, public 
investments in roads and consumer investments in larger vehicles are also cited as reasons for low 
ridership (2Paradigms40, 54) and the declining productivity of Canada’s urban transit agencies 
(2Paradigms77-78). 
This situation is also related to the Continuing suburban hegemony of the era, characterized by 
the CMHC as the result of excessive parking requirements for new developments and insufficient 
consideration of transit in municipal strategic and land-use planning (2Paradigms29). Also, Canadians’ 
cultural affinity for large lots and automobiles did not taper off in the 1980s (2Paradigms51). The 
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (1996) (NRTEE) suggested that 
“government policies at all levels, combined with market forces” (i.e. inexpensive peripheral land, 
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incentivizing homeowners and businesses to migrate) encouraged investment in roads and air transport 
at the expense of urban transit and passenger rail ridership (2Paradigms52). The Transportation 
Association of Canada (TAC) argued that financing issues faced by municipalities and transit agencies in 
the 1980s and 1990s stemmed directly from sprawling development that was expensive to service, as 
well as over-reliance on “consolidated and general revenues” for transit provision (2Paradigms59). 
Codes demonstrating Institutional inertia and barriers to transit improvements were also 
identified in the sample. The CMHC blamed the “multiplicity of jurisdictions” with interests in cities, 
making unilateral interest in transit improvement difficult to implement and ineffective (2Paradigms24). 
TAC also argued that a lack of involvement of transit planners in municipal development approval 
processes, as well as the absence of a long-term vision for sustainable transportation shared by all 
governments in Canada, were major barriers to the coordination of efforts in the 1990s (2Paradigms47). 
In 2001, TAC also suggested in 2001 that provincial and municipal governments tended to prioritize debt 
financing and tax reductions over transit upgrades in the 1980s and 1990s (2Paradigms73). A lack of 
municipal power over revenue generation for transit (2Paradigms71); the availability of federal subsidies 
in the 1980s, encouraging capital-intensive, politically-motivated projects over “lower visibility” 
operational investments (2Paradigms81); and a lack of full-cost accounting for transportation use 
(2Paradigms56); are also cited as systemic barriers to transit improvement throughout the sample. The 
NRTEE summarized jurisdictional barriers as such: 
“There is a general lack of integrated decision making about transportation issues 
among all levels of governments. Economics still drives most transportation decisions of 
the federal government. There is limited consideration of policies and programs 
designed to produce combined economic, environmental and social benefits, and so far 
little sense of urgency about sustainable development (including transportation) evident 
in the government’s policies and programs” (National Round Table on the Environment 
and the Economy, 1996, 2Paradigms50)  
Federal R&D trends discussed in this era did not differ substantially from those presented in 
section 4.4.1, although these codes emphasized technological improvement (i.e. computer applications) 
over other research areas (i.e. efficiency improvements, planning innovations, etc.) (2Paradigms10). In 
1985, the Transportation Development Corporation (the renamed successor of the first-era 
Transportation Development Agency operating under the purview of Transport Canada and carrying out 
much of the federal transit-related research in this era) reported a “lack of R&D funds, lack of time and 
staff, a lack of up-to-date information, and a lack of clear R&D policies” (2Paradigms11). There was also 
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a sense that very little consideration was made for national or regional perspectives in project selection 
(i.e. those “local” in nature were more likely to be carried out) (2Paradigms12). The TDC also suggested 
that there was “consensus” in the policy regime that transit R&D was unsatisfactory in the early 1980s 
both fiscally and in terms of content, a situation the agency argued could have been improved via the 
integration of local transit agencies and CUTA in project selection (2Paradigms13). There were no 
mentions of the state of transit R&D through the 1990s in the sample. 
Perhaps the most substantial departure in the discourse from the previous era was the 
emergence of Sustainable development imperatives following the Brundtland Report and the rise of 
“global” environmental consciousness in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These principles involve 
intertwined economic, social, and environmental ideas, and transit improvements were cited as a link to 
the development of a more sustainable Canadian transportation network as early as 1993 
(2Paradigms23). In laying out its national vision for urban transportation in 1997 and sustainable 
transportation financing in 1998, TAC suggested that automobility and sprawl were actively detracting 
from the achievement of sustainability in terms of environmental quality (2Paradigms60) and fiscal 
stability (2Paradigms64), a sentiment echoed by the CTARP in 2001 (2Paradigms83). Transit’s ability to 
reduce carbon emissions (2Paradigms39, 43) and improve economic performance (i.e. by reducing 
congestion) (2Paradigms45, 55) were both cited on numerous occasions as potential motivators of 
transportation policy reform in Canada during the second era. 
4.5.2 Second-era programs 
Programmatic ideas identified in this analytical era align closely with the transit-related paradigmatic 
ideas introduced in the previous section. Figure 15 presents the distribution of nine open codes within 
this thematic node. 
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Figure 15: Open codes for the “2
nd
 Era Programs” thematic node. 
 
Unsurprisingly, New Public Management programming was a heavily-represented category of 
programmatic ideas in this era, involving proposals related to the reduction of regulation and the scope 
of federal intervention. The federal government changed a number of regulations for private carriers in 
the mid-1980s – while not directly relevant to urban transit, the revamped National Transportation Act 
reduced duties and restrictions imposed on shippers (2Programs20). Program review was also a large 
component of the federal approach to transportation in the 1980s, in keeping with NPM principles 
(2Programs19, 21). This type of “performance monitoring” permeated federal transportation policy-
making in the 1990s as well. For instance, Transport Canada and Environment Canada introduced similar 
sets of strategic objectives specifically aimed at determining the degree of “sustainability” in the 
Canadian transportation system, emphasizing the importance of reduced greenhouse-gas emissions as 
policy goal, and monitoring progress via a number of transportation indicators (i.e. higher transit mode 
share) (2Programs43). As in the previous era, there was significant support in commissioned research 
(e.g. recommendations from TAC and NRTEE) for the adoption of user-pays programming (i.e. HOV 
lanes, congestion charges) at the local level to reduce reliance on general tax revenues and produce 
more efficient and environmentally-benign transportation outcomes by accounting for externalities 
(2Programs28, 86) – however, these ideas were more prevalent in the sample during the 1990s than in 
the 1980s.  
The Sustainable development programming node contains similar ideas, but more specifically 
includes programs referencing the need for more compact, energy-efficient, transit-oriented 
communities, typically aimed at other orders of government (i.e. 2Programs36-38). In order to increase 
ridership and reduce automobile impacts, the CMHC identified the need for increased operational 
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transit funding (via the dedication of parking and gasoline taxes, transfers from capital programs, etc.), 
although it also acknowledged that these programs were not being widely pursued at any level of 
government in the early 1990s (2Programs34-35). The NRTEE and TAC also equated the reduction of 
emissions and the improvement of land-use and transit integration with broad economic gains, as well 
as improvements to the fiscal health of the Canadian transit industry (2Programs81-84). The 
Government of Canada’s Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change and its component Urban Transportation 
Showcase Program was listed as a means by which to demonstrate and promote investment in transit – 
however, it is noted that “any objection by a provincial government to a municipal submission for 
funding is enough to render that application ineligible” (IBI Group and Soberman, 2001; 2Programs85). 
Stemming from these initiatives, Transport Canada’s “Green Commute” program was a “demand 
management” measure instituted for employees in the National Capital Region (i.e. Ottawa and 
Gautineau) to compel federal public servants to take active or public transit to work or telecommute via 
education and awareness-raising about the environmental impacts of transportation choices (a strategy 
mirroring those undertaken by other Canadian employers in the 1990s) (2Programs97). 
Echoing the preceding discussion of paradigms and Hutton's (2012) arguments about the federal 
“regional industrial” project presented in Chapter 3, federal Support for domestic transit manufacturers 
was another emergent coding trend in the early 1980s. For instance, $500,000 was spent the 
Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce in 1981 to lease space for Canadian manufacturers at the 
International Public Transit Expo ’81 in Chicago (2Programs4). In preparation for the Transpo ’86 World 
Fair (held in Vancouver), the federal government invested $60 million (of UTAP funds) in Vancouver’s 
adapted LRT system (now known as the SkyTrain), in order to demonstrate the quality of Canadian 
transit manufacturers to potential buyers from the global community (2Programs1, 8, 12). The success 
of Canadian transit technologies in Detroit and Portland are also described (2Programs2-3). The 
reduction of trade barriers was also a programmatic goal explicitly linked to the promotion of Canada’s 
transit manufacturing industry (2Programs5).  
Closely related is the R&D support programs node, describing research projects prioritized in 
this era. R&D carried out by the federal government (specifically by the TDC) in the 1980s focused on the 
development of intermediate-capacity transit options (2Programs6) – however, the majority of 
Canadian transit R&D in this era were carried out by the UTDC and provincial governments: in 1983, the 
TDC estimated that only 21 percent of Canadian transit R&D was being undertaken with federal funds, 
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with the majority being undertaken by provinces (2Programs13-14). These programs primarily focused 
on computer applications for improving transit efficiency (2Programs9-11). Again, it is unclear from the 
sample how these trends evolved over the 1990s. 
Consistent with this era’s focus on program review, Evaluations of federal support in the urban 
transit policy regime were provided in the context of the CIWP by the Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada (1999), in which transit was an eligible (though little-used) investment category. This program 
involved bilateral agreements with provinces, in which municipalities submitted funding proposals to 
provinces, who then forwarded applications to federal agents (2Protgrams73). However, concerns were 
raised that this capital support program possessed “little accountability” to taxpayers (2Programs72) in 
that CIWP projects were approved by both provincial and federal actors with little quantitative or 
economic justification (2Programs75). Politicization in the project selection process by federal agents 
was considered by the Auditor General, though it was not deemed an issue in the CIWP given that there 
was no federal involvement in project nomination. However, concerns were expressed that this lack of 
oversight resulted in the selection of “sub-optimal” projects (in relation to other, more crucial network 
components) by provincial and municipal agents with “parochial” or limited interests relating to their 
political constituencies (2Programs74). 
Recommendations for federal involvement in urban transit in this period were significantly 
different in the context of the NPM administrative paradigm than in the era previous; however, sporadic 
proposals were made throughout the era. In the 1990s, the Royal Commission on National Passenger 
Transportation suggested that the federal government take an active role in research and financing for a 
possible high-speed rail link between Quebec City and Windsor, opening the door for linkages to urban 
transit systems in cities along the corridor (2Programs23). However, this recommendation was 
conditional on avoiding the need for public operating subsidies and studies guaranteeing reductions in 
the need for highway and airport investments. In the mid-1990s (and in the run-up to Canada’s 
involvement in the Kyoto Accord in 1997), the NRTEE recommended the development of a sustainable 
transportation strategy in concert with provinces, focusing primarily on the development of an 
international negotiating strategy for greenhouse-gas reduction as well as integrated, 
intergovernmental support for transit (2Progrmams51). While emissions-reduction programs were 
proposed and implemented (i.e. as described in the Sustainable development programming node), 
concrete financial support for transit was generally dismissed as an inappropriate federal mechanism for 
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jurisdictional reasons (2Programs45). Components of these regulations included a lead role for the 
Minister of Transport in awareness-raising efforts (2Programs55), and the use of a “common language” 
by all levels of government around the need for sustainable transportation measures (2Programs56).  
The situation evolved somewhat as the turn of the century neared. For instance, TAC presented 
a vision for urban transit financing in Canada in 1998, promoting dedicated revenue streams, 
transparency in funding allocation, simplicity in program design, and the use of measurable performance 
indicators and user-pays principles (2Programs59, 64). The CTARP also supported federal involvement in 
urban transit given the financing challenges faced by municipalities and transit agencies had emerged by 
the year 2000. Specifically, CTARP supported the conversion of underused rail rights-of-way to rapid 
transit corridors (2Programs95), and in regard to funding programs stated the following: 
“The Panel does not believe it is necessary or appropriate for the federal government, 
or governments of the provinces and territories, to specify what measures should be 
adopted in order to qualify for funding. Instead the Panel suggests that agencies simply 
be given performance-based incentives … The Panel recommends that payments to 
transit authorities be made on the basis of their actual performance in inducing shifts 
from private automobile use to transit. The Panel suggests a payment per trip, based on 
mode shift from car (with verification from ridership counts and periodic surveys of new 
riders to determine alternative modes)” (Flemming et al., 2001; 2Programs94). 
 Beyond discussions of the federal role, a number of documents also make explicit Transit 
governance and programming recommendations aimed at other members of the policy regime. The 
“centralizing” (i.e. anti-sprawl) effects of transit projects in Edmonton, Calgary, Montreal, and 
Vancouver were cited by the Department of International Trade and Commerce in 1981 as exemplars 
for other Canadian cities (2Programs9), while the Department of External Affairs (1981) suggested that 
investing in transit capital projects could produce municipal cost savings on road-building and 
emergency services (2Programs7). In the context of developing a national strategy for sustainable 
transportation, the NRTEE encouraged municipalities to set targets and reduce emissions via the 
creation of transit-oriented communities (2Programs57); integrate transit and land-use planning 
processes at the regional level (echoing the MacPherson recommendations from the early 1960s) 
(2Programs26, 47, 81); and consistently apply environmental impact assessment and ecosystem-based 
planning criteria across provinces (2Programs29-30). The NRTEE also suggested harmonizing tax policies 
for fuel and employer-provided transit benefits across jurisdictions (2Programs46, 52). TAC echoed 
recommendations pertaining to modal integration, decreasing car use, and the creation of dedicated 
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transit revenues (2Programs65-67, 69-70), and made unique recommendations regarding institutional 
arrangements: 
 “Several changes to current institutional arrangements and practices may be required 
to develop and implement the new vision: Most municipal departments are structured 
on vertical lines (planning, transportation, transit, sewer, water, etc.). New methods for 
horizontal communications may be needed. Where more than one municipality or more 
than one level of government has jurisdiction in an urban area, a mechanism will be 
needed to coordinate and integrate their efforts across the region, at least for planning 
purposes. Public education will be a major key to success. Without it political leaders 
will not have the mandate to move in the right direction. This can be a very time 
consuming and expensive exercise, but it is necessary. Checks must be built into the 
decision making process, to ensure that day-to-day decisions are compatible with the 
vision and its principles” (Transportation Association of Canada, 1998; 2Programs71). 
The Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety (CCMRTHS) is 
named by the CTARP as a critical institution in harmonizing the implementation of transit-supportive 
policies of this nature at the end of the second era (2Programs96). (Indeed, the CCMRTHS assumed a 
much more prominent role in the policy regime in the following analytical period.) In relation to funding 
provisions specifically, the Auditor General’s CIWP review suggested that federal transit funding ought 
to be carefully considered, in that they may incentivize provinces to reduce their own spending – in 
other words, the availability of federal support meant that provinces tended to shift spending to the 
federal envelope rather than supplement their existing spending (2Programs76), although the degree to 
which transit was affected by this phenomenon is unclear from the report (Office of the Auditor General 
of Canada, 1999). 
Throughout this era, some codes note that Addressing the transit funding shortfall remained a 
programmatic imperative, linked to the escalating costs of service provision in relation to sprawling 
communities (2Programs77), despite decreasing service hours and increased fares in many systems 
(which helped to stabilize revenue losses) (2Programs78-79). A House of Commons debate in 2000 
discussed the transit-supportive capital funding programs proposed by the federal Liberals at the turn of 
the century (implemented in the third era) (2Programs80); however, the means by which federal actors 
suggested the fiscal health of Canada’s transit systems be improved demonstrated a Shifting focus away 
from capital investment, particularly in the era’s early years. In the late 1980s, many transit projects 
across the country were cut as municipal budgets “froze”, including construction delays in Edmonton’s 
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LRT and Montreal’s commuter rail system and a busway cancellation in Winnipeg (2Programs27). The 
situation was summarized in a research paper commissioned by the CMHC as such: 
“As effort focused away from major transportation infrastructure projects, more 
attention was paid to alternative methods of reducing congestion and petroleum 
consumption, and making more efficient use of existing infrastructure. All levels of 
government sponsored efforts in the fields of alternative transportation fuels, demand 
management techniques (e.g. ridesharing and alternative work hours) and traffic system 
management techniques such as improved arterial and traffic signal control systems and 
freeway traffic management systems. Since the major driving force behind such efforts 
was concerns about petroleum dependency, political and general support for these 
measures tended to ebb and flow with the energy crises. However, the measures 
provided enough potential and actual benefits in terms of infrastructure efficiency and 
reduced congestion and emissions to maintain a steady level of support from all 
government levels” (IBI Group, 1993, 2Programs25). 
In the 1990s, TAC suggested that improving the efficiency of existing systems was a more 
pressing policy goal than capital expansion in a difficult fiscal climate (2Programs68), while the CTARP 
noted that transit was underemphasized in the CIWP (2Programs88) and provincial capital subsidy 
programs were largely discontinued in this decade as a result of downloading policies (2Programs89). 
These trends are borne out in capital funding data presented in Figure 4 (section 3.3.1).   
4.5.3 Second-era frames 
Framing statements in the second era related closely to the political climate of austerity and 
subsidiarity, and private-sector support explored in the previous paradigmatic and programmatic 
sections. Figure 16 shows the distribution of framing references for this era over seven open codes. 
Figure 16: Open codes for the “2
nd
 Era Frames” thematic node. 
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In framing issues and policy solutions to transit problems, a number of appeals were made to 
Canadian political culture and urban traditions. Specifically, these included unlimited personal mobility; 
automobiles as status symbols; large lots, suburban homes, and opposition to high-density infill 
development (often in the name of environmental protection); and expectations for access to public 
transit services, even in low-density suburbs (2Frames21, 27). The NRTEE suggested these entrenched 
values were problematic, requiring that Canadians change transportation decision-making habits, 
reframing expectations from “mobility” to “accessibility” in order to avoid significant health 
consequences from pollution and chronic illness related to sedentary lifestyles (2Frames22, 29). 
Similarly, Canada’s export-driven economy and high standards of living were also framed as contributors 
to the nation’s tolerance for distance and driving, to the inevitable detriment of both the environment 
and economy (2Frames26). The economic competitiveness of Canada’s cities and mid-sized 
communities – framed as expressions of this Canadian identity – were considered by the NRTEE to be at 
risk in the context of congestion and sprawl (2Frames40, 47).   
Despite the national-scale costs espoused by some federal agencies in this period (i.e. NRTEE, 
TAC), some codes explicitly and implicitly stated the general Impropriety of national transit policy. One 
statement by a researcher from the Library of Parliament suggested that “[c]learly, the question is 
whether, in a large and diverse country with strong regional differences and interests, it is possible or 
indeed necessary to have a national transportation policy” (Christopher, 1992; 2Frames12). Even TAC, in 
outlining its “vision” for urban transportation in Canada, suggested that given the need for leadership in 
transit, it is “logical that municipal elected officials do so” (2Frames33). Similarly, the “design of the 
[CIWP] recognizes that … provinces and municipalities are responsible for investments in local 
infrastructure. At the provincial and municipal levels, there is extensive experience in planning, financing 
and implementing such investments” (2Frames35). In general and prior to the CTARP report, there was 
little suggestion in the sample that a federally-driven urban transit policy was appropriate for Canada in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Importance of New Public Management policy goals were also referenced in support of the 
programs and as an extension of the paradigm discussed in the preceding sections. The NPM policy 
approach was justified in the National Transportation Policy Act 1985 and 1989 for intra vires 
transportation issues as “the way of the future” (2Frames7), emphasizing the need for relaxed 
regulations in vehicle standards (albeit not at the expense of safety, according to the Minister of 
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Transport in 1985); the reliance on market forces; and a review of legislation should “problems in 
isolated cases” arise (2Frames5-11). Budget reductions for urban transit infrastructure were framed by 
the CMHC in 1993 as a result of “pressure on governments” to reduce deficits and levels of expenditure, 
despite the preparation of extensive transit-expansion plans in all seven of Canada’s major cities in the 
early 1990s (2Frames15). In terms of performance measures, the CIWP contained many: these were 
deemed crucial to the program in order to foster accountability to Parliament, and by extension, the 
Canadian public (2Frames34). Chief among these were the “employment effects”, which the Office of 
the Auditor General suggests were made highly visible and publicly-accessible by federal departments in 
particular (2Frames36-37). Finally, the CTARP suggested the following in relation to privatization and the 
Canadian transit industry at the end of this era: 
“In Canadian conditions, it seems possible that deregulation (permitting entrants to 
compete with what are currently monopoly transit agencies) and commercialization 
could encourage innovative and less costly services, such as small buses or shared taxis 
from less-dense suburbs to interconnections with transit trunk routes. But those 
possibilities are probably quite limited. More extensive commercialization is constrained 
by labour agreements, cultural factors (people’s attachment to their cars), and the fact 
that urban infrastructure tends to favour private automobile use over transit” (IBI Group 
and Soberman, 2001; 2Frames49). 
Given that the federal government strongly encouraged purchases of Canadian transit vehicles 
both domestically and internationally in the early 1980s (section 4.3.2), it is not surprising that the 
Expertise of the Canadian transit industry is espoused in these codes. Canada’s diverse and challenging 
geography, topography, and climate were cited as reasons that the quality of Canadian vehicles and 
transit systems were “universally recognized” (2Frames2), while the “innovative and well-rounded” 
professional experience of the nation’s transit professionals and manufacturers were touted in trade 
publications in advance of Public Transit Expo ’81 (2Frames3). 
Despite a general federal preference for a limited role in urban transit, the Transit problem 
definitions and remedies presented in this era’s framing statements did not differ significantly from 
those in the previous era’s documents. The centrality of provinces in the “successful achievements” of 
Canadian transit systems were cited in 1981 (2Frames1), while the remaining challenges were attributed 
to geographic and historical differences in Canadian cities, facing different challenges than older, denser 
European cities with shorter distances between destinations (2Frames23). However, the CMHC argued 
that “Canadians have retained traditions of urban living”, suggesting that transit may be improved in 
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congruence with cultural values, at least in major urban centres – a characterization in contrast (or as a 
parallel to) the “cultural” frames presented earlier in this section. However, “consensus” emerged over 
the 1990s (i.e. 2Frames45, 52) that stable, long-term funding sources and deterrents to private auto use 
were needed (2Frames48) if the transit issues stemming from sprawl and automobility were to be 
successfully remedied. In 2001, a review of its national policy direction commissioned by Transport 
Canada suggested the following about federal attitudes and future role in the policy regime: 
“The most recent Speech from the Throne, which states that the federal government 
will ‘cooperate with provincial and municipal partners to help improve public transit 
infrastructure’, singles out urban transit as a new area of federal government interest as 
do recent statements by the federal Minister of Transport” (IBI Group and Soberman, 
2001; 2Frames46). 
The Externalities of sprawl and automobility as motivators of action node includes, primarily, 
references to the consequences of greenhouse-gas emissions and climate change that grew in 
prominence through the 1990s. According to the CMHC in 1993, the  “prognosis is grim” for urban 
transit as a result of congestion and sprawling development (2Frames16), while the automobile was 
described as a primary culprit of both atmospheric and ground-water pollution (2Frames13), as well as 
for the geographic divide between residential and employment land uses (2Frames14, 17). Policy reform 
was framed by the NRTEE as a “requirement” given that sprawl was permitted “only to accommodate 
population growth and social desires through low-density development on less expensive land” 
(2Frames28), and due to the hidden costs and environmental externalities imposed by automobiles on 
society (2Frames35). Congestion as a detractor from urban quality of life was also presented by the 
CTARP (2Frames50), while the IBI Group and Soberman (2001) argue that meeting transportation needs 
in urban areas through roadway construction “is no longer practicable from the standpoint of 
sustainable development, system capability, environmental impacts, liveable communities, and the 
accessibility to be provided to all groups of society” (2Frames41). 
Similarly, a number of Economic, environmental, and social benefits of transit were provided in 
the sample. The orientation of cities around transit (rather than cars) was suggested as a means by 
which the future consequences of energy crises, recession, and environmental degradation could be 
avoided or mitigated (2Frames4, 18). Solving global environmental problems (i.e. climate change) was 
increasingly discussed in relation to local benefits (i.e. air quality improvements, health and lifestyle 
benefits of transit reliance) as the 1990s progressed (2Frames23-25). TAC’s vision for financing 
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sustainable transportation in Canada also made reference to these transit-related benefits, as well as 
those associated with high densities, mobility for dependent and disabled populations, efficient 
movement and integration of all modes, and reduced commuting (2Frames30). Long-term cost savings 
for all orders of government stemming from the application of this vision were also presented 
(2Frames32), albeit with little substantive evidence. Later documents espoused the health, climatic 
(2Frames42), economic (via the creation of “vibrant local economies”; 2Frames43-44), and convenience 
benefits (2Frames51) of transit investments. 
4.5.4 Second-era public sentiments 
Public sentiments in the second era share some similarities to those presented in section 4.2.3, although 
a wider range of views are presented as compared to the first analytical era. Figure 17 presents the six 
open codes identified within this thematic node. 
Figure 17: Open codes for the “2
nd
 Era Public Sentiments” thematic node. 
 
If public sentiments in the first era can be generally characterized as transit-supportive (section 
4.3.4), then it is no stretch to suggest that the second era featured a greater degree of opposition to 
transit investment both within civil society and throughout Canada’s urban transit policy regime. 
Automobile entrenchment and individualism were strongly-held sentiments in the national psyche which 
persisted into the 1980s (2PublicSentiments1). When the price of gasoline dropped in the late 1980s, 
Canadians adopted car use even more widely for commuting purposes, “thinking nothing of travelling 
long distances for work, recreation, shopping, and socializing” (2PublicSentiments5) as a result of the 
lower perceived operating costs of the automobile relative to transit (2PublicSentiments28). As 
discussed in section 4.5.3, “values and aspirations” for unlimited personal mobility, comfort of 
transportation services, large suburban lots, rising household incomes, and an aging population were 
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described by the CMHC, NRTEE and others as responsible for increasing auto use over the era 
(2PublicSentiments14-15, 19, 26). Indeed, these preferences were borne out by the expansion of 
suburban communities in Canada at a greater rate than core cities in the 1980s (2PublicSentiments20). 
Also, many of the “demand-management” programs (i.e. soft measures promoting transit use and 
telecommuting; see section 4.5.2) undertaken in this period (including those by Transport Canada) were 
largely unsuccessful as a result of these sentiments, according to the CMHC: 
“The key flaw in … direct demand management methods is that they require incentive, 
and that incentive is missing in Canadian cities. Canadians value the environment, their 
pocket-book and their urban amenities, but not highly enough to make the benefits of 
these practices outweigh the disbenefits in terms of less convenience and flexibility, 
longer travel times, etc. Unless the sensitivity of Canadians to congestion and pollution 
increases, the automobile mode becomes significantly more inconvenient in terms 
increased costs or congestion, or the ‘payability’ of alternative practices improves, such 
practices will continue to have only a marginal effect in terms of sustainability” (IBI 
Group, 1993, 2PublicSentiments11) 
The CTARP also noted that despite the gradual introduction of active- and public-transportation 
policy support from all levels of government in the 1990s, the fact that modal splits in Canadian cities 
did not change dramatically demonstrated the degree to which Canadians continued to value the 
“speed, convenience, flexibility, reliability, and comfort” of auto travel (2PublicSentiments31). 
There was also significant Resistance to user-pays transportation pricing in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While this may seem counter-intuitive in an era of bureaucratic and political support for neoliberal 
policy and programming, cheap oil and the values for unlimited mobility described in this section were 
cited by the NRTEE as reasons for the “political backlash” with which proposals for market solutions to 
transportation behaviour reform were met in the 1990s (2PublicSentiments17), particularly for 
“tougher” measures (i.e. carbon taxation) (2PublicSentiments18). Public resistance to tax increases was 
also cited as both a cause and consequence of deficit reduction programs, decreased transfer payments, 
and reduced budgets (2PublicSentiments26). Indeed, other social pressures for increased health and 
social services to accommodate aging populations were also blamed for reduced emphasis on 
transportation investment in the 1990s (2PublicSentiments27). The CTARP suggested that by the end of 
the era, however, transit was viewed as an “exception” to user-pays principles (2PublicSentiments32), 
although other federal organizations (i.e. TAC, NRTEE) referenced in this chapter would likely take issue 
with this characterization given the contributions of all transit users to operational costs via fare 
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payments. 
Despite this opposition, Big-city transit demand remained strong in the 1980s, and provincial 
(and limited federal) funds were used to upgrade vehicles, commuter services, and metro networks in 
response to political pressure and organized civil-society action at the municipal level 
(2PublicSentiments3-4). The Energy costs and transit use node also offers some explanatory power for 
public support for transit programming in the early portion of the era: for instance, ridership nationwide 
experienced fivefold growth from 1971-1981 in response to spikes in energy prices according to the 
Department of Industry and Commerce (2PublicSentiments2), while the CMHC argued that opposition 
to urban freeways and automobile dependency in Canadian cities (discussed in section 4.2.4) was 
sustained briefly into the 1980s (2PublicSentiments6). However, as discussed by Perl and Pucher (1995) 
these sentiments weakened along with ridership figures throughout Canada as fuel prices declined in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. 
There was little discussion in the sample of Support for federal-urban involvement until the end 
of the era, when transit advocates in Canada’s urban transit policy regime argued before the CTARP that 
flagging ridership could be increased via fare reductions, the introduction of federal operating subsidies, 
and tax exemptions for employer-provided transit passes (to match federal parking exemptions) 
(2PublicSentiments33). Municipal transit providers argued for sustained federal capital support in the 
early 2000s, as well as a share of federal gas tax revenue, drawing upon a similar model in the United 
States (2PublicSentiments34), while regional commuting authorities suggested the federal government 
permit commuter services to share new urban rights-of-way with light-rail services 
(2PublicSentiments35). Other constituencies in the late 1990s also suggested that the creation of TAC’s 
“national vision” for urban transportation – and the concentration of approximately 80 percent of 
Canadians in urban environments at the turn of the century – justified the creation of coordinated and 
long-term sources of federal aid (2PublicSentiments29-30). 
Some codes suggested that over the era’s 20-year span, Canada witnessed Waning and waxing 
support for sustainable transportation policy and transit more specifically. While cheap oil reduced 
transit use in the late 1980s and 1990s, the NRTEE and CMHC suggested that the rise of sustainable 
development policy ideas catalyzed latent environmental concern at the local level in the 1990s 
(2PublicSentiments7), as “major environmental organizations, transit supporters, and transit operators” 
recognized established patterns of transportation as a significant contributor to environmental 
 112 
problems (2PublicSentiments8). These groups began to espouse the importance of transit-oriented city 
planning, and in some cases enacted educational/promotional “transit revival” programs (i.e. in 
Montreal and Winnipeg). Although the substance of these proposals were not translated into provincial 
or federal policy in the 1990s (2PublicSentiments9-10), research conducted for Environment Canada  
(1994) suggested that public pressure facilitated the adoption of environmental assessment criteria for 
infrastructure projects, including transit and roadways in the 1990s both provincially and federally. 
Additionally, the CMHC found that: 
“Currently, there is public pressure, on one hand, to continue expanding the road system, 
and on the other, for more stringent efforts at demand reduction. And, finally, another 
factor being largely overlooked in the debate is the social impact of the lack of 
transportation alternatives for people living in these communities” (IBI Group, 1993; 
2PublicSentiments12). 
A number of conflicting economic arguments were raised in the public realm (and articulated in 
the sample) to debate the importance of public transit in the context of both budgetary pressures and 
sustainable development. Some groups suggested that constraining the auto- and road-building 
industries would cause significant economic harm, while others suggested that greater transit use and 
concomitant returns in energy efficiency and congestion-reduction would provide net benefits 
(2PublicSentiments23-25). Ontario’s provincial GTA Task Force argued for the municipal and provincial 
cost-savings associated with the containment of sprawl, although the NRTEE suggested that the 
organization’s final report largely glossed over the importance of transit and auto reduction and that its 
recommendations were largely ignored by the provincial government (2PublicSentiments16). In 
summary, the NRTEE offered the following statement on the “state of the debate” surrounding the 
possibility of a transformational shift in the transportation habits of Canadians in the late 1990s: 
“The national debate on sustainable transportation is in its infancy. While there is a solid 
body of literature on the severity of the problems and analysis of potential solutions, 
there is no sense of urgency in the public, and no national consensus on what actions 
need to be taken. Despite its profound implications for the future, sustainable 
transportation is not widely debated among Canadians, and ranks lower than jobs, health 
care, education or national unity as an issue of national attention” (National Round Table 
on the Environment and Economy, 1997; 2PublicSentiments21). 
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4.6 Policy ideas, 2002-2015 
As described in Chapter 3 (and in particular, section 3.4), this final analytical era witnessed a remarkable 
shift in the federal government’s position and role within Canada’s urban transit policy regime. This 
transition can be largely attributed to the policy ideas that emerged in the 1990s, as discussed in the 
previous section and in Chapter 3. However, a number of other novel concepts, arguments, and values 
were described in this era’s federal documents: in order to substantively determine why and how policy 
changed in this era, these policy ideas require systematic evaluation. As for the previous two eras, 
sections 4.6.1-4.6.4 outline the substance of these categories in detail. 
4.6.1 Third-era paradigms 
Many of the paradigmatic policy ideas espoused in this era relate closely to categories from the previous 
era – in particular, those which grew in prominence in the 1990s (discussed in section 4.5.1). There 
were, however, a number of differences between the public-administrative climate at the turn of the 
century and the new imperatives of an increasingly-globalized 21st century world. Figure 18 presents the 
distribution of open codes over the eight categories identified within the final paradigmatic node. 
Figure 18: Open codes for the “3
rd
 Era Paradigms” thematic node. 
 
Climate change and sustainability imperatives became increasingly important in this era, as 
scientific and political momentum regarding the anthropogenic nature and serious consequences of the 
phenomenon gathered support. A survey of national transportation policies in Canada’s peer nations 
conducted by Transport Canada in 2004 suggested that sustainability had become a key policy objective 
for national governments, and that most nations were moving to reduce auto use and shift modal 
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shares toward transit, particularly in large cities (3Paradigms18). Similarly, linkages between urban 
sprawl and climate change were made by the CCMRTHS’ Urban Transportation Task Force in both 2005 
and 2009 (3Paradigms24, 33). The sustainable development priorities underpinning a number of transit-
related federal programs (discussed in section 4.6.2) were also discussed as necessary given these 
“policy imperatives” (3Paradigms21, 28). Finally, Transport Canada suggested the following: 
“Canada’s escalating urbanization and increasing international attention to global 
warming and sustainable living have raised the Federal Government’s interest in 
becoming involved with urban transit. This commitment comes at a time when 
provincial funding of the transit industry has decreased to levels that, in many 
provinces, are not considered sustainable. Recently, federal support for urban transit 
has been highlighted in the Speech From the Throne, recommendations by the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the National Climate Change Program, as well as 
the Federal Budget, which has benchmarked significant funds towards programs for 
which urban transit qualifies” (Transport Canada, 2002; 3Paradigms7). 
Globalization and competitiveness imperatives were also cited extensively as reasons for an 
increased federal focus on transit in this era. Keeping pace with other G7 nations economically was cited 
by the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues in 2002 as a rationale for developing national 
transit investment programs (3Paradigms2), while Canada’s falling quality-of-life scores in international 
rankings were listed by Transport Canada in 2004 as an important motivation for increasing federal 
attention to all modes of transportation (3Paradigms15). Urban congestion and gridlock issues – 
discussed to a limited degree in both prior eras – were increasingly linked to the competitiveness and 
economic health of Canadian cities in this period, spanning the discourse produced by representatives of 
both Liberal and Conservative governments (prevalent in documents from 2005, 2009, and 2012) 
(3Paradigms25, 32, 50). In a related vein, the Influence of peer nations was also cited in relation to the 
coordination of land-use and transportation planning processes, although these are acknowledged as 
beyond the scope of practicable federal action in Canada (3Paradigms16-17, 19).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Growing infrastructure deficit came to the forefront of federal 
consciousness in this era, due in large part to the sentiments of municipal members of the policy regime 
(discussed in greater depth in section 4.6.4). Transport Canada (2002) blamed the transit deficit on 
declining operational and capital contributions from provinces and low fares, and identified negative 
impacts of the bottom lines of transit-vehicle manufacturers (3Paradigms3, 5, 8-9, 11). A TAC research 
paper from 2003 echoed a common theme from past eras, suggesting that a lack of investment at all 
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levels related primarily to ongoing fragmentation in infrastructure responsibilities and 
transportation/land-use planning (3Paradigms12), while TAC advocacy from 2012 suggested that by the 
late 2000s, municipalities were no longer able to defer infrastructure expansion or cut services, and 
were in need of additional funding programs (3Paradigms52, 54). However, TAC also suggested that an 
“overemphasis” on capital programs without commensurate operating funding produced a situation in 
which governments focused on “high visibility”, capital-intensive transit modes (i.e. rail rapid transit) 
given their lower annual operating costs (e.g. as compared to bus-rapid transit) “not justified by 
ridership forecasts, because the capital funding is available and because they offer significant lower 
annual operating costs” (3Paradigms53). Similarly, the CCMRTHS suggested that aging vehicle fleets in 
the 1990s and 2000s left little operating funds available for service improvements and upgrades 
(3Paradigms23); while the organization praised the capital commitments made by federal agents early in 
the era, it suggested in 2009 that the “roll-out” time associated with these programs exacerbated 
funding problems and increased the scale of the transit industry’s financial needs from the mid- to late-
2000s (3Paradigms31, 37).  
The Impacts of economic crises of the late 2000s were mentioned briefly in relation to transit in 
this era’s sample: as in the late 1970s and early 1980s, spiking fuel prices in the late 2000s were cited by 
the CCMRTHS as reasons for increased transit ridership and provided governments with short-term 
incentives to focus on these services (3Paradigms34).  However, research conducted by the Ministry of 
Finance about the effectiveness of the Public Transit Tax Credit (described in section 4.6.2) suggested 
that recession from 2008-2009 may have actually reduced transit usage as a function of greater 
unemployment nationally (3Paradigms47). The job-creation benefits of infrastructure stimulus projects 
(in which transit was an eligible category) were also cited as political motivators for federal agents to be 
involved in the delivery of capital projects (3Paradigms35). 
As in the first era, Requirements for new intergovernmental partnerships were espoused in 
many documents. The Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues suggested that the scale of 
budget issues at the turn of the century provided the political impetus to strengthen channels of 
communication and policy-making among all three levels of government, and that timely action was 
required before the “opportunity for change” passed (3Paradigms1). Other motivators for developing 
more effective intergovernmental partnerships included regional uncertainties and discrepancies 
regarding the unit cost of transit provision; the absence of an effective transportation pricing regime; 
 116 
and the increasingly-intertwined interests of all three levels of government in cities (3Paradigms14, 20, 
22). While the CCMRTHS suggested that the relative contributions of the federal government to transit 
capital projects in Canada declined from 2007-2010 as compared to the era’s early years 
(3Paradigms41), the willingness of all orders of government to subsidize transit represented 
“unprecedented” partnership, according to the Standing Committee on Transportation, Infrastructure 
and Communities (3Paradigms55). Support in the federal bureaucracy for new transit partnerships were 
provided by Transport Canada at the beginning of the era: 
“The availability of long-term sustained and guaranteed funding support for transit 
agencies would provide the agencies with the ability to plan and commit to vehicle 
purchases in a stable and predictable environment. This would, in turn, allow equipment 
manufacturers to invest in their production capability to meet the needs of an expanded 
market” (Transport Canada, 2002, 3Paradigms6). 
The Differing needs of large and mid-sized cities for transit services were acknowledged as 
important qualifiers of this involvement in the sample. The CMRTHS suggested that disparities existed 
both within and among provinces (i.e. Ontario vs. New Brunswick), although funding deficits could be 
considered proportionally if controlling for population and resources (3Paradgims26). Primarily, transit 
dysfunctions were generally characaterized as more pressing in larger CMAs (i.e. 3Paradigms13), 
requiring the articulation of different policy solutions for large and mid-sized cities despite similarities in 
the substance of issues (i.e. funding shortfalls, lack of political support, etc.; 3Paradigms4, 30, 42). 
The Impacts of federal involvement in transit policy were also widely discussed in the sample. 
The CCMRTHS suggested that an increased federal role in the early years of the era translated into 
“increased funding, new and expanded transit systems, and growth in ridership”, leading to a “dramatic” 
change in the state of transit funding in Canada by the end of the 2010s, despite lingering issues related 
to rapidly expanding urban populations and transit demand (3Paradigms29, 38). Reduced environmental 
assessment requirements passed in the 2009 federal budget were also cited by federal agents as 
beneficial for the expedience of the Building Canada Fund’s transit projects (3Paradigms36). Ruffilli 
(2010) – representing Canada’s Library of Parliament – suggested that federal programming 
acknowledged the need for cost-sharing and the inclusion of transit as an eligible infrastructure 
investment category beginning in the 1990s in relation to the cost constraints of provinces and 
municipalities (3Paradigms43-44). The implementation of the Public Transit Tax Credit for individuals 
was described by Finance Canada (2011) as an important response to rising transit fares in the 2000s, 
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given the sensitivity of users to permanent changes in fare levels and in order to complement the 
growing levels of  public investments in Canadian transit witnessed over the decade (3Paradigms45-46, 
48-49). Requirements for safety and security improvements and better air quality were also touted as 
benefits of federal efforts by Infrastructure Canada and the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (SCOTIC) (3Paradigms51, 56-57). 
4.6.2 Third-era programs 
At the outset of the era, transit had become a state priority of the federal executive, comprising one of 
three priority program areas in the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues (2002). As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this programmatic focus intensified over the era, which featured a number of 
federal capital funding initiatives and related cost-sharing and policy measures, although the substance 
and style of program design and delivery evolved in tandem with changes in political leadership. Figure 
19 presents the eight categories of open codes identified in this era. 
Figure 19: Open codes for the “3
rd
 Era Programs” thematic node. 
 
In light of the paradigmatic Climate change and sustainability imperatives and the Growing 
infrastructure deficit ideas identified in section 4.4.2, the federal government issued a number of 
Responses to the rising profile of urban and sustainability issues. In the early 2000s, a Task Force on 
Urban Communities was created in the Privy Council Office in order to “develop a profile of the federal 
presence in urban centres,” while line departments were instructed to prepare and submit “sustainable 
development strategies” (3Programs3). This led to the establishment of the Prime Minister’s Caucus 
Task Force on Urban Issues, which made a number of programmatic recommendations for federal 
involvement in urban transit (some of which came to fruition), including the consolidation of all federal 
programs with relevance to transit into a National Program; the development of transit-supportive tax 
incentives, such as the National Capital Region’s “Ecopass”; and investment in an intercity high-speed 
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rail network to integrate with urban transit systems (3Programs5). In 2011 (and as discussed in section 
3.4.2), a private-members’ bill espousing the creation of a national transit strategy prompted the 
assessment by the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (SCOTIC) in the 
debate of stakeholder positions on a more concrete federal role in the urban transit policy regime 
(3Programs50). The capital funding initiatives discussed in the following paragraph are also listed as 
direct responses to sustainability policy goals and transit funding shortfalls (i.e. 3Programs51). Finally, 
Transport Canada’s MOST program was launched in 1999 (during the second era) but persisted until the 
mid-2000s, designed to fund education and awareness-raising efforts regarding ways in which the use of 
active and public modes of transportation could be enhanced in Canadians’ daily lives, as well as to 
better integrate sustainable development into Transport Canada’s programs and policies (3Programs27). 
At the provincial level, regional transit institutions (i.e. Metrolinx, TransLink, AMT; see section 3.4.2)  for 
transit and land-use governance were described by federal agents in relation to their ability to increase 
the environmental and fiscal sustainability of the transit services they provide (3Programs36, 38). 
Examples of Capital funding initiatives include those programs discussed in Chapter 3, as well as 
others that did not come to fruition at the beginning of the era. For instance, the New Deal for Canadian 
Municipalities and its 10-year infrastructure commitments to be coordinated via the Ministry of State 
for Infrastructure and Communities were stymied by a change of government in 2006, but were lauded 
by the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force as “an important step towards the recognition of urban 
transit as an area of long-term national investment” (3Programs4). The Canada Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund was another program preceding both Paul Martin’s leadership and Stephen Harper’s Conservative 
government, in which transit was an eligible investment category (3Programs13).The specific funding 
outlays associated with the capital programs discussed in Chapter 3 are captured in a number of codes 
(i.e. 3Programs29-35, 52) – to avoid repetition, the specifics of these programs are located in Table 12 in 
section 3.4, while codes can be reviewed in Appendix C. From 2006-2011, Finance Canada (2011) 
estimated that  federal contributions to transit capital projects exceeded $5 billion (3Programs51). The 
importance of delivering these projects in partnership with the private sector was espoused by the 
SCOTIC in 2015 (3Programs60). 
These federal programs involved Funding conditions – however, SCOTIC researchers noted the 
only criterion in effect for capital funds in the mid-2010s was a stated commitment from funding 
partners (i.e. provincial and local governments) to cover “operating costs losses in their totality” 
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(3Programs55). Similarly, the only condition placed on Gas Tax Funds to municipalities was that this 
remittal be used for projects eligible under the Building Canada Fund (in which transit is the second-
largest investment category) (3Programs25). In the 2000s, funding conditions imposed by provinces on 
local transit agencies were more extensive: these were described by the CCMRTHS along a spectrum 
including direct assumption of operating responsibilities, targeted payments to agencies for capital or 
operating expenses, and unconditional grant allocations (3Programs24).  
Network expansion initiatives deal with policies guiding the acquisition and repurposing of urban 
rights-of-way. In the previous era (and discussed in section 4.5.2 and 4.5.4), the CTARP recommended 
that rail lines no longer used for freight services ought to be offered for sale not only to local 
governments (as was traditionally the case), but to urban transit operators – this recommendation was 
accepted by the Ministry of Transport and came into effect in 2002 (3Programs11). Similarly, a Transport 
Canada educational manual advises municipalities to reallocate road space for dedicated bus lanes to 
improve transit performance, effectively upgrading bus services from conventional to bus-rapid services 
(3Programs58) (although this programmatic idea was not tied to any coordinated initiative). 
 Proposed components of an improved institutional framework for transit were identified 
throughout the sample in relation to a variety of federal representatives in the policy regime. In a 
speech delivered in support of his New Deal policy, Paul Martin acknowledged the need to “vacate 
existing tax room” for municipalities, while describing his government’s wariness regarding the creation 
of dedicated federal taxes given their inflexibility to changing circumstances (3Programs1) – this position 
was reinforced, of course, via the dedication of the flexible Gas Tax Fund to Canadian municipalities. 
Transport Canada in 2002 also suggested that a number of tools could be implemented by lower orders 
of government in concert with federal transit investments targeted at both large and mid-sized cities, 
including transit priority measures on urban arterials; flexible zoning, density, and parking requirements 
in municipal plans (at the community, subdivision, and site planning scales); and systematic 
consideration of transit in development planning approval processes (3Programs6-7). There was also 
some discussion about the possibility of “alternative service delivery” transit services provided by 
private operators (drawing on moderate success and integration witnessed in Australia), although it is 
suggested that significant study and consultation would be required prior to the approval of these 
services in Canadian cities (3Programs8). TAC also recommended a number of coordinated programs to 
be adopted throughout the policy regime, including the dedication of municipal funding sources (e.g. 
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property taxes and development charges, road user fees, etc.) to transit financing in tandem with 
senior-level funding support and the creation of regional transit governance structures (3Programs9-10). 
Identical programmatic components were also identified and described by the CCMRTHS in 2005 
(3Programs21, 23, 26). Similarly, research by Transport Canada (2005) identified the importance of 
establishing effective performance measures for municipalities and transit systems, the selection of 
effective pricing tools for vehicles, transit, roads, and parking, and the harmonization of regional and 
provincial transportation plans (3Programs19-20, 56, 59). In 2012, the SCOTIC recommended that the 
federal government launch an engagement process with provinces and municipalities to construct a 
long-term transit infrastructure plan (3Programs49). 
As a component of such a framework, a number of Intergovernmental mechanisms are 
discussed in the sample more specifically. Paul Martin promised in 2002 to consult face-to-face with a 
group of mayors selected by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities prior to the preparation of 
annual budgets (3Programs2). This consultative mechanism did not last into the Harper Government’s 
tenure, under which intergovernmental mechanisms primarily involved flexible capital funding sources 
(discussed previously) with some scope for targeted, cost-shared interventions. The Public Transit 
Capital Trust and the Gas Tax Fund were described by the CCMRTHS as the most effective 
intergovernmental policy mechanisms of the 2000s (3Programs33-34, 39). In describing these and other 
initiatives of the era, the Library of Parliament noted that the absence of a coordinating policy was 
countered via cost-sharing agreements for capital programs and bilateral agreements on special 
initiatives (i.e. regional rapid transit projects) (3Programs40-42). 
A number of intergovernmental programmatic components were discussed only in theoretical 
terms in the sample. For instance, in its review of national transportation policies in peer nations, 
Transport Canada (2004) suggested that federal involvement in land-use planning “generally mirrors the 
degree to which the federal government is involved with local government” – in Canada, however, this 
involvement is limited and characterized as jurisdictional encroachment (3Programs15). Indeed, the 
divergent (and generally more centralized) constitutional structures of surveyed nations (Switzerland, 
Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States) was cited as the primary barrier to the 
development of linkages between national and local budgeting for transit, although the conditional 
grant structure in the United States for funding major infrastructure, as well as the federal role in 
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prioritizing projects present in all surveyed nations, were identified as “instructive” to federal policy-
makers in Canada (3Programs16-18).  
Finally, federal Support for soft initiatives included programs designed to moderate demand for 
automobile travel and encourage transit use. For instance, the CCMRTHS’ Urban Transportation Task 
Force operates an information-sharing program for TDM measures across Canadian jurisdictions to 
promote TDM uptake across the country (3Programs37); TAC suggests that the relatively inexpensive 
adoption and promotion of TDM of policies represents an important complement to senior-level funding 
initiatives (3Programs48, 57). In terms of tangible federal programming, the Public Transit Tax Credit 
was introduced in Budget 2006 to promote transit use by reducing fare costs by approximately 15 
percent with the purchase of long-term (i.e. monthly or yearly) transit passes (3Program43-45). 
4.6.3 Third-era frames 
The means by which the programs identified in the previous section were justified to Canadians in the 
final analytical era are articulated in this section. The seven categories of open codes identified in the 
sample are presented in Figure 20. 
Figure 20: Open codes for the “3
rd
 Era Frames” thematic node. 
 
 There were many passages featuring federal Acknowledgement of the fiscal imbalance and need 
for stability in Canada’s urban transit policy regime. Key statements in this regard include claims that 
“the country’s infrastructure needs exceed the capacities of the three orders of government” 
(3Frames2), and that “all orders of government must recognize that amongst competing urban interests 
… transit merit(s) a proportional share of new investment” (3Frames16). In addressing the FCM in 
Hamilton in 2002, Paul Martin suggested: 
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“The challenges you face were intensified after the fiscal belt-tightening that has taken 
place in recent years by provincial and federal governments alike. Let’s just take two 
examples: housing and urban transit. Both present daunting challenges that simply must 
be tackled in order to secure the quality of life we all desire for the future. But the 
solutions – that is to say, the development of affordable rental accommodation and the 
required investment in new transit infrastructure – are simply beyond the capacities of 
local governments acting alone” (Martin, 2002, 3Frames1). 
Similarly, Risks associated with the status quo primarily involve appeals to the economic 
consequences of congestion and fragmentation in the policy regime. Irwin (2003) – representing TAC – 
suggested that “[i]f the existing funding shortfalls for urban transportation and fragmented governance 
… are not addressed in the near future, Canadian urban areas face major environmental, economic and 
social risks affecting up to 80 percent of Canada’s population directly where they live and work” 
(3Frames9) following a description of transit issues in the 1990s and early 2000s. The development of 
competitive and safe cities and the avoidance of “detrimental impacts on the economy and society” are 
also cited as risks should the transit policy regime continue on its trajectory (3Frames10, 13, 38) – the 
terminology used to describe these risks is largely consistent from early to late in the analytical period. 
In a related vein, the Linkages between economic improvement and transit investment were also 
highlighted in the sample. A number of codes made the economic benefits of “sustainable” 
transportation investments salient, emphasizing that individuals, households, and communities depend 
on the economic growth promised via urban transit improvements (3Frames8, 11). In support of the 
New Deal strategy at the beginning of the era, Paul Martin suggested that:  
“What we need to do now is get to work. To move from concept to reality - to strike the 
New Deal. We’ve all seen good ideas, backed by the best of intentions, crash against the 
coral reefs of entrenched ways and attitudes. We can’t let that happen here. The stakes 
are simply too high. The opportunities associated with success too great. More and 
more of our future together as Canadians will be built – brick by brick, idea by idea – at 
the local level. Our speed at innovating on the ground – in practices, in financing and in 
partnerships – will be one of the keys to Canada's success in a very competitive world” 
(Martin, 2002, 3Frames3).  
In the late 2000s, federal infrastructure stimulus programs were framed as critical if Canada 
wanted to “emerge from economic crisis with a more modern and green infrastructure” (3Frames25). 
The time- and cost-savings for auto and transit commuters via the reduction of urban road congestion 
and improvement of transit capacity were also championed (3Frames29, 33), as were the ability of these 
programs to help cities attract and maintain commercial investment and “talented people” (3Frames34-
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35, 43). Other codes argue that the costs required to transition to more transit-oriented communities 
would be outweighed by both mid- and long-term gains in urban quality of life and productivity at 
individual, regional, and national scales (3Frames39-41).  
 Similarly, Climate change as a motivator of action was espoused on a number of occasions. The 
opportunity to be a “world leader” in low-emission transportation and infrastructure design was framed 
as attainable given Canada’s “expertise and resources” for innovation (3Frames4). “Urban 
transportation systems without extensive and well-maintained transit” was also framed as an 
“undesirable future” for Canadian cities in the context of climate change (3Frames6, 28). According to 
Transport Canada (2002), the MOST program was able to bring significant public and media exposure to 
the potential impacts of climate change (3Frames19). The Health and equity benefits of transit also 
featured prominently in third-era documents – reducing the intergenerational impacts of auto use and 
greenhouse gas emissions were cited by the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force in 2002 (3Frames5); 
improved air quality, mobility for those without the means or access to car ownership were described by 
the CCMRTHS’s Urban Transportation Task Force in both 2005 and 2009 (3Frames18, 20, 26-27); and the 
SCOTIC reiterated transit’s benefits for the mobility of dependent populations in 2012 (3Frames42, 50). 
 In support of the capital programming discussed in the previous section, the Constitutionality of 
intervention was a common theme. As in previous eras, efforts were made in the documents to frame 
intervention in the context of the federal government’s respect for the constitutional division of powers 
(3Frames23, 30) – however, a number of passages suggested that the scale of funding problems faced 
by municipalities (i.e. 3Frames31-32) necessitated greater federal involvement in cooperation with both 
provinces and municipalities, in terms of both funding provision and other collaborative efforts (i.e. 
“soft” policy measures, such as public education) (3Frames12, 17, 21). The CCMRTHS’ Task Force 
suggested the following in 2005: 
“The challenges faced by urban areas will require not only new funding but also a new 
partnership amongst orders of governments. Principles that could underlie an effective 
partnership unanimously supported by provincial respondents to a Task Force survey 
include: Federal programs should respect provincial and territorial jurisdiction and 
planning priorities; Federal funding programs should not be contingent upon matching 
funding from provinces and territories; There should be flexibility in program designs to 
accommodate programs that meet the needs of the jurisdictions” (Urban Transportation 
Task Force, 2005, 3Frames15). 
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In 2012, Infrastructure Canada suggested that funding programs implemented by the Harper 
Government “recognized that provinces and municipalities are best-placed to develop and implement 
transit strategies that meet their local needs” and therefore emphasized flexibility and avoided federal 
involvement in prioritizing or project selection (3Frames37). Infrastructure Canada defended the general 
lack of funding conditions by suggesting that prescriptions stating that federal funds be used specifically 
for transit “excluded” communities without transit systems (3Frames45). However, the SCOTIC 
recommended guidelines for providing some degree of federal influence within the confines of its 
jurisdictional authority, including the involvement of the FCM in establishing “transit-specific measures” 
which municipalities must meet to be eligible for funding, such as lowering commute times, creating 
jobs in the transit industry, measurably improving air quality, and avoiding “displacement” of provincial 
and municipal resources that would have been otherwise used to fund transit (3Frames44, 48).  
In tandem with paradigmatic codes described in section 4.6.1, a number of framing statements 
alluded to the Variation in transit needs across Canada. In respect for diversity in the “physical, social, 
and cultural geography of Canada’s cities”, Transport Canada (2002) suggested that significant 
consultation and economic analysis should be undertaken prior to selecting an appropriate transit 
service in a given locale (3Frames7). The CCMRTHS suggested that these considerations were especially 
prudent in small communities suffering from population loss, although transit is also framed as “critical 
to maintaining viable and liveable smaller communities, often providing a much needed transportation 
option for all residents, but particularly for the elderly and low income residents” (Urban Transportation 
Task Force, 2009; 3Frames22). Other passages also suggest that variation in transit needs contains social 
dimensions – while transit may not be practical for some households, or seem inefficient in some 
communities, the importance in maintaining quality of life for new immigrants and dependents “cannot 
be overstated” (3Frames36). It should be reiterated, however, that the Government’s position in 2012 
(as articulated to SCOTIC by Infrastructure Canada) was firmly that the choice to provide these services 
via flexible federal funding should be left to provinces and cities (3Frames46). 
4.6.4 Third-era public sentiments 
This final section of analysis relays the diversity of public sentiments present in the policy regime and 
the broader public throughout the 21st century. The nine open codes identified in this thematic node are 
shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Open codes for the “3
rd
 Era Public Sentiments” thematic node. 
 
This era witnessed the evolution (and in some cases, reversal) of many public sentiments 
identified in section 4.5.4. For instance, portrayals of Attitudes toward user fees and taxation 
mechanisms shifted somewhat – in its review of urban transportation pricing options, Transport Canada 
(2005) suggested that user fees for transit were widely accepted, and that support for road user fees 
was growing (3PublicSentiments2). Finance Canada suggested that by 2011 awareness of the Public 
Transit Tax Credit was strong among the Canadian public, helping to fuel support for transit user fees 
and senior-level investment (3PublicSentiments19). Municipal stakeholders in Canada’s urban transit 
policy regime demanded tax rebates for railway purchasing for urban transit rights-of-way from the 
federal government, arguing that these would further incentivize transit-supportive procurement at the 
municipal level (3PulbicSentiments35), while constituencies of transit users argued (successfully) for tax 
exemptions for employer-provided transit passes early in the era (3PublicSentiments36).   
Some of these perspectives can be attributed to Dissatisfaction with the fiscal gap and funding 
criteria. In 2012, the positions of various municipal representatives – including planners, operators, and 
users – were presented to SCOTIC in the context of its investigation of stakeholder interest in an 
expanded federal role in urban transit (Tweed, 2012). These codes suggest that municipal resources 
were growing increasingly insufficient to meet their transit provision and mobility needs, despite the 
federal support programs introduced in the 2000s and 2010s. Some argued for the imposition of more 
stringent criteria that funds be used for transit, as well as stipulations that recipients demonstrate 
stronger cost-recovery plans and the inclusion of social and environmental benefits in cost-benefit 
analyses underpinning their applications (3PublicSentiments21, 34). Other witnesses testifying before 
the SCOTIC in 2014 and 2015 also suggested that the ridership growth spurred by federal investment 
necessitated the continuation of funding and policy support, and that communities and citizens have 
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demonstrated a willingness to pay (both through taxes and user fees) provided that funds are dedicated 
to transit and that the funding allocation process is open and transparent (3PublicSentiments38, 43).  
Demand for reduced congestion and environmental impacts built on the climate change-focused 
themes of the previous era’s public sentiments, expanding to feature a wider range of issues beyond 
(though still inclusive of) emission-reduction imperatives. The results of public consultations by the 
CCMRTHS’ Urban Transportation Task Force in 2005 and 2009 suggested that an “extra-jurisdictional” 
role for the federal government is required in transit given that the economic and environmental issues 
arising from inadequate services are national in scope (i.e. reduced productivity, pollution, climate 
change) (3Frames4, 30). Reduced congestion and commute times via transit improvement was also 
presented by witnesses before the SCOTIC in 2015 as a means to attract higher-paying jobs to Canadian 
cities (3PublicSentiments42).  
However, given the diversity of “publics” with an interest in urban transit, it is not surprising 
that a number of contradictory positions were articulated by public interest groups in this era’s 
documents. Demand for new federal leadership and programming was articulated in the CCMRTHS’ 
2005 survey, in which it was “generally agreed” that federal agencies should commit to the long-term 
financial support of the transit needs of both large and small communities – the propriety and flexibility 
of the Gas Tax Fund was explicitly supported in some codes (3PublicSentiments6, 12-13). Similarly, 
Transport Canada’s (2006) review of its MOST Program suggests that stakeholders were satisfied with 
the program’s goals and instruments, but concerned about its operational horizon, arguing for project 
funding extensions beyond its two-year limit (3PublicSentiments14-15). Calls for federal actions beyond 
the provision of flexible and largely unconditional cost-shared programs (e.g. in the realms of 
operational support and increased public consultation efforts) were presented by the FCM and 
municipal operators in SCOTIC hearings (3PublicSentiments26, 31, 33). The Amalgamated Transit Union 
(ATU; representing industry workers) also argued for longer-term federal involvement, as well as the 
adoption of an amended funding model that in which federal agencies are not restricted to a 25-percent 
share in public-private partnerships for transit capital projects (3PublicSentiments37, 39). Specifically, 
CUTA and the FCM argued that this figure ought to be raised to one-third (3PublicSentiments45). Other 
groups advocated for investment in transit on the basis of opportunities associated with transit’s 
Technology and job creation potential: municipalities and transit-advocacy groups were portrayed as 
particularly supportive of LRT investments given its perception as a “cleaner, more reliable, and more 
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advanced ‘world-class’ technology,” as well as its higher capital costs (and, therefore, construction 
requirements)  (3PublicSentiments18). CUTA, ATU, and other advocates also argued in 2014 for transit 
investment on the basis of its economic spinoff effects both in cities and in Canada’s transit 
manufacturing industry (3PublicSentiments40). 
Conversely, Demand for jurisdictional respect and flexibility include arguments that federal 
programs ought to set policy goals broadly enough to avoid restricting differential provincial urban 
priorities; allow for bilateral and tripartite arrangements, although with a lesser emphasis on 
“inappropriate” federal-municipal partnerships; and; and allow for allocation of transit funding to other 
priority areas if necessary (3PublicSentiments5, 7-10) – primarily, these views were articulated by 
provincial stakeholders early in the era (c. 2005). In 2012, supporting views for the flexibility provided by 
the Gas Tax Fund were also articulated by representatives of large municipalities (3PublicSentiments25, 
27, 29, 44). In the case of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation (CTF), preferences for restraint verged on 
Opposition to transit investment by the federal government in general on the basis of “distortion” of 
transit agencies’ decision-making processes, resulting in overspending and unnecessary project delays 
(3PublicSentiments22). The CTF also argued that rather than transfer gas tax funds to Canadian 
municipalities, federal agents should stop levying GST on fuel altogether to allow for provinces to tax at 
a higher rate – however, even then the CTF argued that these funds ought not to be used for transit and 
roads, as users should pay via fares and tolls (3PublicSentiments28). These views were presented in the 
context of SCOTIC’s 2012 hearings.  
Comprising a “middle ground” between these positions were those groups articulating Demand 
for coordinated governance. While “transit expansion plans are welcomed by the public”, some 
stakeholders felt that the means by which long-term operational costs will be covered in “one-off” 
federally-funded projects were not adequately addressed among governments in the approval 
processes for this era’s capital funding initiatives (3PublicSentiments17). Municipal stakeholders in 
particular argued that coordination of transit planning and funding among governments ought to occur 
on 25-year horizons, with accountability measures attached (i.e. program review criteria invoked at five-
year intervals) (3PublicSentiments23-24). Stakeholders arguing for coordinated strategies, according to 
the SCOTIC, referred interchangeably to the development of a “strategy” and “policy framework” – 
transit stakeholders argued for a strategy (i.e. CUTA, FCM), while detractors (i.e. the CTF, the Canadian 
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Automobile Association) suggested this method would be “overly prescriptive”, and that a policy 
framework would provide Canadians and cities with greater flexibility (3PublicSentiments32). 
As in the previous eras, the debate over Preferences for suburban living vs. TOD was also 
articulated in the document sample, although these codes were not as prevalent in this era. The 
“motorization” of households was linked to the necessity of “triangular” trips (e.g. home to daycare to 
work) by the CCMRTHS, and that gains in fuel-efficiency and clean fuels are being outstripped by the 
“choices Canadians make about location and travel behaviour” (3PublicSentiments3). It can be inferred 
from this description that these choices are both discretionary and related to the structural nature of 
contemporary Canadian cities and lifestyles. While preferences for suburban housing remain strong, 
research by Finance Canada (2011) suggested that the preferences of an aging population for transit-
oriented, urban living could shift market demand in years to come (3PublicSentiments20). 
4.7 Summary of the content analysis 
This chapter presented an overview of the thematic and open coding processes, and described the 
results of the content analysis of 60 federally-produced documents. The majority of the chapter was 
devoted to the description of urban transit policy ideas invoked by federal agents over the three 
analytical periods involved in this research.  
It is clear that while the substance of many policy ideas changed dramatically over the 47 years 
from 1968 to 2015, a number of problem definitions and proposed solutions have remained relatively 
consistent. Nonetheless, policy change has occurred. The following chapter presents a discussion of 
these analytical results with the aim of formally addressing and resolving the research questions 
articulated in Chapter 1 by comparing the specific ways in which each category of ideas has changed 
over the course of Canadian history, as well as characterizing the specific modes of change witnessed at 
the two transitionary junctures between historical periods. From this discussion, four key findings of the 
research are presented, while in Chapter 6, a number of policy recommendations stemming from these 
findings are presented in tandem with concluding comments. 
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Chapter 5: A Discussion of Federal Policy Ideas and Dynamics in Canadian Urban 
Transit 
5.1 Introduction to the discussion 
The analysis conducted in the previous chapter suggests that policy ideas in Canada’s urban transit 
policy regime have undergone significant change over the study period. The analysis also demonstrated 
that the federal role in this regime has evolved in tandem with social and cultural changes, global and 
domestic economics, and environmental imperatives, among other factors. However, a direct 
comparison of paradigms, programs, frames, and public sentiments across the three analytical periods 
has not yet been undertaken. In addition, the specific modes of policy change witnessed in the regime – 
in accordance with Howlett and Cashore's (2009) framework – have yet to be classified. As such, the 
purpose of this chapter is to connect the findings of the analysis to the research questions presented in 
Chapter 1. 
  To reiterate, the overarching question guiding this research asked: How have the policy ideas 
supporting and informing the role of Canada’s federal government in Canada’s urban transit policy 
regime changed over time? As discussed in Chapter 1, three specific and “actionable” sub-questions 
were posed in order to resolve this broad inquiry. The first was investigated via the review of literature 
in Chapter 3: How has the federal government’s role in the Canadian urban transit “policy regime” 
shifted from 1968-2015, and in response to what “triggering” factors (in the context of the policy 
regime’s ideas, issues, institutions, and interests)? However, given that policy ideas were not analyzed 
until Chapter 4, it is more logical to address the second question first, which was the subject of the 
content analysis: How have urban transit policy ideas (paradigms, programs, frames, and public 
sentiments) invoked by the federal government in public policy documents changed from 1968-2015? In 
section 5.2, each category of ideas is compared across the three analytical periods in section 5.1 in order 
to offer summative answers to this question. Following the comparison of each category of ideas across 
the three analytical periods, section 5.3 integrates discussions of ideas with the issues, institutions, and 
interests developed in Chapter 3 in order to characterize change in Canada’s urban transit policy regime 
at specific historical junctures and identify important “triggers” in this context. 
 This chapter attempts to answer these two questions as fully as permitted by the findings of 
Chapters 3 and 4. The third sub-question – How might the federal government modify its role in 
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Canada’s urban transit policy regime in order to improve transit policy-making and services in Canadian 
cites? – is the subject of Chapter 6, in which specific recommendations drawing upon the findings 
presented in this chapter are outlined. 
5.2 How have urban transit policy ideas invoked by the federal government in public policy 
documents changed from 1968-2015? 
Addressing this sub-question requires that each category of ideas across the three analytical eras be 
closely compared and contrasted in order to determine the character of policy-idea change over this 
study’s historical breadth. In each of the following four sections, these comparisons are carried out, 
illustrating similarities, differences, and cross-cutting themes identified in relation to paradigms, 
programs, frames, and public sentiments. 
It should be noted that some degree of contradiction in the “positions” of federal actors was 
identified in all eras and categories of ideas. This is not an unsurprising result: the Government of 
Canada – composed of a shifting array of line departments, crown corporations, politicians, and 
bureaucrats – is hardly a unitary entity, and its constituent institutions serve a variety of purposes and 
pursue the public interest in different (and occasionally contradictory) ways. The analysis demonstrated 
that in terms of paradigms, programs, and framing statements, the views of line departments (i.e. 
Transport Canada, Infrastructure Canada, Finance Canada) and federal research organziations (i.e. the 
Transportation Association of Canada [TAC], the National Round Table on the Environment and 
Economy [NRTEE]) on appropriate transit interventions, policy proposals, and regime roles have been 
particularly divergent in recent decades. This diversity of ideas and positions necessitated a “messy” 
analysis in Chapter 4 – however, this complexity can be reduced to a series of critical insights and 
observations regarding the evolution of federal urban transit policy ideas, which are determined in 
sections 5.2.1-5.2.4, and summarized in section 5.2.5. 
5.2.1 Comparing paradigms 
Paradigmatic ideas in each era were outlined in sections 4.4.1, 4.5.1, and 4.6.1. This section compares, 
contrasts, and identifies other notable differences among the paradigmatic codes identified over the 
three analytical periods. 
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 In each era, the issues associated with urban sprawl and the externalities of automobiles were 
emphasized. In fact, causal linkages between these issues and the obstacles faced by transit were 
remarkably consistent – the impact of suburban sprawl on the viability of urban transit in Canadian cities 
was the subject of the first era’s Postwar suburban sprawl and the second era’s Continuing suburban 
hegemony nodes, while issues associated with low-density land use and automobile dependency were 
aggregated under Climate change and sustainability imperatives in the third era. Similarly, 
“environmental” motivators of action in the realm of urban transit were listed to some degree in each 
era. The third-era Climate change coding category also shared similarities with the Recognition of 
automobile externalities in the first era, and the second era’s Sustainable development imperatives in 
the second, in that transit was discussed as a tool with which to address anthropogenic climate change 
caused, at least in part, by ubiquitous car use for personal mobility. The evolution of these paradigmatic 
categories suggest that the scope of the issues guiding the federal-administrative paradigm on the 
subject of transit widened in tandem with the trends in global environmentalism discussed in Chapter 3, 
as the local or “point-source” environmental concerns of the 1970s gave way to the global 
environmental movements oriented toward sustainable development and climate change of the 1990s, 
2000s, and 2010s. 
 Similarly, budgetary issues faced by transit service providers (and municipalities more broadly) 
were cited as motivators of action in all eras. The decreasing ability of municipalities to cover transit 
costs were invoked in support of MSUA’s creation in the Transit investment rationales and Inadequacy 
of transit services nodes; in the second era, transit “budget freezes” and “planning paralysis” were both 
identified in the Budget constraints and Declining importance and quality of transit nodes, suggesting 
that transit was largely unable to compete with other municipal priorities and dropping automobile 
costs in this era of public-sector austerity. In the third era, the Growing infrastructure deficit node 
discussed similar issues, although in this era there was a greater emphasis on the physical deterioration 
of rolling stock and other infrastructure  as compared to the second era, codes for which emphasized 
the cancellation of projects and budget crises related to reduced provincial support(i.e. downloading; 
2Paradigms27). 
 Despite these inter-era similarities, there were a number of differences in the paradigmatic 
policy ideas identified in the sample. For instance, the impacts of economic crisis in relation to transit 
investment and use were portrayed differently in the second era as compared to the first: primarily, 
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budgetary restrictions of the 1980s were framed by federal agents as a reason to more fully respect 
jurisdictional bounds given that the New Public Management emphasized the full devolution of fiscal 
responsibilities to the level of government closest to those receiving the services (i.e. subsidiarity), as 
discussed in the New Public Management imperatives node. In the third era, however, the economic 
crisis of the late 2000s was cited as a motivator for a number of infrastructure stimulus initiatives (i.e. 
greater federal involvement), in which capital funding programs for transit accelerated significantly, as 
depicted in the Impacts of economic crises node). While the greater “severity” and length of recessions 
and deficit conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s may have played some role in the differences 
between these paradigmatic statements, the waning of NPM as a pillar of federal public administration 
(at least slightly) can perhaps be inferred from this markedly Keynesian approach to economic recovery 
practiced, no less, by Canada’s first federally-Conservative government since 1993. 
 Another substantive difference in paradigmatic thematic codes relates to the growing 
importance of global imperatives over time – as discussed in relation to the increasingly-global 
perspective guiding “environmental” depictions of urban issues discussed previously,  linkages between 
transit and global phenomena were virtually absent in the first era, but were invoked in relation to the 
Sustainable development imperatives node in the second era, and featured prominently in three 
categories in the third era (Climate change and sustainability imperatives, Globalization and 
competitiveness imperatives, and Influence of peer nations). 
 A number of other cross-cutting themes and observations emerged from a review of 
paradigmatic results. For instance, the evolution of intergovernmental relations in the urban transit 
sphere are discussed in the Jurisdictional tensions (first era), Institutional inertia and barriers to transit 
improvement (second era), and the Requirement for new intergovernmental mechanisms (third era) 
nodes. Codes in these categories suggest that a period of cooperation in the early-to-mid-1970s was 
followed by a virtual absence of regularized interaction between provinces and the federal government 
(and even quieter federal-municipal channels of communication) on the subject of urban affairs, let 
alone transit, in the 1980s as a result of provincial retrenchment (echoing the findings of Chapter 3). 
Beginning in the 1990s, there was a “re-engagement” of provincial and federal authorities (spurred 
primarily by the Growing infrastructure deficit). Generally, these developments mirrored the state of 
intergovernmental relations in Canada. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1980s were a period of significant 
constitutional conflict in Canada, as governments attempted (unsuccessfully) to develop a mutually-
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agreeable formula for constitutional amendment (Bakvis, Baier, and Brown, 2009). The temperature of 
federal-provincial relations cooled by the late 1990s, and the tri-level commitments of Paul Martin’s 
New Deal and the Open Federalism practiced by the Harper Government were both received favourably 
by provinces (Shaker, 2005; Spicer, 2010) such that federal-provincial relations were greatly improved 
over the first two decades of the 21st century. 
There was also evolution in the means by which the interrelationships of transit issues with 
broader urban phenomena were portrayed over the historical scope of the analysis. The Interrelated 
nature of urban issues featured prominently in first-era codes, discussing the suitability of federal 
agencies (i.e. MSUA and the UTRB) to conduct high-level research about the importance of linking 
transportation and land-use planning processes (ideally at the regional level) and effectively coordinate 
members of the policy regime; however, codes of this nature were less common in second-era 
paradigmatic nodes (although certainly not absent, and perhaps most prevalent in the Resilience of 
Canadian transit systems node), before re-emerging in greater force in the Impacts of federal transit 
policy node in relation to the macroeconomic effects (i.e. enhanced productivity via congestion-
reduction, job creation, etc.) of transit investment in the third analytical era. 
5.2.2 Comparing programs 
Programmatic ideas were outlined in sections 4.4.2, 4.5.2, and 4.6.2 of the analysis. As in section 5.2.1, 
this section discusses substantive differences and similarities among programs, and provides other 
notable observations across the analytical eras. 
A number of similarities among federal programmatic policy ideas in all three eras were evident 
in the sample. For instance, transit program ideas possessing social dimensions (i.e. initiatives designed 
specifically to improve accessibility, mobility, and quality of life for urban Canadians) were identified in 
the first era’s Enhancing redistributive benefits node, which referenced the need to launch programs 
targeted to disadvantaged populations (i.e. the physically disabled and elderly; 1Programs16-17); the 
second era’s Sustainable development programming node, in which transit and air quality and emissions 
monitoring were mentioned were discussed in tandem (i.e. 2Programs44); and the third era’s Support 
for soft initiatives node, which emphasized the need to make the health, lifestyle, and expenditure 
benefits of more frequent transit use salient to Canadian households in TDM and transit-marketing 
programs (i.e. 3Programs37, 57). The recognition of linking land-use and transportation planning 
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processes via the coordination of institutions in all eras was another cross-cutting similarity (as 
discussed in relation to paradigms and policy goals in the previous section), although difficulties 
associated with the implementation of reform (given entrenched jurisdictions and institutional 
responsibilities) was acknowledged in all eras (i.e. 1Programs66, 2Programs36, 3Programs10).  
 However, programmatic ideas also differed over the study period in a number of ways. The 
second era’s New Public Management programming constituted a significant departure from the 
Synoptic approach characterizing federal action in the first era; while NPM ideas were not cited as 
directly in third era documents, these programming principles extended into the third era of analysis 
(i.e. private sector cooperation, user-pays programming, flexible funding allocations in federal programs, 
etc.). While the application of these principles was associated with a lesser federal programmatic role in 
the second era, they were equally apparent in the transit-supportive programming of the third era. 
Capital funding support demonstrates a similar pattern of “undulating” federal policy ideas over 
time (i.e. engagement followed by disengagement followed by reengagement). While programmatic 
ideas recognizing transit funding shortfalls were identified in each era, the absence of ideas in tangible 
support of this situation were notably absent in the second era. The Capital funding initiatives of both 
the first and third era constitute the most obvious parallels and describe the concrete contributions 
made by federal agencies in these eras. However, the substance of second-era programmatic ideas to 
deal with this shortfall, however, constituted an obvious difference or fluctuation in policy ideas dealing 
with the transit funding question. Despite the extension of the Urban Transportation Assistance 
Program (UTAP) into the second era of analysis, codes in the Addressing the transit funding shortfall and 
Transit governance and programming second-era nodes largely relayed the programmatic steps taken 
by other members of the policy regime (i.e. municipal and provincial transit providers) to improve the 
fiscal health of their transit systems via “best-practice” policy ideas (i.e. fare increases, parking lot fees, 
and the generation of other sources of revenue to counter declining ridership). The only capital program 
in the second era was the CIWP, in which transit was eligible for investment but garnered little attention 
from provincial applicants. Criticisms of the CIWP levied by the Office of the Auditor General suggest 
that the project approval process was loose enough to permit approval of projects with limited 
economic, social, or environmental justification – while the politicization of funding approval (at least by 
federal actors) was not considered an issue in this framework given that provinces vetted the municipal 
nominations prior to explicit federal involvement, doubt was raised about the degree to which 
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nationally or even regionally significant projects were selected at the provincial and municipal levels 
(Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 1999). The Canada Transportation Act Review Panel (CTARP), 
as discussed in Chapter 4, also discussed the “unintended consequences” of the federal government’s 
focus on capital projects, relating to an overemphasis on expensive capital projects with little 
consideration for how long-term operational costs would be covered. A review of third-era codes and 
the programs outlined in Chapter 3 reveal that this recommendation was largely ignored in the design of 
future programs (i.e. in the Funding conditions node). However, TAC recalled this advice in 2012 in its 
review of sustainable urban and regional transportation in Canada, summarizing the results of federal 
capital support programs as such: 
“The emphasis in some cases on capital funding that is unmatched with a comparable 
increase in funding of operations-related expenditures can lead to suboptimal 
infrastructure decisions (e.g. over-building of capital-intensive transit modes when not 
justified by ridership forecasts, because the capital funding is available and because they 
offer significantly lower annual operating costs). Opportunities to defer infrastructure 
expansion, through strategies such as peak spreading, are largely exhausted. 
Commuters – particularly in larger metropolitan areas – have been shifting their trip 
start and finish times where feasible and peak periods are spreading and intensifying. 
Average trip times have also approached or exceeded the levels of other major cities in 
the world, such that our cities’ ability to attract or accommodate growth is at risk” 
(Transportation Association of Canada, 2012; 3Programs53). 
Another difference in programmatic codes among eras relates to the abrupt shift in federal 
focus from municipalities to the transit manufacturing industry as the locus for federal transit support, 
particularly from the first to second eras. While there was little mention of the linkages between well-
functioning urban transit and the health of Canada’s transit vehicle manufacturers in the first era, the 
Support for domestic transit industry and R&D support programs second-era nodes capture the rise in 
program policy ideas aimed at supporting manufacturers at industry expos and in terms of costly, 
technologically-driven research efforts. 
 It is also worthwhile to highlight the degree to which federal programs respected the 
jurisdictional responsibilities of each order of government since the early years of the first era. Indeed, 
while federal efforts under MSUA’s umbrella were faced with severe criticism by the mid-1970s – 
typically by larger, more self-sufficient provinces such as Ontario and Quebec (Oberlander and Fallick, 
1987) – the political and bureaucratic leadership of both MSUA and UTRB demonstrate awareness of 
and respect for provincial concerns over jurisdictional interference. With regard to transit R&D, 
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representatives of the UTRB, in its 1979 post-mortem, advocated for the creation of an Advisory Board 
on Urban Transportation with membership from all orders of government in order to ensure transit 
research priorities reflected the interests of provinces and cities (1Paradigms78). Codes in the first era’s 
Interdepartmental coordination and influence node also suggests that despite a boycott of the third and 
final tri-level conference chaired by MSUA, the first two Tri-Level Conferences offered effective avenues 
for input from all three orders of government. In the second era, jurisdictional respect was cited as an 
important component and driving force behind the rolling-back of transportation regulations in general 
(i.e. 2Programs16, 20), as well as a motivation for the Shift away from capital funding in the 1990s 
discussed previously. Similarly, the views expressed by Infrastructure Canada to the Standing Committee 
on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (SCOTIC) in 2012 and 2015 highlighted the department’s 
distaste for “dictating” to provinces how transit-eligible funding sources ought to be spent by 
municipalities and provinces (located, most notably, in the Responses to rising profile of urban and 
sustainability issues third-era node). It is beyond the scope of this research to assess the degree to which 
jurisdiction was respected in practice, but it is safe to say that the concerns of provincial stakeholders 
were, at the very least, paid lip service in federal policy documents in all eras. 
5.2.3 Comparing frames 
Framing statements used by federal agents in the document sample were analysed for their substantive 
content in sections 4.4.3, 4.5.3, and 4.6.3. These differed somewhat among the analytical eras – 
however, as in the discussion of paradigms in particular, there were many noteworthy inter-era 
similarities. As discussed previously, the causes and effects of insufficient and underfunded transit 
services have long been acknowledged in the public service (and the academic community from whence 
much first-era research came); concomitantly, the costs of automobility and sprawl and the benefits of 
transit as a means to avoid these negative consequences pervaded framing codes in all eras. The first 
era’s Automobile primacy, Worsening urban conditions, and The need to improve ineffective transit 
services nodes demonstrate these framing strategies most clearly; in the second era, the Externalities of 
sprawl as motivators of action and Transit problem definitions include indistinguishable costs of the 
transportation status quo; while the third era’s Health and equity benefits, Climate change as a 
motivator of action, and Linkages between economic improvement and transit investment nodes build 
upon these themes by espousing the benefits of mitigating climate change and improving national 
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economic competitiveness in urban centres. Generally, however, these third-era themes invoked largely 
the same symbols, values, and concepts related to reduced congestion-driven productivity loss, 
damaged environmental and ecosystem health, and declining livability of urban regions of the first two 
eras. As with the discussion of paradigmatic, cause-and-effect statements, the scope of environmental 
costs greatly expanded in the second and third eras to consider the global implications of transit under-
investment and sprawling, autocentric urban development. 
As with programs, there was also common language used by politicians, bureaucrats, and 
researchers across the analytical eras that highlighted the respect held by federal agencies for the 
constitutional hierarchy underpinning urban transit policy-making and programming in Canada. In the 
first-era sample, the Benefits of improved intergovernmental relations were frequently discussed, as 
MSUA and others attempted to gather political and public support for a growing ultra vires role in urban 
affairs. In this node, the federal role in research, funding, and “coordinating land-use and transportation 
planning” was justified based on the basis of “rapidly escalating costs” and the insufficiency of provincial 
and municipal resources to adequately address the issue – rather than usurping local and provincial 
priorities, however, these efforts are framed in the context of supporting the stated interests of other 
governments (i.e. 1Frames20, 30). In the second era, the Impropriety of national transit policy node 
captures a number of similar values espoused by federal agents – these framing codes, however, 
emphasized the provincial and local expertise in support of a restricted role for the federal government 
in relation to implementing TAC’s vision for urban transportation and in selecting projects for CIWP 
applications (2Frames33, 35). The Constitutionality of intervention is a related third-era theme, in which 
federal interventions deemed “necessary” were supported by an emphasis on partnership, 
collaboration, and the maintenance of traditional jurisdictional roles and responsibilities (i.e. 3Frames5, 
14, 21). 
 In keeping with similarities to the programmatic discussion in the previous section, the benefits 
of support for Canada’s transit manufacturers became increasingly prominent in the second era, 
particularly in reference to the Expertise of Canadian transit industry node – for instance, a trade 
publication produced by the Department of International Trade and Commerce (1981) highlighted the 
familiarity of Canada’s transit industry professionals with “just about every geographic challenge 
imaginable” (2Frames2). While the federal government largely vacated municipal-level urban transit 
support in this era, these codes support towards private sector support in the pursuit of transit 
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improvements. There were very few comparable nodes or codes in the first or third eras, although the 
importance of involving the private sector more broadly in transit project delivery is noted in the third-
era Acknowledgement of fiscal imbalance and need for stability node. This node also highlighted, 
unsurprisingly, the need to redress the mismatch between expenditures and fiscal strength among the 
orders of government vis-à-vis urban transit – similar funding issues were also captured in the first era’s 
Benefits of federal-urban involvement and The need to improve ineffective transit services nodes, as well 
as the second era’s Transit problem definitions node. 
5.2.4 Comparing public sentiments 
Sections 4.4.4, 4.5.4, and 4.6.4 analyzed public sentiments portrayed in the document sample. For the 
purposes of this research, these included the views of other governments and participants in the urban 
transit policy regime. Again, there were a number of commonalities: primarily, all eras featured 
portrayal of public desires for suburban living and preferences for the comfort and convenience of auto 
travel over transit use (i.e. Demand for suburban living and automobilty [first era], Automobile 
entrenchment [second era], and Preferences for suburban living vs. TOD, and Opposition to transit 
investment [third era]).  
 However, differences among the eras were more prominent than similarities. For instance, the 
ways in which public attitudes toward user fees and user-pays principles in general shifted between the 
second and third era were especially divergent – Resistance to user-pays transportation pricing in the 
second era conflicts with the largely supportive Attitudes toward user fees and taxation mechanism in 
the third era. It is beyond the explanatory power of this thesis to assess the validity of this shift in the 
portrayal of public views – however, the views of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation (as presented to 
the SCOTIC in 2012) suggested that a desire to restrict federal action and more strictly apply price signals 
with regard to transit may have indeed grown in prominence (i.e. 3PublicSentiments22). 
Perhaps the most immediately salient differences among historical eras relate to the 
inconsistent degree to which public sentiments were relayed by federal agencies in the course of 
defining urban problems and proposing substantive policy solutions, as well as the diversity of views 
presented in each era. As discussed in section 4.2, only 16 public sentiment codes were applied over 20 
first-era documents – this represents slightly more than a quarter of the sentiment codes identified in 
the third era. This underrepresentation was generally in keeping with the synoptic views regarding the 
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importance of public consultation held by many governments in the postwar period (Davidoff, 1965). 
Additionally, first-era codes portrayed public sentiments as a singular and “knowable” entity by the 
federal cabinet (i.e. 1PublicSentiments5), rather than as a diversity of complex and constantly-shifting 
views held by competing “publics” (i.e. in the Demand for transit and planning reform and Opposition to 
sprawl and automobility first-era nodes). 
In the second and third eras, however, public sentiments were identified more frequently. While 
the substance of the coding categories was similar, second-era public sentiments presented a greater 
degree of nuance beyond individual preferences,. For instance, in the second era, the influence of global 
economic conditions on public support for transit and preferences vs. automobile use were captured to 
a greater degree than in the first era in the Energy costs and transit demand node, despite the fact that 
energy crises occurred in the 1970s. At the end of the second era and throughout the third, a wider 
diversity of public interests were espoused in documents, as consultations involving other stakeholders 
was widely undertaken by the CTARP and SCOTIC. Provincial (and to some degree, municipal) views 
were also relayed in the third era by the CCMRTHS’ Urban Transportation Task Force in relation to 
burgeoning federal transit involvement. As discussed in Chapter 4, stakeholders advocating for a federal 
leadership role in the regime (i.e. Demand for new federal leadership and programming) were countered 
by those suggesting a secondary partnership role (i.e. Demand for coordinated governance, Demand for 
jurisdictional respect), to those (i.e. Opposition to transit investment). From this steady increase in both 
frequency and diversity prominence, it can be inferred that the emphasis placed upon the views of a 
wider variety of public interests and organizations has grown over the course of the historical study 
period. 
5.2.5 Summarizing the evolution of federal urban transit policy ideas 
This section has demonstrated that while federal urban transit policy ideas have evolved over time, the 
degree of change is not uniform across categories. As such, the question posed in Chapter 1 and at the 
outset of section 5.2 – “How have urban transit policy ideas (paradigms, programs, frames, and public 
sentiments) invoked by the federal government in public policy documents changed from 1968-2015?” – 
has no singular answer. However, it can be addressed in relation to each of the categories of ideas 
individually. 
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 In terms of paradigmatic ideas, change has been relatively slight – the codes reviewed in this 
chapter and the one previous suggest that the basic nature of the paradigms in which urban transit 
decision-makers operate have been consistent since at least the 1970s (i.e. fiscal uncertainty, funding 
shortages, automobile dominance, and the difficulty of servicing low-density regions of Canadian cities). 
Environmental motivators of federal action in relation to other participants in the urban transit policy 
regime expanded in reference to ideas about addressing global climate change and the dealing with the 
growing scale of Canada’s municipal infrastructure deficit – however, the fiscal problems of provinces 
and municipalities to provide adequate transit services were widely acknowledged in both first- and 
second-era documents. Nevertheless, the prominence of both climate change imperatives and the fiscal 
gap faced by transit providers suggests that shifting paradigmatic ideas played a role in the most recent 
instance of federal policy change. This connection is explored in greater detail in section 5.3.2. 
With respect to programmatic policy ideas, the analysis and discussion suggest that change has 
been witnessed in terms of the scope of federal offerings. The first era featured federally-driven and 
collaborative initiatives in the realms of capital funding, research, and demonstration programs (i.e. for 
separate systems for the disabled); the second era limited direct municipal financing, support for 
techno-centric demonstration programs, and support for vehicle manufacturers. The third era, in 
comparison, has witnessed resurgence in capital funding initiatives, as well as expansion into the realms 
of “soft” programming, including education, transportation demand management, tax credits, and 
intergovernmental engagement in recent years. The capital support programs of the third era did not 
depart significantly from the first foray into the urban transit financing – in some ways, fewer 
restrictions on funding eligibility were applied. For instance, third-era programs do not require the 
demonstration of integrated transportation and land-use plans across a metropolitan region (although 
these are commonplace in contemporary Canadian cities). Another change relates to flexibility: the 
funding envelopes introduced in the 1990s (i.e. the CIWP) and by the Harper government in the 2000s 
and 2010s permitted far more provincial and municipal latitude in project selection, or whether funds 
would indeed even be used for transit improvement, than UTAP. Other codes identified in both the 
second and third eras suggest that the federal emphasis on capital funding to an unparalleled degree 
(and without related conditions or envelopes for the provision of operational costs) in recent years has 
had unintended consequences, producing a situation in which the long-term costs of urban transit are 
not adequately considered in project approval mechanisms. 
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Framing statements, meanwhile, evolved in concert with the substance of both paradigms and 
programs. This is understandable – frames, by definition, are used to support programmatic ideas, and 
the benefits and costs invoked to sway stakeholders generally draw upon the economic, environmental, 
or social issues (i.e. paradigms) of the time (Campbell, 1998). For instance, frames in the first era 
focused on the social isolation and local air pollution associated with overreliance on auto travel; as 
climate change and the infrastructure deficit were increasingly discussed as motivators of action 
through the latter eras of analysis, concurrent framing statements identified the benefits and costs for 
various segments of society. Like paradigms, many framing techniques remained similar over time. The 
framing passages identified in all eras also demonstrate a significant and consistent emphasis placed by 
federal agents on the jurisdictional respect and “constitutionality” of intervention. 
Perhaps the greatest change in policy ideas was witnessed in the character and diversity of 
public sentiments relayed in the sample. Public and stakeholder opinions were portrayed to a limited 
degree in the first era, and in more detail in the second era; however, the weight of public interest in the 
federal decision-making process rose considerably in the third era – the SCOTIC and the CCMRTHS’ 
Urban Transportation Task Force were especially critical entities in this regard, relaying the multiplicity 
of stakeholder views on the subject of the appropriateness and character of federal investment in and 
involvement with urban transit in the 21st century.  
It can be concluded that the evolution of federal urban transit policy ideas in Canada from the 
1970s to the present has closely mirrored developments in global economics, environmental issues, and 
the state of intergovernmental relations in Canada more generally. The Government of Canada has 
applied its spending power in a limited fashion, espousing strong respect for traditional divisions of 
power in the policy regime. From a political standpoint, there is little risk in upsetting the balance of 
power within the urban transit policy regime – as the demise of MSUA and subsequent second-era 
retrenchment indicate, the values of provincial actors hold considerable sway in determining the 
legitimacy of federal transit interventions. 
5.3 Characterizing federal policy change in Canadian urban transit 
In light of the analysis conducted previously, it is pertinent now to return to the typology of policy 
change described by Howlett and Cashore (2009) in Chapter 2. This section will attempt to resolve the 
following research sub-question: How has the federal government’s role in the Canadian urban transit 
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“policy regime” shifted from 1968-2015, and in response to what “triggering” factors (in the context of 
the policy regime’s ideas, issues, institutions, and interests)? The two historical junctures between the 
three eras will be assessed in relation to the mode of change involved, with reference to the six 
elements of policy characterizing the first and second eras of analysis. 
5.3.1 Policy transition, late 1970s to early 1980s 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the federal position in the urban transit policy regime began to shift 
significantly in 1976 in line with a Ministerial shake-up at MSUA, when Barney Danson was replaced by 
André Ouellet (Oberlander and Fallick, 1987). Spicer (2011) suggests that the size of the Ministry was 
gradually decreased leading up to its “shuttering” in 1978, although its status as a funding partner for 
municipal projects was fully established by the end of its organizational tenure. Indeed, this growing 
influence was a point of major contention for provinces, who increasingly felt that the federal 
government was attempting to dictate local priorities to provinces and municipalities (Horak, 2012a; 
Spicer, 2010). Under Prime Minister Trudeau and the synoptic governing paradigm witnessed in the 
1970s, the scope and scale of the government expanded rapidly – prior to the Glassco and MacPherson 
Commissions of the 1960s, the federal government contained 80 federal departments; by 1980, there 
were almost 200 (Savoie, 2010). While the “size” of the federal government did not retract under 
successor governments, the legacy of this expansion and the opposition it bred in provinces was 
palpable: the Trudeau Government was  rejected by Canadian voters in 1979 and again in 1984  (Savoie, 
2010). The abandonment of MSUA, UTRB, and the urban transit initiatives in this context were also 
undertaken in tandem with growing trends toward global fiscal conservatism and the neoliberal 
administrative paradigm (and specifically, NPM), which emphasized strict jurisdictional respect. As such, 
federal actors were relegated from the domain of urban transit policy-making, though a modest 
programmatic role was maintained in support of transit vehicle manufacturers. These are the factors 
leading to the transition between the period of federal “engagement” and “disengagement” in Canada’s 
urban transit policy regime as determined by the literature review and analysis, constituting the 
“triggers” of policy change.  
But how can this instance of policy change be characterized in accordance with the framework 
of understanding introduced in Chapter 2 (Howlett and Cashore 2009)? Classification requires an 
examination of policy goals. Given that concerns about jurisdictional infringement and growing political 
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support for “rolling back” government service delivery at all levels, the policy goals of federal agencies 
vis-à-vis urban transit changed significantly. In the 1970s, these goals were extremely broad, and were 
perhaps best articulated in MSUA’s Annual Report in 1974: 
“Movement within urban areas should not depend to the extent that it does on the 
private automobile, which results in congestion, environmental pollution, and denial of 
adequate transportation to those without cars such as the poor, the handicapped, the 
elderly and young people. Substantial government assistance is required if public transit 
facilities are to compete effectively with the private automobile in convenience, 
comfort, speed and cost” (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1974; 1Paradigms14). 
While the need for “substantial government assistance” was espoused, the level of government 
at which this assistance should be provided is not specified. As such, the impact of outside ideas and 
factors – namely the rise of neoliberalism; the comparatively cheap oil of the 1980s and consequent 
growth in automobility and suburbanism; and the jurisdictional “turf wars” characterizing Canadian 
federalism of the 1980s – exercised significant influence on the means by which this policy was carried 
out. Therefore, it is appropriate to characterise the juncture between the first and second eras of 
analysis as an instance of “quasi-homeostatic” policy change, in which “policy goals remain stable, but 
objectives change in response to external ideas and factors” (Howlett and Cashore, 2009).  
5.3.2 Policy transition, late 1990s to early 2000s 
Similarly, the literature review and analysis suggest that a number of “triggering” elements converged at 
the turn of the 21st century to raise the profile of urban transit issues on the federal policy agenda. Some 
were global in scope, such as the rising profile of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 
combat climate change, as well as growing recognition of the need to reduce congestion in order to 
improve economic productivity (constituting environmental and economic components of the 
sustainable development paradigm). Other influences were domestic: specifically, the growing municipal 
infrastructure deficit and trends toward provincial downloading – and in particular, the withdrawal of 
capital subsidies from capital budgets for transit in Canadian municipalities (Horak, 2012b) – created an 
urban transit “crisis” and spurred significant municipal advocacy for a federal role in transit funding. This 
advocacy from within the policy regime coincided with a federal leadership transition in the governing 
Liberal Party from Jean Chretien to the municipally-sympathetic Paul Martin, whose government was 
actively looking to engage in sustainable development policy-making in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Transportation Climate Change Table in the wake of the Kyoto Accord 
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(Roschlau, 2008). These factors culminated in the creation of the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund, 
the New Deal for Canadian Municipalities, and the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities 
in the early 2000s (Spicer, 2010). The spirit of many of these initiatives persisted following the election 
of Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party in 2006, and many more capital-contribution programs were 
implemented over the remainder of the third era. Despite the drawbacks of these funding programs 
discussed throughout this thesis, these factors constitute a federal “re-engagement” in the urban transit 
policy regime.  
Federal policy goals for urban transit in the 1980s until the mid-1990s – to the degree that they 
can be articulated at all – acknowledged that transit systems ought to be improved; however, fiscal 
responsibilities for these systems were characterized as an issue best addressed by provinces 
(Christopher, 1992; Gray, 1981). In contrast, transit-related policy goals were articulated by the Prime 
Minister’s Task Force on Urban Issues in 2002 at the beginning of the third analytical era, suggesting a 
broad but tangible federal role in the improvement of transit in Canadian cities: 
“To build world-class, competitive urban regions, all orders of government must invest 
in multi-modal transit systems. Canada is the only G7 country without a national transit 
investment program. Keeping pace with demand will require a commitment to transit 
infrastructure from all orders of government” (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on 
Urban Issues, 2002; 3Paradigms2). 
As such, this shift in federal urban transit policy goals can be attributed to changes in provincial 
policy settings at the end of the second era (i.e. the lowering and removal of transit subsidies), which 
catalyzed municipal advocacy and coincided with the rising profile of transit-supportive sustainable 
development policy ideas. Policy change at this juncture, then, is best characterized as “neo-
homeostatic”, in that “policy goals shift[ed] gradually in response to small changes in policy settings” 
(Howlett and Cashore, 2009). 
5.3.3 Federal transit policy post-2015: A changing philosophy?  
The election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party in the fall of 2015 and the subsequent federal budget 
released in the spring of 2016 merit discussion in the context of this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the election period featured significant – even historic – attention to urban transit issues by all four 
major political parties (Canadian Urban Transit Association, 2015d), while the victorious party’s budget 
commitments contained significant scope for urban transit investment and improvement (Canadian 
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Urban Transit Association, 2015a). Transit-specific commitments included the allocation of $3.4 billion 
to public transit for the 2016-2017 fiscal year, of which $1.49 billion will flow to Ontario and $293 million 
to Quebec, and representing the first installment of a 10-year, $60 billion federal infrastructure funding 
plan (CBC News, 2016a; Government of Canada, 2016). In Ontario, project selection was carried out bi-
laterally, and involves commitments to fund up to 50 percent of eligible costs for select projects, a 
departure from the typical one-third split characterizing the contribution programs outlined in Table 11 
(Vigliotto, 2016). 
In this context, it is pertinent to ask if Canada’s urban transit policy regime has undergone 
another round of policy change. The short answer is that it remains too early to tell. However, early 
indications suggest that few substantive changes to the federal role in Canada’s urban transit policy 
regime have been made. No coordinating strategy involving all three orders of government (let alone 
regional transit entities) appears forthcoming, and while funds have been allocated to provinces based 
on ridership figures (as a proxy for determining investment “impact”; Government of Canada, 2016), 
there are no specific considerations in the lone bi-lateral agreement signed at the time of this writing 
(between the federal and provincial Liberals in Ontario) that address concerns over the politicization of 
project selection by higher orders of government, issues raised in this thesis in the context of the CIWP 
in the 1990s (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 1999) and the capital-contribution programs of 
the 2000s and 2010s (Horak, 2012a). 
5.4 Key findings 
Now that the primary questions of this research have been resolved, key findings from the analysis and 
discussion can be drawn. Four main findings emerged over the course of the analysis that bear further 
discussion. These include the linkages between paradigmatic ideas and the two instances of policy 
change described in the previous section; the unintended consequences of capital-funding dominance in 
federal programming; the overriding jurisdictional respect for provincial jurisdiction and priorities 
evidenced in program descriptions and framing statements across analytical periods; and the growing 
influence of municipal actors in federal transit agenda-setting.  
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5.4.1 Linkages between paradigmatic ideas and policy change 
The discussions of paradigmatic policy ideas across eras (section 5.2.1) and instances of policy change 
(section 5.3) presented in this chapter demonstrate that this category of policy ideas has exercised 
significant influence over the priorities of federal actors on the subject of urban transit in Canada. This is 
a linkage that bears highlighting. While jurisdictional tensions contributed to the waning political 
appetite for urban policy-making and project-funding at the end of the 1970s, the literature review and 
analytical sample suggests that the rise of neoliberal ideology in the latter part of the decade and the 
early 1980s played an equally significant role: indeed, MSUA was at its most impactful in its later years in 
terms of orchestrating funding and undertaking transit-supportive initiatives (Spicer, 2011). As such, it 
can be argued that provincial preferences coincided with the advent of a global paradigm 
(neoliberalism) that did not favour transit investment.   
Similarly, paradigmatic ideas in the late second era and early third era acted as a “vehicle” by 
which to accelerate federal urban transit policy change. Globalization, economic imperatives related to 
the international competitiveness of city-regions, and climate change featured prominently in 
paradigmatic codes in this timeframe. The literature review suggests that NPM policy ideas (supporting 
fiscal responsibility and jurisdictional respect) found significant political traction in the sustainable 
development paradigm (i.e. GHG emissions reduction, urban productivity, etc.). Similarly, the integrated 
discussion of ideas, issues, institutions and actors in relation to policy change at the turn of the century 
suggests that these ideas coincided with supportive municipal and federal political climates, resulting in 
a shift in policy goals towards federal support for transit services. Again, provincial priorities came to 
bear in dictating the federal policy response – however, in this instance, municipal advocacy calling for 
the federal government to fill Canada’s transit funding and policy-making vacuum coincided with transit-
supportive paradigmatic ideas. The willingness of the federal political executive at the turn of the 
century to engage with “innovative ideas” echoes the findings of  Savoie (2010) and Stoney and Graham 
(2009). 
5.4.2 Unintended consequences of capital funding initiatives 
Another finding of this research relates to the “unintended consequences” of an overt emphasis on 
capital-intensive transit funding programs across eras. While a number of these criticisms were 
identified in the literature review (i.e. Horak, 2012a; Sancton, 2015), the analysis suggested that federal 
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agencies were aware of the drawbacks of providing capital funding without commensurate project 
selection requirements or operational funding envelopes. As discussed, these issues include the 
encouragement of politically-motivated projects over “lower-visibility” operational investments and 
insufficient  consideration of long-term costs (3Paradgims53). The consequences associated with an 
overemphasis on capital assistance programs were first identified the second era. As referenced in 
section 4.5.1, criticisms of the CIWP levied by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (1999) 
suggested that the absence of federal criteria for project selection in this capital program did not guard 
against the insertion of provincial political preferences over the most pressing needs of local transit 
agencies. Similarly, CTARP argued that: 
“[In Canada], the availability of capital subsidies has allowed transit agencies to adopt 
capital-intensive solutions, without supporting them with more cost-effective 
operational solutions — such as unpalatable restrictions on car use” (Flemming et al., 
2001, p. 223-224; 2Paradigms81) 
 These views were echoed by TAC in the third era (as discussed in section 4.6.1), which suggested 
that “sub-optimal” infrastructure decisions have resulted from capital-centric federal programming, 
given that they presence of these funds encourage the selection of projects with relatively high up-front 
costs and relatively low annual operating costs (3Paradigms53). Should capital-intensive modes (i.e. LRT) 
fail to meet ridership estimates (as is often the case), services cannot be adjusted easily to better meet 
the needs of the community. While federal agencies argued in the sample that placing conditions such 
as cost-recovery thresholds on federal capital funding could lead to transit agencies deferring 
maintenance (i.e. 3Programs25, 55), and that flexible funding allows the federal government to carefully 
fund select “strategic” projects, the case of Vancouver’s Canada Line outlined in selection 3.4.2 (selected 
for its pre-Olympic visibility over less expensive alternatives and alignments) suggests there is little to 
distinguish strategic from overtly political funding decisions (Horak, 2012a; Hutton, 2012), to the 
occasional detriment or subversion of regional transit priorities.   
5.4.3 Overriding respect for provincial jurisdiction and priorities in framing statements and program 
descriptions 
As discussed in section 5.2 – particularly in relation to federal programs and frames – the policy 
documents analyzed in Chapter 4 for all eras shared commonalities in the “lip service” paid to the 
division of urban transit responsibilities as outlined in Canada’s constitution. While Spicer (2010, 2011) 
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and Oberlander and Fallick (1987) suggest that provincial interests and opposition to federal-municipal 
efforts were key determinants of MSUA’s fate,  documents throughout this era and those from the 
second and third era were cognizant of the need to adhere to the traditional constitutional hierarchy of 
Canada’s urban transit policy regime. While the outcomes of policy differed – as established in the 
literature in section 3.3.2 – codes arguing that federal interventions in this era were complementary and 
deferential to provincial and municipal priorities were captured in the Interdepartmental and 
intergovernmental coordination and influence program node and Benefits of federal-urban involvement 
frames node.  
Similarly and as discussed in section 4.5, the dearth of federal transit policy-making and 
programming in the second era was explicitly referenced in relation to jurisdictional respect, as 
described in the Impropriety of national transit policy and Importance of New Public Management policy 
goals frame nodes. In the third era, and despite the role of municipalities in bringing transit issues to the 
fore in response to perceived provincial shortcomings, policy documents in advance of Paul Martin’s 
New Deal policy made overt reference to the need to include provinces in the development of a national 
approach (i.e. in the Intergovernmental mechanisms program node). Likewise, the “open federalism” 
policy approach to urban issues of the Harper Government discussed in Chapter 3 is borne out in third-
era Constitutionality of intervention frame codes. The most recent federal-provincial transit funding 
initiatives (outlined in section 5.3.3) demonstrate that provinces continue to exercise significant 
discretion over project selection and federal funding priorities. Time will tell if this approach yields any 
meaningfully different (i.e. coordinated, stable, and long-term) policy and programming action involving 
municipal or regional actors. 
5.4.4 Growing municipal influence in federal transit agenda-setting 
A final key finding of this thesis relates to the growing prominence of municipal actors (and their 
“sentiments”) in determining the urban transit priorities of Canada’s federal government. As discussed, 
“public sentiments” as broadly considered in the context of this thesis include the positions of civil 
society, other orders of government, and the private sector – the increasing prominence of public 
sentiments codes in the third era suggests that interests of a wide array of institutional actors are, at the 
very least, increasingly considered and relayed in federal policy documents. More specifically, the 
analysis and discussion of policy change in section 5.3.2 suggest that municipal actors (and municipal 
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governments in particular) are increasingly influential in the crafting of federal policy positions on the 
subject of urban transit. While the only public sentiments identified in first-era documents captured 
simplistic “for or against” perspectives in relation to highway and transit investment, a greater diversity 
of views were captured in the second era, particularly in relation to the growing transit infrastructure 
deficit in the 1990s (a dynamic captured in the Support for federal-urban involvement public sentiment 
node). However, these sentiments became influential in the third era: the importance of lobbying 
efforts in the creation of the New Deal (discussed in section 3.4.1) represents an example of the growing 
role of municipal associations and advocacy in “diffusing” ideas throughout the policy regime – while 
federal agents moved into the policy sphere in response to this advocacy,  municipalities were more 
policy-makers than policy-takers in this regard via the coordination of national lobbying efforts via the 
FCM and the Big City Mayors’ Caucus (Horak, 2012a). Likewise, the diversity of viewpoints relayed by 
SCOTIC in third-era public sentiments nodes – many of which represented municipal criticisms of and 
advocacy for an increased policy role to accompany the programmatic focus of federal transit support 
over the 21st century (i.e. Demand for coordinated governance, Demand for new federal leadership, etc.) 
– suggest that municipal views have been instrumental in bringing transit issues to the attention of the 
federal government in the 2010s. 
This observation meshes with the findings of a recent longitudinal, multi-issue study on the 
character of “multilevel governance” in Canadian cities, in which Horak (2012a) argues that multilevel 
governance in Canadian cities is now “fluid, problem-driven, task-specific interaction among a varying 
set of governmental and non-governmental agents” in which municipalities (i.e. via the Big City Mayor’s 
Caucus) engage in advocacy (or opposition) for transit capital as a response to or to stimulate local 
population and economic growth, while the role of the federal government as a provider of financial 
resources is supplemented by private capital and expertise. Similarly, Sancton (2015) suggests that 
municipally-driven “policy diffusion” is taking place to a significant degree on issues that transcend 
individual municipalities, especially when they are difficult or impossible to deal with locally.  
5.5 Summary of the discussion 
This chapter presented a number of summative elements, including the resolution of two research sub-
questions identified in Chapter 1. Paradigms, programs, frames, and public sentiments were compared 
and contrasted in order to demonstrate the ways in which each category of ideas has evolved from 1968 
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to the present. Paradigmatic policy ideas were judged to have expanded in relation to the growing 
importance of global imperatives; programmatic ideas demonstrated a slight expansion of federal 
transit program offerings; frames demonstrated a similar pattern of evolution to paradigms; and the 
evolution of public sentiments suggest an increasing emphasis placed on this category of ideas by 
federal agents in recent years. Modes of policy change at the two analytical junctures – between the 
first and second and between the second and third eras – were then classified in accordance with the 
framework identified in Chapter 2: it was determined that the transition to a more subdued federal role 
in the policy regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s is  best classified as “quasi-homeostatic”, while 
policy change in the early 2000s, in which policy changed in relation to the incursion of new ideas and 
growing fiscal pressures, can be characterized as “neo-homeostatic.” The recent transit ideas and 
commitments of Canada’s newly-elected Liberal government were then briefly described, although the 
timing of this research is too early to assess whether substantive policy change has occurred once more.  
From these concluding analyses, four key findings were developed, related to the influence of 
paradigmatic ideas on policy change at both critical junctions; the detrimental  and unintended 
consequences of an overt federal focus on capital funding programs; the overriding respect for 
traditional jurisdictional responsibilities and roles that pervaded frame and program codes over all three 
analytical periods; and the growing influence of municipal interests in urban transit agenda-setting at 
the federal level. Despite the identification of these research findings, however, one final sub-question 
remains to be addressed. Drawing on the findings of Chapters 1-5, Chapter 6 offers five forward-looking 
policy recommendations and concluding thoughts on the evolving role of the federal government in 
Canada’s urban transit policy regime.  
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Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations and Conclusions 
6.1 Policy recommendations 
Canada’s urban transit regime, while largely static in terms of its institutional division of responsibility 
over time, has demonstrated at some junctures that change is possible in response to changing 
paradigms and the infusion of new ideas (as discussed in section 5.3). This final chapter aims to 
contribute to the policy debate surrounding the appropriate role for the federal government within this 
regime, proposing new ideas for discussion based on the insights of the preceding five chapters. More 
specifically, the purpose of this chapter is to address the final sub-question of this research, namely: 
How might the federal government modify its role in order to ensure the sustainability (both fiscally and 
environmentally) of transit in Canadian cities? This involves the proposal of four substantive policy 
recommendations for consideration by the Government of Canada.  
 The recommendations that follow need not be considered as a “suite” of actions, to be 
implemented in conjunction or not at all. Rather, in keeping the spirit of this research, these policy 
recommendations represent ideas – to be debated, discussed, discarded, or adopted in relation to the 
priorities of governments and the Canadians they represent. Also note that it is beyond the scope of this 
work to determine the economic feasibility or specific cost requirements of each option. 
 A final note regards the “levers” available to the federal government with which it can affect 
public policy outcomes. This thesis has talked extensively about policy mechanisms and, to some degree, 
fiscal tools (i.e. applications of the spending power and use of the taxation system) – however, there are 
a number of other “tools” that might be employed in concert with policy mechanisms and fiscal tools. 
These include regulatory instruments, referring to legislation, which imposes legally-binding restrictions 
or requirements on activity: an example is the environmental assessment process, by which 
infrastructure initiatives (including transit projects) are approved or denied based on a tolerance 
threshold of environmental harm (Environment Canada, 2015). There are also educational tools, 
referring to awareness-raising or advertising campaigns by which governments can promote the 
adoption or modification of certain behaviours (i.e. transit use). The recommendations for urban transit 
that follow make reference to a number of these types of levers, although there is discussion of policy 
and fiscal mechanisms as well.  
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6.1.1 Intergovernmental relations: A new mechanism for tri-level decision-making 
The role of municipalities in determining federal transit priorities has grown in the 21st century as 
compared to the influence wielded by local governments in the 1980s and 1990s (as outlined in section 
5.4.4). Additionally, there is little doubt that municipalities ought to make decisions regarding alignment, 
technology selection, etc., given the familiarity of local planners and politicians with the transit needs of 
their communities. However, there has been a limited formal role for municipalities in the federal urban 
transit policy regime since the abolishment of tri-level conferences in the 1970s. A formal tri-level 
institution would help to keep municipal transit interests “visible” in the federal issue-attention cycle. 
As such, the first recommendation of this thesis is that the Canadian Council of Ministers 
Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety (CCMRTHS) establish an official Federal Transit 
Policy Working Group in order to aggregate the perspectives of each order of government on transit 
issues and policy. While CCMRTHS’ Urban Transportation Task Force currently provides a means by 
which municipal transit needs and interests are presented to provincial and federal ministers, the Task 
Force lacks a formal role in policy-making and representation from prominent stakeholders in Canada’s 
urban transit policy regime. In contrast, the Federal Transit Policy Working Group would have a stronger 
role in crafting transit-supportive programming than the current Task Force possesses, stemming, 
perhaps, from an annual review of the efficacy of transit-related programming of the federal 
government. The findings of this review could be presented by the membership to the Minister of 
Transport in the form of a “progress report”, drawing on transit metrics from across Canadian urban 
regions in order to reflect the impact of federal investments, as well as growing areas of need. The 
efficacy of such an organization would flow from the degree to which federal partners valued Working 
Group outputs: however, incorporating its recommendations into the mandatory five-year program 
review exercises already undertaken by Transport and Infrastructure Canada is one mechanism by which 
this institution could insert itself into federal policy-making and programming. 
This entity ought to expand its membership beyond the CCMRTHS’ traditional boundaries (while 
retaining the “steering” function of its upper-order leadership) in order to include representation from 
Canadian municipalities (perhaps via the integration of the Big City Mayors’ Caucus of the FCM), as well 
as Canada’s three regional transit governance bodies (i.e. TransLink, Metrolinx, and AMT) given the 
exceptionalism of these regions and their importance in Canada’s national urban fabric of Canada. 
Despite their complex and divergent institutional structures, organizational memberships, and so on, 
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these institutions constitute an increasingly-important tier of transit governance that has yet to assume 
a “seat at the table” in federal transit funding policy-making exercises. Representatives from Transport 
Canada’s Transit Infrastructure Programs group (described in section 3.4.2) could also be appointed in 
conjunction with the federal Minister of Transport, in order to report on the state of federal-provincial 
funding implementation, and respond to questions or criticisms from provincial and municipal agents on 
the execution of its functions. 
6.1.2 Funding formula: Limiting politics in project selection 
Concerns about the impacts of largely “unconditional” federal funding programs were raised in the 
sample by the Auditor General’s review of the Canadian Infrastructure Works Program (CIWP) and the 
Canada Transportation Act Review Panel (CTARP). Specifically, these organizations suggested that the 
absence of strict eligibility criteria for federal funding have the potential to encourage significant 
“politicking” by provinces in regard to project selection. Conversely, in the review of literature, Horak 
(2012a) criticized the capital programs of the 2000s and 2010s (which typically require only that 
recipients commit to covering operational costs over the lifespan of the infrastructure) on the basis of 
the potential for undue federal influence in the selection of “strategic” over “optimal” transit projects, 
an observation borne out in relation to Vancouver’s recently completed Canada Line (Tweed, 2012; 
Hutton, 2012). While the allocation of funding to provinces based on ridership represents an important 
recent development in federal transit decision-making under Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government 
(Government of Canada, 2016), there is a clear need to limit the influence of both federal and provincial 
politicians so that local transit priorities are respected when federal funding is applied within the 
confines of these bi-lateral agreements.  
While overcoming issues with overly-optimistic ridership projections often invoked in support of 
capital-intensive over more cost-effective, flexible, or socially-equitable alternatives (Transportation 
Association of Canada, 2012) is a problem beyond the scope of these recommendations, one step 
towards the removal of politics in federal transit-decision-making might involve the requirement that 
municipal and provincial representatives demonstrate consensus on the propriety of projects selected 
for funding on the basis of sound planning evidence. This consensus would need to be demonstrated to 
federal funding partners prior to signing any transit infrastructure agreement. Coherent and provincially-
specific municipal positions could be articulated by a representative of municipalities in a given province 
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appointed by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM); this position would then have to be 
approved by the province, and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between provincial and 
municipal parties could be signed. This MOU would then be presented to federal funders as evidence of 
consensus. While municipalities in each province are likely to compete for project endorsements within 
this structure, mediation could be undertaken prior to provincial involvement via the rulings of 
independent provincially-specific independent committees of professional and academic transportation 
engineers and urban planners familiar with the transit needs of the province or region in question 
(appointed by the FCM), based on the quality of supporting planning evidence (i.e. ridership forecasts, 
environmental and economic impact assessments, etc.). 
Other requirements might ensure that federal funds contribute strongly to urban transit policy 
objectives (i.e. congestion reduction, increased transit modal share, etc.) in regions committed to 
holistically addressing transportation issues. For instance, funds could be allocated only to municipalities 
that have implemented a formal and comprehensive transportation demand-management (TDM) plan. 
Schiller et al. (2010) suggest that components of this strategy available to municipalities include many of 
the incentives and disincentives discussed throughout the analysis (i.e. road pricing, congestion charges, 
transit-pass provision, parking charges, vehicle restrictions in central business districts, etc.); transit-
oriented development strategies (i.e. parking management and reduce requirements, traffic calming, 
mixed-use development and retrofitting, residential construction near employment centres, etc.), car- 
and bicycle-share programs; and investment in high-quality active transportation infrastructure 
investment and traveler information (i.e. websites/wayfinding platforms) in order to improve linkages 
with transit; among others. Federal funding criteria of this nature might require the implementation of 
all or some of these components, particularly those with greater potential to influence transportation 
behaviour change (i.e. pricing signals and vehicle restrictions).  
CTARP discussed many of the policy ideas in its report at the end of the second era that came to 
fruition in federal policy in the third era (i.e. linking the federal gas-tax remittal to transit, involvement in 
capital funding, etc.), articulating the views of municipal actors and rendering its professional judgment 
on transit issues. It also espoused the following “unused” policy idea in reference to transit funding 
criteria:  
“The Panel does not believe it is necessary or appropriate for the federal government, 
or governments of the provinces and territories, to specify what measures should be 
adopted in order to qualify for funding. Instead the Panel suggests that agencies simply 
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be given performance-based incentives … The Panel recommends that payments to 
transit authorities be made on the basis of their actual performance in inducing shifts 
from private automobile use to transit. The Panel suggests a payment per trip, based on 
mode shift from car (with verification from ridership counts and periodic surveys of new 
riders to determine alternative modes)” (Flemming et al., 2001; 2Programs94). 
While CTARP was silent on the means by which modal shift and the per-unit value of associated 
payments might be determined at the level of an individual project or transit agency, this type of 
innovative performance-based support bears consideration in the context of enhancing the rigor applied 
in federal transit funding decision-making. A reward system of this nature would also avoid the issues 
associated with the application of proposed “cost recovery thresholds” and subsequent deferral of 
maintenance and upkeep, as articulated by Infrastructure Canada (Tweed, 2012; 3Programs55). 
6.1.3 Operational support: Establishing federal links to municipal planning and transit delivery 
Another major criticism of recent federal capital-contribution programs relates to the absence of 
operational funding considerations, as articulated by the Transportation Association of Canada (TAC; 
2012) and CTARP (2001). Specifically, requirements that municipalities assume all long-term costs 
associated with operations incentivizes the selection of projects with relatively high capital costs and 
low annual operating costs. However, operational costs for these systems remain a source of concern: 
as discussed in section 3.4.1 in relation to third-era issues, the increase in federal capital funding over 
the 2000s and 2010s has not alleviated the transit infrastructure deficit (Canadian Infrastructure Report 
Card, 2016). While fares, provincial subsidies, and dedicated municipal funding streams (i.e. parking and 
congestion charges, road tolls, etc.) ought to be used to cover operational expenses, the scale of fiscal 
problems faced by many of Canada’s largest cities (e.g. the projected $516 million operating deficit 
faced by the Toronto Transit Commission in 2017; CBC News, 2016b) necessitate innovations in 
operational support. 
  As such, this thesis recommends the provision of operational funding to accompany federal 
capital investments, with separate funding “envelopes” for large and mid-sized cities. Eligibility and 
competition for these funds could be determined via a framework built around CTARP’s demonstrated 
“modal shift” performance recommendations, as outlined in section 6.1.2. This requirement might also 
incentivize municipalities to champion projects and land-use development strategies that are most 
effective in reducing automobile use, rather than those promising the most lucrative political returns. An 
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operationally-focused program would work to align the interests of municipal planners and transit 
advisers with the interests of a federal funding program that contains no scope for discretionary or 
overtly political support. However, a significant barrier to the implementation of a system of this nature 
relates to the reliable quantification of “shifted” users (as discussed in the previous section). 
6.1.4 Leveraging spending and taxation powers: Individual transfers and benefits 
The final recommendation of this thesis relates to the expansion of federal programming within the 
confines of the taxation system and the targeted application of the federal spending power via the 
transfer of funds to individuals and households demonstrating pro-transit behaviour. As demonstrated 
in section 4.6.2, the Public Transit Tax Credit has been widely viewed by federal agents and the general 
public as an effective tool (Finance Canada, 2011). However, the existing taxation program (which 
permits claims of monthly and annual passes only), might be expanded to permit claims for individual 
fare payments in order to reward and incentivize even occasional transit use.  
In addition, payments to individuals might also be used as a policy “carrot” to reward 
households for pro-transit decision-making. For instance, households of two or more owning only one 
car could be eligible for incentive payments of a value equal to the environmental and economic 
externalities of removing one vehicle from the road (distributed in a similar mold to the Universal Child 
Care Benefit distributed under the Harper Government from 2006-2015). While a benefit scheme of this 
nature would require careful economic assessment and equity considerations beyond the scope of this 
research, the value of this benefit ought to be set sufficiently high to more than cover the 
supplementary costs of mobility via public and active modes of transportation.  
6.2 Conclusion 
This thesis has posed and answered a number of questions about the role of the federal government in 
Canada’s urban transit policy regime. Specifically, the relationship between policy ideas and policy 
change has been explored in great depth, yielding insights related to the motivations, consequences, 
and potential of federal transit policy-making and programming in Canada. The recommendations 
presented in this chapter represent ideas stemming from the cumulative insights of the analysis. There 
is a clear need for an institution to coordinate policy-making – it is the view of this researcher that a tri-
level oversight agency ought to harmonize the existing political structures of the CCMRTHS with 
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increasingly-relevant regional transit governance bodies, and enhance the CCMRTHS’ institutional 
capacity to make meaningful policy recommendations. Similarly, funding formulae ought to be amended 
to ensure federal, municipal and local politics are not permitted to trump sound transit planning, at least 
when funds are provided by the nation’s taxpayers. There is also a need to support the growing 
operational needs of transit agencies – as such, envelopes of this nature ought to be developed with the 
involvement of all three orders of government, conditional upon local commitment to enhancing transit 
mode shares. Finally, further supportive action via the application of the spending power and the federal 
tax system could be applied to incentivize transit use among Canadian citizens, expanding the Public 
Transit Tax Credit program and introducing targeted household benefits for reducing automobile 
ownership. 
 It is the author’s hope that the insights presented over the course of these six chapters will 
serve to educate and inform policy-makers at all levels and stations within the regime. This thesis is 
particularly relevant to municipal and federal agents grappling with how best to conceptualize the needs 
of the other – it is likely, given the scale of the transit infrastructure deficit and the considerable 
financial responsibilities for education, health care, and numerous other public services borne by 
provinces, that the intersection between federal and municipal governments will continue to be 
increasingly important in efforts to enhance the fiscal and environmental sustainability of Canadian 
cities in decades to come.  
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Appendix A: Search Terms and Databases 
This appendix presents a list of search terms and databases consulted during document search and 
selection process, as described in Chapter 2. 
Search terms: 
- Federal AND transportation OR transport OR transit; 
- Federal AND transportation OR transport OR transit AND Canada; 
- Federal funding AND transportation OR transport OR transit AND Canada;  
- Federal funding AND transportation OR transport OR transit; 
- Federal policy AND transportation OR transit OR transport AND Canada;  
- Federal policy AND transportation OR transit OR transport; 
- Finance AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada; 
- Finance AND transport OR transportation OR transit; 
- Fiscal federalism AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada;  
- Fiscal federalism AND transport OR transportation OR transit; 
- Funding AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada;  
- Funding AND transport OR transportation OR transit;  
- Governance AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada;  
- Governance AND transport OR transportation OR transit;  
- Infrastructure AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada; 
- Infrastructure AND transport OR transportation OR transit; 
- Institutions AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada;  
- Institutions AND transport OR transportation OR transit; 
- Institutional integration OR policy integration AND transportation OR transit AND Canada; 
- Institutional integration OR policy integration AND transportation OR transport OR transit; 
- Institutional arrangements AND transit OR transport OR transportation AND Canada; 
- Institutional arrangements AND transit OR transport OR transportation; 
- Mass transportation OR mass transit AND Canada; 
- Mass transportation OR mass transit; 
- Ministry of State for Urban Affairs AND urban transportation; 
- Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities AND urban transportation; 
- Metropolitan transportation OR metropolitan transit AND Canada; 
- Metropolitan transportation OR metropolitan transit; 
- Public transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada; 
- Public transport OR transportation OR transit; 
- Regional AND transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada; 
- Regional AND transport OR transportation OR transit; 
- Sustainable AND urban transport OR transportation OR transit AND Canada; 
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- Sustainable AND urban transport OR transportation OR transit 
- Transport OR transit OR transportation AND Canada; 
- Transport OR transit OR transportation AND policy AND Canada; 
- Transport OR transit OR transportation AND policy; 
- Urban transportation OR transport OR transit AND Canada;  
- Urban transportation OR transport OR transit AND Canada. 
 
Databases queried:  
- Canadian Research Index; 
- Canadian Periodical Index; 
- Canadian Surface Transportation Research Database (TAC); 
- Canadian Urban Transit Association (CUTA) Members’ Library;  
- Council of Ministers and Deputy Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety 
website; 
- EconLit; 
- Elsevier; 
- Environment Abstracts; 
- GeoBase; 
- Google Scholar; 
- House of Commons (Canada) Committees; 
- Journals of the House of Commons of Canada; 
- Library of Parliament; 
- National Round Table on the Environment and Economy (archives); 
- Primo; 
- Transportation Association of Canada (website); 
- Transportation Research Record Metapress (TRID). 
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Appendix B: Content Analysis Document Sample 
This appendix presents the documents identified through keyword/database search produced by the Government of Canada and its constituent 
institutions in each of the three historical eras references throughout this thesis (documents for the years 1968- 1979, 1980-2001, and 2002-
2015). The process by which documents were identified and selected is outlined in Chapter 2. 
Table 13: List of all documents included in the content analysis. 
1968-1979 
Year Title Author (affiliation) Document type 
1972 
Research directions in urban transportation Lewis, C. (Transportation Development Agency, 
Ministry of Transport) 
Conference proceedings 
1973 
Annual Report: 1972-1973 Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Departmental/program 
report 
1973 
The research program of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Gertler, L. (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs; 
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Council of Urban 
and Regional Research) 
Conference proceedings 
1974 
Annual Report: 1973-74 Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Departmental/program 
report 
1974 Comparison of public transit systems Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Research report 
1974 Public transit and the needs of disadvantaged groups Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Research report 
1975 
Annual Report: 1974-75 Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Departmental/program 
report 
1975 Description of selected federal urban-relevant programs Duc, G. (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs) Policy brief 
1975 
Notes for an address: "An Urban Strategy for Canada" to the 
Conference Board in Canada 
Danson, B. (Minster of State for Urban Affairs) Ministerial address 
1975 
Text of an address delivered by the Honourable Barney Danson, 
PC, MP, Minister of State of Urban Affairs to the National Joint 
Conference of the American Society of Planning Officials and 
the Community Planning Association of Canada 
Danson, B. (Minster of State for Urban Affairs) Ministerial address 
1975 
MSUA and the federal government Sunga, P. and Duc, G. (Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs) 
Policy brief  
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1975 Capital assistance program for urban transportation announced  Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Press release 
1975 MSUA: What it is, what it does Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Policy brief 
1976 Intra-urban mobility in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver Kirkland, J. (Ministry of State for Urban Affairs) Research report 
1976 
Annual Report: 1975-76 Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Departmental/program 
report 
1977 
Annual Report: 1976-77 Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Departmental/program 
report 
1978 
Annual Report: 1977-78 Ministry of State for Urban Affairs Departmental/program 
report 
1979 
Transportation/housing interrelationships: pilot study N.D. Lea and Associates, Ltd. (Ministry of State for 
Urban Affairs) 
Research report 
1979 
The Economics of urban transportation Frankena, M. (Urban Transportation Research 
Branch, Transport Canada) 
Research report 
1979 
A Review of the Experiences and Activities of the Urban 
Transportation Research Board, 1974-1979 
Urban Transportation Research Board (Transport 
Canada) 
Departmental/program 
report 
1980-2001 
Year Title Author (affiliation) Document type 
1981 
Notes for a speech by the Honourable Herb Gray, PC, MP, 
Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce to the 76
th
 Annual 
Meeting of the Canadian Urban Transit Association , Hotel 
Loews le Concorde, June 22, 1981 
Herb Gray (Ministry of Industry, Trade, and 
Commerce) 
Ministerial address 
1981 Urban transportation: The Canadian Experience Department of External Affairs Trade publication 
1981 Urban transit solutions Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Commerce Trade publication 
1985 Freedom to Move: A Framework for Transportation Reform National Transportation Agency Policy directive 
1985 
Urban transit research and development: Inventory of projects 
and value analysis 
Transportation Development Centre (Transport 
Canada) 
Departmental/program 
report 
1989 Freedom to move in Canada’s new transportation environment National Transportation Agency Policy directive 
1992 Transportation in Canada: Current Issues John, C. (Library of Parliament)  
1993 
Urban travel and sustainable development: The Canadian 
experience 
IBI Group, prepared for Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation 
Research report 
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1994 Transportation material for the urban chapter IBI Group, prepared for Environment Canada Research report 
1996 
Sustainable Transportation in Canada (Backgrounder) National Round Table on the Environment and the 
Economy 
White paper 
1997 Financing urban transportation Transportation Association of Canada Research report 
1997 
State of the debate: The road to sustainable transportation in 
Canada 
National Round Table on the Environment and the 
Economy 
Research report 
1998 A new vision for urban transportation Transportation Association of Canada White paper 
1999 
Canada Infrastructure Work Program: Phase II and Follow-Up of 
the Phase I Audit 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada Policy directive 
2000 Factors affecting urban transit ridership Kohn, H. (Statistics Canada) Research report 
2000 
Measuring progress: Toward the new vision for urban 
transportation 
Transportation Association of Canada White paper 
2001 National Vision for Urban Transit to 2020 Soberman, R. (Transport Canada) White paper 
2001 
Vision and Balance: Report of the Canada Transportation 
Review Panel 
Flemming, B., Patenaude, J., Findlay, G., Rae, R., 
and Waters, W. (Ministry of Public Works and 
Government Services) 
White paper 
2001 
Sustainable Transportation: The Canadian Context Transport Canada  (Contribution to the dialogue at 
the Ninth Session of the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development, April 16 
to 27, 2001) 
Conference proceedings 
2001 
Commons Debates, December 10, 2001: Transit House of Commons of Canada House of Commons 
proceedings 
2002-2015 
Year Title Author (affiliation) Document type 
2002 
Speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance for 
Canada, to members of the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities 
Martin, P. (Minisry of Finance) Ministerial address 
2002 Urban Transit in Canada: Taking Stock Transport Canada Research report 
2002 
Canada's Urban Strategy: A Blueprint for Action (Final Report, 
Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues) 
Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban 
Issues 
Policy recommendation 
2003 Legislative History of Bill C-26: Transportation Amendment Act Johansen, D. (Library of Parliament) Research report 
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2003 Straight Ahead: A Vision for Transportation in Canada Transport Canada White paper 
2004 
Review of international urban transportation policy 
frameworks, strategies, and governance models 
Transport Canada Research report 
2005 
Urban transportation in Canada: Needs and opportunities Council of Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
Responsible for Transportation and Highway 
Safety, Urban Transportation Task Force 
Policy recommendation 
2005 
Urban Transportation Pricing Options Transport Canada, Urban Transportation Showcase 
Program 
Research report 
2005 
Monitoring Progress Toward Sustainable Urban Transportation Transport Canada, Urban Transportation Showcase 
Program 
Policy evaluation 
2006 
An Evaluation of Transport Canada’s Moving on Sustainable 
Transportation Program 
Transport Canada, Moving on Sustainable 
Transportation Program 
Policy evaluation 
2009 
Urban transit in Canada: Taking stock of recent progress Council of Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
Responsible for Transportation and Highway 
Safety, Urban Transportation Task Force 
Policy recommendation 
2010 
Federal Support for Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail Transit 
Systems in Canada 
Ruffilli, D. (Library of Parliament) Research report 
2010 
Recent Developments in Transit in Canadian Cities, 2010 Council of Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
Responsible for Transportation and Highway 
Safety, Urban Transportation Task Force 
Policy recommendation 
2011 
Tax Evaluations and Research Reports: Evaluation of the Public 
Transit Tax Credit 
Ministry of Finance Policy evaluation 
2012 
Improving bus service: Modest investments to increase transit 
ridership 
Transport Canada Research report 
2012 
Sustainable funding for urban/regional transportation in 
Canada 
Transportation Association of Canada Research report 
2012 
Study on transit in Canada: Report of the Standing Committee 
on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities 
Tweed, M. (House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities) 
House of Commons 
proceedings 
2012 
Infrastructure Spotlight: Improving public transit for the 21st 
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Infrastructure Canada White paper 
2014 
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House of Commons of Canada, Standing 
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 Session, 41
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proceedings 
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2015 
Updating infrastructure in Canada: An examination of needs 
and investment (Report of the Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities) 
Miller, L. (Chair, Standing Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and Communities) 
House of Commons 
proceedings 
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Appendix C: Thematic Codes 
Table 14: First-era (documents from 1968-1979) codes applied during the thematic coding process. 
1
st
 Era 
Paradigms 
Lewis, C. B. (1972). Research  
            directions in urban            
            transportation. In Canadian  
            Federation of Mayors and  
            Municipalities/Ministry of  
            Transport Seminar on Urban  
            Transportation. Montebello,  
            QC: Ministry of Transport. 
1Paradigms1: “Urban mobility has never before been enjoyed by such a large proportion of the 
population. On the other hand the modern private car has also contributed to the urban dweller’s 
increasing sense of isolation and frustration” (p. 1)  
1Paradigms2: “Transportation is not the key to the solution of all urban problems, but it is … an 
important element of the city structure and solutions cannot be proposed without consideration of the 
general problem of the urban dynamic. Transportation, together with modern communications, has 
provided the warp and the weft along which our modern cities have been allowed to sprawl. Without 
transportation, the modern city could not continue to exist” (p. 3) 
1Paradigms3: “The root causes of our present and imminent vehicle traffic problems are the growth of 
human and automobile populations and the almost complete lack of any planned development of our 
cities in the interest of the people who choose, or who are obliged, to live and work in them” (p. 5) 
1Paradigms4: “The automobile is used for 50% to 60% of all trips to and from the central business 
districts of Canadian cities and for 97% of all urban passenger miles travelled. Less than the remaining 
3% are accomplished by public transit. Therefore, it is apparent that particular attention must be 
directed to the private car if any appreciable amelioration of present urban traffic conditions is to be 
achieved. While the provision of improved public transport can relieve some city transportation 
problems, it is by no means the panacea some propagandists would have us believe. The history of 
public transit systems in North America over the last twenty-five years has been one of decreasing 
ridership, increasing costs and inadequate service. If the car commuter is to be encouraged to switch 
back to public transit, it is evident that higher standards of convenience, reliability and comfort must be 
provided. However, in spite of all we can do to improve the situation, it is likely that a variant of 
Parkinson’s Law will pertain; namely, the automotive population will expand to fill the pavement area 
available to it” (p. 5) 
1Paradigms5: “The planners and designers of integrated systems face almost insurmountable economic 
and political problems. Prominent among these are the number of different jurisdictions involved and 
the number of different people and parties who are asked to pay different parts of the total bill” (p. 5) 
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1Paradigms6: “One of our most difficult problems is the lack of any consensus on the values to be 
placed on the many social benefits and disbenefits involved. We do not yet know how to allocate the 
costs of snow removal and policing to the various users of our city streets, let alone how to quantify the 
costs of noise, pollution, accidents, time lost in congestion, and aesthetic intrusion. We know how to 
estimate the cost of building new arterials (or do we?), but we do not know how to evaluate the social 
costs involved in carving up the communities they traverse … One begins to wonder how we shall ever 
be able to apply the … ‘systems approach’ to our urban problems on any significant scale” (p. 5) 
1Paradigms7: “The major urban problems to which the private car makes a substantial contribution are 
traffic congestion, air pollution, noise, and the high total cost of urban transportation. The … automobile 
may be an excellent vehicle for highway cruising, but it would be difficult to conceive of a more 
ridiculous vehicle for urban use” (p.5) 
1Paradigms8: “A well-integrated and comprehensive system [involving flexible, express, and 
conventional transit services] could greatly enhance urban mobility and reduce the need for private 
vehicles to operate in core districts. It should be readily responsive to changes in land use and 
improvements in technology, unlike conventional rapid transit which tends to leave the public 
investment ‘locked in’ to a static technology and to exert a dominant influence on land use patterns 
throughout its useful life” (p. 7) 
1Paradigms9: “Review of the process of building new urban transit systems in North America over the 
last decade or so shows that the major problems encountered were jurisdictional and institutional, that 
these problems dominated the basic technical task of system planning, and entailed extraordinary 
delays before detailed design and construction could be undertaken … There is a mutual attraction 
between real estate investment capital and mass transit, partly because of the permanent or ‘inflexible’ 
nature of rapid transit routing. This in turn inhibits the flexibility of long-term urban development 
planning” (p. 9)  
1Paradigms10: “In the last decade or so there has been a growing awareness of the magnitude of the 
problems facing us in the development of urban transportation, and of the technological opportunities 
offered to us. We have yet to establish effective machinery whereby a concerted and cohesive attack on 
these problems on a nationwide scale can be made through the research and development process” (p. 
17) 
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Gertler, L. O. (1973). The research 
program of the Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs. In 
Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Council of Urban 
and Regional Research. 
Montreal, QC: Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs. 
1Paradigms11: “The pressing urban problems of poverty and housing shortages and escalating land 
costs, transportation and environmental vulnerability and urban servicing are interrelated … and cannot 
be dealt with effectively in isolation from each other. The policy maker must be informed by a synoptic 
view of urban problems. At all levels of government we need to coordinate the urban-related sectors, 
and to develop broad urban policies that provide a perspective and context for sectoral policies” (p. 3) 
1Paradigms12: “Urban problems reflect deep societal forces, such as rural-urban migration, income 
structures, the economics of transportation, the biases of private banking and investment, the 
mechanism of the land market, and so on. As a consequence, urban problems cannot be treated by each 
city in isolation without reference to the relationship between and interdependence of cities and towns, 
town and country, and multi-governmental networks of policies and programs that have an urban 
impact. To cope with urban problems, we need to sustain consultation between all levels of government 
on the character of the problems, the policy options and the ways and means of bringing to bear on the 
solution or alleviation of problems the full weight of the urban government system” (p. 3) 
1Paradigms13: “To understand the role and potential of the Ministry's research program, we have to 
appreciate that the essence of the approach, as represented by the Ministry, is to initiate a process 
which is directed both inwards to the federal system, and outwards to other governments and non-
government urban interests” (p. 5) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1974). Annual Report, 1973-
1974. Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms14: “Movement within urban areas should not depend to the extent that it does on the 
private automobile, which results in congestion, environmental pollution, and denial of adequate 
transportation to those without cars such as the poor, the handicapped, the elderly and young people. 
Substantial government assistance is required if public transit facilities are to compete effectively with 
the private automobile in convenience, comfort, speed and cost. Broadly speaking, the form of the city 
and the type of transport available are closely related: the spread of sprawling low-density suburbs 
tends to make dependence on the private automobile inevitable; conversely a more closely-knit urban 
area may require a commitment to adequate and well-planned transport facilities at an early stage” (p. 
8) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1974). Comparison of public 
transit systems. Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms15: “Fixed guideway modes encourage high-density, linear development while those which 
share roads with other vehicles generally encourage low-density spread out growth. It depends upon 
the goals of the community as to which type of development is the more desirable in a given situation” 
(p. IV-8) 
Danson, B. (1975a). Text of an 
address delivered by the 
Honourable Barney Danson, 
1Paradigms16: “We seem to accept the fact that our roads and highways which concern us so much are 
part of the general revenues. We don't seem to do cost-benefit analyses on these; in this country at 
least we accept them as part of our taxes or our budgets. But as soon as we talk about public 
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PC, MP, Minister of State of 
Urban Affairs to the National 
Joint Conference of the 
American Society of Planning 
Officials and the Community 
Planning Association of 
Canada. Vancouver, BC: 
Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs. 
transportation, we immediately start counting the cost. And so far, I've been unable to find a proper 
economic analysis which will compare those two, compare the losses along those roads, the amount it 
costs us to drive our cars and  amortize those cars and the gasoline to use them, not to mention the 
wear and tear on our nerves and the additional health cost, which is probably hard to quantify” (p. 5) 
Duc, G. (1975). Description of 
selected urban-relevant 
programs. Ottawa, ON: 
Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs. 
1Paradigms17: “Although it is natural that sectoral program objectives predominate, few if any 
programs can by themselves fully take into account the interrelated and wider ranging concerns of 
urban Canada. At the present time, however, there is emerging within federal departments and agencies 
an increasing consciousness of the urban consequences of their actions. In due  course, this can be 
expected to yield a federal  program/activity structure that in addition to satisfying sectoral 
requirements, is sensitive to the needs, concerns and priorities of urban Canadians” (p. 4) 
1Paradigms18: “At the present time, the Ministry [of Transport]'s major role is: (a) to ensure that 
national transportation policy influences and responds to the objectives and programs of the private and 
public sectors. (b) to provide, for any mode of transportation, such as way, terminal and vehicular 
services,  supportable where appropriate by recoverable financing from the users or other beneficiaries,  
that cannot or should not be offered by the  private or other public sectors. (c) To balance economic, 
technical and social  consequences resulting from changes in capability  or use of transportation services 
and ensure  that socially and economically viable standards  of vehicle, way, terminal and operator 
performance are established and adequately maintained. (d) Development – to encourage and promote 
continuous improvement, innovation, growth or phase-out of modal and intermodal transportation” (p. 
346) 
Sunga, P. and Duc, G. (1975). MSUA 
and the federal government. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
 
1Paradigms19: “As the sixties drew to a close the already apparent ‘urban crisis’ and the problems 
foreseen in further unconstrained urban growth generated a new federal initiative in urban affairs 
leading to the creation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. Several other factors motivated the 
creation of the Ministry, including: (a) the realization that the federal government is itself a major actor 
in urban Canada, affecting developments in urban areas to a far greater extent than previously 
supposed; (b) the recognition that the urban implications of current federal activities needed to be 
understood more precisely and that new policies and programs needed to be assessed in terms of both 
the urban objectives and priorities of the Government of Canada, and of provincial and municipal 
aspirations for urban Canada; (c) the fact that the national urban system is highly integrated and 
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responsive to policies at the national level; (d) the realization that interdependent urban problems 
(housing, transportation, land use, environmental deterioration, fiscal pressures and financial demands, 
among others) required comprehensive solutions which would favourably influence the future pattern 
of urbanization and the form and quality of urban regions; and (e) the recognition that policies and 
programs of all levels of government require coordination to guide the development and enhance the 
quality of life in existing and new urban centres” (p. 3) 
1Paradigms20: “Notwithstanding the primacy of provincial and municipal governments in urban affairs, 
actions of the Government of Canada and the activities of its agencies … have significant impact on 
urbanization and urban development. Federal responsibility in the area of urban affairs stems from a 
number of sources. The growing pace of urbanization, the evolution of an integrated urban system and 
the massive infrastructure required to assure its viability, led to major de facto federal involvement in 
urban Canada that undoubtedly surpasses the Canadian government’s explicit constitutional 
responsibilities in urban matters. Secondly, a large number of agreements have been negotiated 
between the federal and provincial governments in the past, extending to the Government of Canada 
responsibilities that have important direct and indirect urban consequences. Lastly, the growing physical 
presence of federal departments and agencies and the operation of their programs in urban centres has 
further accentuated the historical federal involvement in urban Canada” (p. 3) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1975). Annual Report, 1974-
1975. Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms21: “Canada has become one of the world’s most urbanized countries. The challenge of this 
rapid shift of population, of the increased demand for public utilities, housing and transportation, social 
services, education and cultural facilities calls for complex and far-reaching responses from planners, 
developers, and public administrators. The strain on facilities, the drain on the public purse, the private 
distress of crowding, and the rising cost of accommodation are some of the major concerns today for 
Canadian citizens and their government” (p. 2) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1975). Capital assistance 
program for urban 
transportation announced. 
Office of the Honourable 
Barney Danson, Minister of 
State for Urban Affairs. 
Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms22: “The capital assistance program reflects the importance the government attaches to 
solving urban problems. Many of these problems are related to automobile use — including urban 
sprawl, traffic congestion, automobile accidents, wasteful use of energy, and pollution” (p. 2) 
1Paradigms23: “Studies have shown that energy consumption per capita for transportation stabilizes or 
declines as the use of public transportation increases. For every dollar Canadians spend in urban areas 
on private cars, they spend less than five cents on public transportation. The measures now announced 
are intended to encourage planned management of urban growth and greater use of the alternative to 
the automobile, namely, public transportation services. Both these matters are key aspects of the 
government's urban priority” (p. 2) 
1Paradigms24: “The assistance program is expected to have the greatest impact on major metropolitan 
areas where the degree of urgency about urban problems is highest” (p. 3) 
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Danson, B. (1975). Note for an 
address: “An Urban Strategy 
for Canada” to the 
Conference Board of Canada. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1Paradigms25: “A moment ago, I suggested that there seemed to be an emerging consensus that the 
trend toward concentration of our population in three or four provinces and two or three large urban 
regions is unacceptable and that governments at all levels ought to pursue policies that will result in a 
more regionally-balanced pattern of provincial and urban growth. In order to do this effectively, it is 
obvious that we will need to look at ways and means to shift a larger part of the immigration flow to our 
smaller and less rapidly growing centres. At the same time, we need to look at ways and means to 
encourage more people to stay in these same centres instead of migrating to larger urban areas” (p. 11) 
1Paradigms26: “In my view … the management of our urban regions and their future shape and form is 
most appropriately dealt with at the provincial and local level. There are obvious constitutional reasons 
for this. There are other reasons as well. If we want to preserve and enhance the diversity of our 
communities and the life-styles that they offer, this choice should reflect the differences in the social 
fabric and cultural attitudes of a Montreal as compared with a Vancouver, or a St. John's as compared 
with a Regina” (p. 14) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1976). Annual Report, 1975-
1976. Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms27: “For some time … municipalities, both individually and through the Canadian Federation 
of Municipalities, have argued that their revenues are inadequate to meet their expanding financial 
responsibilities. The property tax, their prime source of revenue, is judged by critics to be inadequate. 
Further, the increasing role of intergovernmental transfers is cited as symptomatic of a basic imbalance 
of revenues and expenditures among the three levels of government” (p. 3) 
Kirkland, J. (1976). Intra-urban 
mobility in Montreal, Toronto 
and Vancouver. Ottawa, ON: 
Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs. 
1Paradigms28: “It is easy to single out suburban residential development as representing urban growth 
and population mobility because of the distinct differences from core and / or older sections of urban 
centres. Street patterns and architectural styling are very visible reminders on the physical landscape 
that one as left an inner city district and is now in suburbia. By definition, suburban development and 
population mobility are one and the same” (p. 1) 
1Paradigms29: “By widening and extending present expressways the carrying capacity is increased. This 
does not necessarily reduce the travel time from a given suburban point to downtown. This is prevented 
from happening since more traffic is induced to the system from even greater distances. The efficiency 
of the system is high and its own success is self-defeating. More distant suburban areas can be 
developed at low density as expressways are built further from downtown areas. Thus higher than 
average in-migration rates can be expected in suburban areas developing in response to the 
construction of multi-lane expressways. Massive traffic flows, characteristics of all three centres mainly 
consist of journey-to-work type trips” (p. 24) 
1Paradigms30: “The spatial direction in which cities grow can be directly influenced by transportation 
networks. Certainly the Yonqe Street streetcar line in Toronto in the early 1900s is a case in point. Here 
the strong impetus to the north was strengthened to offset the distinct east-west historic development” 
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(p. 25) 
1Paradigms31: “Subway developments in Montreal and Toronto have in a different fashion influenced 
mobility if not in-migration rates. Terminal stations at any point in time could favour high density 
residential and/or commercial activities. Travel between these points and the core is relatively cheap 
and fast while land costs may be significantly lower than in the central business district. Depending on 
site characteristics, subway terminal locations can foster large scale developments because of the 
conveniences offered … the benefits accruing to suburban commuters in the form of expressway 
development are to a lesser degree there also in subways. Although their extent is not as great as 
expressways, their carrying capacities are markedly higher. Thus through some mixed mode pattern of 
transport, commuters in more outlying areas in metropolitan centres can take advantage of this type of 
transportation. Core areas themselves reap many of the disadvantages of such patterns in certain 
environmental aspects but on the other hand, several economic benefits accrue to them as well” (p. 25-
26) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1977). Annual Report, 1976-
1977. Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms32: “Urban transport facilities occupy up to 40 percent of urban land, and more than 15 
percent of Canada’s oil consumption is used for urban travel. Given the pervasive role of transportation 
in urban development, this directorate investigated urban transportation and the urban impact of inter-
city transportation infrastructure” (p. 7) 
1Paradigms33: “Because of the limited federal role in urban transportation, these efforts were directed 
at assessing existing federal programs in terms of their consistency with local urban transportation 
objectives, without detracting from the achievement of the relevant program objectives” (p. 7) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1978). Annual Report, 1977-
1978. Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms34: “Each parcel of land needs access, needs links to other parcels, if it is to function in its 
intended way. The pattern of transport demand is thus directly tied to the pattern of settlement, both 
nationally and within cities or regions. Some patterns are more efficient than others, in terms of the 
monetary and other resources consumed and in terms of the benefits yielded” (p. 35) 
1Paradigms35: “Urban transit financing is becoming more difficult at a time when transit is expected to 
help solve urban and energy problems. However, federal housing and highway programs can conflict 
with local transit planning. Furthermore, national transportation infrastructure investments frequently 
result in urban impacts which are not fully taken into account, such as conflicts with local development 
plans or the economic viability of small communities” (p. 36) 
1Paradigms36: “It is apparent that continued heavy reliance on the automobile, brought about by the 
more dispersed forms of urban growth and the lack of transit investment relative to roadworks, will 
overshadow minor improvements in transport-system efficiency. Indeed, studies of typical 
neighbourhood designs have indicated that unplanned ‘sprawl’ development may require up to twice 
the investment in road-related construction and operation as a higher density development” (p. 36-37) 
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N.D. Lea and Associates, Ltd. 
(1979). 
Transportation/Housing 
Interrelationships: Pilot 
Study. Ottawa, ON: Ministry 
of State for Urban Affairs. 
1Paradigms37: “In some cases the lower land costs of more peripherally located [housing] projects (and 
hence the lower rents) are offset by the increased costs of transportation to the user and the transport 
subsidies provided by the municipalities” (p. 1) 
1Paradigms38: “[A] factor which appeared to have an important impact on household transportation 
and municipal transport costs was the location of each project in the city. Perhaps the most interesting 
finding in this part of the analysis was that municipal transport costs appeared to be much lower in the 
core than in the frame and in the fringe. Consequently, the transport costs incurred by municipalities for 
households that moved into the core from the frame and fringe decreased; however, the cost to the 
municipalities for households that moved into the frame and fringe from the core increased” (p. 8) 
Frankena, M (1979). The economics 
of urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1Paradigms39: “The greater proportion of trips made by public transit, other things equal, by lower-
income people reflects their lower rate of automobile ownership and the lower dollar value they place 
on savings in travel time and on comfort, and the fact that public transit typically has a lower out-of-
pocket money cost but requires more travel time and less comfortable than the automobile” (p. 17) 
1Paradigms40: “Existing public transit systems generally provide services which are inferior goods. As 
incomes have increased, people have been willing to pay higher out-of-pocket costs to reduce travel 
time and increase comfort and convenience, and automobile ownership per capita has increased 
substantially. Consequently, people have switched from public transit to private automobiles” (p. 18) 
1Paradigms41: “Transit fares in Canada increased substantially relative to the cost of living and relative 
to the price of gasoline between 1945 and 1970 … This naturally deterred people from using public 
transit (p. 18) 
1Paradigms42: “The decline in public transit trips in absolute terms and compared to automobile trips is 
further explained by the decentralization of urban areas. In large part because the private automobile is 
the lowest-cost mode of transportation between dispersed origins and destinations, the transit service 
provided in suburbs is generally inferior to that in the higher density central parts of urban area” (p. 18) 
1Paradigms43: “As real incomes and leisure have increased, the number of non-work trips per capita 
has increased. Consequently, the share of all trips which are to work has declined. Since the share of 
trips made by transit is higher for work than non-work trips, the decreasing share of all trips which are to 
work has entailed a decrease in the share of all trips which are by transit” (p. 20) 
1Paradigms44: “With all of these factors encouraging a decline in transit ridership, it is natural to ask 
why there was not a further decline in ridership after 1960 and why ridership has increased since 1971. 
The major explanation is undoubtedly that there was a 60 per cent increase in the number of vehicle 
miles of public transit service supplied between 1960 and 1975, between 1971 and 1975, primarily as a 
result of increasing government ownership and subsidization of public transit. Consequently, transit 
service improved in many areas, and the population served by transit increased considerably as service 
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was introduced for the first time in suburban areas. It should be noted that ridership per vehicle mile of 
service continued to fall during this period” (p. 20) 
1Paradigms45: “The fact that a case can be made for some form of government subsidies for urban 
public transit on both efficiency and … distributional grounds does not imply that existing subsidy 
programs necessarily contribute to efficiency of resource allocation or a more equal distribution of well-
being” (p. 60) 
1Paradigms46: “In the [case of the proposed Spadina Expressway] … after two miles of expressway had 
been completed, the Ontario provincial government decided in 1971 not to continue the project. This 
decision was made as part of a shift in urban transportation policy from emphasis on expansion of 
facilities for private automobiles to improvement of public transportation” (p. 94) 
1Paradigms47: “The studies of the 1960s have been criticized because they assumed that a proper 
objective for transportation investment was expansion of facilities to accommodate estimated future 
peak-hour travel, usually while achieving some increase in travel speeds. In short, investment projects to 
limit or reduce congestion were recommended regardless of cost. There was rarely any attempt to base 
recommendations on serious cost-benefit analyses of projects and their alternatives, or to determine 
whether people benefiting from the proposed facilities would be willing to pay the costs. This approach 
to investment decisions was in part a reflection of the fact that these transportation studies were 
carried out by people trained in engineering and planning rather than economics” (p. 110) 
1Paradigms48: “Studies [in the 1960s] were biased toward reliance on investment in rights-of-way as a 
solution to urban transportation problems. Little concern was given to other areas of policy such as 
pricing of road use and parking, regulation of taxis, or regulation of roads to improve the functioning of 
bus systems. More recently, however, as political opposition to highway construction has increased, 
greater attention has been given to traffic regulations which would improve the performance of buses 
compared to private automobiles” (p. 112) 
Urban Transportation Research 
Branch. (1979). A review of 
the experience and activities 
of the Urban Transportation 
Research Branch 1974-1979. 
Ottawa, ON. 
1Paradigms49: “Increasing traffic congestion, inefficient utilization of energy and other vital resources, 
deterioration of the urban environment, dwindling land supply and mounting transit deficits are all seen 
as symptoms of basic problems affecting the transportation of people and goods in our modern cities. 
Without quality communications and transport, life in cities as we know them today would not be 
possible. It has been recognized that significant effort is required to ensure that communications will be 
adequate to meet the sophisticated needs of future cities. Hand in hand with these efforts toward more 
effective communication is a need for effective, urban transportation research to identify problem areas 
and to seek out solutions which may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of urban transportation” 
(p. 2) 
1Paradigms50: “Perhaps the greatest social disbenefit of all is urban sprawl encouraged by the 
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automobile system in addition to the cost of automobile accidents and air and noise pollution. The 
automobile has made possible the dispersal of activities and the expansion of the whole urban area, so 
that lacking adequate public transport, the entrenched means for access to traditional urban facilities 
has become the automobile. Since 15% of Canadian families do not own an automobile and 5 to 10% of 
the population does not and cannot have access to a car because of physical disability , economic 
disadvantages or social isolation, existing transit modes must shoulder the burden of daily travel for 
these people” (p. 3) 
1Paradigms51: “In the United States and in many European countries, the federal government Is visibly 
committed to urban transportation RandD (e.g. the Urban Mass Transit Administration in U.S.). In 
Canada, this has not been the case. The support of speculative, high risk RandD is a traditional role of 
central governments. The research sponsored by the Branch was often conducted in response to the 
needs of user groups or clients” (p. 14) 
1Paradigms52: “The transit field, unlike traffic engineering, has never been clearly defined as a 
professional or academic discipline. This fact has contributed significantly to the slow rate of progress in 
developing new transit management and engineering techniques and the lack of interest in transit 
among young professionals leaving university” (p. 17) 
1Paradigms53: “A research group working as part of the federal government and housed within a line 
department necessarily has mixed allegiance. On the one hand, the allegiance is to the broad Canadian 
community. The acknowledgement of that responsibility leads to the conduct of projects which may or 
may not have any interest or relevance to the parent department. In fact, in some instances the 
research results produced may be critical of line policies or programs and may be directly embarrassing 
to the line department” (p. 21) 
1Paradigms54: “Coordination and support of urban transportation RandD on a national scale leaves 
much to be desired and no inter-governmental machinery exists which is suitable for this purpose. 
Existing organizations that already play a minor role in this cannot hope to fill the void, largely because 
their interests are either much wider than urban transportation research per se (e.g., RTAC) or cover 
only a small part of the urban transportation problem (e.g., CUTA)” (p. 23) 
1Paradigms55: “The problems of urban transportation are not unique to any one country. There is real 
value in international cooperation in this field to avoid repeating mistakes and to reap the benefits of 
successes in other countries. Unlike Canada, however, most other countries have a centralized 
responsibility for urban transportation RandD and it is difficult for Canada to participate in these 
studies” (p. 25) 
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1Paradigms56: “Transit is now heavily subsided and many service deficits are a growing burden for 
provincial and municipal finances. Operating deficits have grown rapidly in recent years, from virtually 
nothing in 1970 to over $200 million in 1977. This has prompted studies into their causes, into methods 
of financing them, and into ways of improving transit without increasing costs. The operating deficit has 
risen due to expansion of services, inflation, low fares and increasing trip lengths. Fare changes have 
been found to have little impact on ridership and so have little effect on cost; subsidies used to depress 
fare levels can thus be seen as a transfer of income to transit riders from the rest of society, with little 
economic impact” (p. 37) 
1
st
 Era 
Programs 
Lewis, C. B. (1972). Research 
directions in urban 
transportation. In Canadian 
Federation of Mayors and 
Municipalities/Ministry of 
Transport Seminar on Urban 
Transportation. Montebello, 
QC: Ministry of Transport. 
1Programs1:“In practical terms, [restraining the automobile] might mean using subway systems, bus 
systems, private cars, and taxis for those tasks for which each is best suited; providing efficient 
interchange between these sub-systems, and employing modern technologies to extend, improve and 
generally lubricate the operation of the overall system” (p. 5) 
1Programs2: “In a major city, a … comprehensive bus system might comprise; (a) Express or ‘limited 
access’ main line bus routes connecting the core of the city to the outlying suburbs and exurbs, and 
using equipment similar to the present intercity bus. These buses would usually operate on established 
routes and fixed schedules, using existing highways and arterials. They might provide an alternative … 
where population densities or future uncertainties do not warrant the building of conventional rapid 
transit. (b) Conventional urban bus routes serving cross-town traffic and providing interchanges with the 
express or limited access main line buses. The equipment and passenger facilities could be greatly 
improved, and some degree of flexible routing and demand-responsive scheduling might be introduced. 
(c) Mini-buses or ‘jitneys’ providing shuttle service between points where the traffic volume warrants; 
e.g., to and from airports, railway stations, etc., or in downtown shopping districts. (d) Demand-
responsive, flexibly routed collecting and distributing services provided by small buses or limousines ... 
These would be competing with conventional taxis, U-drive taxis and private cars” (p. 7) 
1Programs3: “Since the bus is likely to remain the work-horse of Canadian transit services for some time 
to come, it is essential that all possible ways of improving labour efficiency and equipment should be 
investigated. However, rising unit labour rates will tend to make automated ‘bus-substitute’ systems 
more economically viable. An intensive development effort in this direction is therefore warranted” (p. 
7) 
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1Programs4: “In general, it would seem that the characteristics of most Canadian cities are not well-
suited to conventional rail rapid transit systems. If, however, a small gauge or mono-rail system 
employing small ‘passenger capsules’ could be devised that would permit fully-automatic control, and 
insertion and removal of passengers without disrupting the high speed (50 mph?) flow of ‘through’ 
traffic, a system would result in which the ratio of investment in rolling stock (plus control equipment, 
etc.) to investment in fixed track and structures would be much higher than for conventional rail transit. 
The flexibility of the system would thus be considerably improved in both routing and response to 
demand” (p. 8) 
1Programs5: “The potential usefulness of public transit for moving goods as well as passengers should 
not be ignored. [Modules] compatible with our larger freight containers and might be a convenient size 
for physical distribution within our cities, using future intermediate capacity ‘mini-transit’ systems for 
main haul, with specially designed conveyors and trucks for final distribution” (p. 11) 
1Programs6: “In the foreseeable future there will be no shortage of research opportunities; there is, 
however, likely to be a very real shortage of research resources. Thus, if improvements in the field of 
urban transportation are not to be hopelessly protracted because of the limited funds and effort 
available at the municipal, provincial and national levels, the development and demonstration phases, in 
many instances, will have to be undertaken jointly under bilateral or multilateral agreements between 
the various levels of governments. This will require the closest co-operation at the planning, research 
and development stages if we are to make wise choices and avoid expensive duplication of effort” (p. 
17) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1973). Annual Report, 1972-
1973. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs7: “The main activities of [MSUA’s] Policy Directorate include the elaboration of federal 
theses on various items on the agenda of the tripartite conference of 1972 and the establishment of 
proposals in the following policy matters: (a) Urban objectives, setting national goals and determining 
general criteria used to judge policies and programs affecting urban-federal relations; (b) Urban Futures: 
projections of the effects of current trends in our cities until 2000 and various policy choices; (c) Urban 
transport: In collaboration with the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Environment, conduct 
research related to the federal role in urban transport policy” (p. 1-2) 
1Programs8: “Under its mandate, the Department must not only develop policy and conduct research 
but must also coordinate policies. This role is multidimensional as it is exercised at all levels. The 
Department coordinates the activities of urban-relevant federal departments, including the 
harmonization of federal policies and programs with those of provincial and metropolitan-regional 
governments” (p. 3) 
Gertler, L. O. (1973). The research 
program of the Ministry of 
1Programs9: “The research program must represent the elements that are salient in the urban life of 
Canada. To emphasize a few, for example, housing, transportation or welfare to the exclusion of others, 
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State for Urban Affairs. In 
Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Council of Urban 
and Regional Research. 
Montreal, QC: Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs. 
would impair the capacity for a synoptic view of urban problems and lead to distortions in policy advice. 
There is an obligation to move on a broad front” (p. 4) 
1Programs10: “Urban government is concerned with the system – involving several levels of 
government, acting separately and in coordination – within which policies and decisions about urban 
affairs are rendered. The evolving approach is to organize the theme by means of a multi-dimensional 
matrix consisting of both a number of policy questions and general social research problems. The policy 
questions are taken from such urban sectors as transportation, housing and community; the research 
problems will encompass such areas of concern as public participation, intergovernmental relations, 
urban policy formulation, urban planning, urban political culture, and so on. At each point where policy 
questions and research problems intersect, a number of research projects can be defined. One such 
intersection, which will have priority in the program, is between citizen participation and transportation. 
Such a project ought to contribute to the resolution of an important policy issue for the federal 
government” (p. 24) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1974). Annual Report, 1973-
1974. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs11: “Any significant shift in these trends towards a more balanced pattern of urban growth 
will require the concerted support of all levels of government. The theme of the second National Tri-
Level Conference on urban affairs at Edmonton in October 1973 was ‘The Management of Growth.’ 
During the conference all levels of government endorsed three preliminary urban objectives: the need 
for a more balanced national pattern of urban growth; the need to divert growth towards small, 
medium-sized or new communities – especially by improving the amenities and attractiveness of such 
smaller centres; and the need to maintain and improve the quality of the environment in the heart of 
the largest urban centres. The conference also endorsed the concerted deployment of public policies to 
these ends” (p. 2) 
1Programs12: “The Senior Interdepartmental Committee on Urban Affairs (SIDCUA) was established in 
July 1973. It is a forum for considering federal policies and programs as they affect urban problems and 
issues and for providing advice to the Minister of State for Urban Affairs on their development and 
evaluation. The committee consists of the deputy head of 15 federal departments and agencies, and it is 
chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry. During 1973-74 it addressed itself to broad issues, and 
specifically to the main agenda items considered at the Second National Tri-Level Conference, i.e., the 
management of urban growth, urban transportation, housing and public finance” (p. 3) 
1Programs13: “Working with and through the Halifax-Dartmouth tri-level committee, the Ministry has 
also initiated or ported work on a number of specific issues such as the redevelopment of the Halifax 
waterfront, solid waste management, transit improvement projects, and container port location” (p. 4) 
1Programs14: “During 1973-74, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs worked closely with other federal 
departments and agencies, principally the Ministry of Transport, in a comprehensive review of the 
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federal role in urban transportation. One result of the review was a federal proposal at the Edmonton 
National Tri-Level Conference to establish a National Urban Transportation Development Corporation as 
a joint venture of the federal and provincial governments. The proposal has been further elaborated and 
refined in subsequent consultation with officials of all provincial governments, involving MSUA, the 
Ministry of Transport and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. Other results of this urban 
transportation policy review were emerging at the end of 1973-74 as new policy program options” (p. 7) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1974). Public transit and the 
needs of disadvantaged 
groups. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs15: “Disabled and elderly persons with walking problems probably need a separate transit 
system. While some representatives of the groups concerned argue for modifications to be made to 
present transit systems to accommodate their needs, the cost and time involved to make these changes 
would appear to be prohibitive. A separate system would require careful planning and could also 
probably provide service to the blind. The importance of removing architectural barriers at origins and 
destinations of wheelchair and other persons should also be emphasized” (p. 6) 
1Programs16: “Some features of present transit systems should be modified to facilitate access by 
certain groups. Some of those persons with walking problems, some of the blind and mentally retarded, 
require only minor modifications to the system in order to serve their needs better. Improvements could 
include greater use of dial-a-bus, re-design of bus entrances, more shelters with benches and better 
information dissemination including special information for the blind. Also increased mobility training 
services for the blind and mentally [challenged] would be desirable” (p. 6) 
1Programs17: “While it would be necessary to study the overall feasibility of [a separate transit system 
for disadvantaged groups] first, a separate door-to-door service could be instituted on a demonstration 
basis. The city or cities should be carefully chosen, and the service should probably be instituted city-
wide rather than only in one or two areas, so that the full logistics of a service to any destination in a city 
can be tested. The city or cities chosen should be sufficiently large to have a large enough population of 
such groups to support a separate vehicle system, and with sufficiently dispersed destinations to create 
mobility problems for the groups. It would obviously also be advisable to select a city sympathetic to the 
needs of these groups; one, for example, which has had a LIP or large volunteer service. Of the cities we 
have studied, possible candidates for such a trial service might be Hamilton, Regina, Quebec City, Halifax 
or Victoria. We also know of interest in this problem in several other medium-sized cities, including 
Kitchener-Waterloo” (p. 9-10) 
1Programs18: “Many cities have introduced fare reductions for the elderly, the blind, children, and in a 
few instances the poor and the mentally [challenged]. However, in no cases have there been any 
attempts to monitor the change in the numbers of trips taken by the groups affected. As a result no 
information is available on how price sensitive these groups are. There are even some quite significant 
experiments with approaches to pre-paying fares which warrant close attention” (p. 10) 
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1Programs19: “Direct funding to individuals for transportation, or in other words, as an alternative to 
providing demonstration of a separate service, providing individuals with funds to purchase their own 
service from those available privately,, and monitoring the changes in behaviour which result … could be 
applied to those without transportation, such as persons in wheelchairs who do not own cars, or to 
groups likely to be sensitive to cost” (p. 11) 
1Programs20: “Urban Affairs can: actively disseminate the results of research on the subject to federal, 
provincial and municipal agencies involved. In particular, our report should be distributed as quickly as 
possible to all persons interviewed during the course of the work … sensitize public transit and agencies 
and urban planners to the needs of these groups, through the development of educational materials 
and management seminars … liaise directly with provincial departments of transportation to draw them 
into considering a problem area usually considered only by welfare-related agencies and departments … 
encourage greater funding of agencies for the blind and mentally [challenged], for providing increased 
mobility training for these groups” (p. 12) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1974). Comparison of public 
transit systems. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs21: “For cities of between 250,000 and 1,000,000 population, the conventional bus is still the 
lowest cost system but bus rapid transit, light rapid transit, and commuter rail can provide low cost 
solutions with higher service levels. In the larger cities of over 1,000,000 populations the transit 
expressway concept of light rapid transit with small vehicles provides the highest level of service. The 
rapid transit modes including light rapid transit, bus rapid transit, and full rapid transit also provide high 
levels of service at low cost, and commuter rail provides the lowest unit cost if existing rail rights-of-way 
can be utilized (p. I-1)” 
1Programs22: “The results of this analysis indicate several trends. For example, in all cities of over 
100,000, bus rapid transit becomes very attractive. There are currently no examples of this type of 
transit system in Canada and this would appear to be a prime area for research and development. For 
cities of over 250,000 population, light rapid transit also appears to be very attractive. Several proposals 
for this type of system have been made recently, notably in Vancouver, Ottawa, and Kitchener, and a 
research effort in this field seems to be required, particularly in the development of a modern vehicle of 
this type. Only in the largest cities of over 1 million population do full rapid transit and the other rapid 
transit technologies become attractive. This is in line with world experience. The heavy capital costs of 
full rapid transit make it unattractive except at the various heavy, maximum expected volumes Even at 
present transit usage in our typical city of over 2 million population, the full rapid transit option does not 
turn out to be the least” (p. V-2) 
Danson, B. (1975a). Text of an 
address delivered by the 
Honourable Barney Danson, 
1Programs23: “There are many instruments or levers as they are sometimes called which governments 
have at their disposal … [including] the tri-level conferences. These are excellent mechanisms to make 
these levers work and while the process if far from perfect; it is making great progress. Once other levels 
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Ministry of State for Urban 
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of government understand that the federal government is not trying to move in, and trying to do a job 
which is perhaps  none of its business, but certainly included in its jurisdiction,  I find that they are 
prepared to listen and to cooperate” (p. 12) 
 
Danson, B. (1975b). Notes for an 
address: "An Urban Strategy 
for Canada" to the 
Conference Board of Canada. 
Winnipeg, MB: Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs. 
1Programs24: “The federal government has many relevant and powerful instruments at its disposal and 
it is prepared to deploy these in support of new goals reflecting new values. Immigration policy, 
economic and tax policies, transportation and industrial policies, as well as regional development 
policies, can be used to influence regional location and urban settlement patterns. Control over railways 
and airports, federal lands and buildings and housing policies can be used deliberately to support 
provincial and metropolitan growth strategies and to improve the quality of the urban environment” (p. 
6) 
1Programs25: “Frankly, I don't think that we have begun to exhaust the types of incentives that are 
available, not only to the federal government, but also to the provincial and municipal governments, to 
influence the location of economic activity and population. It is important that we look at other types of 
incentives, because the achievement of so many of our national goals depend upon a more balanced 
distribution of population and wealth across this country” (p. 12) 
Duc, G. (1975). Description of 
selected urban-relevant 
programs. Ottawa, ON: 
Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs. 
1Programs26: “In respect of research, MSUA may: (a) initiate studies relating to urbanization; (b) 
coordinate with other agencies of the federal government, research relating to urbanization  that has 
been undertaken or financed by those  agencies; and (c) recommend priorities for research in 
urbanization. In respect of its coordinative functions, MSUA may: (a) coordinate, promote and 
recommend urban policies  among agencies of the Government of Canada; (b) coordinate the activities 
of the federal government in establishing cooperative relationships  with the provinces and their 
municipalities; and (c) coordinate the involvement of the federal government with other governments 
and non-government” (p. 371) 
1Programs27: “Interaction with federal urban-oriented agencies, the provinces and municipal 
governments, are an integral part of MSUA's mandate. At the federal level MSUA-agency consultation is 
broadly based extending to a greater or less extent to all agencies dealt with in this paper. The most 
formal mechanism for federal interagency consultation is the Senior Interdepartmental Committee on 
Urban Affairs (SIDCUA) whose membership in total includes 15 departments and agencies. For more 
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specialized tasks requiring interagency involvement, smaller departmental mechanisms may be formed 
as required.  Examples of these kinds of interagency involvement include: MSUA's association with TBS, 
DPW and CMHC in connection with federal land management and with MOT and CTC in conjunction 
with railway relocation. The principal mechanism for intergovernmental consultation is the Tri-Level 
process instituted by the Ministry shortly after its establishment. Tri-Level is discussed at length in a 
companion paper  entitled "MSUA and the federal government" (p. 375) 
1Programs28: “The MSUA Program as it is presently constituted permits the Ministry to exercise 
primarily an indirect impact on urban Canada. Notwithstanding this constraint, the program has the 
potential to significantly affect the course of urban development in this country. In particular, the  
articulation of a viable set of urban objectives;  the development of knowledge-based policies designed  
to further accepted urban goals; the coordination  of urban-oriented initiatives of all levels of 
government; and extending present knowledge concerning  complex urban processes can be expected 
to measurably  enhance the quality of urban living in Canada over time” (p. 376) 
Sunga, P. and Duc, G. (1975). MSUA 
and the federal government. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1Programs29: “In the area of urban affairs, the scope of federal actions and their implications were 
judged to be too comprehensive, too pervasive and probably too important to be dealt with in this 
manner. Traditional mechanisms for consultation and coordination were considered inadequate to 
ensure that urban policy and program initiatives, originating from various quarters in the federal system, 
proceeded toward rationally conceived and commonly held objectives for urban Canada. This prompted 
the establishment of a separate Ministry to assess the effects of ongoing and proposed federal programs 
and policies, to initiate urban policy, to coordinate federal urban activity within federal jurisdiction, and 
to harmonize federal urban activity with provincial and municipal initiatives” (p. 4) 
1Programs30: “The Urban Institutions and Services Directorate operates in two interrelated areas. The 
Urban Institutions Group assesses existing mechanisms and seeks to develop improved delivery systems 
for federal and intergovernmental programs. The Urban Service Systems Group is concerned with 
achieving more desirable urban configurations through the provision or support of more effective and 
efficient transportation, communications, energy, and other services systems” (p. 7) 
1Programs31: “Many federal/provincial agreements and related intergovernmental initiatives with 
urban implications … have been instituted in the past … MSUA’s legitimate concerns extend over a large 
segment of federal activity and moreover, include major areas of interest to all levels of government. 
This requires that the Ministry be concerned with elements of the overall urban environment that affect 
the material well-being of urban Canadians, e.g., housing, land use, transportation, environmental 
quality and the urban economy. It also requires a concern for those less tangible but equally important 
factors that bear directly on cities’ social and cultural development and more generally on the quality of 
life in urban Canada. This endeavour requires MSUA to be concerned with all urban elements in which 
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the federal government has the authority, responsibility and means to effect change for the better. It 
also requires the Ministry to continually explore and develop initiatives which support the urban thrusts 
of provincial and municipal governments” (p. 7) 
1Programs32: “The formulation of a national urban perception, the development of a suitable 
conceptual framework and the articulation of urban objectives for Cabinet consideration, bearing in 
mind the government’s overall objectives and priorities is a lengthy and exploratory process requiring 
extensive research and development. Moreover, obtaining a consensus about perceptions of urban 
objectives within the federal government and with other levels of government requires coordinating 
machinery at the bureaucratic level as well as on national, regional and metropolitan scales at the 
political level” (p. 8) 
1Programs33: “There exists an urgent need for the Ministry to establish and maintain contact with 
planning authorities at the local and provincial levels in order to identify new initiatives that may have 
an important bearing on existing and proposed federal activities in the urban domain and to determine 
how new federal urban initiatives can best be tailored to local circumstances and priorities. These 
contacts at the planning and operational levels are essential for identifying locally-generated urban 
development at a sufficiently early stage so that federal involvement can be most beneficial. Close 
working relationships between the Ministry and local planning authorities are expected to be 
accomplished gradually. Over time this kind of collaboration will result in the development and 
implementation of federal urban initiatives that are in harmony with regional priorities and aspirations” 
(p. 8) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1975). Annual Report, 1974-
1975. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs34: “During 1974-1975, the Ministry was involved with broad policy planning at the federal 
level as well as with specific urban transportation problems. The Ministry carried out a variety of studies 
related to urban transport policies and problems, ranging from an investigation of the special transit 
needs of the handicapped and elderly in 10 major cities to studies for a new public transit network for 
downtown Quebec City … At the federal level, the Ministry and the Ministry of Transport conjointly 
began a national transportation policy review. Extensive consultations took place between the provinces 
and federal government (represented by the Ministry, the Department of Industry, Trade, and 
Commerce and the Ministry of Transport) toward establishing the National Urban Transportation 
Development Corporation. At the provincial-municipal level, the Ministry indirectly assisted 
municipalities through schemes like Vancouver’s Livable Region Program, and Toronto-Scarborough’s 
Light Rapid Transit System ” (p. 5) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1975). Capital Assistance 
Program for Urban 
1Programs35: “The Federal Government will provide $100 million for an urban transportation capital 
assistance program to help the provinces and municipalities manage urban growth and combat traffic 
and related problems. Urban Affairs Minister Barney Danson and Transport Minister Jean Marchand 
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announced today that the funds will be available over five years beginning April 1, 1977 for the 
acquisition of commuter rail vehicles, stations and platforms, and required traffic control facilities. The 
program does not apply to vehicles currently on order or to facilities already in place” (p. 1) 
1Programs36: “To qualify for assistance, the province and the municipality concerned and the federal 
government must agree upon an overall strategy for metropolitan growth management within the 
urban region. Agreement must be reached on the role commuter services will play, the efficient 
utilization of their special characteristics and their integration with the surrounding transportation 
system. The province or municipality must also agree to cover any past or future operating deficits of 
the system” (p. 2) 
1Programs37: “The federal contribution will be up to 75 percent as a grant and 25 per cent as a loan 
toward the capital cost of systems at an early stage of development. For other systems, federal 
assistance will be between 25 per cent and 75 per cent on a grant basis, depending on the maturity of 
the system and up to 25 per cent on a loan basis. Loans will be made to provincial governments or to the 
municipalities or transit authorities if guaranteed by the provincial governments concerned. Federal 
grants will be available for up to half the cost of directly associated commuter rail platforms, stations 
and feeder systems, or traffic control facilities” (p. 3) 
1Programs38: “The Ministers also noted that capital assistance for municipal urban transit services, as 
distinct from commuter services, remains under consideration and will be the subject of further 
examination by the federal ministries of Urban Affairs, Transport, Finance and Industry, Trade and 
Commerce” (p. 3) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1975). What it is, what it 
does. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs39: “[MSUA influences] urban transportation … by developing and recommending urban 
transportation policies, including the National Urban Transportation Development Corporation; and by 
developing the railway relocation program and participating in its implementation” (p. 2) 
1Programs40: “[MSUA influences] urban planning and intervention … by supporting the preparation of 
regional plans and strategies by the provinces to further and guide the development of Canadian urban 
regions. For example, federal contributions are supporting regional planning for Vancouver, Halifax-
Dartmouth, Quebec City, and other centres. [It influences] urban institutions … by providing federal 
leadership for the development of the tri-level process; and by joining with other levels of government 
in establishing provincial and metropolitan tri-level bodies” (p. 3) 
1Programs41: “The [railway relocation] program applies particularly to cities where railway facilities — 
tracks, yards, terminals — are obstacles to planned redevelopment of the community. Part I of the Act 
permits the federal government to fund and support the planning and implementation of railway 
relocation and rail traffic rerouting proposed by provinces and municipalities so that expanded rapid 
transit facilities, housing, recreation facilities, among other projects, can go forward” (p. 4-5) 
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Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1976). Annual Report, 1975-
1976. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs42: “Because all levels of government have policies and programs that impinge on financing 
urban development, it appeared that the most appropriate method for defining the extent of the 
problem, if indeed a problem existed, would be a study jointly sponsored by all levels of government. As 
a result, an independent Tri-level Task Force on Public Finance was set up to examine the matter in 
detail. Officials from the Ministry and the Department of Finance represented the Federal Government” 
(p. 3-4) 
1Programs43: “During the year under review, the Ministry concentrated on a major evaluation of the 
federal role in urban transportation assistance programs. In co-operation with the Ministry of Transport, 
MSUA representatives met with officials from all provinces, major cities and associations to discuss 
urban transportation needs. Research was conducted on the implications of improved public 
transportation for energy consumption, the mobility of disadvantaged groups, urban land use, and the 
demand for transit services. The results are being used to develop guidelines for current federal 
expenditure programs in urban transport” (p. 5) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1977). Annual Report, 1976-
1977. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs44: “Studies were undertaken in the following areas: the financial implications of alternative 
transportation service levels, energy implications of alternative urban transportation systems and travel 
demand levels, urban form and neighbourhood design criteria which would encourage public transit, 
urban development and land value potential of public transport investments, and, the cost of expanding 
urban transport capacity using various combinations of transit/highway infrastructure” (p. 7) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1978). Annual Report, 1977-
1978. Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs45: “[MSUA’s] Urban Networks group approaches transportation from the standpoint of 
urban development, with a geographical perspective both within and between urban areas, and with an 
emphasis on passenger transport, although not to the exclusion of goods” (p. 35) 
1Programs46: “In the short-run, it appears possible to bring about significant improvements in energy-
consumption levels and overall transport-system efficiency through proper management techniques and 
increased attention to provide viable transit services. Improvements and efficiency in the medium-to 
long-term, however, require increased coordination of land use and transportation planning to support 
the development of a more efficient overall transport system” (p. 37) 
1Programs47: “The Costs of Highway versus Transit Expansion Programs to Accommodate Future Travel 
Demand was initiated for the purpose of developing and testing a technique for rapidly assessing the 
marginal and total costs of alternative highway and transit investments. The technique, which is to be 
tested in detail in a selected urban area, will be suitable for use by municipal, regional and provincial 
agencies at the transportation corridor, sub-system and system levels” (p. 38) 
1Programs48: “A Survey of Urban Transportation Level of Service Guidelines and Standards was 
undertaken in cooperation with the Roads and Transportation Association of Canada. The survey was 
initiated to develop an information base and obtain a better understanding of the road and transit level 
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of service guidelines and standards currently being used or developed in Canadian urban areas. Further, 
the survey was designed to identify the presence of standards or performance guidelines for core areas” 
(p. 38) 
1Programs49: “Urban Public Transportation in Canada: Subsidy Levels, Trends and Effects was 
undertaken, jointly with Transport Canada, in order to assemble information on operating deficits of 
transit agencies, along with an analysis of the contributing factors in cities of various sizes. In addition, 
the study reviewed policy options governments could pursue for financing urban transit and determined 
the relationship between these options and transit demand, levels of service, fares and operating costs 
and revenues. Further, it assessed the sensitivity of these relationships to changes in socio-economic 
conditions, urban form, roadway investment and automobile ownership” (p. 39) 
1Programs50: “The Travel to Work Survey, a supplement to the Labour Force Questionnaire 
administered monthly by Statistics Canada, has been performed at least once a year since 1973. For the 
years 1975, 1976 and 1977 the survey was jointly sponsored by Transport Canada, the Departments of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, Regional Economic Expansion and MSUA. The survey represents the only 
source of nationally-available annual statistics of travel behaviour and attitudes in Canada … The 
principle focus of the questionnaire is an overview of the entire work trip by mode (e.g., access to 
transit/car/other, travel time/ distance, location of parking/transit relative to place of work, parking 
availability/ cost, reasons for using particular modes, automobile occupancy)” (p. 40) 
1Programs51: “A Study of the Relationship Between Subdivision/Neighbourhood Design and Urban 
Transportation was undertaken jointly with Transport Canada and CMHC. The objectives of the study 
included the performance of a literature review and synthesis of current subdivision design and planning 
practices, along with related work in the area of transit planning. Seven case studies were performed in 
selected communities across Canada to review and report on conventional and innovative plans and 
projects relating to neighbourhood design and transit services. The study focuses on the development of 
recommended guidelines for subdivision design and transit services and overall evaluation of the 
economic feasibility of alternative designs and guidelines” (p. 41) 
1Programs52: “The [Urban Networks] directorate, along with Transport Canada, is responsible for 
assessing applications under the Urban Transportation Assistance Program (UTAP) and evaluating the 
program as a whole. This five-year, $230-million program, announced in October 1977 by the federal 
government, was designed to assist the provinces to improve their urban public transportation systems. 
UTAP funding includes that of both the Commuter Services Program and the Railway Relocation and 
Crossing Act. Under UTAP funding, participating provinces and municipalities can develop coordinated 
long-range urban land-use and transportation development strategies involving both railway relocation 
and transit improvement. The above-noted descriptions are of the activities undertaken by the six Urban 
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Analysis directorates, which work specifically on improving the quality of urban life by addressing topics 
within the federal government's urban concerns” (p. 43) 
Frankena, M (1979). The economics 
of urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1Programs53: “While public transit service may have improved in the central parts of urban areas, the 
service … in the expanding suburban areas is clearly inferior to that in central areas. Consequently, as 
the share of urban population and employment which is located in suburban areas increases, on average 
accessibility by public transit has probably declined” (p. 13-14) 
1Programs54: “It has often been proposed that reduction of transit fares, increases in road user and 
parking charges, reservation of lanes for exclusive use cases, or investments in mass transit be used to 
induce travelers to switch from automobiles to public transit and thus reduce road congestion oollution. 
There would, for example, be a substantial reduction in congestion if the modal split could be returned 
to the level prevailing two or three decades ago” (p. 23) 
1Programs55: “Large investments in rail rapid transit systems have … been proposed as a method of 
reducing automobile congestion. In most cases economists have predicted that only a modest share of 
automobile trips would be diverted to the new transit systems, basically because the private cost per 
trip (in terms of time and money) by automobile would be lower than that by the new systems for most 
travelers who were previously going by automobile, except those whose origins and destinations are 
close to transit terminals or whose trips are very long. While 54 per cent of the initial riders on Toronto's 
GO Transit commuter railway previously travelled by automobile, the volume diverted to the railway 
was small compared to the volume of traffic on the parallel expressway. When the Yonge Street subway 
opened in Toronto in 1954, a large majority of the riders were people previously used other public 
transit modes. A study of riders on the Yonge Street subway found that 85 per cent previously used 
other public transit and only 13 per cent previously used automobiles” (p. 25) 
1Programs56: “There are three limitations to ‘second best’ pricing of public transit at less than its 
marginal social cost as an alternative to using tolls to price automobile use at its marginal social cost … 
First, if both automobile use and public transit use are priced below marginal social cost, people will be 
induced to do more than the efficient amount of travelling in urban areas. Second, even complete 
elimination of transit fares might not offset the effect on modal choice of failing to collect congestion 
tolls for automobile use in the downtown area and at rush hour, e.g. if efficient public transit fares were 
less than efficient road use and parking charges per person trip. Third, available empirical studies 
suggest that the cross-elasticity of demand for automobile use with respect to public transit fares is very 
low” (p. 58) 
1Programs57: “Subsidization of public transit by municipal and provincial governments is a standard 
practice in Canada. In 1974 bus and integrated bus-subway systems in most urban areas received 
subsidies of 15 to 50 per cent of their costs, and special services such as suburban commuter railways 
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and dial-a-bus typically received subsidies of over 50 per cent of their costs. The most extensive program 
of subsidies has been operated by the Ontario provincial government, which paid 75 per cent of the 
costs of all new transit rights-of-way and vehicles plus 50 per cent of the costs of the operating deficit of 
each urban transit system in the province during 1972-1976. In terms of dollars, the largest subsidies 
have been in Toronto and Montreal, where municipal and provincial governments have paid over $600 
million since 1949 for construction of subways. In addition to such subsidies for capital costs, during 
1976 the Toronto arc Montreal transit systems received over $100 million in municipal and provincial 
subsidies to cover their operating deficits” (p. 60) 
1Programs58: “The fact that a transit company is receiving a subsidy does not necessarily imply that the 
subsidy is being used to reduce the fare to the efficient level. It is possible that the transit system would 
choose to use the subsidy to introduce a new route in a low density suburb where the demand did not 
justify the cost of providing service. In this case, the subsidy might bring about a less efficient allocation 
of resources” (p. 61) 
1Programs59: “While [increasing the speed of buses during rush hour] improve[s] … service … benefits 
may not always have exceeded … costs in terms of increased travel time for other road traffic and bus 
operating expenses. Consequently, a number of such experiments have been abandoned. One problem 
with these experiments is that they have not been accompanied by road user charges for automobiles” 
(p. 71-72) 
1Programs60: “[A] problem faced by rail rapid transit is that the benefits of a transport project are 
mainly reductions in travel costs for people who use the new facility and for people who use existing 
facilities which become less congested … Thus, the benefits of a project depend heavily on the number 
of people who actually use the new facility rather than on the capacity of the new facility … One possible 
exception to this evaluation … would be in situations where rail rights-of-way and usable tracks already 
exist because of interurban railways ” (p. 101) 
1Programs61: “Bus rapid transit has several advantages compared to rail rapid transit. First, at the 
residential and downtown ends of the trip buses can provide their own local collection and distribution 
of passengers while most users of rail rapid transit would have to walk, drive, or take local buses to 
stations and then transfer. Second, buses are small enough to pick up a full load in one residential area 
and then drive non-stop to one destination area. By contrast, because rail vehicles must make stops 
along the route to pick up and discharge passengers, no one is able to travel express. Third, while buses 
can pass each other, rail vehicles cannot. As a result of these three advantages, bus rapid transit may be 
able to achieve faster door-to-door travel times than rail rapid transit. Moreover, the costs of bus rapid 
transit to the transportation authority are lower than those of rail” (p. 102) 
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1Programs62: “It appears likely that a more efficient method of providing intermediate capacity transit 
service in most situations would be to use buses or modern streetcars (typically called ‘light rail transit’ 
to disassociate them from conventional streetcars), operating on exclusive rights-of-way or with priority 
over other traffic at crossings. Within Canada, the principal organization involved in developing both 
advanced technology intermediate capacity transit systems and modern streetcars is the Urban 
Transportation Development Corporation, which is funded by the Ontario provincial government” (p. 
106) 
1Programs63: “A number of urban areas in Canada have been experimenting with demand-responsive 
residential collection and distribution as a way of reducing the cost and improving the service of public 
transit available in low-density residential areas. The major experiments have been with dial-a-bus 
services as feeders for fixed-route line-haul mass transit systems” (p. 107) 
Urban Transportation Research 
Branch. (1979). A review of 
the experience and activities 
of the Urban Transportation 
Research Branch 1974-1979. 
Ottawa, ON. 
1Programs64: “The Urban Transportation Research Branch (UTRB) and the Surface Policy and Urban 
Transportation Assistance Branch of Transport Canada (TC) together with the Urban Networks 
Directorate of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) have provided the impetus and the focus 
for federal government involvement in urban transportation issues during the past five years. As a result 
of recent changes in policy regarding the federal government's role in urban development, the UTRB and 
the Urban Networks Directorate of MSUA have been disbanded, although the Surface Policy and Urban 
Transportation Assistance Branch continues to represent Transport Canada's interests in this area” (p. 1) 
1Programs65: “Emphasis was placed on improving the competitive position of public transit relative to 
the private automobile and optimizing the movement of people, not vehicles. A secondary emphasis 
was the reduction of delay, congestion, and cost to all road users through improvements benefiting both 
modes equally” (p. 6) 
1Programs66: “Many urban transportation problems are due to economic and institutional factors 
rather than to a lack of technology. Better urban transport systems may result either from modifications 
to the socioeconomic framework or through the use of new technology, but the latter will only occur if it 
can be accommodated within this framework. The determining factors are often under the irradiate 
control of the federal, provincial or municipal governments, and this research and the data generated 
will frequently be valuable for policy development purposes “ (p. 6) 
1Programs67: “The challenge of the next decade will be to find ways to make the best possible use of 
transportation infrastructure and capital facilities with emphasis on operational-intensive rather than 
capital-intensive improvements. Thus the division developed new systems and sub-systems to improve 
overall efficiency and to concentrate on projects that have the best potential for visible results in the 
relatively short term. A smaller effort was devoted to monitoring developments of new technologies and 
systems with a view to their potential for implementation in Canada … Overall, there has been a 
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conscious decision to concentrate on public transport and special system research with a corresponding 
reduction of emphasis on highway or auto-oriented research” (p. 7) 
1Programs68: “Certain projects were conducted intramurally, others were contracted out to the private 
sector or universities, and a number arose from requests received from the public sector (e.g., 
municipalities and transit commissions) for technical and/or financial assistance for specific projects. In 
general, assistance was only given to projects in the latter category when: a) they were likely to result in 
demonstrably significant urban transportation improvements; b) the results were likely to be applicable 
to similar problems in other Canadian cities; c) Transport Canada was free to disseminate all results and 
information arising from the project; d) endorsement had been obtained from the appropriate 
provincial authorities; e) the appropriate municipality and/or provincial government was committed to a 
significant technical and/or financial involvement in the project” (p. 8) 
1Programs69: “In 1974 an international joint committee involving Canada, France, the United States and 
the United Kingdom undertook a study of bus priority systems. Canada's contribution consisted of 
researching and writing part of the final report which examined ‘with-flow’ bus priority systems and 
miscellaneous treatments for bus priority” (p. 12) 
1Programs70: “At the provincial level, an example of our coordination work is the New Brunswick Six 
City Transit Study. In 1975, the Province of New Brunswick requested the Branch's assistance in 
analyzing transit needs in its six largest urban communities ... The Branch provided one member to the 
New Brunswick Six City transit study team to supply technical information available within the Branch 
and to advise on federal government programs available to assist transit. Included in the study program 
was a nationwide survey of provincial policies concerning transit” (p. 13) 
1Programs71: “In 1974, the Urban Transportation Research Branch undertook a nationwide survey to 
determine the needs and priorities in … urban transportation planning and modeling ... This national 
survey revealed that research and development were required to develop a model which integrated 
both the traffic and transit systems, and models which accounted for congestion effects” (p. 17) 
1Programs72: “In an attempt to overcome [a lack of academic interest in public transit], the Branch 
developed a … transit engineering textbook which could serve in the universities as the basis of a transit 
course.  It was hoped that this effort would lead to the eventual improvement of transit engineering 
education in the universities, act as a valuable tool for transit operators, and, hopefully, increase interest 
in this field. The textbook was written jointly by a number of leading academics and consultants in 
transportation. It will be used by several universities in the fall of 1979 and is anticipated to enjoy wide 
distribution both in Canada and in the United States” (p. 19) 
1Programs73: “In 1975, the City of Winnipeg approached the Branch with a request to participate in a 
joint study of a transitway to be located along an abandoned rail right-of-way corridor from the central 
 201 
business district of Winnipeg towards the southwest in the direction of the University of Manitoba 
campus. The Branch agreed to co-sponsor this research together with the Province of Manitoba and the 
City of Winnipeg because it afforded an opportunity to evaluate bus transitways and alternative 
technologies in the Canadian urban environment and the use of rail rights-of-way for urban 
transportation applications. This activity … related directly to two Transport Canada programs: the Rail 
Relocation and Crossing Act and the Urban Transportation Assistance Program, and afforded the 
opportunity to examine … implementations of these two programs” (p. 20) 
1Programs74: “A notable example of the way in which the Branch has promoted and underwritten the 
cost of high risk innovative projects is the development of the Automated Bus Passenger Information 
(ADPI) System … Provid[ing] information to the prospective bus passenger on the actual time of arrival 
of the next bus at his nearest bus stop … the passenger could obtain this information by using a normal 
telephone from the comfort of his home or workplace, etc. and thus minimize the time spent waiting in 
the all-too-often hostile environment at the bus stop” (p. 21) 
1Programs75: “In 1970, [the Transportation Development Agency] was among the first to recognize the 
benefits of paratransit and promoted the introduction of dial-a-bus services in Canada. In 1971, TDA 
entered into a tri-level demonstration project with the City of Regina and the province of Saskatchewan 
entitled the ‘Regina Telebus Demonstration’. Basically, the telebus is a high quality, personalized transit 
system service designed to serve areas with low population density. It provides a doorstep pick-up and 
drop-off service in response to telephone requests” (p. 22) 
1Programs76: “The commitment, vision, enthusiasm and drive necessary for research group staff are 
difficult to achieve in a line department especially when: the department has no real mandate or 
responsibility for the improvement of urban transportation in Canada; senior management is 
preoccupied by other matters it considers much more relevant to its mandate and about which it is 
more knowledgeable; a disproportionate share of the professional time of a small group such as UTRB 
had to be devoted to administrative chores” (p. 24) 
1Programs77: “Many innovations and experiments are going on across the country, yet many 
unsuccessful experiments are repeated and successes go unreported because there is no central 
clearing house for urban transportation information. The agencies that conduct these experiments 
rarely have the time or resources to document them full y and while they would like to see these 
experimental results made widely known, they have no responsibility to do so. Planners, transit and 
manufacturing industry all need to be made much more aware of the needs and opportunities” (p. 27) 
1Programs78: “In order to overcome the criticism of ‘hobbying’ and ‘meddling’ with provincial or local 
priorities, an Advisory Board on Urban Transportation could be formed to represent national interest 
across the country. This Board could be responsible for establishing research priorities on a reasonably 
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long term basis (e.g. 3 to 5 years), for reviewing these annually and approving the organization's 
program proposals” (p. 28) 
1Programs79: “The participants of the Branch submit that the operation of UTRB, if viewed as an 
experiment, has been successful and has demonstrated that the federal government does have a role in 
urban transportation research, particularly in the areas of information dissemination and high risk 
RandD. Trying to perform such roles as part of the line administrations, however, was found impractical. 
Should the federal government re-enter this field in the future. It is recommended that responsibility for 
urban transportation research be placed with an independent body where the resources of the federal 
and provincial governments and industry can be pooled and an ideal research environment can be 
fostered” (p. 30) 
1Programs80: “As long as transit vehicles must compete for roadway space with low-occupancy private 
vehicles, transit will be a slower transport mode no matter how slow travel by private vehicle becomes. 
The Branch involvement in this area Included research and development projects giving priority 
treatment to public transit thereby improving its position relative to the private automobile. Examples 
included reserved bus lanes, exclusive transit rights-of-way, and priority treatment for transit at traffic 
signals” (p. 35) 
1Programs81: “Bus priority systems have some scope to improve transit service significantly, although 
this is limited in Canada because traffic congestion is not severe enough in Canadian cities to delay 
buses. Imposition of bus priority schemes may in some cases create congestion where it formerly did 
not exist and hence result in an overall disbeneflt. There are locations where bus priority would be of 
benefit in Canada but these must be carefully studied and monitored since the improvements are 
generally marginal” (p. 35) 
1Programs82: “Where automobile usage is especially costly, and in particular, where there are heavy 
external costs not covered by automobile users, there are grounds for raising driving costs to cover 
social costs, or for discouraging automobile travel through various restrictions. The various measures 
adopted in Ottawa in recent years (bus priorities, variable work hours, parking charges, and expanded 
transit) led, through the proposal of the Branch and the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, to Ottawa 
being one of several case studies reviewed by the OECO Group of Experts on Traffic Policies to Improve 
the Urban Environment. A general finding of this exercise was the need to introduce measures as a 
coherent package, not as piecemeal gimmicks. In particular auto restraints can only be effective if 
adequate transit is provided as a complementary system” (p. 36) 
1
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 Era 
Frames 
Lewis, C. B. (1972). Research 
directions in urban 
transportation. In Canadian 
1Frames1: “In the past ten years almost every city in Canada has had its transportation study. We have 
had one learned paper after another analyzing our urban transport problems ad nauseam. Yet the 
average citizen has seen nothing approaching a solution to his problem as he waits for thirty or more 
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QC: Ministry of Transport. 
freezing minutes, for a bus that is supposed to run every ten minutes, on a morning when his car has 
failed to start or he has refused to face the hopeless task of digging out his driveway” (p. 1) 
1Frames2: “Transportation is so much a part of Canadian life that in the absence of explicit national 
goals it is indeed most difficult to formulate detailed policies for the development of our transportation 
systems or for research oriented towards that end” (p.3) 
1Frames3: “I believe that there is no way in North America that we will be able to banish the private car 
from our cities, and, indeed, most of us would hate to see it abolished unless completely satisfactory 
alternatives were available. Thus, we must attempt to achieve an optimal mix of private and public 
transportation and make the car a better ‘citizen’ of the urban environment. In doing this, we may well 
have to develop some new forms of ‘semi-private’ transportation” (p. 5) 
1Frames4: “There is a growing realization that the basic qualities and inherent advantages of bus 
systems have not been fully appreciated and exploited and that, with the judicious application of 
modern technology, they could be transformed to offer an immeasurably better service than they do at 
present” (p. 7) 
1Frames5: “The easier we make it for people to drive in cities, the more people will drive in them. When 
we have finished redesigning our cities and cars and other transport systems, we shall soon be as 
congested as ever unless we apply some form of economic restraint” (p. 15) 
1Frames6: “The concept of providing so-called ‘free’ public transport for everyone is not a solution, it 
will merely compound the physical problems and create new economic injustices. Surely a saner, if 
perhaps more difficult, approach is to try to ensure that everyone pays a fair share of the total private 
and public costs of the transport services he uses” (p. 15) 
1Frames7: “It may well be that the traditional roles of the Federal Government in transportation 
development need to be reviewed in the light of rapidly changing circumstances. Our national wealth 
will continue to depend on the economic transportation of our resource materials and our 
manufactured goods to their markets. On the other hand, our national well-being will increasingly 
require the application of other than purely economic criteria to transportation planning. For example, 
in the foreseeable future, we may well have to modify our urban use of the automobile, or accept even 
less convenient access to our airports, if we wish to breathe acceptable air or continue to have ‘quiet 
enjoyment’ of our homes” (p. 17) 
1Frames8: “Perhaps the most important contributions the federal government could make in the 
research field would be in the provision of well-digested information and in the assessment of 
development opportunities against Canadian needs and resources. No doubt there are other kinds of 
contributions that many of the provinces and municipalities would like to see the federal government 
undertake in urban transport research” (p. 17) 
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Gertler, L. (1973). The research 
program of the Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs. In 
Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Council of Urban 
and Regional Research. 
Montreal, QC: Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs. 
1Frames9: “Other notable landmarks [in urban research] were … the increasing preoccupation of the 
Federation of Mayors and Municipalities with the ‘fiscal squeeze’ and the need for coordinated action by 
provincial and federal governments; the holding in the mid-sixties of broadly-based national conferences 
on two of the most hard-pressed urban sectors, housing and transportation; the rise of environmental 
consciousness; the linking of economic development and urban growth in the Fourth Annual Review of 
the Economic Council of Canada, published in our centennial year” (p. 1-2) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1974). Annual Report, 1973-
1974. Ottawa, ON. 
1Frames10: “The federal government has maintained that the solution of the urban problems facing 
Canada requires the active cooperation of all levels of government – federal, provincial and municipal. 
From this stems the concept of tri-level consultation and cooperation. Second, the federal government 
as also maintained that the modalities of municipal cooperation and participation are a matter for 
provincial government to determine” (p. 3) 
Sunga, P. and Duc, G. (1975). MSUA 
and the federal government. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1Frames11: “The effectiveness with which MSUA can carry out its mandate depends on a number of key 
factors. These include: the viability of intergovernmental interaction; the strength of interagency 
working relationships at the federal level; and the capacity of MSUA to favourably influence decision 
making that affects urban Canada. The viability of intergovernmental working relationships is 
particularly crucial for the Ministry since all levels of government have mandated responsibilities or 
conduct activities that have important implications for urban Canada. In matters of urban concern, 
governments do not deal with static problems. Issues are continually changing in content and relative 
importance. In large measure, these changes reflect the evolving priorities and the policy and program 
thrusts of the three levels of government” (p. 8) 
1Frames12: “In many ways the character of federal decision making is an evolving one. Continuously, 
new processes are being designed or existing processes refined to promote the clarity, 
comprehensiveness, economy and foresight which are prerequisites to informed decisions in the public 
domain. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public endeavors are naturally matters of concern 
to the government and are among the factors that underlie continuous efforts to improve the basis for, 
and quality of, decision making in the public sector” (p. 9) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1975). Annual Report, 1974-
1975. Ottawa, ON. 
1Frames13: “In many cities … movement depends heavily on the private automobile, with the resulting 
traffic-clogged streets and fume-laden air. At the same time, non-drivers –the poor, the handicapped, 
the very old and the young – are denied cheap and efficient transportation. Governments recognize that 
they will have to lend substantial assistance to make public transportation systems as convenient, 
comfortable, and efficient as the private car” (p. 5) 
 Danson, B. (1975b). Note for an 1Frames14: “If allowed to unfold, [population concentration in Canada’s three largest regions] would 
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Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
have an immense impact not only on these provinces and cities but also on all of the others. Our largest, 
most rapidly growing cities would become unmanageable; the others, continuing to lose population, 
would wither. Regional economic disparities would be accentuated and political power would shift, 
perhaps to quasi city-states, but most certainly to the dominant provinces, to an even greater extent 
than today” (p. 5) 
1Frames15: “The … choice before Canadians has to do with management of our urban regions — with 
the size and shape and form and quality of our cities. What kind of cities do we want? Do we want cities 
with a strong downtown core, full of light during the day and full of life and activity at night? Or do we 
want to see our commerce and our population scattered around the periphery of our cities while the 
downtown core withers. Do we want access to our waterfronts, now often cut off by railways — as here 
in Winnipeg — or by a wall of old harbour buildings, as in Toronto. What kind of communities do we 
want? High, medium or low density? Should we continue to support high rise dwellings or should we 
look to other forms of high and medium density, more in keeping with the results of social research and 
more in keeping with the Canadian climate?” (p. 13) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1976). Annual Report, 1975-
1976. Ottawa, ON. 
1Frames16: “Transportation is a vital part of everyday urban life. We depend on cheap and efficient 
public transit within our cities and towns, and on the large-scale transportation systems that link cities 
and regions to each other and to the rest of the world. In Canada, the federal government exerts a 
major influence on national transportation through its jurisdiction over airport location, railway 
relocation, port expansion and the use of waterfronts” (p. 5) 
1Frames17: “In past years, cities such as Ottawa and Saskatoon have derived major benefits from 
relocating their railway operations away from the downtown core to the fringe of the city. With 
relocation, prime downtown land has been freed for other uses, and the noise and traffic problems 
caused by railway crossings have been removed. Other cities wished to follow their example, and as a 
result the Railway Relocation and Crossing Act was passed in June 1974. The Act provides the federal 
legislative authority for financial assistance to cities considering railway relocation” (p. 5) 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 
(1978). Annual Report, 1977-
1978. Ottawa, ON. 
1Frames18: “By 1971 approximately 76 percent of Canada's population was classified as ‘urban’. These 
trends represented a serious cause for alarm; in the early 1970s, projections indicated a continuing 
urbanization, particularly in the three largest centres of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver” (p. 6) 
1Frames19: “It must be clearly stated … that by identifying these policy areas as those of urban concern, 
the federal government is not claiming responsibility for controlling these aspects of urban life. Instead, 
it is merely stating that these are the areas in which the federal government can have the greatest 
supporting effect or interest” (p. 9) 
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1Frames20: “The rapidly escalating costs to provide adequate transportation services and the need for 
governments to rationally and equitably allocate available funds have made it increasingly apparent that 
there is a need to develop a framework for coordinating land-use and transportation planning. In doing 
so, the potential exists to better cope with traffic congestion, to reduce energy-consumption levels and 
adverse environmental impacts, and to reduce the amount of land required for urban areas” (p. 36) 
N.D. Lea and Associates, Ltd. 
(1979). 
Transportation/Housing 
Interrelationships: Pilot 
Study. Ottawa, ON: Ministry 
of State for Urban Affairs. 
1Frames21: “The criteria and guidelines for social housing may result in the selection of remote or 
unusual sites. These locational decisions in turn can result in additional travel costs being imposed on 
the client group. Such costs take the form of increased travel distances, increased dependency on 
ownership of an automobile, or increased transit subsidies for the municipality” (p. iii) 
Frankena, M (1979). The economics 
of urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1Frames22: “For people who live and work in Canadian urban areas, the major concerns with urban 
transportation are rush-hour congestion, pollution, and availability of public transit. Most of the 
important issues in urban transportation economics involve the use of government pricing, regulatory, 
and investment policies to deal with congestion, pollution, and public transit” (p. 1) 
1Frames23: “One serious criticism of radial expressways and rail rapid transit lines which would connect 
outlying suburbs with the CBD is that benefits would accrue largely to high income commuters, 
suburban landowners, and downtown businessmen. Yet, low income people might bear a significant 
share of the costs in terms of higher taxes, neighbourhood disruption, and higher rents if part of the 
low-income housing stock was demolished to make way for the transportation right-of-way. Because of 
such distributional effects, in carrying out cost-benefit analyses it is desirable to break down benefits 
and costs by income group to determine which income groups receive positive net benefits” (p. 94) 
1Frames24: “Some people believe that urban areas should invest in rail rapid transit rather than expand 
their facilities for automobiles. They argue for rail rapid transit on the basis of its advantages (or alleged 
advantage compared to the automobile: (a) provided the volume of travel is large enough, the explicit 
cost per trip for land, capital, fuel, and wages is lower for rail transit; (b) rail transit involves less loss of 
public open space and trees and less displacement of households and firms because less land is 
required; (c) rail transit causes less pollution and congestion; (d) rail transit does not promote as much 
decentralization of economic activity in the urban area; and (e) rail transit provides greater benefits to 
low income people who do not own cars.(p. 98) 
1Frames25: “Economists generally argue that, in spite of [the advantages of rail rapid transit], in Canada 
additional rail rapid transit investments are rarely likely to be justified when compared to additional 
facilities for automobiles. First, investments in rail rapid transit are much less divisible than investments 
in roads. While investments in roads can be scaled more or less to meet demand, investments in rail 
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rapid transit are inevitably large. The capital cost per mile of rail systems is extremely high. While this 
presents no problem if the volume of travel by public transit is very high, it makes rail rapid transit 
service much more expensive than the automobile for the volumes of travel which occur in all but the 
densest corridors in the largest urban areas … Second, the preceding list of advantages of rail transit 
ignores two important disadvantages: (a) except for trips which both originate and end close to transit 
terminals, rail transit has a higher cost in terms of door-to-door travel time than does the automobile; 
and (b) travel is less comfortable by rail transit than by automobile when allowance is made for walking, 
waiting, transferring, and standing in crowded cars as well as for the loss of privacy” (p. 98-99) 
1Frames26: “Economists generally infer … that additional investment in rail rapid transit would be more 
efficient than investment in additional facilities for automobiles only if origins and destinations are 
dense enough to produce a very high demand for trips in a given corridor. Sufficient densities occur only 
along the major radial suburban-CBD routes and within the CBDs of urban areas with populations 
exceeding 2 million, i.e., Montreal and Toronto, and in most of these cases rail transit already exists. 
Because of the trend toward decentralization of employment and population, it is unlikely that in the 
future travel densities will increase sufficiently to make rail rapid transit more efficient than automobiles 
in other Canadian urban areas” (p. 99-101) 
1Frames27: “There is a widespread belief that the solution to many of the urban transportation 
problems addressed in this monograph – congestion, pollution, availability of public transit – will come 
from new developments in mass transit technology which will make it possible to provide at reasonable 
cost transit service which is competitive in travel time and comfort with the automobile for a large share 
of urban travel. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to expect any such major breakthrough in technology. 
Generally speaking, apart from improvements in more-or-less conventional bus and streetcar service, 
proposals for new systems which would improve the speed and comfort of mass transit involve very 
high capital and operating costs. It appears that such systems would probably be efficient for only a very 
small share of urban travel, even if all the technological problems could be solved … Nevertheless, a 
considerable amount of research is being done to develop new mass transit systems which would have a 
lower social cost per trip than buses, streetcars, or subways in ‘intermediate capacity’ travel corridors, 
i.e. where the number of transit trips in the peak direction during rush periods is between 5,000 and 
20,000 per hour. The supporters of such systems in Canada argue that once the technological problems 
are solved, construction of such systems would be justified by cost-benefit analysis in two situations: in 
major radial corridors in cities with populations around 500,000, and in corridors where travel volumes 
are insufficient to justify a subway in Montreal and Toronto” (p. 104-105) 
Urban Transportation Research 
1Frames28: “The benefits from research are potentially large because the costs of present day urban 
transportation are enormous. Without doubt, the largest element of cost in urban transport is private 
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car operation” (p. 2) 
1Frames29: “During those early years [of the Urban Transportation Research Branch] there was a 
growing feeling within the federal government of some responsibility for urban development. This was 
most clearly demonstrated with the formation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs and the election 
promises made in 1974 regarding federal assistance to urban commuter and transit services” (p. 4) 
1Frames30: “The initial cost of research and the dispersed federal structure of Canada mean that 
adequate research is unlikely to take place in the urban transport field because no one city or province 
can normally expect to recapture the benefits of the costs it incurs. Thus a case can be made for broadly 
based agencies to coordinate funding and implementation, disseminate research findings and assist in 
long-term planning coordination. Given the need for central government involvement, one of the 
impediments to urban research has been the need to combine three levels of government in contractual 
or supervisory capacities The negotiation necessary to set up such tripartite committees is at best time-
consuming and at worst impossible. In the final analysis, a three-level agreement can only be obtained 
through personal trust and understanding amongst the individuals involved and is clearly helped by staff 
continuity and stability in the agencies concerned” (p.5)  
1Frames31: “Most provinces and all municipalities are faced with strained budgets in the urban 
transportation area due to spiraling transit deficits and the increasing costs of road construction. As a 
result, it is difficult for the provinces or cities to make funds available for the more high risk type of 
urban transportation R&D. Benefits to the initial developer are minimal unless the results can be 
exploited on a national, or even International scale. For this reason federal commitment and funding are 
essential. Costs are then absorbed by the entire nation instead of coming out of provincial and municipal 
transit operating budgets. Speculative, high risk R&D should continue to be a traditional role of central 
governments” (p. 23-24) 
1Frames32: “Private automobile traffic can be socially harmful in terms of congestion, energy wastage, 
pollution, accidents and degradation of the urban environment, although it is often the most efficient 
way of transporting people within urban areas. We are now well aware of the futility of attempting to 
increase the supply of infrastructure and energy to match an unrestrained demand, and will be forced to 
adopt measures to control the profligate and at times antisocial urban uses of the automobile” (p. 34) 
1Frames33: “The future of conventional systems such as bus, streetcar, subway and commuter rail is 
increasingly likely to depend on finding new financial mechanisms, such as incentive subsidy programs 
or municipal taxes on gasoline, parking or employment. A hard look must be taken at the economic and 
institutional viability of conventional transit systems over the long term in the face of escalating deficits 
and labour demands, vis-à-vis the development of alternative systems” (p. 36) 
1
st
 Era Lewis, C. B. (1972). Research  1PublicSentiments1: “Civil disobedience and insurrection in North American cities in recent years have 
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Public 
Sentiments 
            directions in urban            
            transportation. In Canadian  
            Federation of Mayors and  
            Municipalities/Ministry of  
            Transport Seminar on Urban  
            Transportation. Montebello,  
            QC: Ministry of Transport. 
been responsible for focusing both public and political attention on the urbanization process. Many 
people are wondering if the pressures of living in North America today are proving to be too much for us 
and whether the city is in any way to blame. We cannot help wondering whether our North American 
style of urban living is somehow failing to satisfy the most profound needs of man” (p. 1) 
1PublicSentiments2: “[Canadian populations] are also demanding more ‘quality’ and convenience in 
their personal transport. In the past twenty years the number of automobiles per capita has trebled; in 
the same period, the number of public transit rides per capita has dwindled to one-third” (p. 4) 
1PublicSentiments3: “The restrained automobile-orientated policy that appears to have evolved as the 
result of public pressure in Metropolitan Toronto will probably influence policy makers in other 
Canadian cities. Rejection of the concept of free traffic flow on urban roads and holding peak-hour 
congestion levels even close to present conditions will necessitate accelerated development of the 
public transit systems of Canada’s larger urban areas and more effective planning for the sane use of 
private transport in most of our cities” (p. 5) 
1PublicSentiments4: “If public transport is to attract a significantly larger share of the market the quality 
of service offered must be substantially upgraded in terms of convenience, speed, comfort and cost, and 
new marketing approaches taken to ensure public acceptance of the new product” (p.14) 
Sunga, P. and Duc, G. (1975). MSUA 
and the federal government. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
 
1PublicSentiments5: “The priorities, in broad terms, are established by Cabinet which in turn is 
responsive to the political environment. Public demands are expressed through opinion polls, through 
members of Parliament, the press and other communication media and through the various community 
and interest groups. Political choices concerning which demands will be honoured are made by 
ministers. They must guide the principal direction of policies and must evaluate alternative programs 
and program mixes as instruments for achieving the more specific objectives of government. The 
ordering of many of these priorities takes place in the Cabinet committees and in particular, in the 
Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, where the broad policy directions and priorities of 
government are determined” (p. 30) 
Danson, B. (1975). Note for an 
address:, “An Urban Strategy 
for Canada” to the 
Conference Board of Canada. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1PublicSentiments6: “There appears to be fairly general agreement that the trends [towards sprawl and 
population concentration in three major cities] are unacceptable ... The residents of two of our three 
largest centres, Vancouver and my own City of Toronto, are showing signs of resisting rapid, 
uncontrolled growth. So are the residents of other communities. These people are telling us that they 
would be happy to see more of the future growth spread around to other regions” (p. 7) 
Kirkland, J. (1976). Intra-urban 
mobility in Montreal, Toronto 
and Vancouver. Ottawa, ON: 
1PublicSentiments7: “Surface transportation networks, in and around metropolitan areas provide the 
means whereby suburban dormitories are linked to central city employment opportunities. Suburban 
households have opted for space over accessibility and are willing to spend more time in transit than 
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Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs. 
would be the case if they lived at higher densities near or in core areas” (p. 24) 
1PublicSentiments8: “Increasing energy costs may force a shift in some of these patterns [suburban and 
automobile congestion] but commuters generally find it difficult to give up the private automobile in 
favour of mass transit” (p. 24-25) 
Frankena, M (1979). The economics 
of urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON: Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs. 
1PublicSentiments9: “Because of increasing public opposition to construction of urban highways, during 
the present decade automobile congestion may increase in many urban areas. Whether this will occur 
depends on many aspects of urban transportation policy and on the extent of decentralization of 
employment in urban areas” (p. 14) 
1PublicSentiments10: “Studies of travel behavior in Metropolitan Toronto and Region and in Winnipeg 
support this type of model of modal choice behavior [economic rationality]. They report that the 
proportion of trips made by public transit was higher when the relative out-of-pocket cost, travel time, 
and comfort and convenience of service were more favourable for transit and when the income of the 
tripmaker was lower” (p.16) 
1PublicSentiments11: “People sometimes support a policy of charging a lower toll for a car with more 
occupants on the grounds that this would encourage car pooling and hence reduce congestion, but such 
a policy would be inefficient “ (p. 40) 
1PublicSentiments12: “Since the late 1950s most Canadian urban areas have sponsored at least one 
major transportation study, including recommendations for investment in highway and public transit 
systems during the next 20 to 25 years. These studies and related plans and decisions concerning 
investment in urban transportation have been criticized both by social scientists and by citizen groups” 
(p. 110) 
1PublicSentiments13: “A … criticism [of 1960s transportation studies] is that when costs were 
calculated, many social and environmental costs were ignored. As a result, there may have been a bias 
toward overinvestment in transportation facilities and, in particular, a bias toward the private 
automobile as opposed to public transit. For example, estimated costs of expressway construction and 
operation typically included only actual government outlays and not the uncompensated costs involved 
in displacement of fami1ies and businesses, traffic congestion and neighbourhood disruption during 
construction, use of park land, air and noise pollution, and unsightly views. Recently, however, there has 
been increased consideration of such costs because of pressure from citizen groups” (p. 110-111) 
1PublicSentiments14: “It is argued that there was inadequate citizen participation in planning and 
decision-making in urban transportation. Land-use and transportation plans were used without being 
publicized and officially adopted, and decisions were made without public discussion and then 
presented as faits accomplis by planners and city politicians. More recently, however, many urban 
transportation studies have had elaborate provisions for public participation” (p. 112) 
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Urban Transportation Research 
Branch. (1979). A review of 
the experience and activities 
of the Urban Transportation 
Research Branch 1974-1979. 
Ottawa, ON. 
1PublicSentiments15: “Since mid-1978 … events have taken a [turn away from political support for 
federal involvement in urban development]. As a result of mounting public pressure to cut federal 
government spending, coupled with a general feeling that the federal government should get out of 
areas not directly within its jurisdiction, a Cost Reduction Task Force was set up in Transport Canada to 
achieve these goals. As a direct result of the Task Force's recommendations. Transport Canada decided 
to phase cut UTRB by March 31, 1979, and return the responsibility for such activities to the realm of 
provincial and municipal agencies” (p. 4) 
1PublicSentiments16: “Present enthusiasm for public transit stems mainly from a reaction against the 
private auto (and major road construction related to it ) and the need to conserve petroleum fuels” (p. 
5) 
Table 15: Second-era (documents from 1980-2001) codes applied during the thematic coding process. 
2
nd
 Era 
Paradigms 
Gray, H. (1981). Notes for a speech 
by the Honourable Herb Gray, 
PC, MP, Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, and Commerce, to 
the 76
th
 Annual Meeting of 
the Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, Hotel Loews le 
Concorde, Quebec City, QC. 
Monday, 22
nd
 of June. 
2Paradigms1: “The current high levels of service and industry achievement have come about through 
the combined efforts of the public and private sectors. These private and public sector efforts keep 
public transit more healthy in Canada than in the USA. This is one reason why Canada today is a world 
leader in the manufacture of public transit equipment, and the development and operation of public 
transit systems” (p. 1) 
2Paradigms2: “The role of public transit is becoming increasingly important in urban areas, especially in 
city cores. Obviously, it can reduce congestion, expense and journey time. In spite of the fact that this is 
a large country, with a relatively small population, almost 75% of Canadians live and work in urban 
areas. With higher energy costs, public transit will play an even bigger role in the future. Public transit 
increasingly serves as primary transportation for many people. It can provide many of the routine daily 
commuting needs of urban dwellers” (p. 4) 
2Paradigms3: “What do we have to do to meet our own needs, and obtain a growing share of world 
markets for urban transit equipment and systems? We must continue to market aggressively; we must 
capitalize on our proven capability in project management; we must develop financial resources to meet 
foreign competition; we need continuing efforts by CUTA, in such areas as coordination of research and 
development; and we need the cooperative efforts of all manufacturers, operators, and municipal, 
provincial, and federal governments” (p. 5) 
Department of External Affairs. 
(1981). Urban transportation: 
The Canadian experience. 
External Information Program 
2Paradigms4: “Canadian cities have been quick to recognize light rail transit's potential for service and 
cost-saving. In Edmonton and Calgary, fast-growing areas in Canada's oil-rich province of Alberta, rising 
oil prices boosted dramatically economic activity and populations during the past decade. To meet 
current and future public transportation requirements, both have embraced the idea of light rail transit 
to keep pace with urban growth” (p. 3) 
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Division. Ottawa, ON.  2Paradigms5: “Despite the dominance of the automobile during the years of rapid urban growth, 
Canada's largest cities maintained and expanded their public transportation systems to provide an 
alternative means of travelling within their boundaries. In small and medium-sized cities such as Ottawa 
and Vancouver, the alternative is a highly reliable bus system. Larger centres such as Toronto and 
Montreal constructed integrated, multimodal transit systems which provide passengers with 
inexpensive, dependable and comfortable transportation. These systems were planned, built and 
commissioned by the municipalities, and most of the equipment required for them was designed, 
developed and manufactured in Canada” (p. 8)  
2Paradigms6: “Most national governments today are increasingly concerned with the cost and supply of 
imported oil. Since urban transportation by private automobile accounts for a significant proportion of 
the oil consumed by many nations, there is growing interest in reducing auto use. Public transportation 
addresses the energy problem directly. In peak travel times, urban diesel buses are approximately 11 
times more efficient than automobiles, achieving approximately 100 passenger-km per L of fuel 
compared with approximately nine passenger-km per L with standard automobiles. The fuel efficiency of 
electrical mass transit systems is similar to that of buses on a passenger-km-per-L basis” (p. 8) 
2Paradigms7: “Over the past 80 years, Canada has developed a solid foundation of transit specialists. 
The urban transportation systems they have built offer affordable and reliable service to millions of 
people daily. The broad base of research and development personnel and the evident public support 
ensure a continuing evolution of the technology and equipment. The Canadian transit-manufacturing 
industry meets both domestic needs and the requirements of the highly competitive international 
marketplace. The export of millions of dollars in new equipment every year illustrates that Canada's 
transit manufacturing sector is well able to compete in tough international bidding” (p. 21) 
Department of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce. (1981). First 
Choice: Urban transit 
solutions. External 
Information Porgram Division. 
Ottawa, ON.  
2Paradigms8: “As well as responding to the challenges of urban growth. Canada’s transit industry has 
always had to face another challenge, that of climatic extremes. Not only is transit equipment required 
to operate in the extreme cold our country is justly famous for but it must operate in summer 
temperatures that in parts of the country can rise over 40°C (104°F) at times. Given the severe operating 
conditions transit equipment and components are subjected to, one can say that, if they work in 
Canada, they will work anywhere” (p. 18) 
2Paradigms9: “Canada’s transit industry is meeting the requirements of the highly competitive 
international marketplace, with the export of millions of dollars in new equipment yearly illustrating the 
ability to hold its own in tough bidding … [there are] many examples of Canadian expertise in the transit 
field that have been or are being applied throughout the world” (p. 33) 
Transport Development Centre. 
2Paradigms10: “The R&D activities in the urban transit sector are concentrated in three main areas, 
namely vehicle/system technology development, computer applications and development, and 
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(1985). Urban Transit 
Research and Development: 
Inventory of projects and 
value analysis. Transport 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
transportation planning and management. Other areas of research with the exception of service and 
methods demonstration are relatively inactive. The largest number of projects in a single research area 
involves R&D on alternative energy vehicles and/or alternative fuels. This R&D is largely at the federal 
level reflecting the federal governments mandate to promote energy efficiency in the transportation 
sector as a whole. Although not a serious problem, there is some duplication of effort on national basis” 
(p. i) 
2Paradigms11: “Lack of R&D funds, lack of time and staff, lack of up-to-date information, and the lack of 
clear R&D policies were most frequently identified as obstacles to more effective R&D. Increased 
funding and a proper coordination mechanism for selecting, funding and implementing … projects were 
most frequently mentioned as solutions to the above obstacles” (p. ii) 
2Paradigms12: “Many projects are clearly local in nature and have been conducted without 
consideration for regional or national Interests. Government agencies were generally more optimistic 
when evaluating R&D projects in comparison to transit operators. Government agency evaluations are 
generally 12-15% higher. Projects in the General Transportation Research, Training and Labour Relations 
and Computer Applications and Development subject categories ranked highest in value. Projects in the 
Policy and Program Development and Transportation Planning and Management category ranked 
lowest” (p. iii) 
2Paradigms13: “There is strong consensus that the level of urban transit R&D is unsatisfactory, that 
urban transit R&D funding should be Increased to meet current Industry needs and that current funding 
policies for the conduct of R&D are not generous enough. There is moderate consensus that the current 
R&D efforts of transit operators and manufacturers are valuable. However, the R&D efforts of provincial 
governments, the federal government and universities/private research organizations is in considerable 
doubt according to the respondents. There is a high degree of consensus that 1f transit operators and 
CUTA were more involved in project identification and selection, urban transit R & D would be more 
valuable. Provincial government Involvement is also seen to be desirable, however, less Federal 
Involvement in project identification and selection is seen to be desirable” (p. iii) 
National Transportation Agency. 
(1985). Freedom to move: A 
framework for transportation 
reform. Ottawa, ON. 
 
 
2Paradigms14: “I, as Minister of Transport, have been guided in particular by the following principles: 
(a) Less regulation, leading to less government interference, will encourage innovation and enterprise; 
(b) Greater reliance on competition and market forces will result in lower unit costs, more competitive 
prices, and a wider range of services to shippers and the public; (c) Canadians require a regulatory 
process that is open, accessible, and not excessively costly or time consuming. A policy and legislative 
framework based on these principles will allow Canada's transportation system to contribute efficiently 
and effectively to our future growth and prosperity” (p. i) 
2Paradigms15: “We must do everything we can to promote an efficient, responsive and productive 
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transportation system. The Government must facilitate and encourage, rather than obstruct and 
intervene. We must allow the system to operate under market conditions and allow business to play its 
proper role in fostering economic growth … The Government recognizes that the changes proposed to 
economic regulation of transportation may, in rare circumstances, such as for essential air services in 
remote areas, result in transitional difficulties for certain users. In such circumstances, a policy of 
selective government action, using the services of the market as much as possible, will ensure assistance 
for cases of greatest need ” (p. ii) 
2Paradigms16: “The [transportation] industry has matured. Trucking has flourished while railways have 
become more specialized carriers with much of their traffic in bulk commodities. Air traffic has tripled, 
and a much wider diversity of air services is now offered. Transportation services utilizing more than one 
mode (multimodal) have grown in importance, while shippers' needs have become more varied. 
Proportionally fewer Canadians are travelling by train and bus, and the automobile continues its 
dominance. A movement to deregulation has occurred in the United States, Canada's major trading 
partner. Greatly increased domestic and international competition has become a fact of life for 
Canadian producers and manufacturers” (p. 1) 
2Paradigms17: “The performance of the [surface] public passenger modes, rail and bus, has been 
significantly weaker than that of air since 1967. Both rail and bus have declined in market share. Rail 
traffic has fluctuated between 5 million and 7.8 million passengers annually. Bus traffic has 
approximated 32 million passengers annually during most of the period, except for 1984, which saw a 
decline to an estimated 28.5 million” (p. 13) 
2Paradigms18: “Since the mid-1970s, the overall performance of the transportation sector has been 
characterized by lower productivity gains, reduced new investment and higher energy prices. Latterly, 
improvements in productivity have been more evident in transportation than in the economy as a whole 
but inflation and high interest rates have inhibited new investment in the sector. Canada now faces a 
period of economic renewal with economic growth expected to be solid. Our producers, confronted 
with increased competition in world markets, need efficient transportation. Our transportation system, 
subject to increased competition from a deregulated U.S. system, requires more freedom and flexibility 
to respond successfully to market pressures“ (p. 14) 
National Transportation Agency. 
(1989). Freedom to move in 
Canada’s new ttransportation 
environment. Ottawa, ON. 
 
2Paradigms19: “Air traffic has tripled, with a much wider diversity of air services becoming available. 
Trucking has flourished. Railways offer more specialized freight services. Services involving several 
different modes of transportation are more common. The needs of shippers have become more 
complex and more varied. In short, much has changed during the last 25 years; the transportation 
industry has changed; the needs of shippers and travelers have changed and the economy has changed. 
Although Canada has a small population, it is the second-largest country in the world. Transportation 
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 ties it all together. Canadians have conquered the sheer size of their land with a sophisticated network 
of transportation — thousands of km of roads, railways, waterways and airline routes. Today we take 
this network for granted, but we depend on it to keep the country moving” (p. 2) 
2Paradigms20: “Regulations have been removed or modified to stimulate competition within the 
industry, allowing a high degree of innovation as transportation firms take the opportunity to provide 
new, improved services to their customers. Under the old regime, innovation entailed long and costly 
procedures to amend license conditions. Antiquated public hearing procedures forced disclosure of 
original marketing proposals to potential competitors” (p. 5) 
Christopher, J. (1992). 
Transportation in Canada: 
Current Issues. Library of 
Parliament. Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms21: “As urban transportation is the responsibility of provincial governments, the federal 
government has always been reluctant to get involved, especially in the recent years of fiscal restraint. 
There is, however, no constitutional barrier to the federal government’s using its spending power to 
become directly involved in urban transit projects. We must ask whether it should be involved and 
whether it can afford to be. Certainly, it is acknowledged on all sides, that there must be substantial 
investment in urban transit from some source over the next few years in Canada” (p. 13) 
2Paradigms22: “Cost recovery has been a part of federal government transportation policy for some 
time. Two years ago, Transport Canada published a proposal for cost recovery in all modes. One of the 
key issues is distinguishing the user costs for services from costs incurred by the government in the 
public interest. Another issue is how much involvement the users of these services … should have in 
developing costing methodologies and setting cost levels. In addition, in order to ensure fairness and 
equity in any cost-recovery regime, it is necessary to identify the amount of ‘hidden’ subsidization” (p. 
15) 
IBI Group. (1993). Urban travel and 
sustainable development: The 
Canadian experience. Canada 
Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation.  Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms23: “Across Canada, and across the industrialized world, there is a growing awareness that 
our systems for moving people and goods in urban areas are in conflict with the principles of sustainable 
development- The Canadian urban transportation system, which with few exceptions is based on the 
private automobile as the primary means of transport, is not considered sustainable for many reasons, 
including its consumption of non-renewable energy resources, its propensity to encourage a sprawling, 
low-intensity and inefficient form of urban development, its emission of air and water pollutants, its 
susceptibility to congestion (with attendant increases in emissions and energy consumption, inhibition 
of economic competitiveness and degradation of urban quality of life), and its direct impact on human 
life and suffering due to accidents” (p. i) 
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2Paradigms24: “While the precise division of urban transportation responsibilities varies across Canada, 
in any given city the multiplicity of jurisdictions is complex. This often hampers environmentally-
motivated transport innovation, as it is difficult for a single agency to take action alone” (p. 4) 
2Paradigms25: “From its rock-bottom low in 1973, transit ridership across the country increased 
between 1974 and 1985. In Canada, the 1970s are often referred to as the ’Golden Age of Transit’, as 
most provincial governments provided generous capital and operating funds. However, as construction 
of the new lines was completed, many cities found themselves facing a type of ‘planning paralysis’ at the 
highest levels. Road-oriented infrastructure projects continued to be widely unpopular, and some 
proposed transit projects were also attacked on the grounds that they disrupted local communities. 
Throughout the period, transportation budgets steadily decreased in real terms, as governments at all 
levels reoriented their priorities towards social, education and health spending. These factors led to a 
virtual freeze on major capital-intensive network expansion, which continues to this day with some 
exceptions” (p. 20-21) 
2Paradigms26: “The period from 1986 to the present can be characterized as the time when the urban 
transportation trends which tended to decrease the sustainability/livability of urban areas (e.g. sprawl, 
increased auto dependency) began in earnest to negate the contributions of positive trends (e.g. 
increased transit ridership, cleaner automobiles) … Almost everywhere, transit operating costs increased 
and revenues declined. In response there were service cuts and fare increases, followed by further 
declines in ridership.  While some transit systems maintained or increased the total number of riders, 
transit did not keep pace with population growth, resulting in declining per capita ridership figures” (p. 
22) 
2Paradigms27: “In the context of severe recession, which began to be felt in 1989 … provincial 
governments not only became unwilling to increase operating subsidies but, in Saskatchewan and 
Quebec … withdrew them entirely. Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver became once again the prime 
growth centres of Canada, having earlier been supplanted … by smaller cities during the late 1970s. 
Cheaper land prices at the rural-urban fringe and government programs continued to encourage 
development of tracts of low density, single family detached homes in the surrounding regions, leading 
to increased servicing costs, longer commuter trips to downtown and the massive growth of suburb-to-
suburb commuting” (p. 24) 
2Paradigms28: “At the present time, within each of Canada’s major urban centres, there exist three 
different types of urban form. At the heart of each area is the old, pre-war city which is pedestrian and 
transit-supportive.  Surrounding this are the older suburbs, which feature lower densities, separation of 
uses, tracts of single-family detached homes, buildings oriented away from the street – often behind 
large parking lots, winding internal roads and cul-de-sacs – and a poor pedestrian environment. In the 
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periphery, or in regions beyond, are areas of new growth where development is not only auto 
dependent in style, but often widely scattered and lacking a coherent urban structure. There is a 
predominance of single-family detached housing and an imbalance of housing over employment, which 
fosters commuter travel to the inner suburbs an downtown” (p. 38-39) 
2Paradigms29: “While most high-level, strategic transportation planning and land use planning studies 
in Canada recognize the strong interactions between land use/urban design and transportation, the 
mind-set in many instances until recently has been to assume a continuation of auto-dependent 
development and infrastructure; the delivery of new suburban subdivisions, and the incremental 
expansion of road infrastructure often includes little or no consideration of transit opportunities and 
requirements. However, there are some examples of joint actions in delivering urban development and 
related transit services in a more integrated manner. For example, in Edmonton, an innovative cost-
sharing agreement between Edmonton Transit and a major developer resulted in the introduction of 
transit services to a new subdivision two years in advance of when it would normally have been 
introduced” (p. 49) 
2Paradigms30: “Other government priorities and fiscal restraint have effectively curtailed the expansion 
of rapid transit infrastructure in Canadian cities in recent years. However, virtually all of the seven major 
cities have stated their intention to expand and improve their rapid transit networks. In contrast, there 
are relatively few plans to significantly expand the urban freeway network” (p. 50) 
2Paradigms31: “At the institutional level, there is a need for re-examination of policies, procedures and 
regulations in order to remove biases in favour of the automobile and make room for innovation. With 
regard to taxation, for example, federal law allows companies to provide parking for employees as a tax-
free benefit. Free or subsidized transit passes, however, are taxable benefits” (p. 58) 
2Paradigms32: “Transit service standards and funding ratios, while providing fair and impartial criteria 
for all routes and operating agencies, can sometimes impede policy and program innovation in special 
situations. When applied to the feasibility of a new route or service, such standards are usually 
predicated on expected ridership levels, which in turn are based on past experience. An innovative 
route/service proposal may be underrated in such a framework” (p. 58) 
2Paradigms33: “Transit planners and operating agencies lack formal power in the development approval 
process. Since the 1950s, there has generally been poor coordination between land-use and 
transportation planning/delivery at the local level, with public transit being provided after-the-fact and 
being required to adapt to difficult and inefficient situations. While initiatives have been begun in 
curtailing sprawl, the momentum of piecemeal urban sprawl continues around all major Canadian cities. 
The status-quo is perpetuated by market forces and government policies and programs which directly or 
indirectly promote development on ‘cheaper’ land at the rural-urban fringe, ‘NIMBY’ … resistance and 
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the general lack of understanding by local politicians, civil servants and general public about the need 
for change and required actions to achieve it. Given the political will, however, municipal and provincial 
governments possess very significant powers to bring about change, through the development planning 
and approvals processes and the funding of infrastructure” (p. 59-60)  
2Paradigms34: “In older core areas, because most of the original transit-supportive infrastructure is still 
intact in most Canadian cities, current levels of service and ridership are still relatively high, and there is 
excellent potential for improvement. The most significant changes since 1946 are declines in population 
density, increases in auto use and traffic congestion and resulting declines in transit ridership, service 
levels, and profitability … In peripheral and regional growth areas, because of the scattered, density, car-
oriented urban form, transit service and ridership are low. If available, local transit service tends to be 
designed to feed commuter rail lines, rapid transit, or highway express bus service in the central city, 
internal and suburb-to-suburb service is generally lacking or available only as paratransit, making it 
extremely difficult or impossible to live without a car” (p. 65) 
2Paradigms35: “While long-term strategies are needed for curbing urban sprawl and creating a more 
focused urban structure, in the meantime it is difficult to improve the general level of transit service in 
these peripheral communities. Some planners have questioned whether significant investment in transit 
is worthwhile in such areas, when the same Investment could bring proportionally much better results in 
other places. However, the number of auto trips associated with the current level of car dependence is 
causing increasing congestion on regional highways and inner city roads and perpetuating an expanding 
cycle of traffic congestion and road construction” (p. 66) 
IBI Group. (1994).Transportation 
Material for the Urban 
Chapter. Environment 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms36: “One may think of transportation and land use as having direct impacts on each other. 
Transportation affects land use by making different parcels of land more or less accessible by different 
modes. In turn, the mix and density of land use will affect travel in terms of the number and length of 
trips made, and the modes used. In one sense, this direct view of the relationship is correct but 
misleading as it fails to explicitly regard the human element. All decisions on land use and transportation 
are made by humans, individually or collectively, and it is this three-way relationship which ultimately 
determines the environmental effects and sustainability of an urban area” (p. 2) 
2Paradigms37: “The expanding municipal boundaries and decreasing densities meant that transit 
systems were carrying fewer passengers per revenue km , with increasing emphasis on more long-
distance commuter trips from distant suburban and exurban areas to the downtown core. Where 
businesses migrated to the suburbs they were often located in scattered, segregated, single-use office 
developments, rather than focused in compact, mixed use nodes or sub-centres which would favour 
internal walking trips and could be served efficiently and effectively by transit” (p. 7)                              
2Paradigms38: “[Beginning in 1986,] transit systems began to be caught in a downward spiral of 
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declining revenues and ridership, leading to deterioration of service, an echo of the massive downward 
spiral experienced following World War II. In the context of the severe recession, which began to be felt 
in 1989 and still grips Canada’s economy, provincial governments not only became unwilling to increase 
operating subsidies but, in some cases actually withdrew them entirely” (p. 7-8) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1996). Sustainable 
transportation in Canada 
(Backgrounder). Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms39: “There is increasing evidence that the negative consequences of transportation may be 
overwhelming the benefits we derive from it, and that there are serious risks to society if we continue 
our current patterns of transportation development and use … Social polarization is occurring between 
those who have access to good transportation alternatives and those who do not. There are major 
threats to human health and the global climate as well as other environmental concerns from 
unrelenting growth in the use of fossil fuels for transportation, both in Canada and around the world. An 
international consensus is emerging, based on an expanding body of research, that present trends in 
transportation, coupled with human settlement and communication patterns, are not sustainable in the 
long term. Effective measures for mitigating the harmful effects of transportation have been widely 
researched and reported in the literature. Many federal agencies, as well as those at the provincial and 
municipal levels, have begun to include elements pertaining to sustainable transportation in their 
strategies on sustainable development” (p. vii) 
2Paradigms40: “Not only are there more cars and trucks on the road, but consumer trends to larger 
vehicles are pushing up the average fuel consumption per vehicle. Despite continued public investments 
in public transportation, transit ridership has been declining in some of Canada’s largest cities both in 
absolute volumes and in modal share over the last 10 years” (p. ix) 
2Paradigms41: “Governments face declining financial resources for maintaining and expanding 
transportation infrastructure … [they] are divesting themselves of responsibility for funding the massive 
additions to infrastructure that will be necessary if current demand trends continue. Even if the financial 
challenge of meeting demand for transportation infrastructure could be met … there is a boomerang 
effect in expanding transportation systems. If we build a freeway system or an extended airport system 
to meet some prediction of future demand, then we should not be surprised to discover that these 
investments hasten our progress in that direction” (p. 2) 
2Paradigms42: “The high costs of infrastructure serving suburban areas are frequently paid for out of 
general tax revenues, not by the people responsible for the demand. Access to such publicly funded 
infrastructure is seen as a right, while user fees are criticized as tax grabs. Under current market 
conditions, users do not pay for the full social costs of transportation. Therefore, transportation is ‘over-
used’ from an efficiency perspective” (p. 4) 
2Paradigms43: “In Canada, the primary focus of attention in sustainable transportation is on the 
impacts of ground level air pollution and greenhouse gases. Of particular concern are the impacts of 
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increasing concentrations of ground level ozone, airborne particulates and carbon dioxide. At the same 
time, much attention is being paid to the economic and social implications of the continuing low density 
of human settlement patterns, particularly in the major urban areas of Canada. The financial constraints 
on all levels of government are forcing municipal and regional decision makers to reconsider land-use 
practices and to look for more cost-effective ways to develop urban infrastructure. There is widespread, 
though by no means universal, consideration of more compact, mixed-use development as one way to 
address this issue. There has been less emphasis, until relatively recently, on the connections between 
the unsustainability of transportation and patterns of land use” (p. 5) 
2Paradigms44: “Much of the debate about sustainable transportation centres on the problem of 
automobile dependence, which includes loss of community, reduced air quality; climate change; 
consumption of large amounts of space for roads and parking; intrusion of automobiles into 
neighbourhoods; boredom in the suburbs; and, in some countries, guarded communities. On a global 
scale, the imminent peaking in the next century of global oil production is also cause for concern” (p. 10) 
2Paradigms45: “Urban transit is several times more energy efficient per passenger-km than the 
automobile. Transit is also much less land-use intensive, and is more inclusive in that it provides access 
for those who do not drive cars. It follows that much more progress could be made toward sustainable 
transportation if the modal share of transit could be substantially increased in urban areas. Current 
trends are in fact in the opposite direction, despite continued calls for increased funding priority by 
public transit advocates” (p. 14) 
2Paradigms46: “Growth in automobile use is highly correlated to historical patterns of low density, 
single-use development in major urban areas, increasing disposable income of consumers and advances 
in vehicle technologies. Urban form and transportation systems have evolved under policies that do not 
require market players, including consumers, to pay the full environmental, social, health and safety and 
economic costs of their transportation or land-use decisions. Change will be required over the next 25 
years or longer, even if steps are taken immediately to induce the massive changes in behaviour, 
technology and infrastructure required for truly sustainable transportation. It is uncertain whether there 
is any set of policies that could gain political acceptance at this time and that would result in truly 
sustainable transportation” (p. 22) 
2Paradigms47: “No long-term vision of sustainable transportation has yet been embraced by the 
Government of Canada or any provincial government” (p. 25) 
2Paradigms48: “Policy development for sustainable transportation in Canada is not being carried out in 
an atmosphere of crisis. Canada continues to work to harmonize its national ground level air quality 
standards and emissions regulations with those of the international community. Canada embraces the 
air quality guidelines of the World Health Organization, and the transportation vehicle emissions 
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standards of the United States … However, the situation could change substantially in the relatively near 
future. Municipal and provincial thinking about urban transportation in Canada today is driven almost 
exclusively by the new reality of shrinking budgets. This may be serendipitous, because some proposals 
for new revenue sources, such as roadway congestion pricing and user fees and tolls, can have positive 
environmental impacts by shifting auto demand to other times and other modes. We seem to be at a 
unique point in history when economic and environmental goals in urban transportation may converge, 
with major implications for sustainability” (p. 31-32) 
2Paradigms49: “Policy responses by governments, at least in North America, continue to focus on 
combinations of regulation and technology policy options in the technology sector. Few steps have been 
taken to implement stronger packages of policies that can affect a broad range of consumer and 
business decisions. Governments are financially constrained and can no longer base infrastructure 
investment decisions primarily on demand growth by individual mode ... There are, however, many signs 
of change in the way decisions are being made. Regional metropolitan governments in all parts of 
Canada are beginning to rethink the way urban transportation systems will be developed in future to 
support new land-use planning approaches. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities and some 
individual municipalities have adopted the generic vision and principles for urban transportation 
articulated by the Transportation Association of Canada. While the TAC acknowledges that the 
approaches it advocates will not lead to true sustainability, they are steps in the right direction” (p. 44) 
2Paradigms50: “There is a general lack of integrated decision making about transportation issues among 
all levels of governments. Economics still drives most transportation decisions of the federal 
government. There is limited consideration of policies and programs designed to produce combined 
economic, environmental and social benefits, and so far little sense of urgency about sustainable 
development (including transportation) evident in the government’s policies and programs” (p. 47) 
2Paradigms51: “Cultural values in Canada favour single-family exurban homes on large lots and wide 
use of the private motor vehicle. Fuel prices are at historically low levels in North America. The relatively 
fixed percentage of disposable income used by consumers for transportation has allowed consumers to 
purchase new vehicles and to drive them longer distances. There is a well-established relationship 
between gasoline price and vehicle use. Fuel prices in European countries are typically two to three 
times higher than in North America, while per capita fuel consumption in the EC is in the range of one 
third of that in North America. It is argued that urban population densities are much higher and that 
public transportation systems are more highly developed in Europe than in North America. The 
counterargument is that it has been the availability of ‘cheaper’ fuels and land in North America over 
many decades that has enabled wide use of the automobile and low density urban development. In 
order to meet sustainability objectives, we in North America may be forced to look seriously at patterns 
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of urban development in other parts of the world, including Europe, for models of how we can have 
vibrant, liveable cities with less dependence on the automobile” (p. 51) 
2Paradigms52: “The availability of inexpensive land, the economic policies of governments over past 
decades and advances in road transport technologies have encouraged massive investments in single-
use urban development, road infrastructure and personal and commercial vehicle fleets that have 
overwhelmed public transit in urban areas and intercity transport of goods by rail. Historically, 
government policies at all levels, combined with market forces, have encouraged developments in road 
and air transport at the expense of modal share for rail, domestic shipping and public urban transport. 
Governments have subsidized low density urban and suburban development with land-use policies that 
preclude financially viable transit systems and foster automobile dependence. The fact that 
governments are now fiscally constrained may offer an opportunity to move to more compact, mixed-
use urban form” (p. 51) 
2Paradigms53: “One of the major limitations of policy development for sustainable development has 
been that efforts to date have largely taken the form of doing those things ‘that are worth doing 
anyway’ – for economic or other reasons in addition to environmental protection. As yet federal and 
provincial governments in Canada have not been able to agree on quantitative greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets that would ensure real progress toward sustainable transportation” (p. 51) 
2Paradigms54: “Substantial investments have been made in urban transit infrastructure and services in 
Canada, but these investments have been overwhelmed by investments in road transport by all sectors 
of society” (p. 52) 
2Paradigms55: “It is unlikely that governments will be able to achieve sustainable transportation 
through policy measures alone, even if coordinated approaches are taken by all levels pursuing 
integrated strategies. It will also take informed action by the majority of citizens (in their choices as 
consumers) and by businesses (seeing it to be in their best interests to offer goods and services that 
contribute to sustainable transportation). Hence governments have a responsibility to educate the 
public about how they can change their behaviours to enable real change to occur. Many observers have 
suggested that efforts to date have been very much at the margin and unlikely to result in real progress 
toward sustainable transportation” (p. 52) 
 223 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1997). State of the debate: 
The road to sustainable 
transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms56: “The division of powers among levels of government fragments decision-making with 
respect to transportation, and militates against investment decisions which maximize economic 
efficiency and minimize environmental and social costs. Moreover, responsibilities for land use and 
transportation planning are divided among provincial governments and municipalities in ways that often 
hinder the sustainable development of urban areas. Users do not pay the full societal costs, including 
the environmental costs, of transportation. For example, the high costs of the transportation 
infrastructure needed to serve suburban areas are mostly paid for out of general tax revenues and not 
by the individuals directly served … These and many other elements of Canadian values and institutional 
structures create barriers to sustainable change in transportation use and energy consumption” (p.  16) 
2Paradigms57: “Urban sprawl forces most commuters to rely on personal automobiles. Walking and 
cycling are impractical due to the length of commutes and the lack of infrastructure to make these 
alternatives safe, pleasant and convenient. Low-density populations also reduce the efficiency, 
effectiveness and financial viability of public transit” (p. 20) 
2Paradigms58: “The federal government is participating in international negotiations on new 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, yet authority to implement many of the policy 
instruments needed to achieve such reductions rests with the provincial and municipal governments” (p. 
23) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1997). Financing 
urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms59: “Historically, finance and delivery of urban transportation infrastructure and services 
have been based on three underlying premises. a) Urban areas would be allowed to sprawl outward, to 
accommodate population growth and social desires through low density development on less expensive 
land on the urban fringe. b) Roads and parking would be provided to accommodate ever increasing 
vehicular demands resulting from that pattern of growth, and public transit would serve whatever 
markets it could. c) Transportation funding would be provided, through departmental and agency 
budgets, primarily from consolidated general revenue accounts and general tax revenues. For senior 
governments that includes transportation taxes (fuel taxes, licence fees, etc.) as well as personal and 
corporate income taxes, sales taxes, excise taxes, etc. For local governments, the principal source is 
property tax” (p. 2) 
2Paradigms60: “Belief in … past practices is rapidly declining for two reasons. 1. The new reality of 
shrinking provincial and local budgets means that the old approaches to land use, transportation 
planning and funding are no longer affordable. 2. There is growing recognition that continuation of the 
status quo will result in 21st century urban areas which are neither environmentally nor socially nor 
economically sustainable” (p. 2) 
2Paradigms61: “Urban transportation is caught up in this budget crunch. Local governments have less 
money available for transportation and (in some cases) more road and transit responsibilities assigned 
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by the provinces. In various locations, roadway maintenance is being deferred, capital funds are being 
used for maintenance, new construction is being delayed or cancelled, and transit budgets are being 
reduced. Meanwhile, automobile demand continues to grow. Urban populations, the number of 
automobiles and the average annual kilometers driven per automobile are all increasing, while the 
average number of occupants per automobile is decreasing. It is becoming obvious that governments 
will not be able to finance transportation systems to serve increasing vehicle demands the same way 
they did in the past” (p. 2-3) 
2Paradigms62: “Past practices are leading to urban transportation systems which are not sustainable in 
the long run. Warning signs are all around. In the environment: increased consumption of fossil fuels 
and other non-renewable resources; air pollution leading to more asthma and emphysema; greenhouse 
gas emissions (notably carbon dioxide) contributing to global warming and climate change; consumption 
of valuable land. In society: communities in which auto use is more a necessity than a luxury; lack of 
“sense of place” in neighborhoods without lively and pedestrian friendly streetscapes; empty, alien 
landscapes with unsafe areas for many citizens, especially at night; family disruptions when one or both 
parents must spend long times in stressful commutes” (p. 3) 
2Paradigms63: “The transportation industry nationally and internationally is undergoing revolutionary 
changes. With deregulation has come increased competition, reduction and elimination of subsidies, 
and private delivery of formerly public transportation services. The principle of user pay, or direct charge 
for consumption, has become firmly entrenched in competitive national and international 
transportation marketplaces. These developments have not yet been reflected in urban transportation 
but they may, as urban areas struggle to maintain services and competitive advantage in relation to 
other urban areas. The results may be intense pressure to reduce or eliminate subsidies, to institute the 
principle of user pay, and to create roles for the private sector where none have traditionally existed” (p. 
6) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1998). A New Vision 
for Urban Transportation.  
Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms64: “Urban transportation systems will have to be very productive, efficient, cost effective 
and accessible to allow cities to generate the wealth needed for quality of life improvements, social 
services, infrastructure, environmental protection and transportation itself. To achieve that goal will 
require new approaches to land use, urban design, transportation planning and financing. Continuation 
of current trends will not work” (p. 1) 
2Paradigms65: “Municipal and provincial budgets have been the traditional sources of financing urban 
road construction and maintenance as well as transit subsidies. Federal transfer payments to the 
provinces and provincial grants to municipalities are decreasing relative to needs as a result of recession, 
a weak economy, government debt service charges and other factors.  Municipalities are faced with 
increasing costs for social and other services, decreasing revenue and citizen resistance to higher taxes. 
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Something has to give, and it is often the municipal transportation budget” (p. 1) 
Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada. (1999). Canada 
Infrastructure Works 
Program: Phase II Follow-Up 
and Phase I Audit. 
2Paradigms66: “There are incentives for provincial governments to transfer their budgetary resources 
away from their own programs to the federal infrastructure initiative. However, this program 
substitution is not inevitable; in two provinces, for example, safeguards were put in place in Phase I to 
limit the "substitution effect". Any substitution that does occur reduces the Program's infrastructure 
development and job creation benefits. The Treasury Board Secretariat has not set out the limitations of 
estimates of employment generated by the Program in reporting them to Parliament” (p. 17-5) 
2Paradigms67: “The Treasury Board Secretariat indicated that although improvements can and should 
be made in any future such programs, the chapter presents an inappropriately negative view of what 
was a highly successful program in terms of results and one that made a positive contribution to federal-
provincial-municipal relations in Canada” (p. 17-6) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2000). Measuring 
progress: Toward the new 
vision for urban 
transportation. Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms68: “Urban transit services, one of the ten key areas addressed in the survey, reported a 
sharp increase (more than 80% of the municipalities surveyed) in the identification of and 
implementation of transit safety/security programs. Annual transit ridership per capita remains an 
important overall indicator since it measures the extent to which transit’s share of the market is 
increasing (or not) on a per capita basis. However, while survey results revealed a decline in per capita 
ridership, a review of key transit related indicators suggest capturing a larger transit market is related to 
the ongoing level of investment in transit services” (p. 2-3) 
IBI Group and Soberman, R. (2001). 
National Vision for Urban 
Transit to 2020. Transport 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2Paradigms69: “Most Canadian municipalities today are unable to find the funding (particularly capital) 
required to maintain existing transit services, let alone expand transit systems and levels of service, 
solely from property taxes. As a result, in almost every municipality, there is a growing lobby for 
financial assistance from senior levels of government to assist in meeting the transit needs of the future” 
(p. 6) 
2Paradigms70: “There are, of course, issues related to the division of powers and responsibilities 
between the federal and provincial governments that underlie the present lack of federal government 
participation in urban transit. Nevertheless, the federal government has recently been showing more 
interest in urban transit, motivated, in part, by Canada’s international obligations with respect to the 
Kyoto Protocol, in part, by the just completed mandatory review of the Canada Transportation Act 
(CTA), and in part by the increasing frequency of requests for financial aid” (p. 15) 
2Paradigms71: “There are a range of institutional constraints on what municipalities can do that are 
imposed by provincial governments. In Ontario, for example, municipalities are not empowered to raise 
revenue from other than property taxes whereas in British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec, 
municipalities have access to other fees and charges. There are also examples of highway policies 
applied in urban areas that are in conflict with municipal transit policies. In addition, within individual 
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municipalities themselves, there are frequently institutional constraints that derive from lack of 
adequate coordination and integration of programs and policies between planning departments, transit 
operating agencies, and those responsible for traffic engineering and road construction. Planners, for 
example, often wish to invest in transit as a precondition for new growth and development whereas the 
service provider may be more interested in catering to existing demands. Road departments, parking 
authorities, and transit operators also often have different agendas within the same community” (p. 26) 
2Paradigms72: “The net operating costs of transit services are funded by municipalities from property 
tax revenues obtained from their constituents. Travel demand, however, is rarely dictated by municipal 
boundaries. As a result, in many cases, the ability to effectively match the supply and demand for urban 
transit is constrained by jurisdictional responsibilities that preclude one community spending money to 
serve the residents of adjacent or nearby communities. Even where regional or interregional authorities 
have been established, achieving agreement on equitable funding and levels of service often means 
that, in the end, with such fragmented decision making, agreement on improvements lags far behind the 
increase in needs. Within Canada, the relative importance of these institutional issues varies 
considerably. They pose more difficulty in the Greater Toronto Area, comprised of 28 separate municipal 
governments that operate 12 transit systems, than in cities such as Calgary and Winnipeg which have 
single municipal administrations and unified transit systems” (p. 26-27) 
2Paradigms73: “Fiscal priorities of both the provincial and federal governments may, in fact, represent 
the key impediment to achieving new visions for urban transit. In both cases, debt and tax reductions 
are increasingly seen as more important policy objectives than the expansion of public services. For the 
provinces, the funding of health care is the number one concern, a sector which has experienced rising 
costs, rising expectations, and rising public concern that in aggregate, may well exceed public concern 
about urban transit. In fact, the same can be said for municipalities that, depending upon the province, 
are now required to find funding for expanded demands in education, social services, social housing, and 
policing, as well as transit, primarily or entirely from property tax revenues” (p. 27) 
 Flemming, B., Patenaude, J. 
Findlay, G., Rae, R., and 
Waters II, W. (2001). Vision 
and Balance: Report of the 
Canadian Transportation Act 
Review Panel. Canadian 
Transportation Act Review 
2Paradigms74: “Urban transit, including buses and rail transit, is still supplied mainly by government 
rather than the private sector. Rail transit is generally government-owned and heavily subsidized. The 
latter reflects both a social policy of providing transportation for those not able to drive and recognition 
that reducing traffic congestion benefits motorists and reduces the need for new road investment. 
Commercial motivation has almost no role in the provision of urban transportation. There is a wide gap 
between the cost of providing urban transportation — whether by car or by transit — and the price paid 
by users. In addition, the signals conveyed to road users are distorted because of their failure to convey 
the high social costs of increasing automobile use in urban regions” (p. 16) 
2Paradigms75: “In principle, in an economically efficient transportation system, both users and suppliers 
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Panel. Ottawa, ON. recognize the true costs. Just as public provision of facilities without adequate charging distorts users’ 
choice of modes, failing to recognize environmental costs results in a less efficient transportation system 
and lower standard of living. This is particularly true for urban transportation, where it is clear that 
automobile use, especially during peak periods, imposes costs beyond those recognized by users and 
where transit prices are deliberately subsidized, partly in an attempt to counter the distortion of under-
priced urban car use” (p. 25) 
2Paradigms76: “Transit has become an anomaly in transport policy. Governments at all levels have 
generally sought to liberalize entry to transport markets, reduce price regulation, and inject a measure 
of enterprise in publicly owned carriers and infrastructure, yet urban transit is still delivered almost 
exclusively by municipal agencies. Further, while governments have tried in other transport modes, and 
in other fields, to make users responsible for the cost of services, urban transit is still funded mainly 
through direct subsidies” (p. 216) 
2Paradigms77: “From 1989 to 1999, service (vehicle-km) remained roughly constant, but trips per capita 
declined by about 15%. Transit companies have been heartened by the slight growth since 1996, but this 
was a period of rapid employment growth, and transit has been shown to be very sensitive to 
employment cycles in the past. The growth also appears to have been mostly in the fast-growing 
western cities, particularly Calgary and Vancouver, while ridership in Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa 
remains ominously below the levels of a decade ago” (p. 218-219) 
2Paradigms78: “Long-term trends in transit costs and productivity raise some serious concerns, 
however. While unit costs of most transport carriers have declined over time with productivity 
improvement and increased load factors, transit operating costs (excluding capital purchases) per 
vehicle-km have doubled (in constant dollars) since 1975, as shown in Figure 12.3. The attempt to retain 
and expand ridership through improved service involved more expensive buses, trains and track with 
higher operating costs (including dedicated light rail and busways). Figure 12.4 shows the trend in costs 
per passenger, which increased even faster, nearly quadrupling over the period (again in constant 
dollars) as the number of riders per vehicle fell with expanded service frequency and coverage — such 
as lower-density suburbs. Labour cost increases also played a role throughout the period” (219-220) 
2Paradigms79: “The situation began to change substantially in the most recent years. Fiscal stringency 
in provincial and municipal governments included reductions in transit subsidies — and notably the 
Ontario government’s transfer of funding responsibility to regional and local governments” (p. 220) 
2Paradigms80: “Analysis undertaken for the Panel suggests that the current extent of annual transit use 
brings benefits in social costs avoided of about $5 to $6 billion. This suggests that current subsidies — in 
the range of $2.2 billion nationally — are producing a substantial net benefit. The analysis also 
compared this to evidence of the returns provided by urban highway investment projects, concluding 
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that the transit subsidies produced greater benefits … still greater benefits would be realized simply by 
charging all road users for the full social costs they impose, including both external costs and the cost of 
resources consumed. In fact, for greatest efficiency, this would be the only remedy needed. Transit 
subsidies become a solution only because direct road charges are not imposed.” (p. 223) 
2Paradigms81: “The availability of federal capital subsidies there, and the attempt to induce shifts away 
from cars with high-quality transit services, is judged to have encouraged capital-intensive projects. 
Further, ridership projections have often proved overly optimistic, so that the cost per new rider has 
been high. That experience cannot be transferred directly to Canadian conditions, where transit is a 
much more accepted means of travel, and major investments have been made more to respond to 
increasing demand than to stimulate new demand. But the experience of recent decades — where rapid 
increases in transit delivery costs failed to arrest the long-term decline in trips per capita — raises 
questions about relying on service improvements alone to induce people to switch from cars to transit. 
Observers suggest that here too, the availability of capital subsidies has allowed transit agencies to 
adopt capital-intensive solutions, without supporting them with more cost-effective operational 
solutions — such as unpalatable restrictions on car use” (p. 223-224) 
2Paradigms82: “The Panel examined concerns about the cost of access for commuter authorities and 
concluded that although the railways appear to have some real bargaining advantages, commuter 
authorities are not without bargaining power. Final offer arbitration became available to commuter rail 
operators in 1996. Over the years, agreements for new services have been negotiated, and existing 
services have been expanded. The Panel is further encouraged by CN’s willingness to see contracts 
between railways and commuter agencies deemed public” (p. 235) 
Transport Canada. (2001). 
Sustainable transportation: 
The Canadian context. 
Submission to the 9
th
 Session 
of the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable 
Devleopment, April 16-27. 
2Paradigms83: “Reducing congestion in urban centres would be a good example of a win-win-win 
scenario because economic losses resulting from delays, time spent on the road, and air emissions that 
contribute to both local air pollution and climate change would all be reduced. A shift from single-
occupancy vehicles to public transit can significantly reduce congestion, but large capital investments 
are required to ensure that systems can effectively handle increased use. While building more roads 
may decrease congestion in the short term, it is likely to cause an increase in traffic over time” (p. 7) 
2Paradigms84: “At the federal level, Transport Canada has evolved significantly to meet the changing 
needs of Canadians since it was formed as a federal department in 1936. Generally, the department is 
moving away from its role as operator of the transportation system toward that of regulator and policy 
maker” (p. 8) 
2
nd
 Era 
Programs 
Gray, H. (1981). Notes for a speech 
by the Honourable Herb Gray, 
2Programs1: “The federal government has committed $60 million to the Vancouver ALRT project for 
three reasons: To bring about the selection of Canadian urban transit technology; To help provide a 
system to demonstrate to Canadian technology to the world, in connection with the Transpo ’86 World’s 
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PC, MP, Ministry of Trade, 
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the Canadian Urban Transit 
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Concorde, Quebec City, QC. 
Monday, 22
nd
 of June. 
Fair in Vancouver (this will be the first time this technology will be demonstrated, as an operating, 
revenue-producing system, to potential buyers from around the world); and to establish an industrial 
development project, encouraging production of its components by firms in BC and throughout Canada, 
both for its construction, and the construction of these systems. We want to sell them to buyers who 
see it in operation in Vancouver” (p. 2) 
2Programs2: “Our urban transportation problems and the solutions we have found for them are very 
relevant to meeting the needs of people living in cities around the world. The world market for urban 
transit is accelerating; the potential in the next 15 years is expected to exceed $100 billion. Some of the 
best current prospects for Canadian firms are in Latin America … and in Africa” (p. 3) 
2Programs3: “In the United States, many communities are committed to move more people, more 
efficiently, more safely, more reliably, more economically, and some of the more innovative concepts, 
which meet American needs, have been developed in Canada. Examples are the LRT system in Portland, 
Oregon; and the ALRT system in Detroit. I’m told the final contract signing is close … The federal 
government’s trade commissioner in Detroit has been playing a major role in this sales effort. In fact, it’s 
an excellent example of the cooperation of industry and provincial and federal governments” (p. 4)  
2Programs4: “We have committed $500,000 to provide full support to the Canadian exhibitors at the 
International Public Transit Expo ’81 in Chicago in October. As many of you are aware, more than 16,000 
square feet has been leased by the federal government, and will be used by 22 companies to display 
Canadian technology. We are producing, jointly with the manufacturers, a new film depicting the 
Canadian experience in urban transit. We are publishing the first catalogue of the industry. And we have 
a brand-new selling tool – ‘Telidon’ … this is the first application of this high-technology system, 
developed by the federal government … This is one of the largest marketing assistance projects we have 
ever undertaken for any industry” (p. 8)  
2Programs5: “We are working at creating an international framework to reduce trade barriers; to 
facilitate joint ventures; and to exchange information and technology. I am pleased to … announce here 
today the formation of a Canada-EEC working group on urban transportation. It will have its first formal 
meeting in September in Brussels. This follows an invitation from the EEC for a visiting Canadian mission. 
We are taking steps to try to reduce the effects of the ‘Buy America’ and the ‘Buy National’ state laws. I 
have raised our concerns about these matters US Cabinet officers, in both the previous Carter 
Administration and the new Reagan Administration” (p. 9)  
Department of External Affairs. 
(1981). Urban transportation: 
The Canadian experience. 
2Programs6: “Over the past seven years, Ontario has also spent large sums on research and 
development through its agency, the Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC), which 
was created in the early 1970s as an element of Ontario's new urban transit policy. Traffic congestion, 
air pollution and public resistance to freeways culminated in a broad provincial policy to improve 
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External Information Porgram 
Division. Ottawa, ON.  
existing roads and transit service. The corporation has since produced a steady flow of new technology. 
Although not a manufacturer, UTDC has forged strong links with industry, government, transit 
operators, consultants and financial institutions. Its major programs have yielded new light rail vehicles, 
intermediate capacity transit systems and a range of advanced technology subsystems, including 
suspension and propulsion equipment” (p. 2) 
2Programs7: “A major benefit of efficient urban transportation facilities is realized in capital investment. 
Stated simply, transit is less capital-intensive than the automobile. Studies conducted in the cities of 
Vancouver and Halifax in the 1970s indicated that the cost of providing transit facilities to meet travel 
demands through the 1980s was roughly half the cost of providing facilities for automobiles. Transit 
means fewer expressways and .access-roads; less parking space; savings on traffic-signaling equipment; 
and savings on police, fire-fighting and ambulance services” (p. 8) 
2Programs8: “In addition to the urban and transportation planning expertise which has evolved over the 
years, Canada also possesses a pool of experienced consulting and technical personnel. Canadian 
specialists, in both the public and private sectors, build, operate and maintain subways, light rail transit 
services, commuter rail and bus networks and urban bus services. This experience is available to 
municipalities anywhere in the world on a commercial basis” (p.  
Department of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce. (1981). First 
Choice: Urban transit 
solutions. External 
Information Porgram Division. 
Ottawa, ON.  
2Programs9: “In addition to improving the quality of urban life in general, well-designed transit systems 
a) alleviate downtown congestion, Toronto’s and Montreal’s central business districts are served by high 
quality, integrated transportation systems; strengthen land-use policy, Metro Toronto’s official plan 
features a decentralization policy away from the high density downtown, a new light rail transit line is 
attracting investment in a regional sub-centre. Edmonton, Calgary, Montreal, Hamilton and Vancouver 
are using transit to reinforce centralization policies; help to achieve the goals of modern urban planning: 
cooperation between urban planners and municipal transit authority planning staff ensures an 
integrated approach to urban transit” (p. 20) 
2Programs10: “The Urban Transportation Development Corporation Ltd. (UTDC) was established by the 
Ontario government in 1973 as a publicly-owned company with a mandate to design, develop am 
market new urban transit equipment and systems, not only within the framework of the Canadian 
transit industry, but on an international level a well. As such, it markets both its own technical 
developments and capability plus Canadian transit operating expertise” (p. 36) 
2Programs11: “UTDC's most ambitious program has been its development of a light, rapid and 
economical intermediate capacity transit system (ICTS), designed primarily for city corridors where 
passenger demand is intermediate between subway and bus system capacities … [and] to reduce capital 
costs and permit urban planners high-quality transit in a wide range of sensitive urban conditions” (p. 
37) 
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2Programs12: “Over the past sixty years, Canadian transit operators have skillfully incorporated new 
transit technology into conventional equipment in an unending effort to upgrade reliability and service. 
Today, conventional bus systems in Canadian cities are being improved through new communications 
and information equipment: from simple two-way radios linking bus operators and a central controller 
to complex on-board micro-processors and data collection devices” (p. 40) 
Transport Development Centre. 
(1985). Urban Transit 
Research and Development: 
Inventory of projects and 
value analysis. Transport 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs13: “Total urban transit R&D expenditures totaled $17.3 million 1n 1983, representing $77.6 
million in R&D expenditures over the life of all projects. It is felt that these figures are underestimated 
by approximately 30%. In 1983, almost 50% … were spent on Computer Applications and Development 
followed by Vehicle/System Technology Development (38.8%), Service and Methods demonstration 
(6.6%), and Transportation Planning and Management (4.7%). All other areas of research in 1983 
account for less than 4% of total R&D expenditures. Provincial agencies provided over 53% of the R&D 
funds expended in 1983. Federal agencies accounted for 21.4%, municipal agencies (Including transit 
operators) 17.1%, private companies 7.0%, and other organizations 1.1%” (p. i) 
2Programs14: “The largest single agency Investment of R&D funds was by the Ontario Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications ($5.6 million in 1983) followed by Transport Canada ($1.2 million) 
and the Quebec Ministry of Transport ($1.1 million). Collectively, urban transit operators spent $2.8 on 
research and development 1n 1983 (48 projects), mainly in the areas of Transportation Planning and 
Management and Service and Methods Demonstration” (p. ii) 
National Transportation Agency. 
(1985). Freedom to move: A 
framework for transportation 
reform. Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs15: “Government should provide direct support to those transportation services that, though 
not economically viable, are deemed to be in the public interest. In this regard, users should also bear 
their fair share of costs” (p. 4) 
2Programs16: “The revised [National Transportation] Act will provide for compensation for imposed 
public duties in order to overcome the disadvantages of the current legislation. Departmental 
operations will be streamlined to reduce the administrative burden, to provide best value for the 
taxpayers' dollar and to promote competition in the marketplace, subject to the essential requirement 
that transportation safety not be compromised. The need for new capital expenditures will be carefully 
examined. Crown Corporations in transportation will be expected to be effective and efficient while 
operating as good corporate citizens” (p. 6) 
2Programs17: “The National Transportation Act of 1967, the chief legislation that established present 
policy and regulatory practices, contains an explicit statement of transportation policy. The NTA and 
related acts governing each mode have emphasized intermodal competition. Today, it is becoming 
imperative that more competition be generated not only between modes but also within each mode. 
There is no compelling reason to discard the heart of the NTA statement of objectives, which calls for ‘an 
economic, efficient and adequate transportation system.’ It is in the subsequent parts addressing the 
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means whereby these objectives are to be achieved that the policy statement needs to be changed in 
order to meet current realities” (p. 17) 
2Programs18: “The new statement … will espouse minimal government intervention and permit more 
flexibility. It will recognize the needs of those in small or remote communities, where low traffic 
volumes or long distances make it difficult to have a competitive environment. The new statement of 
transportation policy objectives will recognize that transportation is a service industry to assist Canadian 
shippers in meeting the competitive demands of the future” (p. 18) 
National Transportation Agency. 
(1989). Freedom to move in 
Canada’s new ttransportation 
environment. Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs19: “The new legislation provides maximum flexibility for transportation firms and users to 
adapt to changing needs and circumstances while protecting the public interest where necessary. To 
ensure the intended results occur, the new National Transportation Agency will review the operations of 
the legislation annually and the government will conduct a comprehensive review of the legislation 
within four years. In addition, Parliament will be informed each year on developments in the key area of 
motor vehicle safety” (p. ii) 
2Programs20: “The new National Transportation Act and Motor Vehicle Transport Act establish a new 
direction for transportation in Canada. This direction was seen as important enough to warrant a 
‘declaration of national transportation policy’ in the Act itself. Here are its principles and objectives: A 
safe transportation system is the top priority; The purpose of Canada’s transportation system is to serve 
the needs of shippers and travelers; Competition and market forces are the best means for providing 
Canadians with efficient transportation at the lowest possible cost; Regulations should be simple and 
kept to a minimum to encourage competition within the transportation industry; Transportation is 
recognized as a key to regional economic development; Carriers should bear a fair and reasonable share 
of the costs of facilities provided at public expense and be compensated for publicly-imposed duties; 
Access to transportation is a basic necessity for Canadians, including travelers with disabilities. Carriers 
should ensure that no undue obstacles are created that prevent access to transportation” (p. 4) 
2Programs21: “The federal government will monitor the effects of the new legislation to ensure that it is 
operating in the way intended. The National Transportation Agency will conduct an annual review of the 
legislation for each year from 1988 to 1991 and report to the Minister of Transport. In 1992, the 
government will prepare a comprehensive report on how the legislation is affecting shippers, travelers, 
transportation firms, trade and regional development. This report, as well as the annual reports, will be 
tabled in Parliament” (p. 13) 
2Programs22: “Recent discoveries in ‘superconductors’ – new materials that can transmit energy with 
100-per-cent efficiency – have created visions o f entirely new modes of cheap, rapid transportation. 
Today, these are just visions; but in our day and age, visions can become reality very quickly” (p. 15) 
John, C. (1992). Transportation in 2Programs23: “The Standing Committee on Transport … recognized that the government will have to be 
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Canada: Current Issues. 
Library of Parliament. Ottawa, 
ON. 
involved in any high-speed rail project; there is not a sufficient return for the private sector to undertake 
it alone. The Committee’s major recommendation was that the federal government should not consider 
making a financial commitment to the development of … the Quebec City-Windsor corridor until it has 
been clearly demonstrated that substantial and tangible socioeconomic benefits will accrue to the public 
interest from such a project. Such benefits would include reduction of air pollution if enough people 
shifted from their automobiles and airplanes to HSR, less energy consumption, less airport and highway 
congestion and deferral of significant public investment in highway and airport infrastructure. The 
Committee concluded, however, that a ‘leap of faith’ would be required for any such project and 
recognized that the government might want to proceed with high-speed rail for other reasons, such as 
the need to stimulate the economy … The November 1992 Report of the Royal Commission on National 
Passenger Transportation recommended that governments invest in high speed rail infrastructure only if 
the benefits to the passenger transportation system exceed the costs, and if taxpayers do not have to 
pay any operating subsidies" (p. 11) 
IBI Group. (1993). Urban travel and 
sustainable development: The 
Canadian experience. Canada 
Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation.  Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs24: “The Federal Government has no direct responsibility in urban transportation matters. 
However, it administers many programs, policies and research activities which directly or indirectly 
affect urban transportation such as immigration, housing, finance, interprovincial and international 
transportation, and energy and environmental policies” (p. 4) 
2Programs25: “As effort focused away from major transportation infrastructure projects, more 
attention was paid to alternative methods of reducing congestion and petroleum consumption, and 
making more efficient use of existing infrastructure. All levels of government sponsored efforts in the 
fields of alternative transportation fuels, demand management techniques (e.g. ridesharing and 
alternative work hours) and traffic system management techniques such as improved arterial and traffic 
signal control systems and freeway traffic management systems. Since the major driving force behind 
such efforts was concerns about petroleum dependency, political and general support for these 
measures tended to ebb and flow with the energy crises. However, the measures provided enough 
potential and actual benefits in terms of infrastructure efficiency and reduced congestion and emissions 
to maintain a steady level of support from all government levels” (p. 20) 
2Programs26: “Following in the path of Metropolitan Toronto and Montreal, the transit systems of 
Vancouver, Ottawa, Halifax and Quebec City regionalized, under new regional authorities and/or 
governments. Regionalization provided for efficient co-ordination and delivery of service, particularly for 
‘trunk’ or ‘backbone’ routes, and also made available resources for operating specialized services such 
as paratransit for persons with disabilities. However, it also tended in some cases to separate the local 
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land-use planning functions from the planning and provision of transit service. With the exception of 
Saskatchewan, none of the provincial governments currently give transit authorities formal power in the 
land-development approval process. Throughout the period, urban population growth continued, and 
there was a disproportionately higher increase in employment associated with increasing participation 
of women in the out-of-home work force. These trends, coupled with an aging, generally more affluent 
population with fewer children and more double income households, led to continued growth in auto-
ownership and increased vehicular trip-making, with a decreasing tendency to use transit” (p. 21-22) 
2Programs27: “Rapid transit expansion came to a halt with a virtual freeze on capital intensive work [as 
a result of shrinking municipal transportation budgets]. This was especially problematic in Edmonton, 
where the LRT system was still too short to function effectively, and in Winnipeg, where the planned 
busway was never built. In Toronto, suburban congestion grew, while plans for completing a rapid 
transit grid stayed on the drawing board. Lacking an extensive commuter rail system, Montreal was 
increasingly affected by traffic from regional commuters” (p. 22) 
2Programs28: “Transit priority/high occupancy vehicle (HOV) facilities are rare in Canada. No urban 
freeway contains them and their presence on urban roads is confined to limited, discontinuous locations 
in a few cities (although dedicated bus lanes are a little more common). However, interest in their use is 
growing. A recently completed strategy would see some 600km of HOV lanes forming a true network 
within Metropolitan Toronto. High-occupancy vehicle lanes are planned as part of the current expansion 
of the main east-west commuter corridor in Vancouver” (p. 51) 
2Programs29: “In addition to specific infrastructure projects, the transportation planning process itself 
has undergone a transformation in Canada. The federal government, and most provinces, have enacted 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) legislation to formally introduce environmental concerns into 
the planning and design of transportati0n infrastructure projects. While EIA processes vary across the 
country, and application is sometimes inconsistent, the best of the Canadian processes are noted for 
their broad definition of the environment, and their consideration of environmental values alongside, 
rather than after traditional project criteria” (p. 52) 
2Programs30: “Ecosystem-based planning, a logical extension of EIA principles, has also been employed 
recently in urban transportation planning. The ecological planning approach articulated by the Royal 
Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront has aided it in assessing the benefits and costs of 
replacing part of a major elevated freeway in Toronto’s central waterfront area with a combination of 
urban streets plus greatly improved commuter rail and transit services and related land use/urban 
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design changes including more downtown housing to help moderate the growth in long commuting trips 
from suburban are many of which are still by auto” (p. 52) 
2Programs31: “Canada’s era of extensive urban road building is over, and few expect a resurgence in 
urban expressway construction. Nevertheless, appreciable road system expansion continues today, 
particularly on the fringes of all major cities. With very few exceptions, the roads being built are almost 
exclusively automobile-oriented. In Canada today, very little thought is given to constructing multi-
modal roads, or refitting older roads to cater equally to pedestrians, cyclists or transit; the latter 
represents a significant opportunity, since most arterial roads outside city centres have generous rights-
of-way and could be converted relatively easily” (p. 60) 
2Programs32: “Road pricing may be a mixed blessing: it may lead to a more efficient use of road 
infrastructure by harnessing the market mechanism, but may also be used only to provide funds for 
additional roadway capacity which, in itself, is increasingly viewed as a self-defeating mechanism in 
terms of sustainability. If it is introduced, sustainability considerations suggest strongly that the funds 
generated should be used for public transit as well as, or perhaps in place of, road improvements” (p. 
64) 
2Programs33: “[In older core areas], at current subsidy and fare levels, it is generally still possible to 
provide frequent, multi-directional service, during both peak and off-peak hours. Except for people with 
special needs or occupations or out-of-town destinations, there is a low level of car dependence. The 
challenge in the central areas is to reduce traffic congestion, improve transit service where appropriate, 
and encourage a modal shift in trips to the central area through a variety of measures. In older suburbs, 
because of the low density, car-oriented infrastructure of the suburbs, service and ridership are lower 
than in central areas. While peak-hour service and ridership may be good on main routes downtown, 
off-peak, cross-town and suburb-to-suburb service and ridership are characteristically poor. Thus, a 
different strategy will needed in the suburbs, that will set in motion long-term changes to urban 
structure while, in the immediate future, making service improvements tailored to the suburban setting” 
(p. 65) 
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2Programs34: “Reducing the ‘burden’ of public transit on government spending will have a detrimental 
impact on sustainability. A structural long-term increase in ridership will come only with the land use 
changes discussed previously. In the short-term, an increase in operating funds is required. To obtain 
additional funding for transit operations, from other than general revenue, requires innovations such as 
a parking tax, a gasoline tax, road pricing or, perhaps, transferring funds from capital budgets (such as 
road building projects) to transit operating budgets. The social and environmental imperatives for 
maintaining and improving transit service would seem to provide ample justification for using general 
revenues as well. However, these initiatives are generally not being pursued in Canada today, and all 
transit systems face operating budgets which tend to be static or declining” (p. 66) 
2Programs35: “The availability of funds [for rapid transit] does not guarantee sustainability. Because of 
the often high capital costs involved and the permanence of the facility, great care has to be taken in 
selecting the appropriate technology and alignment, and developing an effective schedule for phasing 
improvements. These attributes greatly affect the relative cost-effectiveness of rapid transit and its 
contribution to sustainable development” (p. 79) 
IBI Group. (1994).Transportation 
Material for the Urban 
Chapter. Environment 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs36: “Urban structure and urban design practices seek to reduce the need for movement, 
particularly by mechanized modes, by rearranging our use of urban land to create patterns which are at 
a more human-scale. Initiatives include promoting and implementing compact, mixed land use patterns, 
pedestrian-friendly street design, the carrying out of transportation and land use planning as a single 
integrated process, encouraging an overall urban structure which features nodes of concentrated 
development joined by moderate-density, mixed-use” (p. 4) 
2Programs37: “Transportation infrastructure initiatives seek to foster the use of more sustainable 
modes by providing higher-quality facilities. Initiatives include building or expanding rapid transit, 
commuter rail and surface transit networks, high occupancy vehicle (HOV) facilities (dedicated lanes and 
preferred parking), and cycle and pedestrian ways” (p. 17) 
2Programs38: “What can be expected from implementing the above measures in Canadian cities? It is 
not possible to provide a definitive answer to this question, as there is no single measure of 
transportation sustainability which covers all environmental impacts attributable to transportation, and 
the applicability and effectiveness of each measure will vary from city to city. However, one indication of 
their potential comes from a recent study by Natural Resources Canada. The study examined the 
potential effects of a subset of the above measures in reducing transportation-related energy use and 
emissions in the seven largest Canadian cities, and three representative smaller ones. .As the study was 
focused on achieving results by the year 2000, longer-term measures such as urban structure and design 
initiatives were not assessed; neither were the effects of on-going improvements in vehicle emissions-
control and fuel-efficiency technologies. Nevertheless, the study estimated that full application of the 
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remaining initiatives result in an average energy usage reduction of 29-36% relative to 1990 levels” (p. 
18) 
2Programs39: “While many of the initiatives noted above are being led by government, many activities, 
particularly in demand management, are occurring largely independently of government initiatives. For 
example there appears to be a significant trend towards great use of information technology for 
telecommuting (e.g. working at home one or more days per week) due to private sector and individual 
initiatives” (p. 20) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1996). Sustainable 
transportation in Canada 
(Backgrounder). Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs40: “The NRTEE, wishing to make a concrete contribution … has undertaken a Program on 
Sustainable Transportation. The purpose of this program is to assist the Government of Canada in 
developing a strategy for sustainable transportation that can be coordinated with the strategies and 
actions emerging from other levels of government in Canada and internationally” (p. vii) 
2Programs41: “Urban transit and automobile modes each receive total public subsidies from provinces 
and municipalities in the range of 12 cents per passenger-km. However, external costs for urban auto, at 
10 cents per passenger-km, are much higher than those of public transit. External costs for the latter are 
approximately 1.4 cents per passenger-km” (p. 5) 
2Programs42: “In economic terms a sustainable transportation system will have to optimize 
infrastructure, labour, capital operating costs, and logistics costs and benefits. In social terms it will have 
to reduce noise, decrease accidents, including the environmental impacts of transportation accidents, 
and to reduce travel time and the associated stress and frustration arising from, for example, 
congestion. In environmental terms it will have to reduce and/or eliminate air, land and water pollution; 
and it will have to apply reduce, reuse and recycle strategies to decrease waste. In the area of urban 
transportation, mixed use and higher density urban land-use and zoning policies will enable the 
development of transportation systems which will provide an optimal balance between people’s and 
freight shippers’ needs for access to transportation services and mobility, healthy communities, and 
more sustainable transportation services. “ (p. 26) 
2Programs43: “Transport Canada … suggests performance measures of progress toward achieving four 
‘strategic objectives: To meet Canadians’ needs for access to safe, efficient and affordable 
transportation services; To achieve continuous improvements in the sustainable use of resources 
through measures to increase transportation efficiency, improve stewardship and enhance waste 
management; To respect ecosystem integrity; To promote more sustainable transportation in Canada 
and abroad. Other sources of performance measures focus on the environmental impacts of 
transportation … Environment Canada has developed environmental indicators for Canadian passenger 
transportation based on the following series of interrelated factors: Human activity – how Canadians 
travel (passenger-km by mode); Stress – fossil fuel use by automobiles (L consumed); Environmental 
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conditions: climate change, urban air quality, stratospheric ozone depletion, etc; Societal response: 
urban transit and automobile use (passenger-km)” (p. 29) 
2Programs44: “The Canadian government’s key responsibilities in the achievement of sustainable  
transportation include: Canada’s contribution to the development, negotiation of and commitment to 
international protocols related to sustainable development and sustainable transportation; Programs of 
public education and awareness; Monitoring and evaluating performance against national air quality 
standards, including health effects and impacts on ecosystems; National energy policy including 
measures promoting the use of lower carbon content fuels than gasoline and diesel, and standards for 
cleaner fuels; Developing technologies contributing to reduced fuel use and reduced need for 
transportation; Regulating vehicle emissions standards, with particular attention to harmonization with 
the United States and dealing with transboundary air and water pollution; Regulating vehicle safety 
standards; Regulating vehicle fuel efficiency standards, including harmonization with U.S. standards; 
Harmonizing sustainable transportation strategies and actions with other governments, particularly the 
United States, to ensure Canada remains economically competitive with other jurisdictions; Using its 
taxation powers to apply economic instruments in ways that internalize external costs of transportation 
or to meet specific environmental, economic and social objectives, by changing consumer and business 
behaviour. In particular, fuel tax and income tax levers could be adapted to meet sustainability 
objectives” (p. 34) 
2Programs45: “In Canada, jurisdiction over environmental issues, including air pollution, is shared 
among the federal government and the provinces (see Chapter 2). It is likely that the international 
community will attempt to establish more aggressive targets for environmental issues such as climate 
change. It is therefore important that, in advance of negotiating future international agreements related 
to issues such as targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction, the federal government work out a 
national negotiating position with the provinces. This anticipatory approach would ensure that the 
national position includes consideration of provincial interests in relation to provincial powers. The 
National Air Issues Coordinating Committee is one mechanism through which a coordinated national 
position on climate change might be developed” (p. 52) 
2Programs46: “The current division of powers among federal, provincial, and municipal governments 
makes land use and transportation planning and funding very fragmented in Canada. Actions in one 
jurisdiction can create conflicts with the policies or programs of other jurisdictions. For example: Federal 
income tax policies allowing business tax deductions for employer-supplied parking but not for 
employer-subsidized transit passes work against provincial and municipal efforts to encourage higher 
transit use. It is understood that this issue is now under study in the federal Department of Finance; 
Effective use of fuel taxation as an economic instrument for influencing long-term behavioural changes 
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in the market would require coordination between federal and provincial levels since both have fuel 
taxation powers; Municipal efforts to reduce transportation fuel consumption can either be reinforced 
or negated by federal or provincial tax policies; The split of responsibility for road and rail transport 
between the provincial and federal governments makes it extremely difficult to develop integrated 
policy approaches for encouraging higher use of rail for both freight and passenger movement” (p. 55) 
2Programs47: “Planning legislation, as well as regulation of zoning and building codes, can influence 
urban settlement patterns by encouraging more compact, mixed land use to reduce transportation 
demand, increased use of non-motorized modes such as walking and cycling, and shifts to public 
transportation systems. Some of the specific aspects requiring attention include: Integration of 
transportation and land-use planning; Modification of transportation decision making to ensure 
selection of least societal cost modal alternatives and inter-jurisdictional integration of public 
transportation systems; Long-term commitment to providing transportation alternatives to ensure 
improved access for all citizens, as policies constraining high energy intensive modes take effect. Some 
progress is starting to be made in sustainable transportation planning and implementation at the 
municipal level in Canada. Change is happening on at least two levels. At the regional level, the planning 
of transportation networks is concerned with changing origin/destination patterns to minimize 
passenger-km travelled using high fuel-consuming modes. An example of the above is integration of 
transit services within a region to ensure optimized services across municipal boundaries and among 
modes” (p. 56-57) 
2Programs48: “In at least two ways, encouraging sustainable transportation is an ideal application of 
economic instruments. First, each individual has a contribution to make to achieving sustainable 
transportation. On a daily basis, the sustainability of the transportation system is affected by millions of 
decisions, such as walking to the store rather than driving, buying local rather than imported produce, 
spending a vacation locally rather than abroad, or driving a car instead of a sport utility vehicle. 
Behavioural change on such a “micro level” is not well suited to command-and-control approaches, but 
is the raison d’etre of economic instruments. Second, the current lack of urgency surrounding the 
sustainable transportation issue suggests that voluntary approaches are unlikely to lead to changes on 
the scale required. When economic instruments are visible to consumers, they act as reminders of the 
consequences of purchasing decisions. In this way, some economic instruments increase consumer 
awareness much as public education programs do. Education programs can also improve the 
effectiveness of economic instruments by raising public awareness of the intent of economic 
instruments” (p. 59) 
2Programs49: “All levels of government and other stakeholders will likely be involved in developing and 
implementing packages of policy instruments. A coordinated approach to the assessment, selection, 
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design and implementation of the packages is essential for several reasons. First, coordination is 
required to create effective packages consistent with jurisdictional responsibilities. Each level of 
government has different policy instruments available to it and is constrained in different ways in how it 
applies the instruments. Second, coordination can avoid duplication of policy instruments. Avoiding 
duplication will be particularly important if a full costing approach is adopted. Under full costing, the 
total costs paid by transportation users through vehicle registration fees, user fees, fuel taxes and other 
payments should equal the full public, private and external costs. Third, coordinated packages will allow 
exploitation of synergies among policy instruments. For example, an increase in fuel prices may cause 
some people to use public transit instead of private vehicles. However, coupling a fuel tax increase with 
investments in more attractive public transit may have a much greater effect. Finally, coordinated 
packages will counter some of the undesirable effects of individual policy instruments” (p. 62) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1997). State of the debate: 
The road to sustainable 
transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs50: “Decision making related to transportation is highly fragmented in Canada, both 
institutionally and among consumers. The necessary changes are the responsibility of all sectors of 
society. They cannot be achieved by governments acting alone” (p. 4) 
2Programs51: “[NRTEE recommends the] creat[ion of] a national strategy to: reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from transportation; and integrate transportation Action Program on Climate Change. Lead: 
Federal Minister of Transport. Encourage: municipal targets for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
from transport; municipalities to adopt sustainable transportation plans; and large cities to report 
progress on the Transportation Association of Canada’s (TAC) New Vision for Urban Transportation. 
Lead: Federation of Canadian Municipalities” (p. 5) 
2Programs52: “Transportation has not been fully integrated into the National Action Program on 
Climate Change. Sustainable transportation will require coordination of land use and transportation 
planning, often across many different jurisdictions” (p. 23) 
2Programs53: “Full-cost accounting and user-pay approaches can create the right price signals to start 
changing people’s decisions about where to live and work, how and when to travel, and what to buy. In 
addition to managing travel demand and reducing environmental impacts, they can also provide 
sustainable financing mechanisms to maintain a quality transportation system in an era of smaller 
government. As population and economic wealth grow, the low cost of fuels for road transport only 
serves to encourage increased consumption … Canada has the second-cheapest gasoline in the world” 
(p. 24) 
2Programs54: “In recent years, Transport Canada has been transformed from its previous focus on 
subsidizing, building and operating transportation infrastructure to … regulation and transportation 
policy. According to the department’s 1996 Transport Business Plan, ‘the new policy framework 
emphasizes a national vision of safety, efficiency, industry viability and environmental responsibility’” (p. 
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27) 
2Programs55: “It is recommended that the federal Minister of Transport lead the development and 
implementation of a long-term national campaign to raise awareness of the risks of inaction and the 
changes which will be required throughout Canadian society to achieve sustainable transportation by 
reducing: the need for motorized travel; the consumption of energy per unit of transportation; and the 
emissions per unit of energy consumed. Lead: Federal Minister of Transport. Others: Many other public 
and private sector organizations across Canada” (p. 35) 
2Programs56: “Coordinated action is a prerequisite to achieving sustainable transportation. However, 
the current division of responsibilities for transportation, including its environmental, social and 
economic implications, is highly fragmented. Moreover, existing policy coordination mechanisms are 
failing to move Canada towards sustainable transportation. Policy coordination is required both within 
and between governments … A common language for planning and action is needed if consensus is to 
emerge on an integrated national strategy and coordinated approaches. Drawing on earlier work, the 
NRTEE will develop a package for presentation to the federal government, proposing a definition of 
sustainable transportation, a national vision and a set of principles to guide decision making. It is 
recommended that the federal Ministers of Transport and the Environment use the package of 
Definition, National Vision and Principles of Sustainable Transportation, to be presented by NRTEE, as 
the basis for building a consensus on these elements of a national strategy” (p. 36) 
2Programs57: “Municipalities should be encouraged to set their own targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions in support of national targets. Some cities have already taken this step, including those which 
are members of the 20% Club sponsored by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. The main efforts 
of municipalities should be directed towards the implementation of: transit-supportive, compact, mixed 
land use; sustainable transportation plans; and green fleets programs (public and corporate)” (p. 37) 
2Programs58: “It is recommended that the federal Minister of Finance take initial steps towards an 
economy in which decision making supports sustainable transportation. This means developing a clearer 
understanding of how economic instruments, as critical elements of an integrated package of policy 
tools, can help to achieve specific targets for sustainable transportation, as well as a better appreciation 
of their social and economic impacts. Analysis and debate are needed on the potential use of economic 
instruments, with priority consideration given to an integrated package of policy instruments which 
includes: increased fuel taxes to influence travel demand; vehicle purchase decisions and shifts to less 
energy-intensive modes; new fuel economy standards for transportation vehicles: other economic 
instruments, including tax rebates for fuel-efficient road vehicles, registration and parking fees; tax and 
development fee policies which encourage land use compatible with sustainable transportation in urban 
areas; major subsidies and incentives for increased use of public transit; and road pricing” (p. 37) 
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Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1997). Financing 
urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs59: “The goal of the new model is to provide adequate and secure funds to deliver urban 
transportation systems that support new visions and move toward a sustainable future. The new model 
should meet the following criteria. 1. Stable and Predictable: Capital, operating and maintenance 
funding should be stable over time, predictable in magnitude, and provide long term financial 
commitment to the new vision. 2. Transparent: The sources and allocation of funds should be open, 
clearly presented, and easily understood by decision makers and the public to ensure accountability and 
fairness. 3. Least Cost: The model should foster an urban transportation system operating at the least 
possible total cost to the environment, society and economy. 4. Simple: The process should carry a low 
administrative overhead burden. 5. Access to Funds: When senior governments assign additional 
transportation responsibilities to local governments, access to sufficient additional revenues should be 
provided at the same time. 6: User Pay: Funds should be increasingly derived from users, with 
transportation treated as a government controlled utility where the user is charged based on 
consumption. 7. Dedicated: Revenues derived from user pay methods should be dedicated, by law, to 
urban transportation system improvements that support new visions. 8. Public Involvement. Public 
support for the model, resulting from information and consultation programs, should be an integral part 
of the process. 9. Measurable Results: Performance indicators should be used to measure progress and 
report to decision makers and the public” (p. 3) 
2Programs60: “There is no single, simple solution to the urban transportation financing challenge. While 
the goal and criteria in the previous section should be met, any new financing model must draw heavily 
on traditional budgetary sources in the early years, and be supplemented over time with a blend of new 
efficiencies and revenue sources, which may differ between provinces and even between urban areas 
within a province” (p. 4) 
2Programs61: “Before contemplating any new fees, first maximize government effectiveness and 
efficiency, in all departments and service delivery areas: Increase value for expenditure through the 
application of performance indicators, best practices, benchmarking and performance management; 
Consider alternative and potentially more cost effective delivery mechanisms such as interdepartmental 
cooperation in purchase and delivery, contracting out and public-private partnerships; Restructure or 
merge organizations to reduce overheads and duplication, and improve public accountability; 
Streamline processes of purchasing, financial controls and decision making; Encourage transportation 
operations and service delivery that are businesslike and cost effective; Explore alternate means of 
delivering transportation programs, including : public-private partnerships, rationalized equipment and 
facilities to reduce duplication, and revised design standards to lower costs” (p. 4) 
2Programs62: “Public-private partnerships are cooperative ventures between governments and the 
private sector to develop or improve public infrastructure or services, while retaining public control.  
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Benefits to governments can include: Investments in new, improved, or repaired facilities that 
government could not otherwise afford; More rapid or efficient development or operation of a facility; 
Reduced risks for the public sector; New revenues for the facility (e.g. from ancillary development) and 
for government (through taxes or franchise fees). A wide range of partnership types is possible, from 
fully public to fully private” (p. 4) 
2Programs63: “Urban transportation funding should move toward a system in which the user is charged 
based on consumption. This concept is reflected in many existing utilities, such as municipal water and 
wastewater services, electricity and natural gas supply, and long distance telephone. Transit riders also 
pay based on consumption, and the trend is to increase transit revenue/cost ratios. The advantages of 
such an approach, with dedicated fees, are that it will: increase transparency and accountability; 
maintain and protect the transportation network as a key economic asset; and start to send the correct 
market signals to consumers. These benefits can be achieved if revenues are applied to multimodal 
systems in support of local visions. The principal sources of federal and provincial government revenues 
derived from roadway transportation are: Federal excise tax on fuel; Provincial fuel taxes. Provincial 
vehicle registration fees. About half the pump price of gasoline in Canada (26 cents/litre in 1993) is in 
federal and provincial taxes. This element proposes that the majority of money collected from fuel taxes 
and license fees be identified as taxes and retained as general revenues, and an appropriate portion be 
identified as a transportation fee and dedicated to urban transportation in support of local visions. Any 
future increases to either the general revenue tax or the dedicated urban transportation fee would be 
identified as such at the time” (p. 5) 
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2Programs64: “To achieve a new model will require coordination and cooperation between federal and 
provincial governments, between provinces and their municipalities, between municipalities in each 
region, and between governments and citizens. Five major steps are required. 1. Adopt a Local Vision for 
Urban Transportation: Each urban area should first adopt its own local vision … using the TAC vision as a 
model. Some municipalities have already done this. The vision will result in less expensive systems, 
provide a framework for future action and involve citizens. 2. Determine Financial Requirements to 
Achieve the Local Vision: Comparison of transportation budgets from traditional sources versus 
requirements to achieve local visions will help prioritize projects and identify any financing shortfalls. 3. 
Select a Package of New Revenue Sources to Fill the Gaps: A key feature of any new vision, which is 
fundamental to the success of a new financing model, is that it offers choices in land use and travel 
options. User fees should be designed to provide and encourage choices that minimize future urban 
transportation costs to the community. Care must be taken to avoid economic imbalances or 
competitive disadvantages between municipalities, regions, and provinces. New revenue sources must 
be acceptable to citizens and all levels of government. Consultation and consensus building will be 
required throughout. In some cases, legislative change, empowering municipalities, may be needed 
prior to implementation. 4. Create Mechanisms to Dedicate New Revenues: Dedication will be critical for 
public acceptance. Details on how new revenues will be collected, and who will control them and how, 
must be decided in consultations between provinces and their municipalities. Clarification of provincial, 
regional and city mandates regarding urban transportation infrastructure and services may be required, 
to ensure that jurisdictional disputes do not compromise good planning and operations. Legislative 
change may again be required to empower municipalities, who in turn may require new bylaws to 
administer the funds. 5. Allocate Funds to Support the Local Vision: Performance indicators, based on 
policies and priorities in local visions should be established, monitored over time, and reported to the 
public. This will help track progress in achieving the vision, justify revenue allocations, and demonstrate 
benefits” (p. 8) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1998). A New Vision 
for Urban Transportation.  
Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs65: “Better transit can reduce reliance on the single occupant automobile. Current 
demographics, existing urban designs and funding requirements make this a challenging goal, but many 
things can be done – especially if improvements are aimed at specific market segments …The key 
method lies in new urban structure and land use planning approaches … Other methods include: 
Develop a hierarchy of transit services (primary on controlled access ways, secondary on exclusive bus 
lanes or HOV lanes, a feeder network and auxiliary facilities such as park-and-ride). Give transit funding 
and operating priority (e.g. transit or HOV lanes); Improve comfort, security, frequency, on time 
reliability, geographic coverage, access for the physically challenged, and public information services; 
Encourage park-and-ride, kiss-and-ride and bike-and-ride by providing appropriate facilities; Integrate 
transit stations, schedules and fares in areas with more than one transit system; Introduce preferential 
 245 
income tax treatment for transit use (e.g. make employer provided transit passes a non-taxable 
benefit)” (p. 2-3) 
2Programs66: “The private automobile is the dominant mode of urban transportation and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future. Current urban structures and land use practices, coupled with the comfort, 
security and convenience of the auto make this inevitable. However, inefficient auto uses (eg: single 
occupant vehicles to destinations served by transit) should be reduced, and a more balanced 
transportation system could be achieved through a combination of methods: Reduce travel demand by 
bringing origins and destinations close together through higher densities and mixed land use; Design 
new suburbs, major developments and redevelopments to be more walking, cycling and transit friendly; 
Employ traffic management techniques (including HOV lanes) to achieve more efficient use of roads; 
Encourage flexible working hours and ride sharing programs” (p. 3) 
2Programs67: “Each mode … should be conveniently integrated with the rest of the urban 
transportation system. Special planning efforts are required to achieve this. Benefits include more 
attractive transit services and more efficient goods movement. Methods include: In the urban 
development plan, design the location of transit connections to be quick, easy and weather protected; 
In community/neighbourhood plans and site developments, minimize walking distances to transit; 
Promote gateway/mobility centres; Integrate fares and services between transit systems” (p. 4) 
2Programs68: “Improving urban mobility requires a determined effort to make the most of the 
expensive transportation infrastructure already in place. Minor modifications (lane widening, turning 
bays, etc.) may be appropriate, but very expensive items (new freeways, bridges tunnels, mass rapid 
transit, etc.) will have to wait in favour of cheaper options with better payoffs. Methods include: Treat 
the road system as a multi use public facility which recognizes the needs of pedestrians, cyclists, transit, 
high occupancy vehicles, autos and trucks; Make operational improvements through transportation 
management; Promote ways to flatten traffic peaks and shift modes through demand management; 
Enhance transit services; Implement supportive parking policies” (p. 5) 
2Programs69: “Realistic means must be found to provide adequate and sustaining sources of funds for 
new, expanded and properly maintained urban transportation infrastructure and services. Current 
funding/financing mechanisms do not meet this need. Funding should be: Stable over time; Predictable 
in magnitude; ‘Transparent’ (open and easily understood by decision makers and the public); 
Increasingly derived from users in proportion to benefits received; Dedicated by law to urban 
transportation system enhancements; Designed to foster an urban transportation system operating at 
the lowest possible total cost” (p. 5) 
2Programs70: “Differing perceptions surround each [method of financing], and no consensus has yet 
emerged. Some suggested methods include: Redistribution of existing taxes – Some believe that taxes 
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currently levied on the transportation sector could substantially help meet funding needs if they were 
allocated or dedicated to transportation rather than being treated as general revenues. The federal 
excise tax on motor vehicle fuel is often cited in this context. Others suggest that it is unrealistic to 
propose such a fundamental change in government tax policy; New taxes – Dedicated fuel taxes, license 
fee surcharges and frontage levies are proposed by some as ways to raise money for urban 
transportation. Others argue that these are blunt instruments that do little to encourage more efficient 
travel behaviour, and that existing tax revenues should be more equitably distributed before new taxes 
are imposed; Roadway pricing – Proponents say that this can raise money, flatten demand peaks, 
encourage modal shifts and lead to more efficient use of roadways. Opponents say that roadway pricing 
is a punitive measure against private motorists who believe they already pay their fair share” (p. 5) 
2Programs71: “Several changes to current institutional arrangements and practices may be required to 
develop and implement the new vision: Most municipal departments are structured on vertical lines 
(planning, transportation, transit, sewer, water, etc.). New methods for horizontal communications may 
be needed. Where more than one municipality or more than one level of government has jurisdiction in 
an urban area, a mechanism will be needed to coordinate and integrate their efforts across the region, 
at least for planning purposes. Public education will be a major key to success. Without it political 
leaders will not have the mandate to move in the right direction. This can be a very time consuming and 
expensive exercise, but it is necessary. Checks must be built into the decision making process, to ensure 
that day-to-day decisions are compatible with the vision and its principles” (p. 6) 
Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada. (1999). Canada 
Infrastructure Works 
Program: Phase II Follow-Up 
and Phase I Audit. 
2Programs72: “From an overall federal perspective, the Program is essentially ‘running on trust’ with 
little accountability. Criteria for project selection were not clearly defined, and many of the files we 
reviewed lacked persuasive evidence to justify applicants' claims relating to selection criteria. In most 
cases, federal officials recommended projects for approval without ensuring that applicants' claims were 
adequately supported. We found that federal officials relied on municipal and provincial certifications 
with respect to costs claimed. The implementation of compliance audits, which, among other things, 
represent a means of obtaining assurance on the adequacy of financial controls, has been slow” (p. 17-5) 
2Programs73: “The Program is a collaborative arrangement. The federal government is one of several 
program partners. The others include provincial and local governments, and, in some cases, the private 
sector. For the purposes of this program, the federal government entered into a separate agreement 
with each province and territory. Under these agreements, the federal government contributes up to 
one third ofeligible project costs, and the provincial and local governments and other partners 
contribute the remainder. In the majority of cases, municipalities identified their priorities for 
infrastructure program funding based on local requirements, and submitted projects for provincial 
review. Provinces then forwarded projects selected to the federal government for review and approval” 
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(p. 17-7) 
2Programs74: “Officials believe that the [CIWP]'s approach – combining the specific expertise of the two 
levels of government within an established framework of federal-provincial agreements – has been 
largely responsible for [its success]. The provincial governments are responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the Program, while the federal government has a less operational role. Consequently, the 
federal government has not become involved in project nomination or in second-guessing the decisions 
made at other levels on the screening and selection of initial project proposals” (p. 17-11) 
2Programs75: “Most of the federal and provincial project files we examined lacked persuasive evidence 
to support the claims of project applicants relating to selection criteria. Although some files for large and 
complex projects contained more detailed analyses, most applications were prepared in qualitative and 
often vague terms, with no information, other than certifications by project applicants, to back up claims 
that criteria were being met. In most cases, federal officials endorsed provincial assessments without 
ensuring that provincial officials had received and analyzed the appropriate information or requiring 
direct supporting information themselves” (p. 17-12) 
2Programs76: “When projects are funded under the Canada Infrastructure Works Program, provincial 
government expenditures average only about one third of the total investment. Because of the different 
provisions of federal and provincial programs, we believe there are financial incentives for provincial 
governments to transfer their budgetary resources away from their own regular programs to the 
national infrastructure program” (p. 17-17) 
Kohn, H. (2000). Factors affecting 
urban transit ridership. 
Statisitcs Canada. Ottawa, 
ON. 
2Programs77: “The cost of providing comprehensive services, especially for communities that are 
characterized by urban sprawl, has meant a requirement for subsidization. In 1998, governments in 
Canada paid approximately $2.4 billion in capital and operating subsidies to urban transit companies. 
Nevertheless, transit companies have sought … new sources of revenue such as fees from parking lots 
and advertising. Revenues from these sources grew from $82.4 million in 1995 to $110.4 million in 
1998” (p. 2) 
2Programs78: “Both service declines and fare increases will generally have a negative impact on 
ridership but a positive impact on revenues. Thus, it appears that urban transit ridership is, indeed, 
inelastic. It may be that revenue or ridership declines prompted transit companies to raise fares and/or 
decrease service levels on marginal routes. Despite the fact that most bus companies raised fares, 
reduced levels of service and suffered declines in ridership, they did realize greater revenues. This 
indicates that if the objective of the bus companies was to increase revenues, they were successful in 
achieving this goal, even though ridership may have declined” (p. 8) 
2Programs79: “In the 1990s, most Canadian urban transit operators implemented both service and fare 
changes. Generally, service hours have decreased whereas fares have increased. The general impact has 
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been a decrease in ridership coupled with an increase in revenues” (p. 8) 
House of Commons of Canada. 
(2001). Commons Debates, 
December 10, 2001 (Financial 
Statement of Minister of 
Finance, Hon. Paul Martin). 
Ottawa, ON.  
2Programs80: “In Budget 2000, we announced a number of initiatives aimed both at sustaining our 
environment and at developing innovative technologies. Two of those initiatives, the $25 million green 
municipal enabling fund and the $100 million green municipal investment fund, have already spawned 
more than 100 projects. These projects chart new ground in areas as diverse as energy and water 
savings, urban transit, waste diversion and renewable energy. These funds are improving the quality of 
our life and securing our position as a leader in environmental technology. We would like to 
congratulate the Federation of Canadian Municipalities both for its initiative and for its management of 
these Funds. Today, as a result, we are announcing that we will double our contribution to both funds” 
(p. 8082) 
IBI Group and Soberman, R. (2001). 
National Vision for Urban 
Transit to 2020. Transport 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs81: “A capable system [involves]: 1. Door-to-door, “seamless” travel by public transit and 
related modes within the entire urban area, unimpeded by jurisdictional boundaries or intermodal 
barriers, through integration of transit services, pricing, and passenger information systems, as well as 
intermodal coordination and parking policies. 2. Increased transit speed, capacity, frequency, coverage 
and connectivity to compete more effectively with the automobile and reduce automobile dependency 
in serving a wider variety of trip purposes, through general improvements in the network of transit 
services and increased integration of public and private transportation activities. 3. Improved 
accessibility to transit service for the disabled and seniors through modifications to new vehicle and 
infrastructure designs, retrofitting of existing infrastructure, and special services for these individuals in 
communities with modest or no conventional transit services. 4. Increased comfort, convenience and 
safety for transit users in both vehicles and waiting areas, through general improvements in the 
amenities of transit vehicles and waiting areas. 5. Improved transit service in currently transit-deprived 
areas, including use of appropriate service structures and technologies to provide transit services in an 
efficient and cost-effective manner” (p. 11-12) 
2Programs82: “A compatible system [involves]: 6. Fewer and shorter motorized trips per person and 
more trips by transit, walking and cycling, largely through management of urban development, 
regardless of city size, in ways that lead to compact urban form and greater mixed land use plus more 
pedestrian-, transit- and cycling-friendly streetscapes. 7. More transit-friendly and walkable/cyclable 
streets and streetscapes through integrated planning, design and delivery of those services and facilities. 
8. Greater opportunities for accommodating bicycles in connection with transit services through special 
features of transit stations and vehicles” (p. 12) 
2Programs83: “A conserving and clean system [involves]: 9. Reduced transit/transportation energy 
consumption and resource depletion through an increase in the proportion of vehicle-km involving more 
energy-efficient vehicles and the use of alternative propulsion systems. 10. Reduced emissions of 
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greenhouse gases and other pollutants from transit/transportation through use of alternative fuels and 
propulsion systems plus greater reliance on transit, walking and cycling. 
2Programs84: “A cost-efficient system [involves]: 11. More efficient operation of transit vehicles and 
higher vehicle productivity, through road design and traffic engineering policies, urban development 
patterns that are more favourable to transit and consideration of alternative service delivery 
approaches. 12. Transit priority policies that improve average transit travel speed and net revenue per 
vehicle, thus increasing vehicle and driver productivity, as well as the attractiveness of transit relative to 
the private automobile leading to increased transit ridership and revenues and reduced net costs per 
rider. 13. Cost-effective planning and delivery of new and/or expanded levels of transit service as well as 
maintenance and rehabilitation of existing services and facilities based on appropriate governance which 
enables an integrated approach to urban development and provision of transit/transportation. 14. A 
level playing field from the standpoint of transit versus auto travel decisions based on consideration of 
real costs and affordability, including under-priced parking and rationalization of income tax regulations 
affecting allowable deductions and taxable benefits. 15. Generation of reliable, performance-based 
revenue streams to fund urban transit thereby making possible more cost-efficient capital investment 
programs, through public funding policies and drawing on road pricing and/or other user pricing 
mechanisms that account for the external costs imposed on society by road users and the co-benefits to 
society of achieving improved and more widely used transit” (p. 12-13) 
2Programs85: “The Government of Canada’s Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change, for example, includes 
an Urban Transportation Showcase Program intended to promote effective strategies for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, although direct provincial involvement is not mandatory 
(as in the case of both Canada Infrastructure Works Programs), any objection by a provincial 
government to a municipal submission for funding is sufficient to render that application ineligible” (p. 
15) 
Flemming, B., Patenaude, J. Findlay, 
G., Rae, R., and Waters II, W. 
(2001). Vision and Balance: 
Report of the Canadian 
Transportation Act Review 
Panel. Canadian 
Transportation Act Review 
Panel. Ottawa, ON. 
2Programs86: “The most pronounced effects of congestion charges would probably be to encourage 
combining of car trips, or shifting them to off-peak times, while increased charges for emissions would 
induce shifts to more efficient vehicle technologies and alternative fuels. Urban transit would also gain 
some traffic, and there is potential for increased use of intercity buses as well. Importantly, charging for 
the full cost of road use should mean that transit would eventually no longer need general subsidies, as 
its relatively lower social costs would be evident to users when they compared public transit fares that 
included all its social costs with charges for road use that did the same” (p. 183) 
2Programs87: “[The Canadian Transportation Agency] could take on a multi-modal role, notably by 
considering alternatives to expanding the national highway system’s congested links through major 
cities — for example, commuter rail or other forms of public transit — and funding them when they 
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offered superior benefit/cost ratios. In principle, this could also be extended to marine or rail freight 
infrastructure projects that provided alternatives to highways” (p. 192) 
2Programs88: “The [federal] government has provided no such funding in recent years, though 
Transport Canada managed a small-scale Urban Capital Assistance Program during part of the 1970s and 
’80s and has provided some minor funding for transit vehicles using alternative fuels and larger amounts 
intermittently from special funds. Transit infrastructure could be eligible for funding under the present 
Canada Infrastructure Program, though its announced priorities are for water systems and energy 
efficiency (under which, curiously, transit does not qualify)” (p. 221) 
2Programs89: “Subsidy policy varies substantially among jurisdictions. Five provinces (Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan) and all three territories 
do not provide routine capital or operating subsidies directly for transit, so all subsidies are municipal. 
Further, the province of Ontario announced cessation of any new provincial funding of capital or 
operations in 1999, passing the full responsibility to regional and municipal governments. In that year, 
total regional or municipal subsidies in Ontario amounted to $1.1 billion. In the other three provinces 
with major transit systems — Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia — although municipalities continue 
to provide half the subsidy or more, the provincial government has recently adopted innovative 
approaches to transit funding for cities” (p. 221) 
2Programs90: “The Panel came to the following interrelated conclusions: Urban sprawl reduces route 
density, making competitive transit service costly. Moreover, although joint planning of land use and 
transportation is still widely lauded, it is hardly implemented, because of inadequate co-ordination 
among local/regional governments; Increases in transit ridership are induced more by service speed, 
frequency and convenience than by price; Train services, both metro systems and commuter trains, with 
their reliable trip times, are particularly effective in inducing shifts of travelers from cars to transit; The 
speed and reliability of bus/streetcar/trolley services can be improved more cost-effectively by giving 
transit greater priority — bus priority lanes, parking and turning restrictions on other traffic — than 
through capital investments or fare reductions; Increased charges for car use (road tolls, congestion 
charges, or parking surcharges) would also be more effective than reductions in transit prices” (p. 224) 
2Programs91: “The Panel recommends that transit operating agencies and their funders seek the most 
cost-effective ways of improving their services. A key feature of transit is its continued delivery almost 
exclusively by government agencies, which means that costs have not been subjected to market tests to 
the same extent as those of recently privatized or commercialized infrastructure and services. This is a 
sensitive policy and political issue for transit agencies and the governments that fund them, particularly 
because of the nature of labour relations. But the obligation to spend public money wisely requires a 
hard look at these issues” (p. 226) 
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2Programs92: “A practical national transportation strategy would also resolve the issue of federal fuel 
taxes. The Panel has proposed that federal fuel tax revenues be transferred to provinces and territories 
on condition that they deposit them in newly established roads and transport funds. The Panel also 
suggested that the agencies administering the funds should receive proposals for alternative projects in 
other modes” (p. 226-227) 
2Programs93: “The Panel recommends that urban transit be permitted to qualify for funding from road 
user charges. The intention is that initially transit projects should be permitted to compete with roads 
for fuel tax revenues. In the longer term, they should qualify for funding from the proposed provincial 
and territorial roads and transport funds — or urban regional transport funds on the Greater Vancouver 
and Montreal models, with wider responsibilities and greater user involvement in decisions. There is no 
reason in principle to limit funding to capital projects — especially in view of criticisms that past funding 
favouring capital projects has led to less cost-effective solutions” (p. 227) 
2Programs94: “The Panel does not believe it is necessary or appropriate for the federal government, or 
governments of the provinces and territories, to specify what measures should be adopted in order to 
qualify for funding. Instead the Panel suggests that agencies simply be given performance-based 
incentives … The Panel recommends that payments to transit authorities be made on the basis of their 
actual performance in inducing shifts from private automobile use to transit. The Panel suggests a 
payment per trip, based on mode shift from car (with verification from ridership counts and periodic 
surveys of new riders to determine alternative modes)” (p. 227) 
2Programs95: “The Panel recommends that the purchase of railway lines for use as urban transit 
corridors (including spurs identified through the process set out in the previous recommendation) 
qualify for funding consideration from the provincial and territorial roads and transport funds the Panel 
proposes” (p. 241) 
Transport Canada. (2001). 
Sustainable transportation: 
The Canadian context. 
Submission to the 9
th
 Session 
of the United Nations 
2Programs96: “In Canada, three levels of government share responsibility for transportation. In general, 
the federal government is responsible for national, interprovincial, and international transportation; 
provincial governments are responsible for intraprovincial transportation; and municipalities are 
responsible for urban transit and local planning decisions. Federal and provincial ministers of 
transportation coordinate activities through the Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation and 
Highway Safety” (p. 8) 
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Commission on Sustainable 
Devleopment, April 16-27. 
2Programs97: “In 2000, Transport Canada launched an internal Green Commute program to promote 
sustainable commuting behaviour among its employees in the National Capital Region. The Green 
Commute program is about removing barriers to enable employees to make more sustainable choices 
about the commute to and from work. Green commuting is broken down into three different 
transportation categories: active transportation, which encompasses walking, biking, and in-line skating; 
public transit and carpooling; and telecommuting. Transport Canada is committed to working in 
partnership to develop and initiate a Green Commute program for implementation at Transport 
Canada’s regional offices and other federal department offices across Canada” (p. 17) 
2
nd
 Era 
Frames 
Department of External Affairs. 
(1981). Urban transportation: 
The Canadian experience. 
External Information Porgram 
Division. Ottawa, ON.  
2Frames1: “The successful achievements of public transportation in Canadian cities are chiefly the result 
of provincial and municipal policies. To meet public mobility needs, these governments have committed 
funds for transit research and development, the creation of new networks and the strengthening of 
existing systems” (p. 2) 
Department of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce. (1981). First 
Choice: Urban transit 
solutions. External 
Information Porgram Division. 
Ottawa, ON.  
2Frames2: “Over the years we have encountered numerous urban transportation problems in our 
country and we have been most fortunate in finding solutions to formidable challenges. Canadian cities, 
located as they are beside lakes, rivers, mountains, etc., have presented just about every geographical 
challenge imaginable. This, coupled with seasonal changes and a shifting population base, has made the 
Canadian solutions to public transit universally recognized” (p. 3) 
2Frames3: “At the show, some 23 Canadian transit-related companies will make up the main exhibitors 
group – with other Canadian companies and organizations exhibiting separately. All of them are 
equipped to offer North American solutions to mass transit problems. In addition, they are all able to 
offer innovative solutions to the special needs of particularly unique urban centres. So...come to the 
exhibit and see what the Canadians have to offer in buses...rail passenger equipment...maintenance... 
communications...special passenger needs...engineering...and planning. Many of these Canadian 
companies can offer American references to back-up what they sell! And all of them offer an excellent 
follow-up service!!!” (p. 4) 
2Frames4: “The current environmental and economic climates, more specifically the energy crisis, 
favour urban transit” (p. 19) 
National Transportation Agency. 
(1985). Freedom to move: A 
framework for transportation 
reform. Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames5: “I would like to indicate unequivocally that the Government will neither propose nor permit 
any economic regulatory reform that might be detrimental to safety standards” (p. ii) 
2Frames6: “As the transportation sector matures, regulation should be relaxed and simplified to allow 
the system to respond to the changing needs of shippers and the travelling public. Restrictions reducing 
competition and inhibiting cost reductions should be eliminated: diversity and initiative should be 
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promoted. Regulations, and the agency that administers them, should become more flexible, more 
accessible to Canadians and less legalistic.  Mediation and less-formal resolution of disputes should be 
encouraged” (p. 1) 
2Frames7: “The thrust of these proposals, reliance on competition and market forces rather than 
regulations, is clearly the wave of the future. The Government realizes, however that the proposed 
changes, while leading to a more efficient and effective transportation system that will serve Canadians 
at lower cost, may involve some transitional problems in isolated cases. With this in view, the 
Government proposes to review the effects of the legislative reform proposed in this paper within four 
years of the new legislation coming into effect” (p. 3) 
2Frames8: “Transportation Crown Corporations will be discouraged from engaging in non-business-like 
pricing and in loss-making commercial activities. The Government is sensitive to criticism that Crown 
Corporations may unfairly cross-subsidize their operations. Particular emphasis will be devoted to 
ensuring that the transportation Crown Corporations operate as good corporate citizens” (p. 23) 
National Transportation Agency. 
(1989). Freedom to move in 
Canada’s new ttransportation 
environment. Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames9: “Many regulations appeared to have become obstacles to growth, innovation and 
competitiveness in Canadian transportation. Removing those obstacles, while protecting the public 
interest, became a priority in the government’s national agenda for economic renewal” (p. 4) 
2Frames10: “The powers of the new National Transportation Agency are tailored to the new regulatory 
approach. They have been designed to ensure responsiveness to public interest, industry needs and 
policy direction from the government. The legislation calls for the Agency to establish regional offices in 
Western Canada and the Atlantic Provinces” (p. 11) 
2Frames11: “Transportation firms now have the freedom they need to respond to new demands. 
Shippers have the freedom they need to seek out the most competitive transportation services 
available. Canadians have the freedom they need to move into the future” (p. 15) 
John, C. (1992). Transportation in 
Canada: Current Issues. 
Library of Parliament. Ottawa, 
ON. 
2Frames12: “Clearly, the question is whether, in a large and diverse country with strong regional 
differences and interests, it is possible or indeed necessary to have a national transportation policy” (p. 
16) 
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IBI Group. (1993). Urban travel and 
sustainable development: The 
Canadian experience. Canada 
Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation.  Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames13: “Urban travel is, of course, only one element of human society which affects the 
sustainability of that society. It is an important element however, since the internal combustion engine 
powers more than half of the motorized transportation in most urban areas and well over 90% in the 
cities and towns of most Western countries. This form of propulsion is notorious for its consumption of 
fossil fuels … and its production of noxious emissions into the atmosphere and products which 
contribute to ground water pollution. The automobile has also had an extremely profound impact on 
the form, density and livability of urban areas, contributing strongly to let density, spread urban 
development and continuing consumption of high quality farmland for urban purposes” (p. 27) 
2Frames14: “What is particularly of concern about the de-evolution of Canadian urban land use 
practices in terms of sustainability is that most of Canada's future population growth, according to 
current trends, is likely to be accommodated in automobile-oriented, low-density modern suburbs 
leading to an increasingly dispersed urban population. Further, Canada’s population will likely continue 
to concentrate in its three largest cities; currently, one-third of Canada s population resides in Toronto, 
Montreal and Vancouver, with almost half of that in Toronto. This combination of concentration at one 
scale and dispersion at another produces a powerful mix: an urban population which is automobile-
dependent due to its low-density single-use living areas, and which must travel increasing distances to 
employment … In the absence of fundamental policy changes, virtually all growth trends point to a 
future urban transportation scenario where the private automobile is used more frequently by more 
people to make longer trips at lower speeds, with serious impacts on the economic, social and 
environmental viability of Canadian cities.” (p. 39) 
2Frames15: “The implementation of any solutions will be hampered by serious lack of funding, due to 
the intense pressure on all governing levels to reduce deficits and curb expenditures. For example, 
virtually all of [Canada’s largest seven] cities have plans to expand their transit networks, but most of 
these plans have been delayed, scaled down or indefinitely shelved for financial reasons” (p. 39) 
2Frames16: “In assessing the current state of urban transportation in Canada’s one cannot help but 
conclude that the prognosis is grim. However, it is also apparent that the trends of the past 30 years will 
not continue unabated, since in the end these trends are fundamentally unsustainable. The only open 
question is whether Canadian cities take steps proactively to reverse the trends, or allow congestion, 
pollution and resource depletion to do the job” (p. 39) 
2Frames17: “In peripheral growth areas, the priority is to curtail further urban sprawl and create more 
balanced and diversified communities. Restriction is needed on greenfield development and, where that 
is impossible, requirements that new development be planned according to transit-supportive 
principles. Growth needs to be re-directed to already urbanized areas in order to improve the urban 
form and densities, in the same manner as the older suburb” (p. 49)  
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2Frames18: “A city’s transportation infrastructure is an integral part of its urban form which, in turn, 
provides the basis (nodes, corridors, density, orientation of buildings) for the successful functioning of 
the transportation system. A crucial issue for sustainability is whether the automobile is assumed to be 
the main form of transportation or whether at least equal provision is made for walking, bicycling, and 
public transit” (p. 60) 
2Frames19: “In comparison to geographically smaller, older, more densely populated European 
countries, Canada has a particularly challenging task in achieving transportation sustainability. A vast 
country with a small population, its cities are relatively low density and often separated by great 
distances. Thus, there is a relatively high level of energy consumption by the transportation sector as a 
whole” (p. 74) 
2Frames20: “Within many of Canada’s major cities, however, there are good prospects for 
improvement. In comparison to U.S. cities, where central areas have been depopulated and original 
transit systems dismantled, core areas of Canadian cities have largely retained their vitality and a full 
range of functions, along with the transit systems that serve them. Canadians have also retained 
traditions of urban living, with more affinity for walking, bicycling, public transit and use of public space” 
(p. 74) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1996). Sustainable 
transportation in Canada 
(Backgrounder). Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames21: “There are many factors propelling Canadians along the path to unsustainability – including 
population growth, low density urban settlement patterns, the explosion of global communications and 
the competitive advantages of energy intensive modes of transport. But underlying these factors are 
deep roots in Canadian social values and lifestyles, as well as in the country’s economic system and 
political structure. Canadians are already experiencing the negative health impacts of unsustainable 
transportation. Medical research shows that ground-level air pollution in Canada is contributing to 
increased incidence of respiratory illness, higher physician/emergency room visits among people with 
heart or lung disease, and possibly increased mortality” (p. ix) 
2Frames22: “Achieving sustainable transportation requires that individuals and governments change the 
way they make decisions. Increased public education efforts are called for, as well as full integration of 
environmental objectives into transportation policies, and a shift in emphasis from mobility to 
accessibility – to minimize the need for motor transportation. An essential element in all of these 
changes is the use of quantifiable performance measures to track progress towards goals and targets. All 
levels of government – international, federal, provincial/territorial and municipal – have an important 
role to play in achieving sustainable development. While there are signs of positive change, particularly 
at the municipal level, Canadian efforts have not coalesced into a well-formed national strategy for 
tackling urban sustainability” (p. ix) 
2Frames23: “There is also growing evidence that the measures available for dealing with the climate 
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change issue are central to dealing simultaneously with a range of other global and local issues. For 
example, measures that would result in major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from 
transportation would also contribute to improvements in ground level air quality. The reverse is not 
necessarily true. Measures for dealing with greenhouse gas emissions from transportation have also 
been shown to provide economic and social benefits. For example moving to more compact urban form 
and improving the design of streetscapes for pedestrian and transit operations can result in lower cost 
urban infrastructure and reduced social isolation for those without access to automobiles. At the same 
time, single-occupancy vehicle use is reduced” (p. 8) 
2Frames24: “Measures promoting the use of compact urban form and mixed land use, as well as non-
motorized forms of transport, have the potential to reduce the social isolation, barrier effects, public 
safety, health and environmental impacts of transportation and to increase the economic efficiency of 
society” (p. 53) 
2Frames25: “Achieving change on the scale required for sustainable transportation will only be possible 
if the public is well aware of the risks of the status quo and is ready to change its values, behaviours and 
beliefs. The literature suggests that the job cannot be done solely by interventions of governments. The 
public will have to be convinced that it is in society’s long-term interest to take action to modify the way 
we live. The message will be much more palatable if it can be shown that there can be long-term 
economic and social and lifestyle benefits from the changes needed to reduce transportation energy 
use. There are many examples from past battles for environmental change. Some of the strongest 
advocates for clean-up of industrial processes are leaders of companies and industry associations who 
initially resisted regulation but have realized improved profitability from … efforts to reduce waste” (p. 
57) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1997). State of the debate: 
The road to sustainable 
transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames26: “Canada’s highly developed transportation networks are vital to our international 
competitiveness. They also contribute in countless ways to the vibrancy of the economy and the quality 
of our lives. For many Canadians, distance no longer poses a barrier to social and commercial 
interaction. However, current patterns of transportation use are not sustainable. If existing trends are 
allowed to continue, Canada’s transportation networks will become more polluting, increasingly 
congested and, with urban sprawl, more costly to maintain. The economy, the environment and the 
quality of Canadians’ lives will suffer as a result” (p. 9) 
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2Frames27: “Where and how we live, work and play are intimately tied to our access to transportation. 
Unlimited personal mobility, often in single-occupant road vehicles, is highly valued at every level of 
Canadian society. A single-family home on a large lot in the suburbs, a recreational property in the 
country and dependency on personal vehicles are key components of the Canadian dream. Where once 
they walked or cycled, children in urban areas are now driven to school and other activities, whether 
because of fear for their safety or the physical distances between home, school and recreational 
activities - in part a consequence of the low-density, single-use urban sprawl that now predominates in 
Canada’s urban regions” (p. 16) 
2Frames28: “Transportation and land use policies and planning must be integrated. Past practices of 
allowing urban areas to sprawl outward to accommodate population growth and social desires through 
low-density development on less expensive land’ are strongly linked to the growth of fossil fuel 
consumption. Major reform of urban land use policy is required” (p. 32) 
2Frames29: “The current trends away from sustainable transportation are deeply rooted in our culture, 
our economy and our massive built infrastructure. They have little hope of reversal unless there is 
widespread public demand for substantial change. Increased public awareness and understanding of the 
issues surrounding sustainable transportation are thus prerequisites to political action. All Canadians 
need to be much better informed about the risks they face. They must be willing to alter their 
transportation choices, and be open to changes in government policies and programs. The main 
messages to be delivered are that: there will be serious costs and risks to bear if the present 
unsustainable practices are allowed to continue; there are short- and long-term benefits to be derived 
from a shift to sustainable practices; and there are actions that individuals and institutions can take now 
to begin the necessary” (p. 34) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1997). Financing 
urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames30: “A [hypothetical] long term urban development plan has been approved.lt emphasizes multi 
use town centres and high density, mixed use along connecting corridors. Transit has funding and 
operating priority in those corridors. Short-medium term community/neighborhood plans have been 
approved. They emphasize compact, mixed use communities based on pedestrian, cycling and transit 
friendly design. Transit, highways, arterials, parking and truck routes are planned and coordinated across 
the urban area. The percentages of trips made by walking, cycling, transit and high occupancy 
automobiles are all increasing; the percentage of trips made by single occupant automobiles is 
decreasing. The average distance and time for peak hour commuter travel is decreasing. An area wide 
parking strategy is in place and enforced. There are very few places which still require on-street goods 
transfer. The physically challenged enjoy universal access to public transport facilities and services. 
Roads and bridges are in a good state of repair. Air pollution from motor vehicle sources is declining.  
Urban transportation infrastructure and services are adequately funded from stable and sustainable 
 258 
revenues. Political leaders have the support of a well informed public when making decisions on urban 
development and transportation systems to serve the area” (p. 1) 
2Frames31: “[Economic warning signs of unsustainable patterns include] traffic congestion; 
deteriorating infrastructure; systems which cannot operate at maximum efficiency; hidden subsidies and 
accounting systems that ignore environmental and social costs, thus sending the wrong market signals 
to public decision makers and travelers” (p. 3) 
2Frames32: “A new vision can replace the status quo practices of the past. It will help communities 
move toward sustainability and it will result in urban transportation systems which are less expensive to 
build and operate ... A new vision can achieve these dual goals because it will reshape urban 
development, reduce per capita travel requirements, lessen reliance on single occupant auto trips, shift 
demand to more efficient and environmentally friendly patterns and modes, encourage integrated 
approaches by all governments in the urban area, and make the best use of existing revenue” (p. 3) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1998). A New Vision 
for Urban Transportation.  
Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames33: “Someone must take the lead in this process and it is logical that municipal elected officials 
do so. They should be supported and encouraged by the appropriate provincial departments and their 
own urban planning and transportation professional staffs” (p. 6) 
Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada. (1999). Canada 
Infrastructure Works 
Program: Phase II Follow-Up 
and Phase I Audit. 
2Frames34: “The Canada Infrastructure Works Program is a contributions program. This means that the 
federal government pays if performance conditions and program requirements are met, as specified in 
the agreements. These requirements have important implications for the Program's accountability 
regime – in terms of accountability among the partners to the agreements and also accountability to 
Parliament for expenditures undertaken and results achieved” (p. 17-7) 
2Frames35: “The design of the Program recognizes that, in general, the provinces and municipalities are 
responsible for investments in local infrastructure. At the provincial and municipal levels, there is 
extensive experience in planning, financing and implementing such investments” (p. 17-8) 
2Frames36: “In its Performance Report, the Treasury Board Secretariat should provide Parliament with 
information on the employment effects of the Canada Infrastructure Works Program that clearly sets 
out its sources and limitations” (p. 17-19) 
2Frames37: “In future programs of this type, the government should ensure that: environmental 
assessments are completed early enough to be taken into account in the project planning and approval 
process; necessary mitigation measures are clearly identified; and a system for obtaining assurance of 
the implementation of mitigation measures is in place” (p. 17-23) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2000). Measuring 
2Frames38: “Reducing our dependence on the automobile for urban travel is viewed by many as a key 
to realizing more livable cities in the future. Fostering more choice among non-auto modes of travel, 
particularly for peak travel periods, is fundamental in meeting the overall goals of reducing both vehicle-
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progress: Toward the new 
vision for urban 
transportation. Ottawa, ON. 
km traveled and the associated environmental impacts” (p. 4) 
2Frames39: “Achieving the New Urban Vision will require more stable and reliable funding sources than 
are currently available in most Canadian urban areas and an infusion of additional funding- particularly 
to improve public transportation - if the Vision is to be achieved” (p. 5) 
House of Commons of Canada. 
(2001). Commons Debates, 
December 10, 2001 (Financial 
Statement of Minister of 
Finance, Hon. Paul Martin). 
Ottawa, ON.  
2Frames40: “We also recognize that our great cities are too important to our economy, to our quality of 
life and to our signature as a nation, to leave them in straitened circumstances. We recognize as well 
that the same reasoning holds true for smaller, rural or remote municipalities, all of which are hard 
pressed to foster the economic development they need to offer their young people a future in their own 
communities” (p. 8081) 
IBI Group and Soberman, R. (2001). 
National Vision for Urban 
Transit to 2020. Transport 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2Frames41: “The likelihood of meeting future urban transportation needs through road expansion alone 
appears to be increasingly impracticable from the standpoint of sustainable development, system 
capability, environmental impacts, liveable communities, and the accessibility to be provided to all 
groups of society (including the disabled and seniors, shippers, and those for whom travel by automobile 
is essential)” (p. 6) 
2Frames42: “Improvements in transit that attract individuals from the private automobile, as well as 
land use and transportation planning that leads to shorter trips, fewer motorized trips and increased use 
of cycling and walking are also seen as essential elements of meeting Canada’s commitments to 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, improvements in air quality, and related health impacts, while 
also helping to conserve energy and reduce dependence on fossil fuels” (p. 6) 
2Frames43: “A sustainable transportation system should be: capable of providing the necessary speed, 
capacity, frequency, coverage and connectivity to provide access to all activities in the urban areas with 
service that is safe, comfortable and convenient; Compatible with liveable communities that support a 
vibrant economy, walkable streets, people-friendly places, and a high quality-of-life; Conserving of 
energy and other natural resources and clean in terms of waste products; and cost-efficient in terms of 
efficient service delivery, appropriate and affordable transportation pricing, and adequate, predictable 
funding arrangements” (p. 10-11) 
2Frames44: “By 2020 Canada’s urban transit/transportation policies and initiatives will have achieved: a 
reduced level of motorized travel per person; less dependence on the private automobile; improved 
transit accessibility for those who by reason of age, income, or physical disability are unable to drive; 
more competitive transit service delivered in an effective and cost-efficient manner that attracts users 
from their cars for a wider variety of trip purposes; and, resulting from the above, more capable, 
compatible, clean, conserving and cost-effective urban transit and transportation systems” (p. 11) 
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2Frames45: “In Canadian urban areas, there is a growing consensus that: The likelihood of meeting 
future urban transportation needs through road expansion alone appears to be increasingly 
impracticable from the standpoint of sustainable development, system capacity, economic viability, 
environmental impacts, liveable communities, and the accessibility to be provided to all groups of 
society (including the disabled and seniors, shippers, and those for whom travel by automobile is 
essential); Improving urban transit services in ways that increase the competitiveness of transit relative 
to the private automobile and which reduce the ever increasing growth in car dependence are desirable 
from social, economic and environmental standpoints; Improvements in transit that attract individuals 
from the private automobile, as well as integrated planning and delivery of transit/transportation and 
land use that leads to shorter and fewer trips and increased use of transit, walking and cycling are also 
seen as essential elements of meeting Canada’s commitments to reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions, improvements in air quality, and related health impacts, while also helping to conserve 
energy and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; Stabilization and, if possible, reduction in levels of road 
congestion are necessary to maintain and improve the competitiveness of urban economies, and thus of 
the national economy; [and that] most Canadian cities are unable to find the funding (particularly 
capital) required to maintain existing transit services, let alone expand transit systems and levels of 
service, solely from property taxes” (p. 14-15) 
2Frames46: “The most recent Speech from the Throne, which states that the federal government will 
‘cooperate with provincial and municipal partners to help improve public transit infrastructure’, singles 
out urban transit as a new area of federal government interest as do recent statements by the federal 
Minister of Transport” (p. 15) 
2Frames47: “Perhaps the single most important difficulty in attempting to reach consensus on a 
Canadian transit vision probably derives from the tremendous variation in size, demographic 
characteristics, and needs of urban communities across the nation. Converting automobile users to 
transit users is a very different challenge in Haliburton, Ontario than in Markham, Ontario, as it is 
between some residential areas of the same region such as White Rock and the community of Kitsilano 
in British Columbia. Location, independently of size, moreover, affects the practicality of using small, 
more fuel-efficient automobiles in built up urban areas, as opposed to large, four wheel drive vehicles 
that are more of a necessity in rugged, rural municipalities” (p. 67) 
Flemming, B., Patenaude, J. Findlay, 
G., Rae, R., and Waters II, W. 
(2001). Vision and Balance: 
Report of the Canadian 
2Frames48: “The Panel … conclude[s] that transit service improvement without deterrents to private 
vehicle use are unlikely to be successful. Policies should therefore encourage the governments involved 
to seek the most cost-effective solutions, which clearly means solutions that deal with both transit and 
urban car use” (p. 224) 
2Frames49: “In Canadian conditions, it seems possible that deregulation (permitting entrants to 
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Transportation Act Review 
Panel. Canadian 
Transportation Act Review 
Panel. Ottawa, ON. 
compete with what are currently monopoly transit agencies) and commercialization could encourage 
innovative and less costly services, such as small buses or shared taxis from less-dense suburbs to 
interconnections with transit trunk routes. But those possibilities are probably quite limited. More 
extensive commercialization is constrained by labour agreements, cultural factors (people’s attachment 
to their cars), and the fact that urban infrastructure tends to favour private automobile use over transit” 
(p. 225) 
2Frames50: “Continued urbanization will bring greater traffic congestion in the next 20 years, with 
continued growth at suburban and ex-urban nodes also contributing to commuter demand. Several 
Canadian cities anticipate that commuter rail will become an increasingly attractive option as population 
and traffic volume rise. In order for the option to be available, existing rail corridors might need to be 
preserved from abandonment and redevelopment” (p. 232) 
Transport Canada. (2001). 
Sustainable transportation: 
The Canadian context. 
Submission to the 9
th
 Session 
of the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable 
Devleopment, April 16-27. 
2Frames51: “Sophisticated intelligent transportation systems, including satellite communication and 
navigation, are not only getting us to different places accurately and faster, they are also making 
connections between various modes of transportation much easier. More and more, urban transit 
systems are linking downtown with rail stations, airports, and ports. Canadians will have more options 
from which to choose the best combination of commuter rail, intercity bus, subway connections, 
railways, or cars, benefiting the environment by increasing the use of more sustainable modes” (p. 16) 
2Frames52: “The challenges of sustainable transportation are immense and will not be solved overnight. 
Sustainable transportation is a long-term goal, requiring the cooperation of many partners, domestically 
and internationally, in the search for effective solutions. Progress toward sustainable transportation 
must be made incrementally. In Canada, the key will be to better integrate economic, social, and 
environmental considerations into decisions affecting transportation activity” (p. 21) 
 2
nd
 Era 
Public 
Sentiments 
Department of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce. (1981). First 
Choice: Urban transit 
solutions. External 
Information Porgram Division. 
Ottawa, ON.  
2PublicSentiments1:“As was experienced elsewhere, rapid urban growth creating housing shortages 
within the city necessitated residential development on the outskirts. It was difficult and expensive for 
transit systems to keep pace with the resulting urban sprawl, which caused Canadians to buy 
automobiles to commute with — possible within a growing economy possessing plentiful low-cost gas 
and oil. Large-scale auto use, however, created several problems, such as traffic congestion on main 
arteries, air and noise pollution in city centres, loss of valuable space to roadways and parking lots, and 
increased capital expenditures for related services” (p. 17) 
2PublicSentiments2: “The number of public transit users is increasing steadily as service improves and 
oil prices rise. In the past decade, public use of transit systems has increased by almost five times” (p. 
18) 
2PublicSentiments3: “In recent years, Canada’s cities have concentrated on modern rapid transit to 
move large volumes of riders quickly. While planning, constructing and operating two major systems, 
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Canadians have developed a broad range of rapid transit experience which spans the steel-wheel/steel-
rail in Toronto and the rubber-tire technology of Montreal” (p. 39) 
2PublicSentiments4: “New equipment has also been developed for commuter rail services as well. For 
example, GO Transit’s rail service had become so popular with Toronto area commuters by the mid-
seventies that the agency was forced to alleviate overcrowding. As a result, GO began replacing its 
single-level coaches on the busiest route with new bi-level cars. These cars, with a full upper level, are 
unique in North America” (p. 40) 
IBI Group. (1993). Urban travel and 
sustainable development: The 
Canadian experience. Canada 
Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation.  Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments5: “In comparison to geographically smaller, older, more densely populated ‘old 
world’ countries. Canada’s cities are relatively low density and often separated by great distances. Thus, 
there is a relatively high level of energy consumption by the transportation sector as a whole and a high 
level of auto dependence and auto use within urban areas. Culturally, Canadians expect a high degree of 
mobility, thinking nothing of travelling long distances for work, recreation, shopping and socializing. 
Within many of Canada’s major cities, however, there are good prospects for improvement. In 
comparison to many ‘new world’ cities where central areas have been depopulated and original transit 
systems dismantled,  core areas of Canadian cities have largely retained their vitality and a full range of 
services along with the transit systems that serve them. Canadians have long and proud traditions of 
urban living, with more affinity for walking, bicycling, public transit, and the use of public spaces” (p. 2) 
2PublicSentiments6: “The unpopularity of freeway projects, the pressure to consider a full range of 
environmental and social goals in planning transportation systems, and concerns regarding petroleum 
dependency due to the two petroleum energy ‘crises’ in1974 and 1979 caused a renewed interest in 
public transit” (p. 5) 
2PublicSentiments7: “Against this backdrop, a number of events crystallized popular environmental 
concern. For example, publication of the Brundtland Report popularized the concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ in all fields of development, including urban transportation, published articles in the 
scientific and popular literature on acid precipitation and the appearance o f an ‘ozone hole’ in the 
Antarctic brought home the growing impacts of human activities on the environment. The emergence of 
global warming as an environmental issue refocused attention on the energy-intensive nature of urban 
transportation in Canada” (p. 25) 
2PublicSentiments8: “Transportation began to be recognized as an environmental issue in its own right 
by the major environmental organizations, transit supporters and transit operators. Various publications 
were produced and programs adopted encouraging a reduction in car use and car dependence. 
However, unlike the case of the Clean Air Act in the United States, such concerns were not translated 
into specific reduction targets and schedules enshrined in legislation” (p. 25) 
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2PublicSentiments9: “There has been renewed interest in some Canadian cities in harnessing 
transportation/land use interactions, and the ability of compact, mixed land-use patterns, pedestrian-
friendly streets, integrated transportation/land use planning and controls on parking supply to 
contribute to an urban area's sustainability” (p. 47) 
2PublicSentiments10: “A number of government and non-government organizations have recently been 
undertaking public awareness programs to stress the environmental benefits of non-automobile 
transportation modes. The Canadian Urban Transit Association’s Modal Shift project includes a 
substantial outreach program to reverse the trend toward declining transit ridership, as does Montreal’s 
‘transit revival’ program. Winnipeg Transit recently undertook a ‘green bus campaign’, wherein ten 
buses were painted green and white as part of a major publicity effort in newspapers, transit shelters, 
bus boards and television advertisements stressing the environmental benefits of public transit” (p. 56) 
2PublicSentiments11: “The key flaw in … direct demand management methods is that they require 
incentive, and that incentive is missing in Canadian cities. Canadians value the environment, their 
pocket-book and their urban amenities, but not highly enough to make the benefits of these practices 
outweigh the disbenefits in terms of less convenience and flexibility, longer travel times, etc. Unless the 
sensitivity of Canadians to congestion and pollution increases, the automobile mode becomes 
significantly more inconvenient in terms increased costs or congestion, or the ‘payability’ of alternative 
practices improves, such practices will continue to have only a marginal effect in terms of sustainability” 
(p. 62) 
2PublicSentiments12: “Currently, there is public pressure, on one hand, to continue expanding the road 
system, and on the other, for more stringent efforts at demand reduction. And, finally, another factor 
being largely overlooked in the debate is the social impact of the lack of transportation alternatives for 
people living in these communities” (p. 66) 
IBI Group. (1994).Transportation 
Material for the Urban 
Chapter. Environment 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments13: “The growing citizen dissatisfaction with the lack of concern for environmental 
and social issues in major transportation projects and other public-sector undertakings led to the 
establishment of environmental assessment legislation and processes. To varying degrees across the 
country, transportation plans were required for the first time to consider explicitly environmental and 
social goals as well as the transportation and cost objectives. On a formal level, transportation planning 
agencies began to incorporate environmental factors into their planning processes” (p. 5) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1996). Sustainable 
transportation in Canada 
2PublicSentiments14: “What is propelling us on such an unsustainable path? At first glance, it appears 
that population growth, low density urban settlement patterns, the explosion of global communications 
and the competitive advantages of energy intensive modes of transport, including cars, trucks and 
aircraft, have combined to make transportation unsustainable. Underlying these factors, however, are 
the deep roots unsustainable transportation trends have in Canadian social values and lifestyles, as well 
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(Backgrounder). Ottawa, ON. as our economic system and political structure. For example: unlimited personal mobility, often in 
single-occupant vehicles, is viewed by many as a right. Calls to curtail travel are seen as draconian 
measures that impinge on basic freedoms; Cars continue to be one of the most important status 
symbols for many Canadians. People see sport utility vehicles, high performance sports cars, luxury cars 
or, in the case of many teenagers, any car at all as symbols of lifestyle and wealth. A home in the 
suburbs remains a key component of the Canadian dream. Fierce opposition to high density or infill 
development often arises from nearby homeowners. Ironically, these not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) 
reactions often argue against such development in the name of environmental protection” (p. 3) 
2PublicSentiments15: “Such are the powers of the market and the aspirations of citizens for ‘mobility’ 
that they have, acting rationally and in their own interests, used the personal transportation freedom of 
the automobile, as well as increasing disposable income, to create expanding urban sprawl, and to 
increase the distances between activities. While the benefits of road transport are embedded in the 
public psyche and have driven much political action in past generations, the public is only now becoming 
aware of the disbenefits of continuously expanding transportation and low density land use” (p. 15) 
2PublicSentiments16: “The report of the GTA Task Force to the Premier of Ontario in January 1996 … 
estimated that capital investment in new road, sewer and water infrastructure could be reduced from 
$55 billion to $42.8 billion over the next 25 years by adopting a more compact mixed-use development 
pattern for the region. When capital, operating and maintenance, as well as external costs are taken into 
account, the Task Force estimated that the annual cost savings of containing urban sprawl would be 
about $1 billion. This, it is argued, would reduce the cost burden on governments as well as increasing 
the economic competitiveness of the city-region in the global market. The subsequent public debate on 
the recommendations of the Golden report generated little discussion of the collateral benefits that 
could be obtained through the reduced automobile use that could accompany the more compact mixed-
use settlement pattern” (p. 53) 
2PublicSentiments17: “The use of economic instruments, including taxes and fees, to send strong, long-
term signals to consumers for reduced automobile use and to manufacturers for sale of more fuel-
efficient vehicles, has been the subject of much research and analysis internationally. However, there 
has been great resistance in North America to the use of fuel taxes for this purpose because of the 
entrenched cultural values and beliefs of North Americans … In contrast, the use of such instruments 
appears to be gaining political support in various European countries, including the United Kingdom, 
despite the fact that fuel prices in Europe are already two to three times higher than in North America” 
(p. 56) 
2PublicSentiments18: “Public support for some of the tougher policy instruments that will be needed is 
weak. Public education regarding the benefits of tough measures can provide support for political 
 265 
action” (p. 60) 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and Economy. 
(1997). State of the debate: 
The road to sustainable 
transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments19: “Stakeholders agree that reversing current trends will be extremely difficult 
because of market forces and consumer behaviours which are entrenched in Canadians’ values and 
aspirations” (p. 4) 
2PublicSentiments20: “A home in the suburbs remains the choice of many Canadians. In all but one of 
Canada’s 25 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAS), the core cities are growing at a much lower rate than 
their suburbs. The same trend is evident in smaller cities such as Regina, Trois-Rivieres and St. John’s. A 
first step toward changing this trend would be to increase awareness of the full environmental and 
financial costs of the decision to live in new, detached dwellings in low-density, single-use areas. At the 
same time, immediate action is needed by all three levels of government to change the way 
communities develop in the future” (p. 20) 
2PublicSentiments21: “The national debate on sustainable transportation is in its infancy. While there is 
a solid body of literature on the severity of the problems and analysis of potential solutions, there is no 
sense of urgency in the public, and no national consensus on what actions need to be taken. Despite its 
profound implications for the future, sustainable transportation is not widely debated among Canadians, 
and ranks lower than jobs, health care, education or national unity as an issue of national attention” (p. 
32) 
2PublicSentiments22: “Entrenched societal values and commercial interests, backed up by massive 
transportation and urban infrastructure, pose formidable barriers to slowing or reversing the growing 
use of fossil fuels in transportation in order to reduce air pollution, including greenhouse gases. 
Achieving sustainable transportation will take decades, and possibly generations” (p. 32) 
2PublicSentiments23: “There is disagreement about the public acceptability of moving future urban 
development towards more compact, mixed use. Opponents of intensification within core urban areas 
believe that it results in increased crime, devaluation of property and a general loss in the quality of life. 
Other voices argue that governments can no longer afford the infrastructural costs associated with 
sprawl, and that more liveable, economically efficient, environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive 
communities can be developed, or redeveloped, over the long term, using well-designed, compact urban 
form. The use of fuel taxes to modify consumer behaviour is controversial. Advocates argue that fuel 
taxes are among the most efficient and effective means of modifying market behaviours, in that they 
affect the broadest range of decisions made by individuals and businesses. Opponents argue that fuel 
taxes could prove to be economically disruptive and regressive, that Canada’s fuel taxes are already far 
higher than those in the United States and, given the relative inelasticity of transportation demand with 
respect to fuel price, that large fuel tax increases would be required to produce substantial changes in 
market behaviour” (p. 33) 
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2PublicSentiments24: “Some argue that fiscal pressures on provinces and municipalities provide an 
opportunity for motivating decision makers to invest in ‘least societal cost’ transportation systems, by 
carefully evaluating the merits of alternative transportation solutions – for example, road versus public 
transit, or intermodal versus truck movement of goods. Others contend that established patterns of 
decision-making will not necessarily change in an era of tighter budgets” (p. 34) 
2PublicSentiments25: “Opinions differ about the potential economic impacts of policies favouring 
expanded use of lower energy modes - for example, public transit rather than increased automobile use 
or intermodal over trucking. Some argue that serious economic harm could result from measures aimed 
at constraining road-vehicle use. Others cite research suggesting that the economic impacts of shifts to 
lower energy-consuming modes and the more selective use of cars, trucks and aircraft could actually 
provide net economic benefits” (p. 34) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (1997). Financing 
urban transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments26: “Federal and provincial deficit reduction programs, decreased transfer payments, 
the trend to downsizing government, declining tax bases in some areas, and citizen resistance to tax 
increases are combining to reduce public budgets. At the same time a growing, changing and aging 
population continues to exert strong demand for social and other services provided by government” (p. 
2) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2000). Measuring 
progress: Toward the new 
vision for urban 
transportation. Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments27: “Financing transportation expenditures is a major challenge due primarily to 
reduced transfer payments from provinces and increasing pressure on municipal governments to focus 
on social and other services. Many urban areas reported continued interest in investigating new sources 
of revenue for transportation including user charges such as fuel taxes and vehicle registration taxes or 
parking surcharges dedicated to transportation” (p. 5) 
Kohn, H. (2000). Factors affecting 
urban transit ridership. 
Statisitcs Canada. Ottawa, 
ON. 
2PublicSentiments28: “Many have postulated reasons for the decline in the early nineties: increased 
suburbanization leading to an increase in automobile usage; lower perceived operating costs of the 
automobile; a preference for the convenience of the automobile4; increasing fares, decreasing 
subsidies, an aging population with a preference for the comfort and security of personal transportation; 
and varying levels of public support for urban transit across jurisdictions” (p. 2) 
IBI Group and Soberman, R. (2001). 
National Vision for Urban 
Transit to 2020. Transport 
Canada. Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments29: “A variety of arguments can be raised in support of developing a national vision 
for urban transit, some of which, of course, are posed by constituencies such as national organizations 
that see a “national vision” as justification for federal financial aid. Others may simply argue that the 
majority of Canadians live in urbanized areas and that the federal government has an implicit obligation 
to look at urban transportation to ensure national goals are met” (p. 66) 
2PublicSentiments30: “Policy and decision-makers need to understand that there is no simple, one-stop 
solution to improving the transportation problems that face our urban areas. The report must clearly 
indicate that an overall strategy needs to be developed that reflects action on a number of fronts. 
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Having said this, there is a great deal of information that should assist those new to transit/ 
transportation about some of the key issues facing transit, and the number of factors that interact to 
influence the demand for transit services” (p. 90) 
Flemming, B., Patenaude, J. Findlay, 
G., Rae, R., and Waters II, W. 
(2001). Vision and Balance: 
Report of the Canadian 
Transportation Act Review 
Panel. Canadian 
Transportation Act Review 
Panel. Ottawa, ON. 
2PublicSentiments31: “Walking, biking and using public transit could replace some urban mobility, 
reducing congestion and environmental impacts. Buses, and potentially trains, could replace some 
intercity car (and aircraft) use, again with less environmental impact … Some road use might be avoided 
relatively easily, without switching modes, by combining car trips … The fact that Canadians are not 
adopting these alternatives to a greater extent – especially when they would often be cheaper in terms 
of out-of-pocket costs –  shows how much users value the service qualities they get from cars and 
trucks: speed, convenience, flexibility, reliability and comfort. But it also reflects the fact that road users 
do not have to cover the whole cost of road use, because of the way governments fund road 
infrastructure, and because most users do not have to deal personally with some of the unwelcome 
social effects. If they had to do so – if road users were charged directly on each trip for the cost of 
maintaining the road network, as well as for the costs of congestion, environmental damage and 
accident risks that their road use imposes on others – it seems likely that their choices would change 
and more of the alternatives would be used. This possibility poses crucial policy issues for governments 
at all levels” (p. 180) 
2PublicSentiments32: “The current status of urban transit reflects a mutual agreement that transit is a 
necessary exception to general policies of user pay, that services are essential and worth their large 
subsidies, and that their delivery by government is appropriate. At issue for the Panel was how the 
principles of an integrated national transport policy could be extended to guide future transit decisions 
and what their implications might be” (p. 216) 
2PublicSentiments33: “Transit operators and advocates told the Panel they are confident that ridership 
can be increased through expanded service, particularly investment in light rail or dedicated busways. 
They argue for lower fares, through increased subsidies, specifically proposing a federal tax exemption 
for employer-provided transit passes, to match the treatment of employer-provided parking (which is 
technically a taxable benefit, but usually not enforced as such). They also advocate direct federal 
participation in transit funding” (p. 220-221)  
2PublicSentiments34: “Transit operators … now argue for a much larger federal commitment, solely to 
transit. They suggest the government should share routinely in funding transit capital, by dedicating 
revenues from road fuel taxes. U.S. federal assistance provides a model, they suggest: US$6-7 billion a 
year (20% of revenues from fuel taxes and vehicle fees dedicated to the Highway Trust Fund), is being 
allocated to transit capital investments. Canadian operators propose a range of 2 to 4 cents/L, which at 
current fuel consumption rates would raise revenues of about $1-2 billion annually” (p. 221) 
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2PublicSentiments35: “Commuter authorities’ main concern was their lack of a right of access to federal 
railway lines in urban areas. TransLink, supported by CUTA on behalf of its members, recommended 
amendments to the Canada Transportation Act to provide for shared use of active rail rights of way by 
light rail transit, with suitable safety requirements and oversight provisions similar to those for 
conventional commuter rail, provide for access to rail rights of way for urban transit infrastructure 
where this is possible without undue interference with railway operations, and to designate urban rail 
corridors as general transportation corridors” (p. 233) 
Table 16: Third-era (documents from 2002-2015) codes applied during the thematic coding process. 
3
rd
 Era 
Paradigms 
Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force 
on Urban Issues. (2002). 
Canada’s Urban Strategy: A 
Blueprint for Action. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Paradigms1: “We agree with the assessment that if we do not act now, the opportunity for change will 
be lost. The options for action being debated range from restructuring the constitution to provide more 
autonomy for cities to developing new means and new fiscal tools to serve municipalities. At the core of 
the debate is the relationship between and among federal, provincial and municipal governments and 
how to develop opportunities to strengthen these partnerships. The significant presence of the 
Government of Canada in urban regions is a major factor in this equation and key to its success” (p. v) 
3Paradigms2: “To build world-class, competitive urban regions, all orders of government must invest in 
multi-modal transit systems. Canada is the only G7 country without a national transit investment 
program. Keeping pace with demand will require a commitment to transit infrastructure from all orders 
of government” (p. 15) 
Transport Canada. (2002). Urban 
transit in Canada: Taking 
stock. Ottawa, ON. 
3Paradigms3: “Provincial government contributions to capital funding of transit are in decline. To 
account for this, higher fares have covered a larger portion of expenses, new funding sources such as 
regional gas taxes in British Columbia have been introduced” (p. 4) 
3Paradigms4: “A significant difference between [mid-sized cities] and the three large urban areas is that 
only about one third of the projects identified have already been planned and budgeted for, compared 
with more than half … in the larger regions. While there are no absolute data available to explain this 
difference it is likely the result of two factors: 1) Two of the three large urban regions (Montreal and 
Vancouver) have access to alternative funding sources providing them with a significantly more stable 
funding environment. 2) Only three of the nine mid-to-large sized urban areas have extensive, high 
quality rapid transit facilities. The remaining six areas view some form of rapid transit in the future as 
the only way of achieving their local visions. However, they are not in a position to fund a major 
program. This compares with the large urban areas where the projects are largely additions to the 
existing system rather than completely new endeavours” (p. 7-8) 
3Paradigms5: “Fare revenue from transit users in the National Vision scenario is assumed to grow from 
an annual amount of $1.8 billion today to $2.7 billion in the future. The difference between this future 
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revenue and the future total annual operating costs of $4.1 billion is $1.4 billion (compared with a gap of 
$1.1 billion today). Thus, the potential gap in operating cost funding under the National Vision, would be 
approximately $300 million annually. This operating funding gap essentially reflects the additional funds 
… required to pay for the extra peak period service necessary to allow transit to compete effectively 
with the automobile” (p. 10) 
3Paradigms6: “The availability of long-term sustained and guaranteed funding support for transit 
agencies would provide the agencies with the ability to plan and commit to vehicle purchases in a stable 
and predictable environment. This would, in turn, allow equipment manufacturers to invest in their 
production capability to meet the needs of an expanded market” (p. 10) 
3Paradigms7: “Canada’s escalating urbanization and increasing international attention to global 
warming and sustainable living have raised the Federal Government’s interest in becoming involved with 
urban transit. This commitment comes at a time when provincial funding of the transit industry has 
decreased to levels that, in many provinces, are not considered sustainable. Recently, federal support 
for urban transit has been highlighted in the Speech From the Throne, recommendations by the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the National Climate Change Program, as well as the Federal 
Budget, which has benchmarked significant funds towards programs for which urban transit qualifies” 
(p. 11) 
3Paradigms8: “Fluctuation in timing for bus purchases is a function of availability and the ability to 
provide funding. If anything, it has not been consistent over the past 10 years, which has the by-product 
of making it difficult for Canadian bus manufacturers to manage their businesses” (p. 32) 
3Paradigms9: “Operating expenses are paid for by operating revenues … municipal funding, provincial 
funding and other sources, which might include a gas tax allocation, as is the case in British Columbia 
and Alberta. [From 1992-2000], operating revenues have increased slightly, while provincial funding 
decreased to almost non-existence by 1999 … Municipal funding has stayed fairly constant, and other 
funding sources have increased … Debt servicing [has fluctuated, reflecting] operating or capital 
expenses not fully covered in previous years” (p. 50-51) 
3Paradigms10: “Similar to operating funding, capital funding from the provincial governments has 
experienced a general downwards trend. Unlike operating funding, the difference has had to be made 
up entirely by municipal contributions, which have risen steadily in response to the declining provincial 
funding” (p. 52) 
3Paradigms11: “Through the analysis and discussion presented in this chapter, a number of issues, or 
pressure points, for the Canadian transit industry are evident: 1. There is a significant gap between 
current capital funding and future needs to accommodate significant growth in transit ridership, as set 
out in the National Vision of almost $1.4 billion annually; 2. Significant positive progress must be made 
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by all governments, transit agencies and industries on the elements that influence transit ridership; 3. 
The best opportunities for reducing operating costs in real terms will require investment in a wide 
variety of information technologies that provide more information and better service at a lower per 
passenger cost; 4. The incentive for transit agencies to implement so-called “green’’ technologies on a 
large scale is limited because of the added cost and the fact that improved conventional technologies 
meet environmental standards. The most effective strategy in reducing green house gases is for all 
governments to pull together in programs which will see people shift from their private cars to public 
transit; 5. All transit agencies, regardless of size need financial assistance (new funding) for the 
rehabilitation and replacement of their fleets; 6. All transit agencies in Canada need new sources of 
funding to meet the requirements for new and expanded service as set out in the National Vision:  
7. The twelve largest urban regions in Canada need financial assistance (new funding) in order to 
implement transit infrastructure to accommodate growth in ridership, improve reliability and maintain 
or improve running speed” (p. 90) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2003). Urban transit: 
An essential factor. Paper 
prepared for presentation at 
the opening session of the 
2003 Annual Conference of 
the Transportation 
Association of Canada. St. 
John’s, Newfoundland and 
Labrador.  
3Paradigms12: “Two major reasons for the lack of the required transportation investment integrated 
with land use development are identified: 1. Insufficient funding; and 2. Fragmented planning and 
implementation of transportation and related land use” (p. 2) 
3Paradigms13: “The importance of transportation improvements to reduce pollution and contribute to 
better health and to use resources efficiently (e.g., land, energy) is less in smaller CMAs than in larger 
metropolitan areas. However, the major benefit of providing safe, convenient service and a people-
friendly ambience (e.g., low levels of noise, vibration and dust) is seen as equally important for both 
CMA size groups. Similarly, while for some smaller CMAs it may be less important to make 
transportation changes to shape and support smart growth and to move people and goods more 
efficiently, it is seen as essential for both size groups that transportation improvements be provided in 
order to attract and retain investments, jobs and income” (p. 4) 
Transport Canada. (2003). Straight 
Ahead: A Vision for 
Transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Paradigms14: “Both the road system and the urban transit system, arguably the backbone of Canadian 
transportation and the primary means of linking communities and activities throughout the country, 
have been left largely untouched by [reforms for more commercial decision-making and responsive 
governance structures]. The CTA Review Panel noted many challenges in the future provision of 
adequate road infrastructure and urban transit systems. In particular, the Panel identified several factors 
that undermine the health of current systems: the growth of traffic, high unit transit cost, the need for a 
practical approach to ensure sustained funding, the lack of an effective pricing regime, and uncertainties 
about the total cost of road transportation” (p. 52) 
Transport Canada. (2004). Review 
of international urban 
3Paradigms15: “Beginning in the 1990s, issues global in scope, but local in scale began to confront 
Canada and its policy makers. Gridlock and congestion, municipal financial capacity, adequate affordable 
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transportation policy 
frameworks,strategies and 
governance models. 
Metropolitan Knowledge 
International. Toronto, ON. 
housing, and strategic infrastructure investment rose to the national stage. Other countries and cities 
around the world began to market themselves and compete for business using local ‘quality of life’ 
indicators, creating a new link between economic competitiveness and urban conditions. In Canada in 
2004, the ‘new deal for communities’ discourse is part of the federal lexicon, and sustainable urban 
transportation in particular is a key area of national interest” (p. 4) 
3Paradigms16: “All countries have a number of urban transportation infrastructure programs that fund 
road and highway capital projects; by contrast public transit needs, as well as all urban transportation 
maintenance needs are not funded by all of the survey countries’ governments’ (p. 17) 
3Paradigms17: “A recognition of the need to co-ordinate land use and transportation principles has 
emerged in all survey countries, and receives at least minimal attention in urban transportation policy in 
all countries. The extent to which this objective is given policy teeth varies from country to country, but 
the tools to achieve land use goals are particularly strong in the UK and (somewhat surprisingly) in the 
United States, where TEA-21 incorporates a number of land use requirements. Conflicts have emerged 
where national-level transportation policy and local-level planning policy are not in tune, a situation that 
makes this connection a potentially problematic one in Canada” (p. 56) 
3Paradigms18: “A more extensive and influential policy linkage exists between environmental policy 
(usually referred to as 'sustainability') and transportation policy. All survey countries now include 
'sustainability' as a key policy component and recognize a need for a national initiative to reduce the 
environmental impacts of transportation, by addressing specific issues such as vehicle emissions. Canada 
probably leads, or at least matches, the other survey countries in the extent to which this policy link is 
being executed through various programs” (p. 56) 
3Paradigms19: “In general, it is apparent that the success of national transportation policy often 
depends on its ability to adapt to local context and competing policy interests. Even in the UK, a 
relatively centralized state, it is clear that local-level interests often successfully challenge national 
interests in executing a transportation agenda. The experience of some of In states with highly 
decentralized (i.e. strong local) levels of government, this need is the survey countries suggests that the 
success of a national transportation strategy hinges, to some extent, on its ability to integrate 
successfully with other levels of government and respond to the unique requirements of the local 
context in which transportation projects occur. In states with highly decentralized (i.e. strong local) 
levels of government, this need is considerably stronger” (p. 56) 
Transport Canada. (2005). Case 
Study 32: Urban 
transportation pricing 
options. Urban 
3Paradigms20: “There has been much study and discussion of urban transportation pricing 
opportunities in Canada, but little movement to take advantage of them. Progress in pricing beyond the 
realms of transit and municipal parking has been limited by the presence of legislative, regulatory, 
technical and cultural barriers” (p. 1) 
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Transportation Showcase 
Program.  Case Studies in 
Urban Transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
Transport Canada. (2005). Case 
Study 34: Monitoring 
progress toward sustainable 
transportation. Urban 
Transportation Showcase 
Program, Case Studies in 
Urban Transprotation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Paradigms21: “Canadian urban areas are becoming more strategic in their approaches to planning for 
sustainability. Transportation plans are growing more sophisticated and far-reaching as they increasingly 
tackle the linkages between transportation and other key quality of life issues (e.g. land use, 
environmental and public health, economic growth, access to opportunity). However, the success of 
these long-range plans will depend in part, on efforts to monitor relevant conditions, actions and their 
impacts. Cities that remain aware of their progress toward key objectives can modify their plans, and 
add or delete priorities as needed. This will foster a continuous understanding of successes, failures, 
new opportunities and emerging challenges” (p. 1) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2005). Urban transportation 
in Canada: Needs and 
opportunities. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Paradigms22: “The federal government has committed to provide new funding through its ‘New Deal’ 
for cities and communities, funded in part by sharing federal gas taxes. It is an important principle from 
the federal perspective that provincial/territorial governments not reduce their funding to municipalities 
as a consequence of that federal investment. It is recognized that funding decisions for the “New Deal” 
will be the product of an intergovernmental negotiation that involves many ministries and departments 
at both the provincial and federal levels. The emphasis, regardless of mechanism, must be on securing 
reliable, long-term, net new revenue sources adequate to meet the growing needs in urban areas” (p. 2) 
3Paradigms23: “[Canada’s public transit] vehicle fleet … averages 11 years old, compared to the … 
recommended average fleet age of 6 to 9 years. At the extreme, in some cases buses are pressed into 
service at 25 years of age and subway cars in Montréal and Toronto have been in service since the 60s. 
The delivery of transit services in a reliable, efficient and effective manner, which is necessary to ensure 
they are a viable alternative to the automobile, is greatly challenged by the age of the system” (p. 5) 
3Paradigms24: “Lower density land use and the sprawl of residential zones and places of employment 
fosters increased automobile use, complicates management of public transit services, accentuates 
infrastructure needs and limits the potential of certain alternative modes, such as walking and cycling. 
Sustainable land-use planning and development approaches could limit sprawl and its effect on urban 
areas” (p. 5) 
3Paradigms25: “Large urban centres experience major congestion and gridlock, causing delay, increased 
energy consumption and air pollution. The economic and environmental consequences of congestion 
are high, estimated at several hundred million dollars to $2 billion annually in some urban centres … The 
modern economy relies on its workforce and on ‘just-in-time’ production. Urban congestion has a 
substantial negative impact on the competitiveness of Canadian urban centres and Canada as a whole” 
 273 
(p. 5) 
3Paradigms26: “In the jurisdictions with the largest cities, the investment required is much larger than 
in jurisdictions with smaller cities. For example, in Ontario, investment required in just the next four 
years to maintain, renew and expand transit infrastructure, rolling stock and technology will exceed $10 
billion. In New Brunswick, investment needed in transit is estimated to be nearly $39 million over the 
next ten years. There, the primary investment needs are replacement of buses and maintenance of 
transit infrastructure such as garages and bus stop locations with some additional funding required for 
advanced technology traveler information systems. While there is an order of magnitude difference in 
dollar value, in proportion to the current resources of the jurisdictions, the needs are similarly 
significant. Furthermore, the impact of the investment is expected to be important from an economic 
support and development perspective, regardless of the size of the need or the jurisdiction” (p. 13) 
Transport Canada. (2006). An 
evalution of Transport 
Canada’s Moving On 
Sustainable Transportation 
Program. Departmental 
Evaluation Services. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Paradigms27: “There is a legitimate and necessary role for government in the MOST Program. It is the 
only Canadian federal contribution program that is dedicated to providing contributions for sustainable 
transportation projects. Additionally, federal involvement in these types of projects is viewed by MOST 
funding recipients as a stable source of funding, which has been used as leverage to obtain additional 
funding from other partners” (p. ii) 
3Paradigms28: “It is difficult to determine the extent to which the MOST Program as a whole realizes 
quantifiable results for TC’s sustainable development priorities. An examination of the three case studies 
suggests that there are projects that have realized some quantitative environmental and sustainable 
development results. However, in other cases, the objectives of the projects do not intend to lead to 
quantitative results” (p. 13) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2009). Urban transit in 
Canada: Taking stock of 
recent progress. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Paradigms29: “Greater interest in transit over the last few years has translated into increased funding, 
new and expanded transit systems, and growth in ridership. There is widespread agreement that 
investing in public transit produces measurable economic, social, and environmental benefits. New 
governance models and long range transit expansion plans are being put in place and all indications are 
that much more will be accomplished in the near future. Especially noteworthy are substantial new 
transit funding partnerships among Canada’s municipalities, provincial/territorial, and federal 
governments. The state of transit funding has changed dramatically in recent years” (p. 3) 
3Paradigms30: “The population of major urban centres continues to increase, usually in municipalities 
on the periphery of CMAs. Employment is growing faster in the peripheral areas than in the central 
municipalities of CMAs. These conditions exacerbate the pressures on urban transportation networks 
and make the delivery of effective and efficient transit systems more difficult. There is a growing need 
for transit to operate within suburban areas, from suburban areas to central areas, and between 
suburban areas. Smart planning is required to manage these patterns and pressures” (p. 4) 
 274 
3Paradigms31: “In 2005, aging transportation infrastructure and a lack of funding were widely 
recognized as key issues for federal, provincial/territorial, and municipal governments. With recent 
funding commitments made by all levels of government, progress is being made towards addressing the 
requirements for new and improved transportation facilities and services. However, it will take time to 
launch all the necessary projects and costs have continued to rise, leaving an infrastructure challenge to 
contend with for some time” (p. 5) 
3Paradigms32: “Traffic congestion has a substantial negative impact on Canada’s economic 
competitiveness. For example, in 2006, traffic congestion cost the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area 
(GTHA) $6 billion in travel delays and lost investment. By 2031, three million car trips (compared to the 
current two million) will be made during the weekday morning commute and the costs to the area are 
estimated to be $15 billion in travel delays and lost investment.6 Easing gridlock and improving the 
movement of people and goods through Canada’s urban centres can be furthered by investing in 
transit” (p. 5) 
3Paradigms33: “Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from transportation are significant, accounting for 
almost 27% of Canada’s GHG emissions in 2006. The need to address these issues was noted in 2005 and 
has grown in importance since that time. Many jurisdictions have developed climate change action plans 
and sustainability objectives. Transit plays a key role in meeting such objectives” (p. 6) 
3Paradigms34: “Over several months in 2008, sharp increases in fuel costs captured the nation’s 
attention, raising concerns about fuel dependence and raising the awareness – and attractiveness – of 
alternatives to the automobile, such as public transit and active modes of transportation. Transit 
ridership increased as fuel prices rose” (p. 6) 
3Paradigms35: “The state of the economy in Canada, the United States, and around the world became 
one of the foremost issues for governments in 2008-09. Investments in transportation infrastructure and 
transit specifically are viewed as valuable contributions to economic activity in the long term and as 
effective forms of economic stimulus and job creation in the shorter term, while playing a key role in 
long-term sustainability objectives … While most major urban centres in Canada are experiencing 
population growth, some smaller communities are suffering population losses. Transit can be critical to 
maintaining viable and liveable smaller communities, often providing a much needed transportation 
option for all residents, but particularly for the elderly and low income residents” (p. 6) 
 275 
3Paradigms36: “The 2009 federal budget also included several legislative and regulatory amendments 
that would ensure a more efficient approval of projects under the Building Canada plan and other 
funding initiatives. For projects requiring federal environmental assessment decisions, regulations could 
allow one environmental assessment process to meet both federal and provincial/territorial 
requirements, by agreement with the provinces and territories. With these changes, it is expected that 
the time needed to provide federal approvals for major projects could be shortened by up to 12 
months” (p. 19) 
3Paradigms37: “That the need is even greater than originally projected in the 2005 report is a reflection 
of many factors, including: growing demand for transit services in both large urban centres and in 
smaller communities; with growing demand, some transit systems are reaching capacity and need to 
expand operations; [and] continuing need to maintain and renew transit infrastructure and fleets” (p. 
21) 
3Paradigms38: “The transit investments made to date have produced direct and indirect impacts that 
have begun to pay off and will continue to do so into the future. But recent successes of increased 
investments have spawned even greater demand for transit services. Capacity is being reached in some 
systems, and they must improve and expand operations in order to accommodate growing populations 
and growing economies. Smaller communities that may not yet have transit systems see its benefits and 
are exploring the addition of new services. Municipal plans predicated on environmental sustainability 
are building on transit services to help meet such objectives” (p. 26) 
Urban Transit Task Force. (2010). 
Recent developments in 
transit in Canadian cities: 
Report of the Urban Transit 
Task Force to the Ministers of 
Transportation. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Paradigms39: “The previous report noted exceptional levels of investment in transit by the provincial, 
municipal, and federal governments in the period 2005 to 2007. From 2007 to 2008, Canadian provinces 
and municipalities increased their contribution to both operating and capital funding. One way to 
measure operating contributions by governments is to look at ‘net operating revenues,’ which exclude 
passenger fares from total operating revenues. In 2008 Canadian municipalities contributed 62.7% of 
net operating revenues, or a 4.2% increase from 2007. Provincial governments contributed 29% of net 
operating revenues, a 20% increase over the previous year. In 2008 municipal capital contributions 
amounted to 18% of total capital costs, while provinces increased their capital contributions by 39.0%, 
representing 59% of total capital cost. Meanwhile, federal capital contributions as a percentage of total 
capital investment decreased from 25% to 20%” (p. 5) 
3Paradigms40: “Transit funding varies greatly from one province to another. For example, the Atlantic 
provinces rely on fare revenues and municipal funding as the sole sources for operating funding. All 
other provinces have established programs to contribute to operating costs. The federal government 
does not provide funding to support transit operations” (p. 6) 
3Paradigms41: “The thrust of developments since 2003-07 continued in 2008-09, with growth in 
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ridership and service, upgrades of fleets, and greater investments in capital and operating costs by all 
levels of government. Current expansion projects for public transit systems will contribute to healthy 
ridership gains in the upcoming years, as suggested by preliminary ridership numbers for 2010 from 
Canada’s 10 biggest transit systems. Transit agencies are using technology and pooling their buying 
power to improve service and reduce costs. But some signs of slower growth were also evident in the 
latest data. When full data becomes available for 2009 and 2010, we can expect to see slower growth in 
transit as fiscal restraint replaces fiscal stimulus as government policy across the country. The end of 
federal infrastructure and stimulus programs and of the transit trust funding of 2006 and 2008 may have 
a significant effect. The Urban Transit Task Force will continue to monitor and report on the status of 
transit as developments occur” (p. 13) 
Ruffilli, D. (2010). Federal support 
for bus rapid transit and light 
rail transit systems in Canada. 
Library of Parliament. 
Industry, Infrastructure, and 
Resources Division. 
Parliamentary Information 
and Research Service. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Paradigms42: “At the core of current discussions in several Canadian cities over the future direction of 
their public transit systems is a debate over the relative merits of BRT and LRT. This debate is fuelled by 
passionate proponents of both technologies and often clouded by inaccurate perceptions of the cost 
and nature of BRT and LRT systems. Indeed, BRT and LRT share many common advantages: they connect 
communities rapidly and reliably; they can reduce gridlock and improve mobility, particularly for lower-
income residents; they can be designed to remove barriers for people with mobility impairments by 
ensuring that stations, platforms and vehicles are fully accessible; and they can reduce emissions, both 
through the displacement of car traffic as drivers shift to public transit and the use of lower-emissions 
transit technology (i.e., electricity for LRT, and hybrid, alternative fuel or electric trolley technology for 
BRT)” (p. 3) 
3Paradigms43: “Public transit in Canada is normally provided by municipal governments, although in 
some cases, such as Metrolinx in Ontario and BC Transit in British Columbia, certain public transit 
services are provided on a regional basis by the provincial government. To provide federal support to 
public transit systems across the country, in recent years the Government of Canada has established a 
range of funding programs, many of which are cost-shared with provincial/territorial and local 
governments. In fact, since the Infrastructure Canada Program of the late 1990s, most federal 
infrastructure funding programs have included public transit as an eligible category of investment” (p. 6) 
3Paradigms44: “The Government of Canada, in partnership with provincial/territorial and local 
governments, is supporting several rapid transit projects through the Building Canada Fund and the 
Infrastructure Stimulus Fund as well as the Gas Tax Fund. The federal government states that it invests 
in public transit through these programs to support its priorities of ‘a growing economy, a clean 
environment and safe and prosperous communities.’ As the cost of developing rapid transit systems is 
generally beyond the capacity of Canadian municipalities, implementing BRT and LRT projects currently 
in the planning stages will depend largely on continued federal and provincial infrastructure funding to 
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local governments” (p. 9) 
Ministry of Finance. (2011). 
Evaluation of the Public 
Transit Tax Credit. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Paradigms45: “Public transit users are sensitive to a permanent change in price, and that the 
responsiveness increases with time. The longer a price adjustment is in effect, the greater will be the 
response of transit users. This finding is key to the assessment of the PTTC as it suggests that the 
effectiveness of the credit should increase over time as individuals take into account the price reduction 
due to the credit when making their long-term decisions (such as where to live or whether to buy an 
automobile)” (p. 16) 
3Paradigms46: “Data show that public transit fares grew at a steady pace in Canada [from 1995-2010), 
averaging about 3.8% per year. There were no marked price increases following the introduction of the 
PTTC: the average annual growth rate in public transit CPI from 2006 to 2010 was 4.0%, slightly higher 
than the long-term growth rate” (p. 16-17) 
3Paradigms47: “Economic conditions, in particular employment, are key determinants of the demand 
for public transit. A primary reason for using public transit on a regular basis is to commute to work. The 
deterioration in employment typically observed during depressed economic periods will therefore 
translate into reduced use of public transit” (p. 19) 
3Paradigms48: “[High] levels of spending would be expected to translate into significantly better transit 
networks and increased quality of service … The second half of the past decade was marked by a 
significant renewal of bus fleets (the average bus age decreased by 32% from 2005 to 2010, compared 
to less than 9% from 2000 to 2005) and major increases in the per-capita total hours of operation of all 
vehicles (an increase of almost 16% from 2005 to 2010 compared to 1.2% from 2000 to 2005). The 
average speed of vehicles in service has not improved over the past decade. However, it is not clear 
what this indicates for the quality of service. For example, it could reflect an increase in the number of 
routes that are in urban centres relative to suburban or rural zones, rather than a lack of improvement 
in commuting time” (p. 22) 
3Paradigms49: “There is evidence that the key conditions for the credit to be effective are present: 
econometric studies indicate that public transit users are responsive to a permanent change in fares, 
and data on the price of public transit indicate that the benefits of the PTTC appear to be captured by 
the target population. It is expected that the effectiveness of the credit will increase as time passes and 
individuals continue to include it as a consideration in their long-term decisions regarding their 
transportation options. Recent trends in ridership could suggest that the PTTC has had an impact on 
public transit use. However, factors such as economic conditions, the cost of alternative modes of 
transportation, the quality of public transit service, population aging, urbanization and environmental 
awareness can also affect the demand for public transit. A multivariate analysis over a prolonged period 
of time could help separate the effect of the PTTC from these factors, but this would remain a complex 
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task. Such an analysis is not possible at this time given that the PTTC was introduced in July 2006, which 
provides for only a few years of observations” (p. 24) 
Infrastructure Canada (2012). 
Infrastructure spotlight: 
Improving public transit for 
the 21
st
 century. Ottawa, ON. 
3Paradigms50: “Effective public transit systems also help reduce urban traffic congestion and the cost of 
gridlock to our cities’ economic competitiveness. Traffic gridlock means increased fuel consumption and 
air pollution, more public health issues, higher costs from traffic accidents, increased greenhouse gas 
emissions, and productivity losses. In fact, a national study from Transport Canada1 found that 
congestion in urban areas could cost Canadians as much as $ 4.6 billion per year” (p. 2) 
3Paradigms51: “The current level of federal investments in transit infrastructure is unprecedented. 
Since 2006, the Government of Canada has committed close to $5 billion to provinces and municipalities 
across the country for public transit projects that they have identified as priorities. At no other time has 
the Government of Canada made such substantial investments in transit systems. This has not only 
helped build better transit – it’s also built strong partnerships among all levels of government and key 
stakeholders, and created momentum for increased public transit investments. These coordinated 
efforts have meant tangible improvements to public transit all over Canada, such as new and expanded 
transit systems, larger fleet sizes with more accessible vehicles and the capacity to handle increasing 
ridership. Furthermore, CUTA reports that over the past decade, existing federal, provincial and 
municipal funding programs have increasingly been able to cover the expansion and renewal needs of 
the country’s transit systems. The result: more and more Canadians across the country can count on 
modern, efficient and attractive transit systems in their community” (p. 5) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2012). Sustainable 
funding for urban/regional 
transportation in Canada. TAC 
Briefing. Ottawa, ON. 
3Paradigms52: “Particularly during the past two or three decades, a number of factors have resulted in 
chronic underinvestment in urban and regional transportation. This has led to an increasing backlog of 
deferred maintenance, service cut-backs, deteriorating facilities, and growing congestion/crowding as 
transportation demands continue to outstrip supply in most Canadian cities” (p. 2) 
3Paradigms53: “The emphasis in some cases on capital funding that is unmatched with a comparable 
increase in funding of operations-related expenditures can lead to suboptimal infrastructure decisions 
(e.g. over-building of capital-intensive transit modes when not justified by ridership forecasts, because 
the capital funding is available and because they offer significantly lower annual operating costs). 
Opportunities to defer infrastructure expansion, through strategies such as peak spreading, are largely 
exhausted. Commuters – particularly in larger metropolitan areas – have been shifting their trip start 
and finish times where feasible and peak periods are spreading and intensifying. Average trip times have 
also approached or exceeded the levels of other major cities in the world, such that our cities’ ability to 
attract or accommodate growth is at risk” (p. 2) 
3Paradigms54: “Total transit infrastructure needs for the next five years are valued at $53.5 billion, 
including $12.8 billion (24%) to rehabilitate or renew infrastructure and $40.7 billion (76%) to expand 
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service to meet the growing mobility needs of the Canadian population. Of total infrastructure needs, 
only $35.9 billion (72%) can be met by existing funding programs – leaving a funding gap of almost $18 
billion (28%). Meeting this capital investment gap of $3-4 billion per year over the next five years will 
require additional funding programs” (p. 4) 
Tweed, Mervin . (2012). Study on 
transit in Canada: report of 
the Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities. House of 
Commons of Canada Standing 
Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities. Ottawa, ON.  
3Paradigms55: “No transit system in Canada, or virtually anywhere in the world, can exist without 
substantial government subsidies.27 Despite the fact that Canada has one of the highest average 
revenue to cost ratio in the G8 (at around 60%), municipal and provincial governments must make up 
shortfalls in operating and maintenance costs and all levels of government are needed to make capital 
investments possible. Some provinces, such as British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia and 
Quebec, provide operating as well as capital funding for transit services; in other provinces and 
territories, municipalities must cover net operating and maintenance costs. The willingness of all orders 
of government to subsidize transit reflects the generally held view that the combined transportation, 
economic, environmental and social benefits from the service are important and justify the subsidy” (p. 
5) 
3Paradigms56: “Federal contributions to transit have amounted to nearly $1 billion annually in recent 
years and have leveraged even greater annual investments from other governments because of the 
cost-sharing nature of the programs. In total, some $13 billion has been invested in transit initiatives 
since 2006” (p. 6) 
3Paradigms57: “According to Infrastructure Canada, the Government of Canada has focused capital 
investments in transit projects that demonstrate positive outcomes in areas such as: mobility and 
congestion; access to transit; transit ridership; transit modal share; travel times; safety and security for 
passengers and other transportation users; operational efficiency; air emissions and greenhouse gases; 
and, implementation of transit-oriented development” (p. 6-7) 
Transport Canada. (2012). 
Improving bus services: 
Modest investments to 
increase transit ridership. Gris 
Orange Consultant. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Paradigms58: “Many Canadian communities have taken actions to improve the sustainability of their 
urban systems and reshape their transportation systems to address congestion issues, respond to their 
community needs and provide travelers and commuters with convenient, reliable, clean, safe, and 
sustainable transportation options. In this attempt, Transportation Demand Management (TDM) 
strategies have gained momentum over the past decades. TDM is based on the idea that there is an 
increasing need to manage mobility and not just providing more mobility options” (p. 5) 
3
rd
 Era 
Programs 
Paul Martin. (2002). Speech by the 
Honourable Paul Martin, 
Minister of Finance for 
Canada, to members of the 
Federation of Canadian 
3Programs1: “It has been suggested … that a specific tax source be dedicated to municipalities by the 
federal and provincial governments, or that the federal and provincial governments vacate existing tax 
room to create a revenue source for municipalities. Now, the federal government has always been wary 
of dedicated taxes – arguing that such ties make it very difficult, if not impossible, to respond to 
changing circumstances. So I’m a skeptic, but I also recognize that it is a plain fact that municipalities 
 280 
Municipalities. Hamilton, ON. have inadequate revenue sources as things stand – and I’ve said we need to be open to considering all 
options” (p. 7) 
3Programs2: “While I have always met with municipal delegations before budgets, the step I am 
proposing today goes further. In the preparation of future budgets, I have agreed to institute a formal 
meeting with a group of mayors, assembled by the FCM, for the same kind of working session - and I’d 
like to have that meeting soon. We’ll roll up our sleeves, just as I do with provincial and territorial 
finance ministers” (p. 8-9) 
Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force 
on Urban Issues. (2002). 
Canada’s Urban Strategy: A 
Blueprint for Action. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Programs3: “The Government of Canada responded to the debate on urban issues on several levels. 
Within the Privy Council Office, an internal Task Force on Urban Communities was established to 
develop a profile of the federal presence in urban centres, research into best practices and to explore 
ways of integrating federal programs. Every federal department is preparing a Sustainable Development 
Strategy and Environment Canada has created a ‘sustainable development lens’. As well, Industry 
Canada created a Sustainable Cities Initiative to advance this agenda in Johannesburg and beyond. A 
Sustainable Development Coordinating Committee was established comprising Deputy Ministers from 
departments that are responsible for programs related to sustainable development” (p. iv) 
3Programs4: “We congratulate the government for its announced intention to set up a 10-year 
Infrastructure Program that includes a component for a strategy for a transportation system: within this 
framework, it will introduce a new strategy for a safe, efficient and environmentally responsible 
transportation system that will help reduce congestion in our cities and bottlenecks in our trade 
corridors”. This is an important step towards the recognition of urban transit as an area of long-term 
national investment” (p. 14) 
3Programs5: “The Task Force recommends the Government of Canada commit to a National 
Transit/Transportation Program that will: Consolidate current federal transit/transportation programs 
into a National Transit/Transportation Program; Create further tax incentives to aid the construction and 
use of public transit; Amend the Income Tax Act to permit employers to provide transit benefits to 
employees on an income tax exempt status. A personal income tax exemption gives employers the 
incentive to offer transit benefits to their employees. This in turn, motivates drivers to use public transit; 
Encourage the expansion of the ‘Ecopass’ and ‘Passe Partout’ Programs, currently a federal pilot 
program in the National Capital Region, to other federal employees to allow payroll deductions for the 
purchase of transit passes; Treat employer-provided free parking in large urban centres as a taxable 
benefit where there is readily accessible public transit. Taxes collected under this method should be 
dedicated to transit programs; Consider tax incentives to Canadian companies that implement traffic 
reduction programs such as shuttle services from main transit intersections to places of work; and Invest 
in a high-speed inter-city rail network with upgraded railway infrastructure, including grade separations 
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and traffic control systems. A National Transit/Transportation Program will have specific criteria, 
performance measures, rigorous evaluation and monitoring of all projects funded under this program” 
(p. 16) 
Transport Canada. (2002). Urban 
transit in Canada: Taking 
stock. Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs6: “The National Vision calls for a 50% increase in transit over the next 20 years, with the 
demand for transit growing faster than the Canadian population … This would represent a tremendous 
challenge for all concerned. To even make the attempt would require a systematic assessment of the 
factors that influence transit demand and a concerted effort to improve and adjust practices and policies 
related to these factors. For example: Policies that recognize and support transit’s integral role in 
creating a sustainable transportation system would be needed at all levels of government; Transit 
priority measures (tools to improve the … performance of transit vehicles through congested urban 
streets) would need to be the standard rather than the exception; Policies that allow flexibility of zoning 
requirements with respect to parking and development intensity adjacent to transit facilities would need 
to be established by urban municipalities; Policies that facilitate increased urban density would need to 
be researched, developed and implemented; Policies to integrate transit efficiency and service 
considerations into land use decisions would be needed at the municipal level; Improvements would be 
needed to transit service availability and reliability to a level as yet not obtained in Canada; Rapid Transit 
infrastructure development would be needed to ensure that transit could be competitive, particularly in 
a congested traffic environment; [and Policies that provide for increased charges for car use such as 
road tolls, complementary congestion charges, license surcharges and parking surcharges would be 
needed” (p. 8-9) 
3Programs7: “Two basic types of programs to address the gap [in capital funding for transit] would be 
needed: 1) Large-scale infrastructure programs geared to the needs of the large transit agencies and 
residents of the urban areas they serve. Over 70% of capital funding would likely be for rapid transit 
projects in the three largest urban regions and the nine mid-to-large sized transit systems; [and] 
Programs to assist with vehicle purchase and small infrastructure projects for all transit agencies” (p. 9) 
3Programs8: “Some forms of service delivery beyond the conventional municipal public transit system 
could also possibly result in lower operating costs. However, this approach must be carefully studied so 
as not to disrupt the needed integration of all services in a given urban area. Transit service must be 
seamless to the user. Experience in other countries such as Australia has shown that quality of service 
and level of service can be adversely affected by such arrangements it care is not taken to address these 
issues in an ongoing manner. These Alternate Service Delivery …  options generally involve various 
degrees of contracting-out different elements of the transit system” (p. 82) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2003). Urban transit: 
3Programs9: “Demand-related, cost-based, reliable, multi-year funding sources are required which will 
overcome the [transit capital] shortfall and provide a firm basis for achieving improved transportation in 
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An essential factor. Paper 
prepared for presentation at 
the opening session of the 
2003 Annual Conference of 
the Transportation 
Association of Canada. St. 
John’s, Newfoundland and 
Labrador.  
the area. Among the possible sources identified are the following: Increased municipal charges including 
property taxes and development charges; transfers from senior governments; Transportation user fees, 
based on full costs for fuel, road space, parking, vehicle registrations, etc., with the revenues dedicated 
to fund transportation improvements. It was concluded that a combination of funding sources will be 
required while recognizing that there is little or no scope for increased municipal charges and that 
transfers from senior governments require multi-year continuity and local coordination to be truly 
effective” (p. 8) 
3Programs10: “Reliable, multi-year funding is required, at levels which will address existing funding 
shortfalls such as, for example, those that have been identified for the [GTHA] urban area; and an 
institutional/governance arrangement is required to achieve integrated planning, funding and delivery 
of transportation and related land use for the entire urban region. For urban regions involving more 
than one municipal government, this will require either municipal amalgamation to achieve a single 
municipal government or (more likely) development of a coordinating Transportation Agency with the 
necessary planning, funding and delivery powers, working with existing municipal and provincial 
agencies and transportation providers as well as the private sector” (p. 10) 
Transport Canada. (2003). Straight 
Ahead: A Vision for 
Transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs11: “Preserving surplus rail corridors for subsequent use by urban transit is a potential 
concern in large urban centres. A railway line that is no longer required for freight service must first be 
offered for continued railway operations, then to governments for a price no greater than net salvage 
value (NSV). The government proposes to retain this approach to corridor valuation. Urban transit 
authorities, which, in some urban areas, serve several municipalities, have no right to receive such 
offers. In the interests of protecting corridors that may be required for urban transit, the government 
agrees with the recommendation of the CTA Review Panel to amend the Act to require an offer of sale 
to urban transit authorities before municipal governments. The current discontinuance provisions do 
not technically include railway passenger stations, ‘spurs’ or ‘sidings’, some of which are of sufficient 
length to have potential use for commuter rail. The Government proposes that railways be required to 
offer these line segments and passenger stations to governments and urban transit authorities before 
removing them from service” (p. 35) 
3Programs12: “The government’s interest in investigating alternative governance models for road 
infrastructure and urban transit should not create an expectation of change in its policy with regard to 
excise taxation of fuels. Some stakeholders advocate federal spending on highways based on the fact 
that federal revenue from fuel used in transportation is not returned to the sector, contrasting this with 
the U.S. government’s dedication of revenues from fuel taxes and user fees to highways, transport 
infrastructure and urban transit. Federal fuel taxes are an instrument of fiscal, not transportation policy 
and are an important source of general revenue, used to finance many federal spending priorities, 
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including health care, social security and national defence” (p. 53) 
3Programs13: “Ensuring adequate funding urban transportation is a major challenge for Canadian cities. 
Urban transportation projects are already eligible for funding under the Canada Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund, as well as the $2 billion Infrastructure Canada program announced in 2000. In the Speech from the 
Throne, the government announced that it will put in place a 10-year program for infrastructure. This 
program, under the leadership of the Minister Responsible for Infrastructure, will contribute to reducing 
congestion in our cities” (p. 55) 
3Programs14: “To promote more sustainable urban transportation systems, transportation planners 
recommend a combination of options, such as demand management to optimize the use of existing 
transportation infrastructure, active promotion of alternatives to private vehicle use (such as expansion 
of infrastructure to permit walking and bicycling) and strategic investments in infrastructure to support 
urban transit systems. Other investment options include road and rail grade separations … which can 
reduce traffic delays and lower … greenhouse gas emissions, and urban bypasses, which can help 
diminish congestion in urban centres while contribution to trade and national competitiveness by 
permitting through traffic to avoid congested areas” (p. 55)  
Transport Canada. (2004). Review 
of international urban 
transportation policy 
frameworks,strategies and 
governance models. 
Metropolitan Knowledge 
International. Toronto, ON. 
3Programs15: “The role of the federal government [internationally] in linking land use strategies with 
transportation planning and funding generally mirrors the degree to which the federal government is 
involved with local government. In the UK and France the government exercises a relatively high degree 
of control on broad land use/transportation policy. In the US the involvement is specific to federal 
objectives but also relates land use and transportation. The Swiss government sets out a land use 
strategy but only for guidance. In Australia there is little connection between national transportation 
objectives and state level and use policies” (p. 17) 
3Programs16: “Funding decisions are always made by multiple levels of government, either through 
intergovernmental partnerships or through lower levels submitting project proposals and/or 
transportation budgets. All surveyed countries use a measure of efficiency to evaluate and prioritize 
project proposals, though cost-recovery is seldom used as a funding criteria” (p. 43) 
3Programs17: “Urban transportation issues are approached from perspectives that can inform the 
Canadian context, but must be viewed from wider economic, geographic, and historical-political 
standpoints. France and Switzerland have constitutional structures and cultural or social differences that 
make comparison difficult. The United States has a well funded conditional grant structure that offers 
excellent experiences from which to learn. The UK demonstrates a system with a strong central 
government dealing directly with local authorities, a model for some discussion, but one that would 
require constitutional change in Canada. Australia, while most comparable from the perspective of 
government structure and geography, has not identified urban transportation as a federal issue. New 
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Zealand is of a scale that minimizes regional differences and allows for some unique structures for the 
delivery of urban transportation services” (p. 55) 
3Programs18: “Funding for capital expenditures on urban transportation is also provided by all national 
governments to local authorities – though local authorities vary in their powers from near-autonomy 
(Switzerland) to central government agencies (France). Yet in all survey countries, national governments 
have a role in determining funding priorities and in distributing capital funds for major infrastructure” (p. 
56) 
Transport Canada. (2005). Case 
Study 32: Urban 
transportation pricing 
options. Urban 
Transportation Showcase 
Program.  Case Studies in 
Urban Transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs19: “The four major avenues for urban transportation pricing options are vehicle use pricing, 
road pricing, parking pricing and transit pricing. The many tools that could be applied in each of these 
areas have clear benefits for urban quality of life, but vary in their feasibility, acceptability, cost, 
effectiveness, equity and side-effects” (p. 1) 
Transport Canada. (2005). Case 
Study 34: Monitoring 
progress toward sustainable 
transportation. Urban 
Transportation Showcase 
Program, Case Studies in 
Urban Transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs20: “To be useful, objectives should be measurable and reflect a desired change in baseline 
conditions over a specific timeframe. Even then, the dynamic cause-and-effect relationships among 
goals, objectives and indicators may not always be explicitly understood or defined, and judgment and 
intuitive understanding may be needed to interpret monitoring results. For example, one can only 
approximate the degree to which a drop in transportation energy use is due to transit ridership growth 
rather than improved auto fuel efficiency, or the degree to which an increase in transit ridership growth 
is due to improved service levels rather than rising fuel prices” (p. 3) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2005). Urban transportation 
in Canada: Needs and 
opportunities. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Programs21: “[Federal transit] funding must be: Long-term, stable and sustainable. These 
characteristics are necessary to allow jurisdictions to undertake longer term planning and strategic 
investment in urban areas; Equitable, flexible and balanced. Funding should account for local needs and 
priorities and new funding should not be at the expense of investment in rural areas; Combined with 
good governance. Funding should be complemented by a governance structure that ensures 
coordinated planning with a responsible, accountable, transparent framework for all levels of 
government and independent transportation authorities” (p. 2) 
3Programs22: “Individually and collectively, Deputy Ministers of Transportation have elevated urban 
transportation as an important issue to discuss with a view to finding solutions to urban transportation 
problems while strengthening federal/provincial/territorial cooperation in this domain. The Council of 
Deputy Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety directed the establishment of a 
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Task Force to explore urban transportation issues and exchange information on urban transportation 
policy matters” (p. 4) 
3Programs23: “Infrastructure needs exceed the funding capacity of traditional partners – the users, the 
municipalities and provincial governments. New sources of funding and innovative funding 
arrangements must be found in order to address the substantial needs within urban areas. The federal 
government has committed to a ‘New Deal’ for cities and communities that would include new funding 
and a new partnership with provincial and territorial governments in collaboration with municipal 
governments. While the details of the deal have yet to be revealed, the Task Force has identified two 
key considerations that must be resolved in the establishment of a ‘New Deal’. These are funding 
arrangements and governance matters” (p. 14) 
3Programs24: “In some provinces, urban transit is the exclusive responsibility of municipalities and fare 
revenues and municipal funding are the sole sources of transit funding. In other provinces, government 
support directly targets capital expenditures and operation of services while in other cases the provinces 
do not systematically pay direct subsidies for capital or operating expenditures, favouring other modes 
of financing such as unconditional grant allocations. Some provinces also assume direct responsibilities 
for services. This is the case in Ontario where the provincial government recently took back 
responsibility for GO (Government of Ontario) Transit. Four provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, 
Ontario, Québec) have established financing formulae that involve the collection of motorists’ fees or 
fuel taxes that are then dedicated to public transit and transportation. In BC, a dedicated tax of 11.5 
cents per L on fuel sold within the Greater Vancouver Regional District is directed toward transportation. 
In October 2004, Ontario began transferring one cent per litre of its provincial gas tax for transit capital 
projects across the province. This transfer will increase to one and a half cents per litre in October 2005 
and two cents per litre in October 2006. This will impact the provincial funding share for public transit in 
Ontario” (p. 14-15) 
3Programs25: “The federal government has already committed to a rebate on the goods and services 
tax for municipalities and this represents another means to reduce the burden on municipal 
governments and allow room for new investment in urban infrastructure. Existing capital funding 
program partnerships should be continued and new ones should also be established. Even with tax 
rebates and revenue sharing, there will continue to be tremendous need for investment and there will 
always be strategic projects where additional federal investment will be essential” (p. 17) 
3Programs26: “Emerging from the needs, priorities and principles discussed above, the Task Force has 
identified a set of recommendations that should be considered by all governments. The 
recommendations received the endorsement of the Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation 
and Highway Safety in September 2004. [These include:] 1. Recognizing the importance of urban areas, 
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the federal government should provide sustainable, predictable, long-term funding to support urban 
transportation investment. 2. All orders of government must recognize that amongst competing urban 
infrastructure needs, the specific needs of transportation, including transit, are significant and merit a 
proportional share of new investment. 3. Governments must take action to improve transportation and 
travel time for freight and passengers in urban areas through increased investment, transportation 
demand management, improved planning processes and the use of advanced technology. 4. While 
respecting provincial and territorial jurisdiction and planning priorities, all orders of government must 
find ways to work together more effectively to improve transportation and mobility in urban areas. 
Opportunities for collaboration beyond funding partnerships should be explored. 5. All governments 
should pursue opportunities to promote awareness of the importance of sustainable urban 
transportation and transportation choices to the economy, the environment and social lives of 
Canadians” (p. 21-22) 
Transport Canada. (2006). An 
evalution of Transport 
Canada’s Moving On 
Sustainable Transportation 
Program. Departmental 
Evaluation Services. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Programs27: “The MOST Program, originally named the Sustainable Transportation Fund (STF), was 
launched in 1999 as part of the department’s first Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), a three-year 
strategy that outlines challenges and commitments through which TC can better integrate sustainable 
development into its activities. This program supports projects that produce education, awareness, and 
analytical tools needed to make sustainable transportation a viable option for Canadians. The program is 
currently in its second phase with $2.5 million in funding to be allocated over the 2002 – 2007 period” 
(p. ii) 
3Programs28: “The MOST Program provided contributions to 46 projects that involved the development 
of studies/analyses, tools/practices, demonstration pilot projects, workshops/seminars, and 
education/outreach programs. These projects addressed a wide range of sustainable transportation 
issues such as public transit, urban planning and smart growth, and transportation demand 
management and employer programs” (p. iii) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2009). Urban transit in 
Canada: Taking stock of 
recent progress. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Programs29: “Annual federal investments in public transit infrastructure have increased significantly in 
recent years and are projected to reach an estimated $1 billion in fiscal year 2008/2009. Furthermore, 
there is significant potential for more funding to be invested in transit in the future, under the  
$33-billion Building Canada Plan, if provinces and territories choose to give priority to transit over other 
infrastructure investments. Between 2001 and 2005, the federal government launched significant 
infrastructure funding programs that included public transit as an eligible category. The Infrastructure 
Canada Program, Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund, and Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund 
collectively represented a commitment of $8.25 billion. Of that amount, approximately $1.84 billion will 
be invested in public transit between 2002 and 2014” (p. 17) 
3Programs30: “The Gas Tax Fund (GTF), announced in 2005, committed $5 billion to environmentally 
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sustainable municipal infrastructure from 2005 to 2010. Budget 2007 committed another $8 billion from 
2010 to 2014. The GTF is a major source of predictable long-term federal funding. Municipalities select 
eligible projects within program parameters, and public transit is an eligible category. In fiscal years 
2005/6 and 2006/7, approximately 25 per cent of committed spending, or $217 million, was allocated to 
public transit. In fiscal year 2007/8, 29 per cent of the Gas Tax Fund, or a total of $270 million, was 
allocated to public transit. Some major urban areas have allocated 100 per cent of their GTF allotments 
to public transit. For example, for the period 2005-2010, Toronto, Metro Vancouver, and Edmonton 
allotted $407 million, $307 million, and $108 million respectively to transit. The $400-million Public 
Transit Fund (PTF) supported investments in public transit infrastructure from the fiscal years 2005-
2006” (p. 17) 
3Programs31: “The first Public Transit Capital Trust, which was announced in Budget 2006, provided 
$900 million from 2006 to 2009 to support capital investments in public transit and infrastructure, as a 
means to reduce traffic congestion, as well as carbon dioxide and other emissions. In addition, Budget 
2006 provided $1.5 billion for the ecoTrust, which was designed to support provincial and territorial 
climate change agendas, including transit. Budget 2006 also created the Public Transit Tax Rebate for 
transit pass users, the scope of which was extended in Budget 2007” (p. 17) 
3Programs32: “Building Canada plan components include: The $8.8-billion Building Canada Fund (BCF), 
under which public transit is particularly prioritized, along with clean water and sewage treatment 
infrastructure, the core National Highway System, and green energy. The Fund also has dedicated 
funding for projects in communities with populations of less than 100,000; The Gas Tax Fund, which will 
provide $2 billion per year by 2010, and a total of $11.8 billion by 2014; A full Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) rebate for municipalities, providing $5.8 billion in additional flexible funding by 2014 will allow 
them to devote more money to priorities, such as transit; The $2.275-billion Provincial/Territorial Base 
Funding Initiative, which provides each jurisdiction with $25 million per year to support core 
infrastructure priorities; [and] the $1.25-billion Public-Private Partnerships Fund (P3s) will be awarded to 
projects on a merit basis” (p. 18) 
3Programs33: “Budget 2008 announced the creation of the $500-million Public Transit Capital Trust 
2008, which provides supplementary funding to support capital investment projects in public transit 
infrastructure. Allocated on a provincial-territorial per capita basis, the Trust will finance projects such as 
such as rapid transit, rail, transit buses, and high occupancy vehicle and bicycle lanes. Furthermore, 
Budget 2008 confirmed the GTF as an annual $2 billion permanent measure, taking effect as of 2014, 
providing municipalities with predictable, long term, sustainable funding that will help provinces plan 
and finance their infrastructure needs” (p. 18) 
3Programs34: “The new $4-billion Infrastructure Stimulus Fund will provide support for 
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provincial/territorial and municipal infrastructure rehabilitation projects, including transit. Funding will 
be available for two years for projects that will begin construction in 2009/10. The federal government 
will fund up to 50 per cent of eligible project costs” (p. 18) 
3Programs35: “To accelerate the construction of community projects, Budget 2009 provided up to $500 
million in new funding over two years under the Communities Component of the BCF. Also, payments 
under the Provincial/Territorial Base Funding initiative will be accelerated; for the next two years, up to 
$1 billion of this federal funding will be brought forward and will be available for infrastructure projects, 
including urban transportation projects. Budget 2009 identified two public transit projects for potential 
acceleration of infrastructure spending, namely Union Station revitalization in Toronto and the 
Evergreen Line in Vancouver, and also announced that the P3 Fund will include an initial call for 
applications in 2009/10. Transit projects are considered an eligible category” (p. 19) 
3Programs36: “Some provinces are introducing new governance models within their metropolitan 
areas. These models encourage region-wide coordination of land use and transportation planning and 
decision-making. It is argued that such practices by regional authorities can resolve inefficiencies and 
inequities in the provision of government services and will ultimately be favourable to transit” (p. 29) 
3Programs37: “Urban Transportation Task Force members have shared information about TDM 
measures being used in their jurisdictions. The information compiled includes practices relating to: 
education, promotion and outreach; travel incentives and disincentives; sustainable travel options; and 
supportive land use practices, among others. It is evident from the extensive compilation that all 
jurisdictions in Canada have begun implementing transportation demand management in one form or 
another” (p. 30) 
Urban Transit Task Force. (2010). 
Recent developments in 
transit in Canadian cities: 
Report of the Urban Transit 
Task Force to the Ministers of 
Transportation. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Programs38: “In 2009 the Urban Transit Task Force (UTTF) presented a report to Ministers of 
Transportation on the state of transit in Canada, based on data from 2006-07. That report updated an 
earlier study released in 2005. Last year’s report presented a picture of increased government 
investment in transit, increased demand for transit, innovative governance models, and the funding 
challenges facing transit systems. At their meeting in 2009, Ministers asked to be updated regularly on 
the status of transit in Canada” (p. 2) 
3Programs39: “Federal investments in public transit have greatly increased since the beginning of the 
decade, with over $5 billion in federal funding invested in transit infrastructure since 2000-01. In fiscal 
2008-09, total federal investments in transit amounted to $1 billion. Federal funding is provided through 
various mechanisms, all of which emphasize respect for the primary provincial and municipal jurisdiction 
over public transit. In 2008-09, over 30 per cent of the transfer of federal gas tax funds to municipalities 
($285 million) was allocated to public transit. Cities such as Toronto and Vancouver have allocated all of 
their gas tax fund allotments to public transit projects” (p. 10) 
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Ruffilli, D. (2010). Federal support 
for bus rapid transit and light 
rail transit systems in Canada. 
Library of Parliament. 
Industry, Infrastructure, and 
Resources Division. 
Parliamentary Information 
and Research Service. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs40: “This support for public transit takes the form of transfers of federal and provincial gas 
tax revenue to municipalities as well as targeted, cost-shared infrastructure funding. This funding is not 
coordinated through any national transit strategy … Canada is the only G8 country without a federal 
policy of long-term, predictable transit investment” (p. 1) 
3Programs41: “In February 2009, the governments of Canada, Ontario and Quebec announced that a 
contract had been awarded to EcoTrain Consortium to update the feasibility study for high-speed rail in 
the Québec–Windsor corridor. Although no decision has been made to date whether to develop an 
interurban high-speed rail network in Ontario and Quebec, several of the rapid transit projects being 
planned and constructed in the region include inter-modal nodes in their designs” (p. 6) 
3Programs42: “Part of the Government of Canada’s Building Canada Plan announced in the 2007 federal 
budget, the Provincial/Territorial Base Funding Initiative provides $175 million to each province and 
territory for investment in its infrastructure.51 The initiative is cost-shared with provinces and 
territories. Federal funding is provided up front without a requirement to use the funding in the year in 
which it was provided, in order to maximize flexibility. Funding under this initiative may be used for 
construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure in almost all Building Canada Fund eligible categories, as 
well as for Highway System infrastructure” (p. 8) 
Ministry of Finance. (2011). 
Evaluation of the Public 
Transit Tax Credit. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Programs43: “The Public Transit Tax Credit (PTTC) was introduced in Budget 2006 to encourage 
individuals to make a sustained commitment to public transit use and to reduce traffic congestion by 
providing a tax credit for the cost of public transit passes. The PTTC was part of a broader government 
strategy to promote a cleaner, healthier environment, which also included major investments in public 
transit infrastructure. The Government acknowledged at the time that the success of the credit would in 
part depend upon transit authorities’ willingness to continue to work to boost ridership through quality 
service and low fares—two of the factors that affect the demand for public transit” (p. 1) 
3Programs44: “The PTTC, which reduces the cost for individuals of using public transit by up to 15%, is 
delivered directly to transit users through the tax system. For the credit to be effective in providing an 
incentive to use public transit, the benefits from the credit must not be reduced or eliminated by 
coincidental increases in public transit fares. The fact that public transit fares have remained relatively 
stable following the introduction of the PTTC suggests that public transit users have been the main 
beneficiaries of the credit” (p. 2) 
3Programs45: “The PTTC applies to eligible transit passes purchased for travel in the current taxation 
year. An eligible transit pass is one that allows travel for an extended period of time. This includes 
annual and monthly passes, and, since 2007, weekly passes purchased for a period of at least four 
consecutive weeks, as well as electronic fare cards used for at least 32 one-way trips in a month. 
Individuals can claim trips taken by bus, ferry, subway, train or tram. There is no limit on the amount 
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that may be claimed. The credit applies to individuals who purchase public transit passes for use within 
Canada. It may be claimed by taxfilers on behalf of themselves, their spouse or common-law partner, 
and their children who are under age 19 at the end of the taxation year” (p. 2-3) 
3Programs46: “Capital spending by transit operators grew substantially over the second part of the last 
decade due to major increases in funding from all levels of government. While public transit falls under 
the jurisdiction of the provinces, territories and municipalities, the federal government has made 
significant investments in this area through a number of infrastructure funding programs in partnership 
with other levels of government. Since 2006, close to $5 billion in federal funding has been provided in 
support of public transit infrastructure projects across Canada, leveraging investments of $7.9 billion 
from other funding partners. This includes funding for public transit through one-time initiatives such as 
the Public Transit Trusts in Budget 2006 and Budget 2008. In addition, $1.1 billion in investments have 
been made in public transit infrastructure since 2006 through the Gas Tax Fund. According to CUTA data, 
capital spending by public transit operators from 2006 to 2010 averaged $3.3 billion annually, compared 
to about $1.2 billion annually from 2001 to 2005” (p. 21-22) 
Infrastructure Canada (2012). 
Infrastructure spotlight: 
Improving public transit for 
the 21
st
 century. Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs47: “For many years, the Government of Canada has worked with other orders of 
government to support key transit infrastructure projects throughout the GTA. This includes federal 
funding commitments of over $1 billion through the Building Canada Fund for projects such as the 
Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension, investments in the GO Transit rail and bus networks, as well as 
the revitalization of Toronto’s Union Station, Canada's busiest passenger facility.Under the 
Infrastructure Stimulus Fund, part of Canada’s Economic Action Plan, the federal government provided 
over $101 million in additional funding towards important transit projects in the GTA. These include 
enhancements to the City of Toronto's transit system, a transit facility in Oakville, and a new intermodal 
‘Mobility Hub’ in Brampton. In addition, since 2005, the municipalities of the GTA have used over $550 
million of their federal Gas Tax Fund allocations towards transit investments. These significant and 
strategic investments ensure that Canada’s largest metropolitan region can benefit, now and in the 
future, from a modern and more efficient public transit system that improves the region’s quality of life 
and competitiveness” (p. 3) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2012). Sustainable 
funding for urban/regional 
transportation in Canada. TAC 
Briefing. Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs48: “Effective incentives for both sustainable transportation and sustainable land use 
therefore depend on having reliable, long-term funding sources for urban and regional transportation 
and sources that also provide direct pricing signals encouraging more sustainable travel behaviour. Such 
pricing signals and related incentives to use the system more efficiently provide a powerful tool box for 
implementing transportation demand management (TDM), a major policy instrument for achieving 
sustainable transportation” (p. 3) 
3Programs49: “If scaled up from the GTHA to all Canadian CMAs, the estimated yield [for ‘Federal and 
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Provincial Urban Infrastructure Funding’] is not necessarily more than current funding levels allocated in 
recent years by the federal and provincial governments for urban and regional transit/transportation. 
On this matter, for example, the federal government already provides significant funding through the $2 
billion per year Gas Tax Fund for municipal infrastructure, which includes urban transit and 
transportation infrastructure, and several provinces provide in excess of $1 billion per year for urban 
and regional transit/transportation infrastructure” (p. 8) 
Tweed, Mervin . (2012). Study on 
transit in Canada: report of 
the Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities. House of 
Commons of Canada Standing 
Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities. Ottawa, ON.  
3Programs50: “The apparent transit infrastructure gap in Canada gave rise to a private member’s bill in 
support of a National Transit Strategy for Canada in the first session of the 41st Parliament. According to 
the bill’s sponsor, the bill asked “the federal government to take a leadership role to bring different 
levels of government and transit authorities together … and say what a long-term plan would be.” All 
members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities 
(hereafter “the Committee”), including the bill’s sponsor, agreed to study the question of a National 
Transit Strategy in September 2011. The Committee convened 12 meetings and received oral and 
written comments from 20 stakeholders on the subject of a potential National Transit Strategy” (p. 2) 
3Programs51: “In recognition of the need to intensify investment in transit, the Government of Canada 
has made unprecedented contributions to transit systems in the past decade. The federal contributions 
to transit have largely been through infrastructure programs intended for ‘incremental’ projects, i.e., 
new projects that would not have otherwise happened without federal involvement. One major funding 
instrument was the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund, of which approximately $1.5 billion was 
invested in transit infrastructure. Since 2006, the Government of Canada has directly committed 
approximately $5 billion towards transit across Canada through other infrastructure programs, including 
the Building Canada Fund, the Infrastructure Stimulus Program, the ecoMobility Program, the Public-
Private Partnership (P3) Canada Fund,34 and the Green Municipal Fund” (p. 6) 
3Programs52: “Smaller federal program investments have been used by municipalities to purchase 
buses, construct rights-of-way and dedicated transit signals, and introduce Intelligent Transportation 
System technologies. The Building Canada Fund expires in 2014 and consultations on a new 
infrastructure program are forthcoming” (p. 6) 
3Programs53: “The other major component of federal funding for transit is transfers of federal gas tax 
revenues to provinces and municipalities. The Gas Tax Fund, which was established in 1996, amounts to 
$2 billion per year Canada-wide and is distributed according to population to support environmentally 
sustainable infrastructure. The federal gas tax transfers give recipients more flexibility than the 
infrastructure programs because the federal government is not involved in project selection and does 
not require cost-sharing from other governments. Approximately $1 billion of the gas tax transfers have 
been spent on transit projects since 2006. The Government of Canada recently made the gas tax 
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transfers permanent in legislation” (p. 7) 
3Programs54: “The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to recognize the 
need to form a strong partnership with the provinces, the territories, municipalities, as it has by 
launching a formal engagement process on the long-term infrastructure plan” (p. 15) 
3Programs55: “Infrastructure Canada officials commented on whether the Government of Canada 
should establish different criteria or triggers in the project approval process during their first appearance 
before the Committee. The Committee learned that the only thing the Government of Canada requires 
from its partners is that they commit to covering any operating losses in their totality. The effect of 
establishing financial criteria in the project approval process would be that funding would be awarded 
only to larger transit systems. Any projects outside of larger cities would likely automatically be 
excluded. Furthermore, Infrastructure Canada suggested that establishing a cost-recovery threshold 
could give municipalities incentives to defer maintenance or increase fares in order to improve its ratio” 
(p. 17) 
Transport Canada. (2012). 
Improving bus services: 
Modest investments to 
increase transit ridership. Gris 
Orange Consultant. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Programs56: “Planning for bus service is more effective when it relies on a comprehensive and 
strategic approach. The primary purpose is to form an integrated and efficient network of transit 
services, combining bus service with other modes of transportation (both public and private) and urban 
development policies” (p. 7) 
3Programs57: “Branding and marketing strategies have become a critical component of transit 
improvement projects. These strategies are intended to build a distinct brand identity for a bus service 
by emphasizing its distinctive features and benefits, and presenting it as a ‘premium’ transportation 
alternative. Branding, market research activities and social marketing are among the list of possibilities” 
(p. 8) 
3Programs58: “A bus service can significantly benefit from the introduction of right-of-way and other 
measures that reallocate road space by giving priority to transit vehicles and increase the 
competitiveness of buses. By allowing buses to bypass traffic congestion, the service gains in speed and 
reliability. There exists a variety of transit priority measures and right-of-ways along which the bus can 
operate, such as dedicated right-of-ways, bus lanes and transit priority systems” (p. 8) 
3Programs59: “Harmonizing provincial, regional and local governments’ transportation plans, strategies 
and budgets is crucial to create a supportive framework to improve the general functioning of transit 
systems. Land-use planning, road construction and regulation, major private and public events are 
intricately linked to transit use. Employers and various agencies can also mutually benefit from transit 
use by capitalizing on programs that seek to broaden transportation services from the workplace such as 
car-pooling, park-and-ride or bike-and-ride facilities, financial incentives, etc. For transit authorities in 
particular, this collaboration translates into intermodal coordination where transit vehicles from 
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different networks synchronize their scheduling or ticketing methods to provide complementary 
services” (p. 21) 
Standing Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities. (2015). 
Updating infrastructure in 
Canada: An examination of 
needs and investments. 
Report of the House of 
Commons of Canada Standing 
Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities (Larry, Miller, 
Chair). Ottawa, ON. 
3Programs60: “Budget 2015 proposes new merit-based public transit funding in the amount of $750 
million over two years starting in 2017-2018, and $1 billion annually thereafter. The new public transit 
funding would be administered by PPP Canada, the federal P3 agency, in support of projects that 
demonstrate more value for money for taxpayers as public-private partnerships. The terms and 
conditions of the proposed new public transit funds have not been announced. Major transit P3s in 
Edmonton, Winnipeg, Kitchener-Waterloo, York, Toronto and Ottawa are already underway. What the 
Committee heard from stakeholders about P3s is discussed in more detail in the following section” (p. 
11) 
3
rd
 Era 
Frames 
Paul Martin. (2002). Speech by the 
Honourable Paul Martin, 
Minister of Finance for 
Canada, to members of the 
Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities. Hamilton, ON. 
3Frames1: “The challenges you face were intensified after the fiscal belt-tightening that has taken place 
in recent years by provincial and federal governments alike. Let’s just take two examples: housing and 
urban transit. Both present daunting challenges that simply must be tackled in order to secure the 
quality of life we all desire for the future. But the solutions – that is to say, the development of 
affordable rental accommodation and the required investment in new transit infrastructure – are simply 
beyond the capacities of local governments acting alone” (p. 3) 
3Frames2: “The simple fact is that the country’s infrastructure needs exceed the capacity of the three 
orders of government to fund them adequately in the short term. Therefore, the last suggestion I would 
raise today arises out of the fact that countries all over the world are showing that innovative 
partnerships with the private sector make it possible to use public money more effectively by leveraging 
billions in private investment” (p. 8) 
3Frames3: “What we need to do now is get to work. To move from concept to reality - to strike the New 
Deal. We’ve all seen good ideas, backed by the best of intentions, crash against the coral reefs of 
entrenched ways and attitudes. We can’t let that happen here. The stakes are simply too high. The 
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opportunities associated with success too great. More and more of our future together as Canadians will 
be built – brick by brick, idea by idea – at the local level. Our speed at innovating on the ground – in 
practices, in financing and in partnerships – will be one of the keys to Canada's success in a very 
competitive world” (p. 9-10) 
Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force 
on Urban Issues. (2002). 
Canada’s Urban Strategy: A 
Blueprint for Action. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Frames4: “Canada has the capacity to be a world leader in new infrastructure design; that is, office 
buildings, transit systems, water and sewage treatment plants, that meet reduced targets of greenhouse 
gas emissions, and which are environmentally ‘clean’ in accordance with international agreements such 
as the Kyoto Protocol. We have the expertise and the resources to place Canada in the forefront of 
technology and innovation” (p. 2-3) 
3Frames5: “The broad objective for a National Transportation/Transit Program is to facilitate 
implementation of sustainable transportation defined by the Centre for Sustainable Transportation as a 
system that: Allows the basic needs of individuals to be met safely and in a manner consistent with 
human and ecosystem health, and with equity within and between generations; Is affordable, operates 
efficiently, offers a choice of transport mode, and supports a vibrant economy; Limits emissions and 
waste within the planet’s ability to absorb them, minimizes consumption of nonrenewable resources, 
limits consumption of renewable resources to the sustainable level of yield, reuses and recycles its 
components, and minimizes the use of land and the production of noise” (p. 15) 
Transport Canada. (2002). Urban 
transit in Canada: Taking 
stock. Ottawa, ON. 
3Frames6: “Where urban transit was once viewed as a local matter with limited impacts beyond the 
immediate municipality, there is a growing recognition in Canadian society that improving and 
expanding public transit is a key element in moving towards a more sustainable transportation system. 
Citizens and agencies across Canada are discovering that urban transportation without extensive transit 
is not a desirable future. Public transit is also recognized as an important component in reducing 
greenhouse gases and meeting Canada’s environmental commitments” (p. 11) 
3Frames7: “The wide variation in the physical, social and cultural geography of Canada's cities results in 
transit infrastructure projects that are unique to each city. Before deciding which projects to invest in, it 
is important that comprehensive economic analysis tools be used to assist with choosing the most 
effective projects” (p. 92) 
3Frames8: “Should efforts be made and funding provided in order that the future vision for transit can 
be achieved? To answer this question, it must be asked what the alternatives are? Is the future of 
transportation in urban Canada an extrapolation of today or will it include an enhanced transit 
component? Most researchers and observers agree that transit will need to play an expanded role in 
urban transportation if economic growth, congestion, sustainability and environmental issues are going 
to be tackled with a positive outcome. To do this will require work to begin on closing the resource gaps 
identified in this study. To accomplish this, governments at the municipal, provincial and federal level 
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will need to work together to identify resources and programs that can be used to close the capital and 
operating funding gaps. All levels of government should work together because economic growth, 
sustainability, air quality, etc. are all regional and national issues in scope and affect individual 
Canadians. Municipal agencies are generally responsible for delivering the service, however to do so 
they need the committed and sustained support from other levels of government in order to meet the 
goals of the National Vision” (p. 98) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2003). Urban transit: 
An essential factor. Paper 
prepared for presentation at 
the opening session of the 
2003 Annual Conference of 
the Transportation 
Association of Canada. St. 
John’s, Newfoundland and 
Labrador.  
3Frames9: “If the existing funding shortfalls for urban transportation and fragmented governance 
currently experienced in some CMAs are not addressed in the near future, Canadian urban areas face 
major environmental, economic and social risks affecting up to 80 percent of Canada’s population 
directly where they live and work” (p. 10) 
Transport Canada. (2003). Straight 
Ahead: A Vision for 
Transportation in Canada. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Frames10: “Urbanization, together with the ever-increasing amount of economic activity that 
originates in urban centres, is putting pressure on public transit and on road infrastructure. 
Transportation policy must address the challenges that growing congestion poses for the development 
of competitive cities and healthy communities” (p. 14) 
3Frames11: “The Panel offered bold, innovative concepts for new governance frameworks and new 
principles to guide investment, financing, costing and pricing decisions for roads and public transit. At 
the same time, the Panel acknowledged the debate about the role of the federal government and the 
complex jurisdictional and public ﬁnancing issues. While federal responsibility for highways and urban 
transportation is minimal, the government recognizes their contribution to trade, competitiveness and 
mobility for all regions of Canada. Good connections to facilities under federal jurisdiction and the best 
use of all transport modes are also important contributors to the overall efficiency of the transportation 
system” (p. 52) 
3Frames12: “Recognizing the success of the models now in place for the air, freight rail and marine 
modes, the government believes that innovative options for managing the enormous funding pressures 
associated with road transportation and urban transit should be explored with other levels of 
government and the private sector. New governance models – such as the introduction of 
transportation authorities and the possibility of earning user revenue for infrastructure investment, 
including the tolls now charged for some highways and bridges – afford an opportunity to address the 
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longstanding concern of provincial and territorial governments about a sustained funding regime for 
road infrastructure. While not minimizing the extent of public concerns in connection with these 
concepts, the successes achieved in other transportation modes call for at least a careful consideration 
of all possible options. The federal government is interested in pursuing consideration of these issues 
with provinces and territories” (p. 52-53) 
3Frames13: “The efficient and safe movement of people and goods is crucial for greenhouse gas 
reduction, ensuring a thriving economy and supporting the well-being of all Canadians. Traffic 
congestion is a major problem in larger urban areas. Concerted efforts are required to alleviate traffic 
congestion in urban areas and minimize its detrimental impact on the environment, economy and 
society” (p. 54) 
Transport Canada. (2004). Review 
of international urban 
transportation policy 
frameworks,strategies and 
governance models. 
Metropolitan Knowledge 
International. Toronto, ON. 
3Frames14: “The … Minister [of Transport] states that ‘transportation is fundamental to Canada’s 
economic prosperity and Canadians’ quality of life … we need to ensure our transportation system is 
efficient and able to adapt to new challenges … to ensure that our system is safe, secure and 
environmentally responsible’. These policy goals are virtually identical to those of the other six countries 
surveyed: competitiveness and innovation, supporting quality of life and sustainability, and recognizing 
the environmental impacts of transportation. While there is commonality in the basic goals of the six 
countries and Canada, it is clear from the information provided that the current issues in Canada 
regarding urban transportation funding are shared only to a limited degree by other countries and 
within the context that government revenue sharing is by its nature a contentious issue. It would appear 
that funding and responsibility arrangements are more a product of history, culture and constitutional 
arrangements than they are a reflection of common issues arising from land use and transportation 
problems in our cities. As in Canada, transportation is one of many competing priorities for funding and 
rarely is at the top of a national agenda” (p. 55) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2005). Urban transportation 
in Canada: Needs and 
opportunities. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Frames15: “The challenges faced by urban areas will require not only new funding but also a new 
partnership amongst orders of governments. Principles that could underlie an effective partnership 
unanimously supported by provincial respondents to a Task Force survey include: Federal programs 
should respect provincial and territorial jurisdiction and planning priorities; Federal funding programs 
should not be contingent upon matching funding from provinces and territories; There should be 
flexibility in program designs to accommodate programs that meet the needs of the jurisdictions” (p. 3) 
3Frames16: “Recognizing the importance of urban areas, the federal government should provide 
sustainable, predictable, long-term funding to support urban transportation investment … All orders of 
government must recognize that amongst competing urban infrastructure needs, the specific needs of 
transportation, including transit, are significant and merit a proportional share of new investment” (p. 3) 
3Frames17: “While respecting provincial and territorial jurisdiction and planning priorities, all orders of 
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government must find ways to work together more effectively to improve transportation and mobility in 
urban areas. Opportunities for collaboration beyond funding partnerships should be explored … All 
governments should pursue opportunities to promote awareness of the importance of sustainable 
urban transportation and transportation choices to the economy, the environment and social lives of 
Canadians” (p. 3) 
3Frames18: “[Investing in public transit] should increase the efficiency of goods movement in support of 
trade and the economy, reduce air pollution and environmental impacts and improve the quality of life 
and the social well being of Canadians living in urban areas. Public transit also serves a social mission: for 
people who do not have a car, it is often the only means of access to employment, health care, schools 
and other important activities” (p. 9) 
Transport Canada. (2006). An 
evalution of Transport 
Canada’s Moving On 
Sustainable Transportation 
Program. Departmental 
Evaluation Services. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3Frames19: “There was a high level of exposure about the Urban Transportation Project in local media, 
provincial websites and other environmental websites. Over 500,000 individuals were reached through 
consultations, surveys, and various other outreach activities. On average, BSD tracked over 1,400 unique 
visits per month to the project’s website. The BSD report anecdotally observed, ‘The words, Transit, 
Sustainable Development and Climate Change have been in our local media and in the conversations of 
our population more in the past year than in all of the 25 years I have lived in the city’” (p. 47) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2009). Urban transit in 
Canada: Taking stock of 
recent progress. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3Frames20: “Many positive impacts can be identified as a result of the unprecedented transit 
investments. Direct impacts include increasing ridership, new and expanded transit systems, and 
increasing fleet sizes with more accessible vehicles. Indirect impacts include improved accessibility, new 
urban developments that are often more transit-oriented, and many health, environmental, and 
economic benefits” (p. 1) 
3Frames21: “Emerging from the Urban Transportation Task Force’s review of the status of transit in 
Canada, recent investments and plans for the future, four recommendations are made. They are: 1. All 
levels of government need to work together to provide adequate funding to support transit, while 
respecting jurisdictional responsibilities. 2. Recent federal investments in public transit have supported 
national economic, social, and environmental priorities, and the federal government’s continued 
commitment to provide sustainable, predictable, long-term funding for transit is welcomed. 3. The 
movement of people and goods in urban areas must be improved through greater investment in transit, 
transportation demand management, improved planning processes, and the use of advanced 
technology. 4. All governments should promote transit use by raising public awareness of its economic, 
social, and environmental benefits” (p. 1-2) 
3Frames22: “While most major urban centres in Canada are experiencing population growth, some 
smaller communities are suffering population losses. Transit can be critical to maintaining viable and 
 298 
liveable smaller communities, often providing a much needed transportation option for all residents, but 
particularly for the elderly and low income residents” (p. 6) 
3Frames23: “Public transit is a provincial, territorial, and municipal area of responsibility. All federal 
engagement in public transit, including funding, is based on strict respect for jurisdiction” (p. 17) 
3Frames24: “The Building Canada plan is predicated on flexibility and respect for jurisdiction, meaning 
that the extent of funding dedicated to transit, or any other sector, is largely contingent on priorities 
established by the provincial/territorial and municipal sectors” (p. 18) 
3Frames25: “In response to the current economic climate, Budget 2009 provided approximately $12 
billion in new infrastructure stimulus over the next two fiscal years, and transit is an eligible recipient for 
much of this funding. In addition, approvals will be streamlined and funding accelerated under the 
Building Canada plan. The objective of these investments is to help Canada emerge from economic crisis 
with a more modern and greener infrastructure that is the foundation of sustainable, long-term 
economic growth” (p. 18) 
3Frames26: “Investments in transit can mean services are improved or expanded, which will improve 
access. Greater access may translate into increased ridership, increased mobility for transit-captive 
sectors of the population, and decreased use of, and reliance on, less efficient options such as the single-
occupancy automobile” (p. 23) 
3Frames27: “Access to new or improved transit services may encourage and attract new transit-
oriented development. With transit as a community focal point, those developments may also have 
more efficient land use patterns, with greater population density and services offered in a transit-
friendly form. More efficient land use patterns would allow transit systems to become more cost 
efficient and cost effective to operate” (p. 24) 
3Frames28: “With improved transit services, transit mode share may increase relative to the automobile 
mode, which could result in reduced congestion and reduced GHG and air pollutant emissions” (p. 24) 
3Frames29: “There is a strong economic case for public transit. Improving and expanding public transit 
systems can result in economic benefits. The availability of transit services can reduce the number of 
automobile trips and reduce congestion within urban centres, saving auto and transit commuters time 
and money, and making the movement of goods and people more effective and efficient. Less 
congested areas and areas that are well-served by transit are more appealing to businesses. Reducing 
travel delays, driving costs, and collision rates by reducing congestion are also clearly beneficial from an 
economic perspective” (p. 24) 
3Frames30: “For its part, the federal government is currently providing more funding for transit than 
ever before, having increased funding from about zero at the beginning of the decade to approximately 
$1 billion in fiscal year 2008/9; at the same time federal funding is based on strict respect for 
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jurisdiction” (p. 26) 
Ruffilli, D. (2010). Federal support 
for bus rapid transit and light 
rail transit systems in Canada. 
Library of Parliament. 
Industry, Infrastructure, and 
Resources Division. 
Parliamentary Information 
and Research Service. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Frames31: “As the cost of operating and expanding public transit systems is beyond the capacity of 
most municipalities to undertake on the basis of property taxes and transit fare revenues alone, the 
federal and provincial governments both provide funding to support public transit. Although public 
transit is not in federal jurisdiction, the Government of Canada has stated that investing in public transit 
“contributes to economic, environmental and social objectives” (p. 1) 
3Frames32: “In Canada, the choice of whether to employ BRT or LRT technology is made by individual 
communities. Under the federal government’s infrastructure programs, the particular transit technology 
to be used in a given project is ultimately the choice of the project proponent. As a result, given the 
relative merits of BRT and LRT, communities must reflect upon their current and future transit needs 
and their fiscal capacity to undertake the necessary capital investments when determining whether to 
adopt BRT or LRT as their preferred rapid transit technology” (p. 4) 
3Frames33: “Announced in the 2007 federal budget as part of the Government of Canada’s Building 
Canada Plan, the Building Canada Fund is an $8.8 billion infrastructure fund that the government 
describes as designed ‘to advance national priorities important to all Canadians – a stronger economy, a 
cleaner environment and better communities’ through the 2013–2014 fiscal year” (p. 7) 
Infrastructure Canada (2012). 
Infrastructure spotlight: 
Improving public transit for 
the 21
st
 century. Ottawa, ON. 
3Frames34: “Efficient transit systems move commuters to and from centres of employment, commerce 
and other points of interest. They enhance our quality of life, and help our cities attract and retain 
business investment and talented people. Better public transit makes it easier for Canadians get to work, 
to school, to visit the doctor, or to see friends and family” (p. 1) 
3Frames35: “Ultimately, high-quality public transit systems mean more balanced, integrated urban 
transportation that improves the safety of daily travel and the quality of life in our cities. Whether they 
include buses, subways, light rail vehicles or commuter rail, transit systems increase transport options 
available to residents, workers and visitors. By improving mobility and accessibility to services and jobs, 
they make our cities more attractive and competitive” (p. 2) 
3Frames36: “Reliable public transit systems are important for communities large and small. They are the 
main transportation option for many Canadians, and provide easier access to jobs, education, recreation 
and social activities. In fact, Canadians are using public transit in record numbers. In 2010, transit 
ridership increased by 4.1%, representing an all-time record with 1.9 billion trips. These numbers 
continue to grow, with a nearly 5% ridership increase for the first half of 2011.Access to transit is 
particularly important to newcomers to Canada. As reported in a recent study by the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities, new Canadians are twice as likely to commute by public transit.4 Efficient 
public transit helps people to connect with their community and provides access to jobs and much-
needed services, such as language training, medical care, and others. As immigration is expected to play 
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a significant role in Canada’s economic growth, public transit is an important piece in our nation’s 
future. In today’s economy, public transit also plays a key role in supporting young Canadians across 
Canada. Indeed, Canadian Urban Transportation Association (CUTA)’s ridership data and surveys show 
that the 15-24 age group uses public transit more frequently than other segments of the population. As 
increasing numbers of Canadians are relying on public transit, our cities must be able to meet that 
demand. This means renewing and expanding rapid bus, light rail and subway systems, and building new 
terminals, stations and facilities” (p. 4) 
3Frames37: “Modern transit infrastructure is vital for the long-term economic growth and prosperity of 
both our largest urban centers and our smaller communities. The Government of Canada recognizes 
that provinces and municipalities are best positioned to develop and implement transit strategies that 
meet their local needs. Federal investments in transit infrastructure have clearly respected jurisdictional 
responsibility for public transit, and provide significant flexibility for provinces, territories and 
municipalities to address their respective priorities” (p. 5) 
Transportation Association of 
Canada. (2012). Sustainable 
funding for urban/regional 
transportation in Canada. TAC 
Briefing. Ottawa, ON. 
3Frames38: “Unless these negative trends are addressed, the resulting toll of congestion, accidents and 
unreliability will create increasingly significant economic, environmental, social and health problems. A 
stable mix of reliable, long-term funding sources that provide consistent revenue streams sufficient to 
meet ongoing capital and operating requirements, that send pricing signals to transportation users and 
beneficiaries to use the system more efficiently, and that encourage innovative approaches for 
transportation improvements will lead to more sustainable transportation and land use in Canadian 
cities” (p. 2) 
3Frames39: “The broadly estimated capital funding gap of $8-10 billion per year in capital funding for 
urban and regional transit and urban roads and bridges is large, but recovering the accumulated shortfall 
over the next five years could be feasible if alternative funding sources are brought to bear … If a ten 
year recovery period were implemented, some or all of the net transit operating cost could also 
potentially be funded from alternative revenue sources” (p. 5) 
3Frames40: “Long-term federal and provincial infrastructure funding plans could, however, provide a 
framework for cost-effective delivery and maintenance of urban and regional transit/ transportation 
systems and operations across Canada and enhanced achievement of [economic and environmental 
benefits]“ (p. 8) 
3Frames41: “Sustainable funding from governments and derived user fees/levies are required to 
maintain, expand, operate and rehabilitate urban and regional transportation systems in Canada. The 
benefits are substantial and the negative consequences of continuing shortfalls – growing 
congestion/crowding, reduced economic prosperity, a continually degrading environment, and eroded 
social/ health wellbeing – will generate costs greatly exceeding the investment required to bring our 
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urban and regional transportation systems up to acceptable levels of effectiveness and efficiency. The 
user/beneficiary levies required, while significant, will more than repay urban/ regional residents and 
travellers in terms of their economic prosperity, environmental well-being and overall qualityof-life. 
They could also promote innovation and gain new partners for joint public-private implementation of 
transportation improvements” (p. 10) 
Tweed, Mervin . (2012). Study on 
transit in Canada: report of 
the Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities. House of 
Commons of Canada Standing 
Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities. Ottawa, ON.  
3Frames42: “Transit provides an essential service for certain groups in Canadian society that depend on 
it for mobility, including people who are too young to drive, those individuals that have physical 
limitations that prevent them from driving, and lower-income residents. Many people who have access 
to an automobile also value transit services as they are a less expensive and less polluting alternative to 
driving. Businesses benefit from transit services because they take some drivers off the roads, allowing 
for more rapid movements of goods and services. In addition to the benefits of transit services to 
communities, the manufacture of transit vehicles and operation of transit systems are also significant 
industries in Canada” (p. 2-3) 
3Frames43: “Given the many benefits of transit services, the Committee recommends: As part of the 
new infrastructure plan that will replace the Building Canada Plan after its expiry in 2014, that the 
Government of Canada should continue to recognize the importance of transit to the economic health, 
quality of life and technological advancement of Canadian communities and the people who live in those 
communities” (p. 3) 
3Frames44: “We recommend the following parameters for assessing the effectiveness of every 
investment in transit by the Government of Canada: Growth in access to and use of transit; 
Improvement of productivity through reduction in commute times and congestion; Economic impact 
through the number of jobs created and other GDP benefits; Decrease in greenhouse gas emissions and 
improvement of air quality;  
Utilize federal funding in an incremental way, i.e. no displacement of provincial and municipal 
resources” (p. 7) 
3Frames45: “When questioned about their preference between a dedicated transit fund and a broad-
based infrastructure fund, many stakeholders did not have a preference as long as there were set asides 
for transit projects under a broad-based program. Officials from Infrastructure Canada pointed out that 
there are some 15 investment categories to provide flexibility for all communities to fund their 
priorities, including transit, whereas a fund dedicated to transit would exclude communities without 
transit … [As such,] the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada establish a new long-
term infrastructure funding program, similar to the Building Canada Plan, for post-2014 that includes 
transit as an eligible investment category” (p. 10-11) 
3Frames46: “Officials from Infrastructure Canada presented the federal government’s view to the 
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Committee, which is that equity among Canada’s diverse communities is best achieved through the 
combination of a distributed, flexible source of funding (gas tax transfers) and special infrastructure 
programs. Government officials told the Committee that the question of operating subsidies for a 
private intermunicipal bus operator would pose some difficulty for the government, whereas … services 
operated by the municipalities involved would be eligible for funding under existing programs” (p. 11) 
3Frames47: “The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to support the 
long-term usability of transit infrastructures” (p. 12) 
3Frames48: “The FCM proposed that the federal government and its agencies can take a leadership role 
in considering national principles and national level policy or national level resource allocation that will 
leverage resources from other orders of government and other actors. On this issue, officials from 
Infrastructure Canada indicated that the Government of Canada has shown leadership in funding and in 
financing, but it has not imposed any types of transit-specific measures that must be undertaken by 
provinces or municipalities” (p. 16) 
3Frames49: “The Committee recommends that all levels of government should pursue greater private 
sector involvement in the provision of mass transit [and] … continue to recognize the importance of 
private partners in transit and consider carrying out infrastructure projects through public-private 
partnerships where the conditions are met” (p. 18) 
Standing Committee on Finance. 
(2014). Number 049, 2
nd
 
Session, 41
st
 Parliament. 
Evidence: Monday, October 
20, 2014. House of Commons 
of Canada Standing 
Committee on Finance. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3Frames50: “Industry Canada [notes that] in car-oriented industrial countries, those who either cannot 
afford a car or are unable to operate one often have no access to jobs, schools, health centres, and 
other important destinations. Children, the handicapped, the poor and the elderly are not only made 
less mobile by an auto-based system, but they also bear the brunt of its costs: the physically weak suffer 
the most from pollution, and the poor are those most often displaced by roads. At the FCM conference 
in 2010, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated that better transit means fewer cars; fewer cars mean 
cleaner air, and of course cleaner air means people breathing easier” (p. 2) 
3Frames51: “First, we should negotiate a special permanent exemption agreement for buy American 
procurement rules pertaining to public transit rolling stock. Second, we should partner with transit 
manufacturers, universities, and other private contributors to invest in research and development. On 
the second point, in budget 2014 we established the Canada first research excellence fund with $1.5 
billion in investments over 10 years. We committed to a long-term strategic vision for research and 
innovation in Canada, and, in fact, it's been well received, especially by the universities in Canada. David 
Barnard, the president of the University of Manitoba, has said this is a pivotal moment for research 
excellence and innovation in Canada. That being said, is this enough? Is this going to be the spark that 
generates research and innovation in the transportation sector? We can always do more” (p. 10) 
Standing Committee on Transport, 3Frames52: “The Committee recommends that the federal government continue to work with 
 303 
Infrastructure and 
Communities. (2015). 
Updating infrastructure in 
Canada: An examination of 
needs and investments. 
Report of the House of 
Commons of Canada Standing 
Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities (Larry, Miller, 
Chair). Ottawa, ON. 
provinces, territories and municipalities to deliver record levels of funding for public transit through the 
New Building Canada Plan, the Gas Tax Fund and the new Public Transit Fund” (p. 12) 
3
rd
 Era 
Public 
Sentiments 
Paul Martin. (2002). Speech by the 
Honourable Paul Martin, 
Minister of Finance for 
Canada, to members of the 
Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities. Hamilton, ON. 
3PublicSentiments1: “I’ve heard a lot of support for is the creation of completely new, targeted 
Infrastructure funds. This type of new program could help to achieve better results, it is said, by focusing 
exclusively on a national priority like urban transit or safe water or housing. Again, this is another 
proposal worthwhile developing together” (p. 6-7) 
Transport Canada. (2005). Case 
Study 32: Urban 
transportation pricing 
options. Urban 
Transportation Showcase 
Program.  Case Studies in 
Urban Transportation. 
Ottawa, ON. 
3PublicSentiments2: “Transit pricing options are numerous and varied, reflecting the solid public 
acceptance of transit user fees (i.e. fares) and the readily available means of collecting them. The main 
limitation of transit pricing strategies is that, while they can help attract new transit users and retain 
existing ones, they have no effect on the great majority of passenger travel that is still served by 
automobiles” (p. 5) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2005). Urban transportation 
in Canada: Needs and 
opportunities. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3PublicSentiments3: “The increased motorization of households combined with changes in land use 
patterns and travel structure (increase in triangular trips such as home to daycare to work) mean that 
urban populations are increasingly reliant on the automobile. While automotive technology and fuel is 
becoming cleaner, technological advances are largely negated because of choices Canadians make about 
location and travel behaviour” (p. 5) 
3PublicSentiments4: “The provision of effective transit services is viewed as an important element of 
sustainable transportation within urban centres and transit is expected to be key to remedying the 
problems facing urban communities. Investing in transit systems to deliver higher quality (more 
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efficient, effective, reliable) transit services will increase its attractiveness relative to the private 
automobile, thereby reducing automobile use and reducing gridlock and traffic congestion” (p. 8-9) 
3PublicSentiments5: “Federal programs should respect provincial and territorial jurisdiction and 
planning priorities: Unanimously agreed by provincial respondents. Transport Canada noted that the 
federal government has indicated a “New Deal” for communities would require provincial and territorial 
acceptance. Federal funding programs should not be contingent upon matching funding from provinces 
and territories: Unanimously agreed by provincial respondents. Transport Canada could not comment 
whether future federal funding programs would be contingent upon matching funding. There should be 
flexibility in program designs to allow for tri-partite (federal-provincial/territorial-municipal), bilateral 
(federal-provincial/territorial), and direct programs (federal-municipal) based on the needs of the 
individual provinces and territories: Unanimously agreed. One respondent remarked that in complex, 
larger urban environments direct federal-municipal agreements may not be appropriate. One 
respondent recommended that a formal committee be established to ensure coherent guidelines and 
framework” (p. 18-19) 
3PublicSentiments6: “The federal government should commit to long-term funding of urban 
transportation infrastructure in Canada: Generally agreed. One respondent suggested the statement 
should refer to all, not only urban, transportation. One respondent observed that the federal 
government should approach such a commitment with caution. While urban infrastructure is currently a 
pressing issue, other priorities will emerge” (p. 19 
3PublicSentiments7: “All provinces and territories should negotiate a national urban transportation 
infrastructure program with the federal government, with jurisdiction-specific agreements negotiated 
bilaterally: Generally agreed. One respondent noted that it may be difficult to negotiate a 
federal/provincial/lterritorial framework agreement and that bilateral agreements may be more 
achievable” (p. 19) 
3PublicSentiments8: “Allocation of funding among provinces and territories should meet national 
objectives such as economic competitiveness, trade expansion, and environmental sustainability: 
Generally agreed. Provincial respondents remarked this statement could be supported as long as the 
national objectives are sufficiently broad in scope and are consistent with provincial objectives. 
Respondents recommend the words ‘and provincial’ or ‘and regional’ be added after the word ‘national’ 
in the statement” (p. 19) 
3PublicSentiments9: “Urban transportation funding should be directed to priorities identified in 
provincial and territorial infrastructure plans and strategies: Generally agreed by provincial respondents. 
In at least one jurisdiction, cities set their own priorities. One respondent added that intergovernmental 
negotiation and cooperation involving urban municipal representatives is possible although it may be 
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necessary to sign agreements only between the federal and provincial/territorial governments. One 
respondent recommended the statement be changed to read ‘Urban transportation funding should be 
directed to priorities identified in a tri-partite or bilateral (provincial-municipal) process.’ Transport 
Canada remarked that federal funding for urban transportation should support national objectives and 
complement provincial/territorial, regional and municipal plans reflecting agreed sustainable 
parameters” (p. 19-20) 
3PublicSentiments10: “Provinces and territories should have the flexibility to reallocate urban 
transportation funding to areas not covered under any new transportation infrastructure program … 
One respondent disagreed. One respondent added that provinces and territories should have the 
flexibility to identify urban transportation projects servicing inter-urban routes including provincial 
transportation infrastructure within or leading to urban centres. One respondent recommended that 
each provincial and territorial government should determine the detailed program design and mix best 
suited to its own needs and circumstances to meet agreed objectives. A provincial/territorial 
government, which does not require the total transfer to fulfill the agreed objectives, should be able to 
reinvest additional funds in the same or a related priority area. Transport Canada commented that 
projects would be expected to comply with established parameters of funding programs” (p. 20) 
3PublicSentiments11: “Allocation of funding among provinces and territories should be equitable and 
based on a per capita formula: Generally agreed although there was some disagreement with using a 
per capita funding formula. One respondent recommended that funding be allocated based on a relative 
portion of the gas tax collected from each province. One respondent noted that a per capita formula is a 
good start but it may be in the national interest to make additional strategic investments in regions that 
make a disproportionate contribution to Canada’s gross domestic product. One respondent remarked 
that the allocation must ensure that smaller urban centres receive their fair share of funding to invest in 
strategic transportation projects” (p. 20) 
3PublicSentiments12: “The federal government should financially support urban transportation 
infrastructure to meet economic, social, and environmental goals in large urban centres and the 
essentially social mission of transportation in smaller cities. General agreement although four 
respondents disagreed with the notion that transportation in smaller centres is essentially for social 
missions and recommended the statement be changed to read, ‘the federal government should 
financially support urban transportation infrastructure to meet economic, social, and environmental 
goals in all urban centres.’ One respondent recommended that the federal and provincial governments 
should influence the investment so that federal and provincial visions for economic growth, social 
programs, and environmental targets are considered and incorporated” (p. 21) 
3PublicSentiments13: “The largest portion of federal gas tax revenues should be reallocated specifically 
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to projects improving urban transportation. Five of eight provincial respondents disagreed with this 
importance or where there is a demonstrable need to remedy deficiencies. One respondent 
recommended a balance between large urban centres, small urban centres and the provincial 
transportation network, suggesting the largest portion of federal fuel tax should be directed towards 
highways. One respondent urged the federal government to vacate the federal fuel tax since it has no 
jurisdiction over municipal infrastructure. Transport Canada indicated that the means to provide federal 
funding remains to be determined; it is the purview of the Department of Finance” (p. 21) 
Transport Canada. (2006). An 
evalution of Transport 
Canada’s Moving On 
Sustainable Transportation 
Program. Departmental 
Evaluation Services. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3PublicSentiments14: “There is an on-going demand for the MOST Program from stakeholders as well 
as a demand for longer-term funding for sustainable transportation projects” (p. ii) 
3PublicSentiments15: “Some key recommendations stemming from the evaluation seek to address 
stakeholder demand for longer-term funding, deal with issues with performance reporting and improve 
certain aspects of program delivery … TC should examine the feasibility of modifying the MOST 
Program’s terms and conditions to provide project funding beyond the current two-year maximum” (p. 
iii-iv) 
Urban Transportation Task Force. 
(2009). Urban transit in 
Canada: Taking stock of 
recent progress. Council of 
Ministers Responsible for 
Transportation and Highway 
Safety. 
3PublicSentiments16: “There continues to be a strong need for all levels of government to support 
urban transit. However, transit projects continue to compete with other infrastructure investment 
needs for funding across all levels of government. The provincial members of the Task Force strongly 
support greater federal investment in transit, including a long-term federal funding program dedicated 
to transit” (p. 26) 
3PublicSentiments17: “Transit expansion plans are welcomed by the public, but there is much debate 
on how these investments will be financed. A single jurisdiction cannot achieve transit expansion 
without a coordinated funding partnership and stakeholder consensus. It is essential to align transit 
visions, planning goals, project justification, construction time-frames, and budgets. In the absence of 
funding assurances, it is difficult for transit authorities to adequately prepare their organization, 
generate community support, align transportation and transit networks, and ensure that transit demand 
is coordinated with transit supply. Long term funding envelopes are critical to transit expansion” (p. 31) 
Ruffilli, D. (2010). Federal support 
for bus rapid transit and light 
rail transit systems in Canada. 
Library of Parliament. 
Industry, Infrastructure, and 
Resources Division. 
Parliamentary Information 
3PublicSentiments18: “Many Canadian municipalities are expanding, constructing or planning rapid 
transit systems to address traffic congestion, growth and environmental issues. BRT, by virtue of its 
lower capital costs and scalability, remains a popular choice for many Canadian cities. LRT’s greater 
carrying capacity makes it attractive for large cities such as Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary that need to 
move large numbers of riders in and out of employment centres at peak periods. LRT is also viewed by 
many policy-makers and the general public alike as being a cleaner, more reliable and more advanced 
“world-class” technology than BRT. This perception persists despite the fact that many BRT systems now 
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and Research Service. 
Ottawa, ON. 
feature articulated and double-decker buses equipped with new hybrid or alternative fuel technology. 
Ministry of Finance. (2011). 
Evaluation of the Public 
Transit Tax Credit. Ottawa, 
ON. 
3PublicSentiments19: “Canadians are increasingly aware of the PTTC and benefit from it in large 
numbers: approximately 1.5 million taxfilers claim the credit annually for themselves and/or other 
family members” (p. 1) 
3PublicSentiments20: “The demand for public transit is affected by the age profile of the population it 
services. As one of the primary purposes for commuting is to travel to work, an increase in the 
proportion of retirees in the population will likely result in slower growth in the number of regular 
transit users. On the other hand, as individuals get older, they may be more attracted to larger urban 
centres where social, health and other services tend to be more accessible. A greater concentration of 
the population around large urban centres would be expected to have a positive effect on the use of 
public transit since larger urban centres tend to have more developed systems of public transit. Also, 
operating an automobile in large cities is generally more expensive and less attractive due to heavier 
traffic congestion and higher parking fees. In addition, individuals may also factor in environmental 
concerns in their transportation decisions. These considerations could, over time, be increasingly 
important as individuals become more aware of environmental issues” (p. 24) 
Tweed, Mervin . (2012). Study on 
transit in Canada: report of 
the Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities. House of 
Commons of Canada Standing 
Committee on Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Communities. Ottawa, ON.  
3PublicSentiments21: “Various transit stakeholders, including transportation planners, transit 
operators, municipal representatives and others, submit that provinces and municipalities do not have 
sufficient resources to operate and keep Canada’s existing transit systems in a state of good repair — let 
alone to plan and provide new services” (p. 1) 
3PublicSentiments22: “A number of stakeholders who met with the Committee in Ottawa took the 
opportunity to express appreciation for the billions in federal contributions to Canada’s transit systems 
in recent years. These witnesses indicated that the additional federal funds precipitated the undertaking 
of many important transit projects. Conversely, a representative of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation 
(CTF) was of the view that federal funding programs had distorted decision-making for transit agencies 
and had actually delayed necessary projects. The CTF argued that projects such as the Evergreen Line in 
Vancouver would have been built sooner if the transit agency had not waited for an offer of federal 
funding” (p. 9) 
3PublicSentiments23: “The most consistent message from stakeholders concerning [the design of a] 
future infrastructure plan was the need for a predictable, longer term funding program for transit 
projects. A representative from CUTA suggested to the Committee that rapid transit, which takes many 
years to plan and build, is what Canadian cities need for the future. Furthermore, rapid light rail transit 
and bus transit use dedicated corridors and require major investments from all orders of government to 
achieve. In order to approve such projects, transit authorities need assurance that all orders of 
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government will be present and partners from the beginning until the end of a project. Given the long 
planning cycle for transit capital for systems of all sizes, the overall policy framework should provide 
assurance of funding for 25 years while a particular program could be reassessed every 5 years” (p. 10) 
3PublicSentiments24: “Some stakeholders also stated that accountability would be an important 
feature of the new funding program so that transit projects survived changes in government, whether 
municipal, provincial or federal, among other reasons. In their brief to the Committee, the Victoria 
Chamber of Commerce recommended new legislation to ensure year-over-year funding and provide a 
more predictable investment climate for transit” (p. 10) 
3PublicSentiments25: “Some stakeholders told the Committee that a new funding program for transit 
should consider the needs of different-sized communities, particularly those in rural Canada. A 
representative of Metrolinx, the commuter rail operator and manager of the air-rail link in Toronto, 
suggested that any funding program that succeeds the Building Canada Fund should have portions 
reserved for different-sized communities. This notion was supported by the Canadian Automobile 
Association (CAA) and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM). The AAMDC also recommended 
that funding should be earmarked for rural transit and that the federal share of rural transit project 
funding be raised to 50%. To further support rural transit, the AAMDC and a representative of Motor 
Coach Canada (MCC), which represents the private bus industry, both proposed a new federal subsidy 
for intermunicipal bus operations, where necessary, to ensure continued operations. MCC also 
suggested that private bus company fares should be exempt from sales tax where a private bus 
company is in competition with public bus services in order to level the playing field somewhat between 
the two operators” (p. 11) 
3PublicSentiments26: “Some stakeholders who met with the Committee felt that the ineligibility of 
existing transit system needs, such as fleet replacement, and operating and maintenance costs, was a 
problem with past infrastructure programs. The FCM noted that Canada’s infrastructure is extensive and 
much of it is either out of date or in disrepair and argued that federal funding should not be restricted to 
new infrastructure projects only” (p. 12) 
3PublicSentiments27: “A number of witnesses praised the predictability of the federal gas tax transfers 
and the municipalities’ freedom to direct the funds to their top infrastructure priorities. Several large 
municipalities, including Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa have dedicated the totality 
of their federal gas tax allocations to transit. The FCM told the Committee that the federal gas tax 
transfer is appropriate for the various and diverse needs of municipalities in the way it is administered 
and designed, but that it is not sufficient for the size of infrastructure investments required. The FCM is 
opposed to increases in the property tax to bridge the infrastructure gap because it submits that the 
property tax is already relied upon too heavily. Several recommendations were put forth that would 
 309 
effectively increase federal gas tax transfers” (p. 12-13) 
3PublicSentiments28: “The CTF had a different opinion of the federal gas tax transfers. The CTF 
recommended that the Government of Canada stop levying excise tax on gasoline so that the provinces 
can tax it at a higher rate to better fund the building and maintenance of roads and bridges. The CTF 
proposes that road users pay for roads through the gas tax and transit users pay for transit through 
fares” (p. 13) 
3PublicSentiments29: “Many stakeholders who met with the Committee presented the view that the 
Government of Canada has an interest in creating more federal policies and initiatives to foster growth 
of and demand for transit, despite its lack of constitutional jurisdiction. The CTF disagreed with this view, 
stating: If anyone thinks that city transit ought to be a federal responsibility, you could propose rewriting 
the Constitution. But it probably makes sense that city transportation, transit, ought to be a city 
responsibility, and they ought to have the means available to pay for it” (p. 13) 
3PublicSentiments30: “The FCM suggested that there is an extra-jurisdictional role for the Government 
of Canada in transit because the problems that arise from inadequate transit services, such as traffic 
congestion, air pollution and limited mobility, create national social, environmental and economic 
challenges. This assessment was reinforced by CUTA and CUPE, which observed that traffic congestion 
has economic and environmental impacts that transcend provincial borders. CUTA, and other witnesses, 
also commented that creating dynamic urban environments is a central part of Canada’s competitive 
advantage and thus a federal issue. On this point, the representative of the STM suggested that the 
Government of Canada has underestimated the impact of congestion on competitiveness and the 
importance of transit. Former Chief Planner for the City of Toronto Paul Bedford is convinced that 
Canada’s ‘cities and city regions are absolutely critical for the economic health of the country’” (p. 13-
14) 
3PublicSentiments31: “Some stakeholders drew upon existing federal government roles and initiatives 
to justify a new role for the Government of Canada in transit. According to Transport Action Canada, the 
Government of Canada should have more of an interest in transit because it has well-established 
responsibility for transportation safety. CUTA suggested that a national transit strategy would be 
complementary to existing national gateway, greenhouse gas, and innovation policies. Some 
stakeholders, including AAMDC, SARM and Metrolinx, proposed that Canadians should have a right to 
expect mobility wherever they live, with the implication that a national standard is a federal 
responsibility” (p. 14) 
3PublicSentiments32: “During the Committee’s hearings, many stakeholders alternated freely between 
the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘policy framework.’ The CAA drew a distinction between the terms and was 
wary that a ‘strategy’ would be overly prescriptive. Similarly, CUTA rejected the notion of a strategy and 
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suggested that ‘all orders of government should work together in developing a framework of national 
transit policies that are integrated and mutually supportive.’ On the other hand, the FCM recommended 
a strategy based on principles, long-term planning and funding. Whether as part of a policy framework 
or a strategy, stakeholders suggested a number of federal policies that could support transit to the 
Committee, which are described in the following sections” (p. 14) 
3PublicSentiments33: “There were multiple requests from stakeholders for the Government of Canada 
to assume new administrative and leadership functions with respect to transit in Canada. Several 
witnesses suggested that the federal government organize a venue or forum for all transit stakeholders 
to meet, discuss issues and share best practices. A representative of the Swiss Association of Public 
Transport strongly recommended that the general public be consulted about transit decisions, as did the 
former Chief Planner from the City of Toronto. A notable exception was the CTF whose representative 
commented that the federal government ‘has no useful place in the process’ (p. 14-15) 
3PublicSentiments34: “Some witnesses suggested that adding some conditions to the federal grant 
approval process would better ensure that value for money is achieved and only the best projects are 
selected. For example, financial criteria in the application process could help identify projects that meet 
a minimum cost-recovery standard if the government chose to set one. Metrolinx supported evidence-
based project selection in order to demonstrate why certain projects are chosen over others, but 
recommended the inclusion of social and environmental benefits in the analysis [given that] … although 
some transit projects do not seem efficient from a financial perspective, they might be the right answer 
to respond to a particular social need” (p. 17) 
3PublicSentiments35: “Some stakeholders recommended federal tax measures to foster the growth of 
and demand for transit. TAC suggested that more municipalities would be able to acquire unused rail 
lines and corridors for transit purposes more readily if the Government of Canada would issue a tax 
receipt to the railway for the charitable donation. TAC told the Committee that municipalities often do 
not have the resources to acquire railway lines when the freight railways wish to dispose of them” (p. 
18-19) 
3PublicSentiments36: “The Government of Canada recently provided tax deductibility for transit users 
who buy a pass but a number of witnesses called for federal tax exemptions for employers who 
subsidize transit passes for employees[, giving] employers an incentive to provide transit benefits 
instead of parking benefits, and [increasing] transit ridership” (p. 19) 
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3PublicSentiments37: “ATU Canada proposes permanent dedicated funding for public transit to 
maintain, renew, and expand transit services across Canada. ATU Canada recommends to government 
that at least one source of this permanent funding be a percentage of the current fuel and gas tax funds. 
Additional revenues sources should be considered, such as a small portion of the goods and services tax 
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and/or an employer payroll tax. Canada is one of the few developed countries without a federal policy 
covering the long-term predictable transit investment that would permit our transit systems to achieve 
their full potential. A Canadian transit framework would provide economic and environmental benefits 
to all Canadians by ensuring that gridlock is reduced while allowing the public to reach their destinations 
in a safe and timely manner. Furthermore, tourism would be enhanced when our cities could boast 
world-class transit systems. Effective world-class transit systems will increase Canada's ability to 
compete globally in a world economy, help to protect our environment, and improve our quality of life. 
Expanding public transportation can help create thousands of new, green, well paid jobs and save 
billions of dollars in time, energy, and other efficiencies. Equally important, a world-class public transit 
system creates an all-inclusive community, a community that provides and even protects the most 
vulnerable in our society. A Canadian transit framework would also help to level the playing field for a 
large segment of that group, those who cannot afford a private vehicle, thereby aiding a segment of 
society that tends to get marginalized under the current system” (p. 2) 
3PublicSentiments38: “It is unusual for any industry's biggest stress to be their success, but even some 
of the more progressive transit systems in Canada struggle financially due to a steady growth in 
ridership owing to urban sprawl, an aging population, and more and more younger Canadians moving 
away from cars and onto public transit. It appears that these same Canadians are now ready to pay for 
better public transit also. A recent survey by CivicAction in Toronto shows that people are willing to pay 
more for public transit if the funds are dedicated to and assured to go towards public transportation. 
These same sentiments have been echoed across Canada. The main platform for the candidates in 
Toronto's current municipal election is public transportation. ATU Canada has seen these same 
sentiments unfold at the municipal level across the country for many years … A recent CBC online poll 
showed that 88% of the 359 respondents said yes when asked if Canada should adopt a national transit 
strategy” (p. 2) 
3PublicSentiments39: “The industry is open to alternative funding sources such as P3s, but the current 
procurement model restricts the federal government to a maximum of 25% share of the cost in a P3. 
This often leaves municipalities and provinces with a more substantial share of the initial capital 
investment up front. As the federal government prepares its next budget, it should consider raising its 
maximum share of P3 projects from 25% to 33%, especially in cases where no private partners are 
providing initial capital investments” (p. 4) 
3PublicSentiments40: “By investing in transit infrastructure, we can maximize job creation in 
communities across the country. The Canadian transit industry employs 75,000 people and creates 
thousands more in spinoff jobs. In addition, many of the manufacturers, consultants, and suppliers at 
the core of the industry have developed their expertise here in Canada and export a substantial share of 
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their production. Despite difficult economic times, they've continued to sustain a long legacy of public 
transit innovation, which has helped them increase their share of the North American transit market. In 
order to maintain our competitive advantage, the federal government can partner directly with the 
Canadian Urban Transit Research and Innovation Consortium, a new not-for-profit organization 
dedicated to bringing industry and academia together to increase technological development in 
Canadian transit. Before concluding, I'd like to be clear on one more point: buy America. Now more than 
ever, the threat of protectionist measures being debated in the United States regarding buy America 
procurement rules is real. That could raise U.S. transit content from 60% to 100%, putting hundreds, if 
not thousands, of Canadian jobs at risk if transit manufacturers are forced to shift their production to 
the U.S. We will continue to work with the Government of Canada to come up with solutions to help 
protect the high- value jobs in the Canadian transit industry and address these concerns with our U.S. 
counterparts” (p. 5) 
3PublicSentiments41: “A core element of a [national transit] strategy could be better alignment 
between infrastructure investments in new subway lines or light rail systems, for instance, and land use 
planning. That is the most important principle. Ensuring that investments are as effective as possible is 
key, so it's important to target the investment in the area that will deliver the best return and ridership. 
The right investment formula is also necessary to ensure adequate and ongoing funding in the context of 
a multi-level government partnership. Finally, a research and development program to help develop 
state-of-the-art technology would be important, in addition to ridership incentives. That could take the 
form of an excise tax exemption for employers who want to give their employees a choice between a 
parking spot and a monthly transit pass, for example” (p. 8-9) 
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3PublicSentiments42: “The economic, social and environmental benefits of transit investment were 
thoroughly discussed during the course of this study. Some witnesses highlighted that transit 
investments reduce traffic congestion in major cities, whose impact on economic productivity was 
considered to be of national importance as it costs Canada billions in lost economic activity already. 
Transit projects are also expected to attract higher-paying jobs to communities, support the 
development of business clusters, and reduce urban sprawl, car dependence, greenhouse gases and the 
cost of living for some households. Witnesses proposed that transit projects generate a return on 
investment, in terms of incremental economic activity, of at least 20%” (p. 10-11) 
3PublicSentiments43: “CUTA told the Committee that its members strongly support the new federal 
transit funding funding proposal and hope that the terms for accessing the funds will be flexible. By 
proposing $1 billion in dedicated transit funding per year starting in 2020 ‘the government is setting the 
wheels in motion to unlock funding for major infrastructure projects across the country.’ Although CUTA 
appreciates the predictability of the new funding, it told the Committee that there would still be a 
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shortfall of $18 billion for the $56 billion in transit projects planned over the next five years … 28% of 
transit needs over the next five years will be for rehabilitation or replacement” (p. 11) 
3PublicSentiments44: “FCM … signaled its members’ approval of the new public transit funding 
announced in Budget 2015. As the terms and conditions of the funds are established, however, the FCM 
told the Committee that it would like to ensure “that local governments retain the flexibility to 
determine the appropriate degree of private sector involvement.” Since the proposed new public transit 
fund is set up to respond to big projects, which take time, the delay in disbursing those funds is not seen 
as a problem by the FCM as long as the approval process starts soon. Some representatives of individual 
municipalities expressed some concerns about the P3 requirements of the proposed new public transit 
funding. For example, the Mayor of Burnaby would like to have a choice not to engage in a P3 for a large 
transit project, and representatives from the City of Montréal suggested that the new public transit 
funds for P3 projects would only benefit the transit systems in the largest municipalities in Canada. The 
City of Montréal recommended that public transit funding be flexible, inclusive and long term. The 
representatives of the City of Vancouver also recommended having flexible rules around the new transit 
fund” (p. 12) 
3PublicSentiments45: “The FCM and CUTA both requested that the federal contribution for P3 transit 
projects be raised to one-third of eligible projects costs, like other federal funds. The FCM told the 
Committee that it is critical that the federal government invests as a true one-third partner in these 
projects as P3s do not reduce the need for government funding for the capital costs of public goods like 
major transit projects” (p. 12) 
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Appendix D: Open Codes 
Table 17: First-era (documents from 1968-1979) codes applied during the open coding process. 
Idea category Open codes Thematic keys 
1
st
 Era Paradigms 
 
Federal impacts on cities 1Paradigms18-20, 1Paradigms32-33, 1Paradigms45, 1Paradigms51, 1Paradigms53, 1Paradigms55 
Inadequacy of transit services 1Paradigms8, 1Paradigms39-41, 1Paradigms43-44, 1Paradigms46, 1Paradigms52, 1Paradigms56 
Interdependence of urban issues 1Paradigms11, 1Paradigms12, 1Paradigms17 
Jurisdictional tensions 1Paradigms5, 1Paradigms9-10, 1Paradigms13, 1Paradigms26-27, 1Paradigms54 
Postwar suburban sprawl 1Paradigms2, 1Paradigms28-29, 1Paradigms34, 1Paradigms36-38, 1Paradigms42, 1Paradigms50 
Recognition of automobile 
externalities 
1Paradigms1, 1Paradigms4, 1Paradigms6, 1Paradigms7, 1Paradigms14, 1Paradigms16, 
1Paradigms22, 1Paradigms47-48 
Transit investment rationales 1Paradigms15, 1Paradigms23-24, 1Paradigms30-31, 1Paradigms35, 1Paradigms49 
Urban decay 1Paradigms3, 1Paradigms21, 1Paradigms25 
1
St
 Era Programs 
Capital funding initiatives 1Programs35-38, 1Paradigms41, 1Programs52 
Enhancing redistributive benefits  1Programs15-20, 1Programs60, 1Programs75 
Federal R&D involvement 1Programs6, 1Programs39, 1Programs44, 1Programs47-51, 1Programs68-69, 1Programs71-72, 
1Programs74 
Improving multimodal efficiency 1Programs3, 1Programs4-5, 1Programs9-10, 1Programs30, 1Programs45-46, 1Programs54, 
1Programs59, 1Programs65, 1Programs80, 1Programs82 
Intergovernmental coordination 
and influence 
1Programs7-8, 1Programs11-12, 1Programs13-14, 1Programs23-29, 1Programs 31-34, 
1Programs40, 1Programs42-43, 1Programs64, 1Programs66, 1Programs70, 1Programs73 
Modernizing transit 1Programs1-2, 1Programs21-22, 1Programs53, 1Programs55-58, 1Programs61-63, 1Programs67, 
1Programs81 
Program effectiveness 1Programs76-79 
Synoptic approach 1Programs9-10 
1
st
 Era Frames 
Automobile primacy 1Frames3, 1Frames5, 1Frames28, 1Frames32 
Benefits of federal-urban 
involvement 
1Frames8, 1Frames10, 1Frames12, 1Frames16, 1Frames19, 1Frames29 
Benefits of improved 
intergovernmental coordination 
1Frames11, 1Frames17, 1Frames20, 1Frames30-31 
Social justice as transit policy 
objective 
1Frames13, 1Frames21, 1Frames23 
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The need to improve ineffective 
transit services 
1Frames1, 1Frames4, 1Frames6, 1Frames24-27, 1Frames33 
Transportation as a key 
component of Canadian identity 
1Frames2, 1Frames7 
Worsening urban conditions 1Frames9, 1Frames14-15, 1Frames18, 1Frames22 
1
st
 Era Public 
Sentiments 
Demand for suburban living and 
automobility 
1PublicSentiments7-8, 1PublicSentiments10 
Demand for transit, planning, and 
pricing reform 
1PublicSentiments2, 1PublicSentiments4, 1PublicSentiments14 
Opposition to sprawl and 
automobility 
1PublicSentiments1, 1PublicSentiments3, 1PublicSentiments6, 1PublicSentiments9, 
1PublicSentiments11-13, 1PublicSentiments16 
Public influence on federal 
decision-making 
1PublicSentiments5, 1PublicSentiments15 
Table 18: Second-era (documents from 1980-2001) codes applied during the open coding process. 
Idea category Open codes  Thematic keys 
2
nd
 Era Paradigms 
Budget constraints 2Paradigms61-62, 2Paradigms65-66, 2Paradigms69, 2Paradigms72, 2Paradigms79 
Continuing suburban hegemony 2Paradigms26, 2Paradigms28-29, 2Paradigms34, 2Paradigms37, 2Paradigms42, 2Paradigms51-52, 
2Paradigms57, 2Paradigms59 
Declining importance and quality of 
transit 
2Paradigms16-17, 2Paradigms19, 2Paradigms25, 1Paradigms35, 2Paradigms38, 2Paradigms40, 
2Paradigms54, 2Paradigms77-78 
Energy shortage and related effects 2Paradigms2, 2Paradigms6, 2Paradigms18, 2Paradigms27, 2Paradigms44 
Federal R&D trends 2Paradigms10-13 
Institutional inertia and barriers to 
transit improvement 
2Paradigms21, 2Paradigms24, 2Paradigms30-33, 2Paradigms47-50, 2Paradigms53, 2Paradigms56, 
2Paradigms58, 2Paradigms67-68, 2Paradigms70-71, 2Paradigms73, 2Paradigms81 
New Public Management 
imperatives 
2Paradigms14-15, 2Paradigms20, 2Paradigms22, 2Paradigms41, 2Paradigms63, 1Paradigms75-76, 
2Paradigms80, 2Paradigms84 
Public-private cooperation 2Paradigms1, 2Paradigms3, 2Paradigms7, 2Paradigms9, 2Paradigms74, 2Paradigms82 
Resilience of Canadian transit 
systems 
2Paradigms4-5, 2Paradigms8  
Sustainable development 
imperatives 
2Paradigms23, 2Paradigms36, 2Paradigms39, 2Paradigms43, 2Paradigms45-46, 2Paradigms55, 
2Paradigms60, 2Parradigms64, 2Paradigms83 
2
nd
 Era Programs 
Addressing funding shortfall 2Programs77-80 
Evaluations of federal support 2Programs72-75 
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New Public Management 
programming 
2Paradigms15-21, 2Programs28, 2Programs43, 2Programs53-54, 2Programs60-63, 2Programs84, 
2Programs86 
R&D support programs 2Programs6, 2Programs10-11, 2Programs13-14, 2Programs22 
Recommendations for federal 
involvement 
2Programs23, 2Programs40, 2Programs45, 2Programs50-51, 2Programs55-56, 2Programs58-59, 
2Programs64, 2Programs69, 2Programs87, 2Programs92, 2Programs94-95 
Shifting focus away from capital 
investment 
2Programs25, 2Programs27, 2Programs31, 2Programs68, 2Programs88-89 
Support for domestic transit 
manufacturers 
2Programs1-5, 2Programs8, 2Programs12 
Sustainable development 
programming 
2Programs34-38, 2Programs42, 2Programs44, 2Programs48, 2Programs82-83, 2Programs85, 
2Programs97 
Transit governance and 
programming recommendations 
2Programs7, 2Programs9, 2Programs24, 2Programs26, 2Programs29-30, 2Programs33, 
2Programs39, 2Programs41, 2Programs46-47, 2Programs49, 2Programs52, 2Programs57, 
2Programs65-67, 2Programs70-71, 2Programs76, 2Programs81, 2Programs90-91, 2Programs93, 
2Programs96 
2
nd
 Era Frames 
Canadian political culture and 
urban traditions 
2Frames20-22, 2Frames26-27, 2Frames29, 2Frames40, 2Frames47 
Environmental, economic, and 
social benefits of transit 
2Frames4, 2Frames18, 2Frames23-25, 2Frames30, 2Frames32, 2Frames42-44, 2Frames51 
Expertise of Canadian transit 
industry 
2Frames2-3 
Externalities of sprawl and 
automobility as motivators of 
action 
2Frames13-14, 2Frames16-17, 2Frames28, 2Frames31, 2Frames38, 2Frames41, 2Frames50 
Importance of New Public 
Management policy goals 
2Frames5-10, 2Frames11, 2Frames15, 2Frames34, 2Frames36-37, 2Frames49 
Impropriety of national transit 
policy 
2Frames12, 2Frames33, 2Frames35 
Transit problem definitions and 
remedies 
2Frames1, 2Frames19, 2Frames39, 2Frames45-49, 2Frames52 
2
nd
 Era Public 
Sentiments 
Automobile entrenchment and 
individualism 
2PublicSentiments1, 2PublicSentiments5, 2PublicSentiments11, 2PublicSentiments14-15, 
2PublicSentiments19-20, 2PublicSentiments22, 2PublicSentiments28, 2PublicSentiments31 
Big-city transit demand 2PublicSentiments3-4 
Energy costs and transit use 2PublicSentiments2, 2PublicSentiments6 
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Resistance to user-pays 
transportation pricing 
2PublicSentiments17-18, 2PublicSentiments26, 2PublicSentiments27, 2PublicSentiments32 
Support for federal involvement 2PublicSentiments29-30, 2PublicSentiments33-35 
Waning and waxing support for 
sustainable transportation policy 
2PublicSentiments7-10, 2PublicSentiments12-13, 2PublicSentiments16, 2PublicSentiments21, 
2PublicSentiments23-25 
Table 19: Third-era (documents from 2002-2015) codes applied during the open coding process. 
Idea category Open codes Thematic keys 
3
rd
 Era Paradigms 
Climate change and sustainability 
imperatives 
3Paradigms7, 3Paradigms18, 3Paradigms21, 3Paradigms24, 3Paradigms28, 3Paradigms33, 
3Paradigms58 
Differing transit needs in large and 
mid-sized cities 
3Paradigms4, 3Paradigms13, 3Paradigms26, 3Paradigms30, 3Paradigms42 
Federal involvement in transit 
funding (rationales and impacts) 
3Paradigms27, 3Paradigms29, 3Paradigms36, 3Paradigms38, 3Paradigms40, 3Paradigms43-46, 
3Paradigms48-49, 3Paradigms51, 3Paradigms56-57 
Globalization and competitiveness 
imperatives 
3Paradigms2, 3Paradigms15, 3Paradigms25, 3Paradigms32, 3Paradigms37, 3Paradigms50 
Growing infrastructure and service 
deficits 
3Paradigms3, 3Paradigms5, 3Paradigms8-12, 3Paradigms23, 3Paradigms31, 3Paradigms52-54 
Impacts of economic crises 3Paradigms34-35, 3Paradigms47 
Influence of peer nations 3Paradigms16-17, 3Paradigms19 
Requirement for new 
intergovernmental partnerships 
3Paradigms1, 3Paradigms6, 3Paradigms14, 3Paradigms20, 3Paradigms22, 3Paradigms39, 
3Paradigms41, 3Paradigms55 
3
rd
 Era Programs 
Capital funding initiatives 3Programs4, 3Programs13, 3Programs27, 3Programs29-32, 3Programs35, 3Programs42, 
3Programs46, 3Programs52, 3Programs60 
Funding conditions  3Programs24-25, 3Programs55 
Intergovernmental mechanisms 3Programs2, 3Programs15-18, 3Programs33-34, 3Programs39-40, 3Programs47, 3Programs53 
Proposed components of improved 
institutional framework for transit 
3Programs1, 3Programs6-10, 3Programs14, 3Programs19-21, 3Programs23, 3Programs26, 
3Programs49, 3Programs54, 3Programs56, 3Programs59 
Network expansion initiatives 3Programs11, 3Programs41, 3Programs58 
Responses to rising profile of urban 
and sustainability issues  
3Programs3, 3Programs5, 3Programs12, 3Programs22, 3Programs28, 3Programs36, 3Programs38, 
3Programs50-51 
Support for soft initiatives 3Programs37, 3Programs43-45, 3Programs48, 3Programs57 
3
rd
 Era Frames 
Acknowledgement of fiscal 
imbalance and need for stability 
3Frames1-2, 3Frames16, 3Frames47, 3Frames49, 3Frames51-52 
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Climate change as a motivator of 
action 
3Frames4, 3Frames6, 3Frames19, 3Frames28 
Constitutionality of intervention 3Frames12, 3Frames14-15, 3Frames17, 3Frames21, 3Frames23-24, 3Frames30-32, 3Frames37, 
3Frames44-45, 3Frames48 
Linkages between transit 
investment and economic 
improvement 
3Frames3, 3Frames8, 3Frames11, 3Frames25, 3Frames29, 3Frames33-35, 3Frames39-41, 
3Frames43 
Health and equity benefits 3Frames5, 3Frames18, 3Frames20, 3Frames26-27, 3Frames42, 3Frames50 
Risks associated with the status quo 3Frames9-10, 3Frames13, 3Frames38 
Variation in urban needs 3Frames7, 3Frames22, 3Frames36, 3Frames46 
3
rd
 Era Public 
Sentiments 
Attitudes toward user fees and 
taxation mechanisms 
3PublicSentiments2, 3PublicSentiments19, 3PublicSentiments35-36 
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